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Korzystam z najstarszego prawa wyobraźni  
i po raz pierwszy w życiu przywołuję zmarłych,  
wypatruję ich twarzy, nasłuchuję kroków,  
chociaż wiem, że kto umarł, ten umarł dokładnie.  
 
Czas własną głowę w ręce brać  
mówiąc jej: Biedny Jorik, gdzież twoja niewiedza,  
gdzież twoja ślepa ufność, gdzież twoja 
niewinność,   
twoje jakośtobędzie, równowaga ducha  
pomiędzy nie sprawdzoną a sprawdzoną prawdą?  
 
Wierzyłam, że zdradzili, że niewarci imion,  
skoro chwast się natrząsa z ich nieznanych mogił  
i kruki przedrzeźniają, i śnieżyce szydzą  
─ a to byli, Joriku, fałszywi świadkowie.  
 
Umarłych wieczność dotąd trwa,  
dokąd pamięcią się im płaci.  
Chwiejna waluta. Nie ma dnia,  
by ktoś wieczności swej nie tracił.  
 
Dziś o wieczności więcej wiem:  
można ją dawać i odbierać.  
Kogo zwano zdrajcą ─ ten  
razem z imieniem ma umierać.  
 
Ta nasza nad zmarłymi moc  
wymaga nierozchwianej wagi  
i żeby sąd nie sądził w noc,  
i żeby sędzia nie był nagi.  
 
Ziemia wre ─ a to oni, którzy są już ziemią,  
wstają grudka po grudce, garstka obok garstki,  
wychodzą z przemilczenia, wracają do imion,  
do pamięci narodu, do wieńców i braw.  
 
Gdzież moja władza nad słowami?  
Słowa opadły na dno łzy,  
słowa słowa niezdatne do wskrzeszania ludzi,  
opis martwy jak zdjęcie przy błysku magnezji.  
Nawet na półoddechu nie umiem ich zbudzić  
ja, Syzyf przypisany do piekła poezji.  
 
Idą do nas. I ostrzy jak diament  
─ po witrynach wylśnionych od frontu,  
po okienkach przytulnych mieszkanek,  
po różowych okularach, po szklanych  
mózgach, sercach, cichutko tną. 
 
Wisława Szymborska: Rehabilitacja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructed memories are continuously subject 
to critical scrutiny and revision in the framework 
of a history that is constantly written and 
rewritten from an ever-changing present. History 
is in flux; it is, like the present, in a permanent 
state of transformation. History does not exist 
‘out there’, waiting to be discovered, but is 
permanently invented in order to give meaning to 
the present -and to the future- through the past.  
 
Bo Strǻth: “Introduction. Myth, Memory 
and History in the Construction of 
Community” 
 
 
 
 
 
P.P. - En realidad, doctor, tanto el Bisa, como el 
Abue y el Padre lo que querían es que yo fuese 
un buen soldado así que llegara mi guerra. 
 
Dr. - Pero ¿es que a la fuerza tenías tú que hacer 
otra guerra? 
 
P.P. - Por lo visto, sí señor, eso decían, que yo 
me recuerdo al Abue: todos tenemos una guerra 
como todos tenemos una mujer, ¿se da cuenta? O 
sea, para que usted se entere, cada vez que 
pasábamos por Telégrafos, donde el Isauro, el 
Bisa la misma copla: ¡Qué, Isauro! ¿No llegó la 
guerra de éste? Que el Isauro, a ver, aún no hay 
noticias, señor Vendiano; ya le avisaré. 
 
Dr. - ¡Qué cosas! 
 
Miguel Delibes: Las guerras de nuestros 
antepasados
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Resumen 
 
Haciendo historia: autopercepciones y visión del pasado de la inteligencja polaca en 
la oposición (1976-1991) 
 
 
En la presente investigación doctoral proponemos estudiar la relación entre 
intelectualidad, oposición política al comunismo y pensamiento histórico a través del 
caso de la República Popular de Polonia entre los años 1976 y 1991. En concreto, 
analizamos cómo los opositores intelectuales polacos interpretaron el pasado de su país 
en sus publicaciones y la forma en que su visión de la historia y de sí mismos como 
inteligencja influyeron, a su vez, en su percepción del presente y del futuro.   
Desde las coordenadas marcadas por la historia intelectual, hemos tomado en 
consideración aspectos teóricos relacionados con los conceptos de mito, inteligencja y 
oposición. Además, planteamos una interpretación de los trabajos históricos de los 
intelectuales polacos a la luz de las tesis de Walter Benjamin Sobre el concepto de 
historia y sugerimos que, en ocasiones, se produce un fenómeno que hemos 
denominado historización del tiempo presente. Por último, definimos el tipo de fuentes 
escritas y gráficas utilizadas en la investigación y precisamos algunos términos básicos 
vinculados con las publicaciones opositoras de los años setenta y ochenta en Polonia. 
En su empeño por saber cómo enfrentarse a un poder represivo e ilegítimo, los 
intelectuales opositores volvieron su mirada hacia la historia en busca de inspiración y 
consejo, además de para justificar sus puntos de vista. Intentando estar a la altura de la 
misión mítica de la inteligencja, basada en el compromiso social y el liderazgo moral y 
político, recuperaron y reconsideraron ideales, valores transhistóricos o métodos, toda 
vez que advirtieron en contra de la recreación de ideologías políticas pretéritas en la 
actualidad. Consideraban que lo que unía a los polacos como nación era una tradición 
de comportamientos éticos procedentes de diversas fuentes, apostaban por distinguir 
entre patriotismo y nacionalismo y recurrían al antagonismo maniqueo tanto entre la 
nación y el aparato del Estado, como entre aquélla y la ideología comunista soviética. 
Por otra parte, percibían a la sociedad polaca a lo largo del tiempo en términos de 
adquisición, pérdida y recuperación de su condición de sujeto histórico-político 
(podmiotowość). También reflexionaron sobre las complejas relaciones de sus 
compatriotas con Rusia-la URSS y Occidente, entendidas como la visión del otro y una 
búsqueda de responsabilidades morales y, por tanto, como una parte más de su propia 
identidad colectiva. Todo ello propició una percepción del paso del tiempo basada en la 
fusión de imágenes cíclicas y lineales, así como un gran interés por los elementos 
pioneros de las protestas y los movimientos de oposición al comunismo. Esto, a su vez, 
estimuló la conciencia histórica y la historización del tiempo presente, que se aprecian 
en los discursos sobre la (in)capacidad de cambiar el curso de los acontecimientos, el 
dilema entre poder y responsabilidad en la toma de decisiones y el tema de la 
posteridad, así como en la recolección, escritura y publicación masiva de documentos 
relacionados con actividades opositoras, última cuestión que estudiamos en nuestro 
trabajo. 
En conclusión, los discursos sobre el pasado permitieron a los intelectuales 
polacos críticos definirse a sí mismos y a la nación en oposición al régimen comunista, 
influyeron en la percepción del presente y del futuro de los opositores hasta el punto de 
engendrar formas de razonamiento y acción específicas, y tenían la intención de unir, 
liberar e infundir valor a la sociedad polaca a fin de alcanzar la libertad, la 
independencia y la democracia. 
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En definitiva, con sus reflexiones sobre la historia y el tiempo, los intelectuales de 
la oposición polaca que hemos estudiado en este trabajo ofrecieron en 1976-1991 una 
relectura crítica sobre cómo habían sido, eran y podían llegar a ser los polacos como 
nación, y retomaron la misión mítica y prometeica de la inteligencja de guiar a su país 
en tiempos difíciles, conduciéndolo hacia días mejores. 
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Abstract 
 
History in the Making. Opposition Inteligencja in Poland (1976-1991): Self-
Perceptions and Discourses on the Past 
 
The present Ph.D. dissertation aims to study the relation between intelligentsia, 
political opposition to Communism and historical thought in People’s Republic of 
Poland between 1976 and 1991. We specifically try to answer the following questions: 
firstly, how did Polish opposition intellectuals approach their country’s past in their 
writings? And, secondly, how did their perception of history plus their self-perception 
as inteligencja influence, in turn, their view of the present and the future? 
Taking intellectual history as the starting point, we consider theoretical aspects 
related to the concepts of myth, inteligencja and opposition, suggest an interpretation of 
Polish intellectuals’ historical reflections and works in the light of Walter Benjamin’s 
theses On the Concept of History and, in addition, propose that a phenomenon we have 
christened as historicization of present time sometimes took place within them. Lastly, 
we define the genre and thematic criteria used to select our written and graphic sources 
and pin down the different terms one should be familiar with when approaching Polish 
opposition publications in the 1970s and 1980s, like publicystyka, drugi obieg (that is, 
underground publishing), samizdat and tamizdat. 
 In their determination to know how they should confront a repressive and 
illegitimate power, intellectual oppositionists turned to history for inspiration and 
guidance, as well as to justify their views. Trying to keep up with inteligencja’s 
mythical mission of social commitment plus moral and political leadership, they 
recovered and revised ideals, transhistorical values or methods, while advising against 
the recreation of past political ideologies in the present. They believed that what drew 
Poles together as a nation was a tradition of ethical behaviors coming from different 
sources (Western-European values, Catholicism and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth), wanted to distinguish nationalism (destructive) from patriotism 
(constructive) and resorted to a Manichaean antagonism both between the nation and the 
State apparatus and between the former and Soviet Communist ideology. On the other 
hand, they regarded Polish society throughout time in terms of its acquisition, loss and 
retrieval of historical and political agency (podmiotowość). Similarly, they pondered as 
well on the complex relationships of their fellow countrymen with Russia/the USSR and 
the West, understood as a question of “otherness” plus a search for moral accountability 
and, hence, as another indispensable part of their own collective identity. All this 
fostered a perception of time based on the blend of cyclic and lineal images of the past 
and on a keen interest in the pioneering aspects of Polish protests and opposition 
movements. In turn, this stimulated historical awareness and historicization of present 
time, which can be appreciated in inteligencja’s discourses about the (in)capability to 
change the course of events, the dilemma between power and responsibility in decision-
making and the question of posterity, as well as in the massive gathering, writing and 
publication of documents related to opposition activities, to which we devote the last 
part of our work.  
 To sum up, discourses on the past enabled Polish critical intellectuals to define 
themselves and their nation in opposition to the communist regime, influenced 
oppositionists’ perception of the present and the future to the point of engendering 
specific forms of reasoning and action and had the purpose of uniting, “liberating” and 
emboldening Polish society in order to achieve freedom, independence and democracy. 
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In conclusion, with their reflections on history and time, the Polish opposition 
intellectuals we have approached in this dissertation offered back in 1976-1991 a 
personal and critical approach as to who Poles had been, were and could become as a 
nation, and resumed inteligencja’s mythical, Promethean mission of guiding their country 
towards better days in moments of hardship. 
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Haciendo historia: autopercepciones y visión del pasado de la 
inteligencja polaca en la oposición (1976-1991) 
 
Introducción 
 
 
 
La idea que no trata de convertirse en palabras es una 
mala idea; la palabra que no trata de convertirse en acción 
es, a su vez, una mala palabra.  
 
Gilbert Keith Chesterton 
 
No son las locomotoras, sino las ideas, las que llevan y 
arrastran al mundo. 
 
Victor Hugo  
 
Las ideas son los mimbres sobre los que se ha tejido y se teje, para bien o para 
mal, la historia de los seres humanos1. Detrás de muchas de ellas se encuentra la figura 
del intelectual; éste, contemplándose a sí mismo en ocasiones como un representante y 
guía de la nación o de amplios colectivos de la sociedad, decide actuar bien como 
impulsor del cambio o de la reforma, bien como cabecilla de los inconformistas, los 
renegados y los objetores, cuando no ambas cosas al mismo tiempo. La proliferación de 
estudios sobre intelectuales críticos, abiertamente enfrentados con las viejas 
autoridades, o que ponen en cuestión las nuevas, no debe extrañarnos si consideramos, 
como François Dosse, que “la entrada del intelectual en la política [fue] originalmente 
un acto de protesta”. Son de obligada mención a este respecto, qué duda cabe, la 
Ilustración y la Revolución francesas, además del affaire Dreyfus a finales del siglo 
XIX, pero también la España de los Austrias según los ensayos de José Antonio 
Maravall, las Generaciones del 98 y del 14 sobre las que se detienen, entre otros, 
Marichal y Varela, la Segunda República y el exilio intelectual tras la Guerra Civil 
española, las revoluciones latinoamericanas, la disidencia y el exilio cubanos que retrata 
Rafael Rojas, o la “Resistencia” al fascismo y al nazismo de pensadores franceses, 
italianos y alemanes recogida por James D. Wilkinson2. 
Al tándem formado por intelectualidad y oposición cabe añadírsele un tercer 
elemento,  el pensamiento histórico,  cuya importancia no ha dejado de aumentar dentro 
                                                 
1
 Esta investigación doctoral ha sido posible gracias a la concesión y disfrute de una beca del Programa de 
Formación del Profesorado Universitario (FPU) del Ministerio de Educación español (2009-2013). 
2
 DOSSE, François: La marcha de las ideas. Historia de los intelectuales, historia intelectual, Valencia, 
Universitat de València, 2006 (2003), 24 para la cita textual; MORNET, Daniel: El pensamiento francés 
en el siglo XVIII. El trasfondo intelectual de la Revolución francesa, Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro, 1988; 
MARAVALL, José Antonio: La oposición política bajo los Austrias, Barcelona, Ariel, 1974; 
MARICHAL, Juan: El intelectual y la política en España (1898-1936). Cuatro conferencias, Madrid, 
Publicaciones de la Residencia de Estudiantes/ Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1990;  
VARELA, Javier: La novela de España. Los intelectuales y el problema español, Madrid, Taurus, 1999; 
NICOLÁS MARÍN, Encarna y ALTED VIGIL, Alicia: Disidencias en el franquismo (1939-1975), 
Murcia, DM, 1999; ABELLÁN, José Luis (dir.): El exilio español de 1939, Madrid, Taurus, 1976-1978, 6 
vols.; MARSAL, Juan Francisco: Pensar bajo el franquismo. Intelectuales y política en la generación de 
los años cincuenta, Barcelona, Península, 1979;  GILMAN, Claudia: Entre la pluma y el fusil. Debates y 
dilemas del escritor revolucionario en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores Argentina, 
2003; ROJAS, Rafael: Tumbas sin sosiego. Revolución, disidencia y exilio del intelectual cubano, 
Barcelona, Anagrama, 2006; WILKINSON, James D.: La resistencia intelectual en Europa, México, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989. 
8 
 
del ámbito de las humanidades y las ciencias sociales. Los discursos históricos, 
presentes en mayor o menor medida en algunos de los ejemplos anteriores, trascienden 
el marco estrictamente académico con más frecuencia de lo que habitualmente se cree, 
generando debates y controversias de gran calado al interactuar con audiencias amplias 
y, en consecuencia, con diversas memorias colectivas3. Mi investigación doctoral se 
enmarca precisamente dentro de las coordenadas que definen estos tres elementos. 
 A lo largo de estas páginas, me propongo estudiar la relación entre 
intelectualidad, oposición política y escritura histórica basándome en el caso de la 
República Popular de Polonia4 desde mediados de los años 70 hasta 1989/1991. Un caso 
que consideramos de especial relevancia, en primer lugar, debido a la centralidad y al 
carácter de mito que adquirió la figura del intelectual en el imaginario nacional polaco 
durante los últimos siglos; en segundo lugar, por el peso que tuvieron los movimientos 
de oposición al comunismo en el seno de la sociedad polaca y más allá de sus fronteras; 
y, por último, debido a la popularidad sin precedentes que alcanzaron las reflexiones 
históricas durante esas dos décadas en un país donde el interés público por la historia ya 
era (y es) de por sí muy alto. En este trabajo, analizaremos concretamente cómo se 
aproximaron los opositores intelectuales polacos, a través de sus propias publicaciones, 
al pasado de su país, y la forma en que su visión de la historia influyó sobre su 
percepción del presente y del futuro. 
 
 
Marco cronológico y ámbito de la investigación 
 
Hemos tomado los años 1976 y 1989/1991 como límites de la investigación 
debido a los cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos que se produjeron entonces en la 
trayectoria de los movimientos polacos críticos con el sistema comunista. A raíz de la 
represión gubernamental de las protestas obreras por el alza de precios en junio de 1976, 
un pequeño grupo de intelectuales fundó en septiembre de ese mismo año el Comité de 
Defensa Obrera (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) y, pese a su reducido tamaño, 
pronto se convirtió en uno de los primeros movimientos abiertamente opositores dentro 
del país, marcando un antes y un después en la forma de protestar y de oponerse al 
gobierno comunista5. Además, dentro del ámbito editorial polaco independiente (y, por 
tanto, no sujeto a la censura)6 comenzaron a usarse nuevos sistemas mecánicos de 
                                                 
3
 PASAMAR, Gonzalo: Apologia and Criticism. Historians and the history of Spain, 1500-2000, Oxford, 
Bern..., Peter Lang, 2010; ARÓSTEGUI, Julio (ed.): España en la memoria de tres generaciones. De la 
esperanza a la reparación, Madrid, Editorial Complutense y Fundación Largo Caballero, 2007; 
TYRRELL, Ian: Historians in Public. The Practice of American History, 1890-1970, Chicago & London, 
University of Chicago Press, 2005; TRAVERSO, Enzo: El pasado, instrucciones de uso. Historia, 
memoria, política, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2007; CARRERAS ARES, Juan José, FORCADELL 
ÁLVAREZ, Carlos et al.: Usos públicos de la historia, Madrid/ Zaragoza, Marcial Pons Historia/ Prensas 
Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2003; FORCADELL, Carlos, PASAMAR, Gonzalo et al.: Usos de la historia 
y políticas de la memoria, Zaragoza, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2004. 
4
 En polaco Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL. 
5
 ZUZOWSKI, Robert: Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland. The Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR”, London/ Westport (Connecticut), Praeger, 1992; FRISZKE, Andrzej: Opozycja polityczna w 
PRL 1945-1980, London, Aneks, 1994, 338-406, 588-589; BERNHARD, Michael H.: The Origins of 
Democratization in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1993, 76-130.  
6
 En el contexto polaco de 1976-1989, las publicaciones no sujetas a la censura eran descritas 
preferentemente como “independientes” (niezależne) o, un poco más adelante, como drugi obieg 
(“segundo campo”); la palabra “clandestina” (zakonspirowana, tajna) se utilizaba con menos frecuencia 
porque se asociaba más a publicaciones de épocas pasadas, igual que el término bibuła (siglo XIX, 
período de entreguerras, años 40-50). Véase el sub-apartado dedicado a las fuentes para más detalles. 
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imprenta que, aplicados primeramente a publicaciones periódicas con vocación 
informativa y después a la publicystyka en general, facilitaron la copia masiva de los 
textos, permitiendo una difusión muy superior a la conseguida hasta ese momento7.  
Este hecho, junto con el inicio de las actividades del KOR, se convierte en la 
frontera que divide una etapa de propuestas editoriales independientes esporádicas, 
fuertemente clandestinas y técnicamente sencillas, de otra etapa en la que debutaron 
muchas revistas que serían importantes a lo largo de los años siguientes, tanto porque 
lograron ser más duraderas en el tiempo, como porque en sus páginas se fueron 
fraguando los programas y los puntos de vista de los círculos opositores del país (como 
Głos, Krytyka, Zapis, Puls, Robotnik, Bratniak...). Gracias tanto a las publicaciones 
periódicas como a los libros, el movimiento editorial independiente no tardó en 
consolidarse e institucionalizar su actividad. La primera casa editorial de estas 
características, Nieocenzurowana Oficyna Wydawnicza, rebautizada más adelante como 
Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, operaba ya entre finales de 1976 y principios de 1977 
en Lublin, para después trasladarse a Varsovia8.  
Por otro lado, con las primeras elecciones semi-libres celebradas en la República 
Popular de Polonia en junio de 1989, la antigua oposición cambió de “estatus” y pasó a 
formar parte de las instituciones oficiales de poder, promoviendo nuevas normas y leyes 
que garantizaban la libertad política y de expresión, con lo que dio comienzo la etapa de 
transición a la democracia (transformacja) mientras, a nivel internacional, el bloque 
comunista quedaba desmantelado9.  
En alguna ocasión, nuestro límite cronológico se amplía hasta un par de años más 
tarde, pues es entonces cuando algunos intelectuales publicaron reflexiones acerca de lo 
que supuso para ellos pasar de ser una “oposición moral” a líderes políticos activos o, 
sencillamente, autores no perseguidos. Su participación en la vida pública se prolongó, 
pero también cambió en muchos aspectos, y es sólo un tiempo después cuando 
expresaron su asombro, algunos de sus dilemas y dudas sobre la nueva situación general 
y la suya propia.  
 
 
Interés del objeto de estudio 
 
Hay al menos cuatro razones que hacen que me interese por las construcciones del 
pasado de los intelectuales polacos en la oposición. 
Primero, por la relevancia y originalidad políticas de sus ideas y actuación. El 
pensamiento de los activistas y estrategas opositores de la inteligencja polaca ha sido 
muy importante en dos sentidos: en primer lugar, porque los movimientos sociales de 
base autóctonos que crearon o apoyaron contribuyeron de manera notable a la caída del 
sistema comunista; y en segundo lugar porque, junto con autoridades en la materia, 
                                                 
7
 MIKOŁAJCZYK, Magdalena: Jak się pisało o historii...: problemy polityczne powojennej Polski w 
publikacjach drugiego obiegu lat siedemdziesiątych i osiemdziesiątych, Kraków, Księgarnia Akademicka, 
1998, 17-18; Bernhard: The Origins of Democratization…, 104. 
8
 Mikołajczyk: Jak się pisało…, 17-18; Bernhard: The Origins of Democratization…, 105, 107. 
9
 CASTLE, Marjorie: Triggering Communism’s Collapse. Perceptions and Power in Poland’s Transition, 
Lanham y otras, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003; DOBEK-OSTROWSKA, Bogusława: “El 
proceso de Transición en Polonia”, en MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA, Ricardo M. y PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, 
Guillermo A. (eds.): Los países de la antigua Europa del Este y España ante la ampliación de la Unión 
Europea. Jornadas de Estudio y Análisis celebradas en Valladolid del 18 al 22 de Septiembre de 2000, 
Valladolid, Instituto de Estudios Europeos/ Universidad de Valladolid, 2001, 53-69; EKIERT, Grzegorz y 
KUBIK, Jan: Rebellious Civil Society. Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-
1993, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002 (1999); SWAIN, Geoffrey y SWAIN, Nigel: 
Eastern Europe since 1945, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 (1993), 201 y ss.  
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consideramos que la obra intelectual que generaron individual y colectivamente ha 
supuesto una de las aportaciones a la teoría política actual más originales, penetrantes y 
útiles10.  
Segundo, por la prolongación de su faceta pública, pasando de la oposición 
durante la dictadura a la oficialidad y la responsabilidad cívica en democracia. Muchos 
opositores polacos de los años 70 y 80 ocuparon puestos políticos y/o desempeñaron 
funciones públicas muy destacadas durante la transición (transformacja) y en el período 
democrático. Por ejemplo, Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1927-2013) fue el primer primer 
ministro no comunista de Polonia después de casi medio siglo, y Marcin Król (n. 1944), 
historiador y destacado publicysta, fue miembro de su equipo electoral en 1990, además 
de redactor principal de la revista Res Publica (luego Res Publica Nowa, 1979-1981 y 
1987-1992) y decano de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Aplicadas de la Universidad 
de Varsovia (1996-2002). Jacek Kuroń (1934-2004) fue Ministro de Trabajo y de 
Política Social en 1989-1990 y 1992-1993 y, pese a su derrota en las elecciones 
presidenciales de 1995, fue diputado entre 1989 y 2001, además de líder del partido 
Unia Wolności, y después fundó junto con su esposa la Universytet Powszechny im. Jan 
Józef Lipski en Teremiski, una institución socio-cultural informal que continúa en 
activo y de la que fue primer rector11. Władysław Bartoszewski (1922-2015) presidió 
desde 1990 el Consejo Internacional del Museo Estatal de Auschwitz-Birkenau, fue 
embajador de Polonia en Austria durante cinco años, senador entre 1997 y 2001 y 
ministro de Asuntos Exteriores en 1995 y 2000-2001. Por otro lado, después de 
desempeñar distintas responsabilidades políticas, el historiador Bronisław Geremek 
(1932-2008)12 también fue Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores entre 1997 y 2000, y Anna 
Radziwiłł ocupó varios puestos directivos en el Ministerio de Educación desde los años 
90 hasta su muerte en 2009. Wojciech Roszkowski (n. 1947) ocupó hasta hace pocos 
años un escaño como eurodiputado, y su obra sobre la Polonia contemporánea, 
publicada clandestinamente en los años 80, pasó a ser (previa revisión) la base del 
manual de historia que preparó junto a Anna Radziwiłł (1939-2009) para enseñanza 
secundaria13. Zbigniew Bujak (n. 1954) también fue diputado, y Adam Michnik (n. 
1946), después de abandonar la política de primera línea, fue durante muchos años 
redactor-jefe del diario Gazeta Wyborcza, el periódico por excelencia de la transformacja. 
Además, la mayoría del personal universitario en los departamentos de historia (a 
excepción de aquellos más estrechamente ligados al Partido Comunista Polaco) 
conservó sus puestos después del fin de la dictadura y continuó progresando en su 
profesión. Entre 1989 y 1990, por ejemplo, Krystyna Kersten (1931-2008), Jerzy 
Jedlicki (n. 1930) y Jerzy Holzer (1930-2015) fueron nombrados profesores del Instituto 
de Historia de la Academia Polaca de Ciencias (IH PAN) o del de la Universidad de 
                                                 
10
 FALK, Barbara: The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and 
Philosopher Kings, Budapest/ New York, Central European University Press, 2003, 2-3; BRIER, Robert: 
“Broadening the Cultural History of the Cold War. The Emergence of the Polish Workers’ Defense 
Committee and the Rise of Human Rights”, Journal of Cold War Studies, 15 (4), Fall 2013, 104-127. 
11
 Para conocer su trayectoria y proyectos más a fondo: http://www.teremiski.edu.pl/. Por el momento, la 
web sólo está disponible en polaco. 
12
 Entre las obras de Bronisław Geremek traducidas al castellano se cuentan: La piedad y la horca: 
historia de la miseria y de la caridad en Europa, Madrid, Alianza, 1989; Marc Bloch, historiador y 
resistente, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 1990 (1986); La estirpe de Caín: la imagen de los vagabundos y de los 
pobres en las literaturas de los siglos XV al XVII, Madrid, Mondadori, 1991. También Bronislaw 
Geremek en diálogo con Juan Carlos Vidal, Madrid, A. & M. Muchnik, 1997. 
13
 RADZIWIŁŁ, Anna y ROSZKOWSKI, Wojciech: Historia 1871-1945: podręcznik dla szkół średnich 
y Historia 1945-1990: podręcznik dla szkół średnich, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Szkolne PWN, 1994. 
También ROSZKOWSKI, Wojciech: Historia Polski, 1914-1993, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Szkolne 
PWN, 1994. Todos cuentan con sucesivas reediciones o ampliaciones. 
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Varsovia (IH UW); Holzer fue también director del Centro de Estudios Alemanes 
(Zakład Studiów nad Niemcami, 1990-2005) y del Instituto de Estudios Políticos de la 
Academia (ISP PAN) entre 2000 y 2004, mientras que Jedlicki dirige desde 1991 el 
Gabinete de Historia de la Inteligencja del IH PAN14.   
Debido a esta combinación de cambios y permanencias, buena parte de los 
discursos históricos alternativos y de la visión del mundo de la antigua oposición al 
comunismo pasaron a ser durante los años 90 los discursos hegemónicos u oficiales15, 
de ahí que sea interesante rastrear y conocer sus orígenes en tiempos de la República 
Popular de Polonia. 
Tercero, porque contribuyeron a la profundización y divulgación del 
conocimiento histórico. Gracias a sus obras y a la curiosidad que mostraron por 
cuestiones históricas, los inteligenci críticos con el gobierno comunista ayudaron a 
difundir aspectos sobre el pasado polaco poco o nada conocidos bajo este régimen, o 
bien ratificaron, gracias a su autoridad moral y académica, la información sobre este 
pasado que ya circulaba extraoficialmente. Revalorizaron, además, algunos temas 
tradicionales que habían sido evitados o excluidos de la cultura comunista oficial, y 
promovieron debates acerca de cuestiones olvidadas o controvertidas, principalmente 
sobre historia reciente, que siguieron creando tendencia después de 1989: la guerra 
polaco-bolchevique (1920), la política de la URSS hacia Polonia en la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial y la masacre de Katyń (abril-mayo 1940)16, las deportaciones de polacos a 
Siberia, las relaciones entre judíos polacos y polacos no-judíos en la Segunda República 
y durante la Guerra, la reafirmación o puesta en duda de la imagen de Polonia como 
“víctima” y, sobre todo, la naturaleza del régimen de la PRL y la valoración de su 
legado (cuestiones de historia política, características del  aparato estatal y de la 
oposición, el sistema represivo, las crisis del sistema y la campaña anti-semita de 1968, 
las relaciones de la Iglesia con el Estado comunista, etc.)17.  
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 Falk: The Dilemmas..., 356-357; BARLIŃSKA, Izabela: La sociedad civil en Polonia y Solidaridad, 
Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas/ Siglo XXI, 2006, 364-370; CHRISTIAN, Michel y 
DROIT, Emmanuel: “Écrire l’histoire du communisme: l’histoire sociale de la RDA et de la Pologne 
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 Mikołajczyk: Jak się pisało…, 232; DOMAŃSKI, Henryk: “Wstęp”, en DOMAŃSKI, Henryk (pod 
red.): Inteligencja w Polsce. Specjaliści, twórcy, klerkowie, klasa średnia?, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo 
IFiS PAN, 2008, 11; MIKUŁOWSKI POMORSKI, Jerzy: “Wprowadzenie: Inteligencja wobec nowych 
czasów”, en MIKUŁOWSKI POMORSKI, Jerzy (pod red.): Inteligencja. Między tradycją a wyzwaniami 
współczesności, Kraków, Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie, 2005, 6; RUDNICKI, Zbigniew: “O 
inteligencji w dobie przemian” , en Mikułowski Pomorski (pod red.): Inteligencja..., 89; Bernhard: The 
Origins of Democratization…, 194-195; KOPEČEK, Michal: “Human Rights Facing a National Past. 
Dissident ‘Civic Patriotism’ and the Return of History in East Central Europe, 1968-1989”, Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft, 38, 2012, 601; WAWRZYNIAK, Joanna: “History and Memory: The Social Frames of 
Contemporary Polish Historiography”, Acta Poloniae Historica, 103, 2011, 134. 
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 Ejecuciones en masa de más de 21.000 oficiales del ejército, policías, intelectuales y otros civiles polacos 
llevadas a cabo por la policía secreta de la Unión Soviética (Comisariado del Pueblo para Asuntos Internos, 
NKVD) en el bosque de Katyń, cerca de la ciudad de Smolensk (actualmente territorio ruso). 
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 GÓRNY, Maciej: “From the Splendid Past into the Unknown Future: Historical Studies in Poland after 
1989”, in ANTOHI, Sorin, TRENCSÉNYI, Balázs and APOR, Péter, (eds.): Narratives Unbound. 
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Y, en cuarto y último lugar, porque reevaluaban para avanzar. Gracias 
nuevamente a sus reflexiones históricas, los inteligenci opositores contribuyeron a 
reconsiderar el pasado polaco en la esfera pública con el fin de que el país tuviera 
mayores probabilidades de éxito como nación y como Estado en el futuro.  
Las cuestiones sobre las que trabajamos aún son, además, poco conocidas en el 
contexto historiográfico español, y se diferencian bastante de la propia experiencia 
española durante la dictadura franquista y de las formas de lucha y protesta que 
desarrolló aquí la oposición política. Con lo cual mi aportación puede servir, en cierto 
modo, para aproximarnos a otras realidades y conocer mejor tanto aquello que podemos 
tener en común como sus, o nuestras, especificidades. 
Por otro lado, esta investigación también puede verse como un estudio de caso 
acerca de cuestiones e inquietudes frecuentemente compartidas, tales como nuestra 
forma de percibir el paso del tiempo, de reflexionar sobre lo acontecido, de sentirnos 
dueños o esclavos de nuestro pasado, de preguntarnos hasta qué punto podemos influir 
o cambiar aquello y a aquellos que nos rodean (es decir, el impacto social que tienen 
nuestras acciones), cómo nos puede impulsar o lastrar el afán de pasar a la posteridad, o 
el afán por preservar y dar testimonio, etcétera. 
 
 
Hipótesis 
 
Al profundizar, desde las coordenadas marcadas por la historia intelectual18, en la 
percepción del paso del tiempo de los círculos opositores polacos, nos hemos planteado 
las siguientes preguntas, a las que trataremos de dar respuesta en esta tesis: ¿Cómo 
creían los inteligenci de entonces que fueron, eran y podían llegar a ser los polacos 
como nación? Y ¿cómo se autopercibían como grupo social que cree que puede cambiar 
la situación actual de un país?  
A la hora de definir la nación polaca y a sí mismos, muchos intelectuales 
compaginaron en sus obras la lógica racional con el recurso a diversos mitos nacionales. 
Esto desencadenó un proceso, propio del pensamiento mítico, de  búsqueda de referentes 
en el pasado a fin de poder actuar en el presente y llegar al futuro que, desde ese mismo 
presente, ya estaban proyectando. A lo largo de esta tesis, sostenemos que este interés por 
el pasado y su visión de la historia de Polonia influyó en su percepción del presente y les 
hizo adquirir (tal vez recuperar) e insuflar una conciencia histórica que, entre otras 
consecuencias, favoreció la historización del tiempo presente dentro de sus discursos y 
argumentaciones. En estos textos, por tanto, se produce una simbiosis muy particular 
entre lo histórico y lo político, en un doble intento de explicar o reformular el pasado 
polaco (sobre todo el más reciente) y de comprender la situación presente a fin de poder 
cambiarla. Parecía existir entre los intelectuales comprometidos con los movimientos de 
oposición el convencimiento más o menos explícito de que la forma de construir el futuro 
del país, de formular expectativas hacia adelante, dependía en buena medida de la forma 
en que la sociedad valorase y “recordase” su pasado. Pero no sólo creían, como 
inteligenci que eran, que podían influir o transformar la realidad actual de Polonia, o 
incluso la percepción que se tenía de su pasado, sino también el propio curso de su 
                                                                                                                                               
revisión del pasado y la política de la memoria en la Polonia poscomunista”, Historia del presente, 8, 
2006, esp. 165-166 y 169-171; Mikołajczyk: Jak się pisało…, 232-234.  
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 Nos resulta particularmente atrayente la aproximación teórica de SOUTHGATE, Beverley: 
“Intellectual history/ history of ideas”, en BERGER, Stefan, FELDNER, Heiko y PASSMORE, Kevin 
(eds.): Writing History. Theory and Practice, London/ New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 2010 (2003), 
268-285. 
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historia de ahí en adelante, continuando, de esta forma, con una dilatada tradición de 
pensamiento histórico propia de la intelligentsia europeo-oriental. Por tanto, en esta 
investigación no sólo se trabaja con el “pasado”, sino que se han introducido las variables 
de “presente” y “futuro”: caminaremos, pues, sobre la delgada frontera intelectual que 
separa lo ocurrido, lo que está ocurriendo y lo que aún está por venir.     
 
 
Consideraciones teóricas 
 
1. El mito 
 
Un término clave que manejaremos con asiduidad, y sobre el que trabajaremos 
siguiendo principalmente los referentes y percepciones de los propios autores polacos, 
es el de mito. 
Hace mucho tiempo que el mito se ha separado de la idea decimonónica de la 
antropología pre-estructural. Desde hace décadas, se acepta casi de manera unánime que 
los mitos no son sólo propios de sociedades “primitivas” o  “arcaicas” (tal y como las 
califica Mircea Eliade19), sino que también han formado y forman parte de las 
modernas20. Sin embargo, mientras los mitos clásicos o premodernos son de tipo 
cosmológico o cosmogónico y se remontan a unos orígenes “anteriores al tiempo” y a la 
historia, el mito moderno sería, según Jan Ifversen, un mito político que legitimaría 
actos fundacionales producidos ya dentro del tiempo histórico. Mantendría, eso sí, su 
papel de referente normativo, pues expresa valores transhistóricos que sirven de guía a 
una sociedad determinada21.  
La nación, colectivo sobre el que nos centramos, se cuenta entre los grupos 
generadores de mitos más destacados y estudiados en la Edad Contemporánea. Un mito 
nacional sería una construcción cognoscitiva que proporciona a una comunidad dada 
una identidad nacional. La recurrencia a los mitos resulta, en este caso, de la necesidad 
de los individuos de ubicarse a sí mismos dentro de la continuidad histórica de la 
nación, proporcionando un sentido de pertenencia a una comunidad duradera, 
suprahistórica. Con los mitos se trata de responder a las preguntas “¿cómo somos?” y 
“¿qué nos ha hecho como somos?”. Sacian, en otras palabras, la necesidad de 
“enraizamiento” y de entendimiento con los miembros de ese grupo, dado que ofrecen 
un modelo retrospectivo de participación en la vida social, basándose en enseñanzas, 
puntos de vista e imaginarios colectivos, y apelan por igual a una visión del pasado, del 
presente y del futuro en clave nacional22.  
De una forma similar describe Stanisław Ossowski los “mitos étnicos” que, 
pudiendo tener como base mitos genealógicos o raciales, mantienen la cohesión interna 
del grupo social, así como las relaciones amistosas o antagónicas entre grupos étnicos u 
organizaciones políticas23. Por tanto, para aproximarnos en esta investigación a los 
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mitos nacionales polacos, será necesario conocer los mitos que han generado sus 
habitantes no sólo sobre Polonia, sino también acerca del otro, refiriéndonos tanto a 
Europa en general, como a los países que la integran o flanquean, en particular. 
Si nos ceñimos al ámbito historiográfico, a la altura de los años 70 del siglo XX 
era habitual que los historiadores, en su necesidad de autodefinirse académica y 
profesionalmente, contrapusieran el pensamiento mítico al pensamiento histórico con el 
fin de trazar una frontera clara entre lo que aún es mito y el nacimiento de la historia 
como disciplina científica y de investigación. El mito supone, según esta concepción, 
remitirse al pasado como fuente de paradigmas; se le atribuye, además, una ausencia de 
linealidad temporal, la heterogeneidad de la realidad descrita y la sacralización del 
sujeto u objeto en los que se centra. Esto implica, a su vez, que la historia sea percibida 
como lo contrario, a saber, como una sucesión lineal de los acontecimientos24.  
La “mitificación” del pasado, es decir, el proceso por el que un conjunto de 
hechos se convierte en un conjunto de símbolos, modelos y precedentes, y que es 
frecuente en las popularizaciones de la historia y en las imágenes más habituales que se 
manejan del pasado, es tratada en muchas ocasiones como una amenaza al conocimiento 
científico contra la que el historiador se ve obligado a batallar25. Así lo manifestaban, 
por ejemplo, historiadores polacos marxistas tan célebres como Witold Kula, que 
afirmaba que “cuando aparecen constantemente nuevos mitos (y la actividad humana 
creadora de mitos es inagotable) se abre ante el ser humano un hermoso campo de 
batalla para liberarse de ellos”26; o como Jerzy Topolski, que define la historia de la 
historiografía como “la creación continua de mitos y los intentos de los historiadores 
por disolverlos”27. El interés de la historiografía por los mitos, siguiendo estos 
parámetros, se basaría en el deseo de conocer y definir a un “enemigo” o “rival” para 
poder “defenderse” de él de manera efectiva28. Los reproches que, desde esta 
perspectiva, se le hacen al pensamiento mítico con más asiduidad son su falta de 
correspondencia con la realidad (lo que explica la frecuente equiparación del mito con 
la mentira), que cumple un cometido ideológico, que sustituye la libertad de 
pensamiento y de la imaginación individuales por modelos y referentes de autoridad 
preestablecidos, que ya no es útil para describir y entender el mundo si se compara con 
otras formas de pensamiento desarrolladas más tarde, y que puede formar parte de una 
tradición dañina o negativa para una o varias comunidades29.  
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Desde otros ámbitos, Ernst Cassirer o Stanisław Ossowski también creían que el 
pensamiento mítico y el pensamiento racional o discursivo eran fenómenos opuestos, 
aunque para Cassirer su coexistencia era posible30. No obstante, Barbara Szacka apunta, 
no sin razón, que la propia ciencia puede convertirse en fuente de mitos cuando las 
sociedades de masas depositan su fe en ella31.  
En esta línea, aprovechamos también para mostrar nuestras reservas acerca de la 
asociación exclusiva, en términos de percepción del paso tiempo, de lo histórico con lo 
lineal y de lo mítico con lo cíclico. Pues, ¿no es acaso el “progreso infinito”, la idea 
lineal por antonomasia, otro tipo de mito, tal y como se entendía desde el positivismo, o 
desde el marxismo32? Por otro lado, si un discurso histórico hace hincapié en fenómenos 
que se repiten o repara en la existencia de determinados ciclos, ¿deja de ser “histórico” 
y pasa automáticamente a ser “mítico”? Desde aquí consideramos que no trabajamos 
con conceptos excluyentes, sino con categorías complementarias o, incluso, 
dependientes la una de la otra porque, si la realidad tal y como la experimentamos se 
compone de continuidades y cambios, ¿es posible prescindir de alguno de ellos en un 
relato? ¿Cómo puede percibirse lo que perdura si algo no cambia, o lo que cambia si no 
hay algo que sea duradero? ¿Cómo podríamos ser conscientes si no de la existencia del 
tiempo, aunque sea tan complejo de aprehender en su esencia y naturaleza como el ser 
humano mismo33?  
A partir de los años 70 y 80 del siglo XX, el giro cultural que experimentó la 
disciplina histórica, influida preferentemente por la antropología en su discurso, 
provocó una revalorización del mito, que empezó a contemplarse como un elemento 
complementario e incluso intrínseco a la propia escritura de la historia, en lugar de 
como algo ajeno y antagónico a ésta34. Para Ewa Domańska, que apoya este enfoque, 
tanto la historia como la mitología, contempladas como géneros literarios, tienen su 
origen en el mito de la búsqueda de la identidad perdida35: “El mito nos permite acceder 
a nuestra historia reprimida, y la historia es nuestro mito reprimido. De hecho, cuando 
los historiadores decidieron atacar al mito y expulsarlo de la historia, socavaron la base 
más importante para nuestro acercamiento al pasado”. Es el mito, dice Domańska, lo 
que nos ayuda a crear expectativas de futuro, a regenerar la moralidad de una 
comunidad, a curar, a volver a tener esperanza, y “es una expresión”, en suma, “del 
nivel más profundo de la historia”36.  
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Otros historiadores que han contribuido a revalorizar el mito suelen definirlo, a 
grandes rasgos, como una forma de conocimiento del pasado que recurre al saber 
histórico, pero que es distinta de la historia, dado que en el mito la aproximación a la 
verdad es algo secundario o incluso indiferente; que concierne a un único 
acontecimiento; que está basado en la fe y no es susceptible de ser verificado; que crea 
lazos sociales y, por último, que provee más información acerca de las añoranzas y del 
estado emocional de un colectivo en la actualidad que sobre el pasado en sí mismo37.   
Para Törnquist Plewa, que se inspira en las obras de Ernst Cassirer, Mircea Eliade 
y Leszek Kołakowski, los mitos son concepciones (convicciones, visiones, creencias…) 
generadas en la conciencia de una determinada comunidad en respuesta a una fuerte 
necesidad emocional, y que se remiten a estratos de la conciencia situados más allá de lo 
racional38. Tendrían cuatro rasgos distintivos, que podremos detectar en el pensamiento 
de la inteligencja polaca dentro de este trabajo. 
En primer lugar, una base emocional colectiva. Si el mito refleja una verdad, es, 
ante todo, una verdad de la emoción compartida, no una creación puramente intelectual. 
La forma de expresar la emoción colectiva es casi tan importante como la emoción 
misma, a juicio de Törnquist Plewa, y suele manifestarse visual o verbalmente39. 
Babiuch-Luxmoore, en cambio, considera menos importante verbalizar el contenido del 
mito que haberlo experimentado y vivido, dado que la verbalización introduciría ya una 
ordenación lógica, que “racionalizaría” lo irracional40. 
En segundo lugar, la transhistoricidad. El mito tiene la capacidad de funcionar 
como un modelo atemporal: es una forma de reconstruir el pasado, y a la vez proviene 
del pasado, pero impone su propia interpretación de los acontecimientos 
contemporáneos y además está enfocado hacia el futuro41. Contaría, según Babiuch-
Luxmoore, con una doble estructura: por un lado, histórica, dado que se remonta a 
hechos pretéritos primigenios; y por otro, intemporal, porque “el mito no sólo satisface 
la necesidad de conocimiento histórico, sino también la necesidad de participación en 
valores que fueron, son y serán”42.  
El mito puede moldear el pensamiento y también el comportamiento si se percibe 
como un programa de acción para el futuro, o una profecía, que legitima la acción 
presente enlazándola con el pasado.  En los mitos se buscan analogías en el pasado para 
explicar el presente y prever el futuro; se generan entonces patrones y modelos en lugar 
de una secuencia histórica lógica de causa-efecto que recalque la especificidad de los 
acontecimientos históricos. La transhistoricidad del mito, en definitiva, es una parte 
muy importante de la conciencia histórica de una comunidad y contrasta con la historia 
entendida como una disciplina académica formalizada43. 
El tercer rasgo característico de los mitos sería su capacidad de trascender la 
experiencia empírica humana. Acudir al mito implica creer que pueden distinguirse 
patrones recurrentes en la experiencia humana que no sólo dan sentido al pasado, sino 
también al presente y al futuro. A la luz del mito, la historia cobra un significado 
especial, dado por Dios, por el destino, o derivado de la creencia en el cumplimiento de 
valores transhistóricos a lo largo de la historia. A través de él, por tanto, la historia de 
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un pueblo o comunidad puede verse como el cumplimiento de una determinada 
misión44.   
Por otro lado, el contenido del mito permite distintas lecturas e interpretaciones y 
no puede ser probado empíricamente; de ahí que no puedan aplicársele criterios como 
“verdadero” o “falso”. Manifestaría su existencia, eso sí, mediante su transmisión de 
generación en generación45.  
La cuarta y última característica del mito es su división cualitativa del mundo en 
sacrum y profanum. Las épocas, lugares, objetos, números o valores que son recordados 
pasan a formar parte de lo sacro, y aquellos que se descartan y olvidan, de lo profano. 
Al dar el estatus de sacrum a determinados períodos, cosas o valores, se les hace dignos 
de ser recordados por todos, contribuyendo a la transmisión intergeneracional de 
autoridad y de valores46. 
Desde el punto de vista de la cohesión y la dinámica sociales, los mitos cumplen 
al menos tres cometidos fundamentales: consolar, integrar y movilizar.  
El consuelo permite dar sentido y esperanza a la comunidad, ya que ayuda a 
superar la aflicción y el sufrimiento mediante la justificación transhistórica de lo 
ocurrido47.  
Por otro lado, la integración crea un sentido de pertenencia a la comunidad, 
construyendo nexos no sólo entre los vivos, sino también con las generaciones pasadas 
y los ancestros. A través del mito, los miembros de una comunidad pueden comunicar 
sus ideales, miedos y esperanzas compartidos, y los símbolos facilitan, con su carga 
emocional, esa transmisión. Imaginar el pasado y participar de las tradiciones 
posibilitan la identificación grupal48, como sucede en el caso nacional que nos 
concierne. 
Por último, en lo que respecta a la movilización, los mitos juegan un papel 
importante en la formación y activación de la memoria colectiva. Las dimensiones 
moral y afectiva (pathos) del mito, alejadas de la mirada objetivizante de la ciencia y 
refractarias a ciertas formas de racionalidad (aunque eso no significa que sean 
irracionales), refuerzan la implicación y la responsabilidad de la comunidad hacia 
aquellos valores que este mito codifica, volviéndolos sacrum. El recuerdo de 
acontecimientos pasados relevantes o la planificación de un nuevo futuro, a su vez, 
ayudan a las personas a definir sus deberes actuales49. Es decir, los mitos pueden ser 
representaciones enfocadas primordialmente tanto hacia el futuro como hacia el pasado, 
pero en cualquier caso tienen el poder de hacernos actuar y de estimularnos para 
transformar el mundo que nos rodea. También expresan el deseo, en palabras de Leszek 
Kołakowski, de que en el transcurso del tiempo no sólo se sucedan los cambios, sino 
que también haya lugar para las permanencias y los cúmulos; algo, en suma, que 
permita creer a esa colectividad que lo pasado está contenido en aquello que ha 
conseguido preservarse, y que los hechos no son sólo hechos, sino pequeñas 
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aportaciones de cada generación al mundo de los valores, que se salvaguardan aunque 
no sea posible retroceder literalmente en el tiempo50.   
El mito, además de expresar valores, también puede desempeñar un cometido 
ideológico en caso de que una determinada interpretación de éste se vuelva cerrada, es 
decir, si se convierte en un argumento para legitimar e imponer una visión igualmente 
específica y obligada de la realidad, dejando, de esta forma, de favorecer el 
entendimiento social51.  
No obstante, las fronteras entre expresión de valores e ideología no son, en este 
sentido, del todo precisas; lo veremos con toda claridad en nuestro caso si nos 
apoyamos en la distinción, basada en las emociones, propuesta por Kołakowski. Según 
este autor, los mitos que expresan valores son aquellos que codifican el compromiso, el 
deber y la obligación, y que hacen referencia a una situación de partida mítica para 
facilitar la comprensión del mundo actual. Los valores a los que se remiten vendrían ya 
dados, no sería necesario cambiarlos o añadirles nada; se trataría, simplemente, de 
aceptarlos y salvaguardarlos. En cambio, los mitos que cumplen una función ideológica 
codificarían aspiraciones o pretensiones, ofreciendo perspectivas, organizando el 
descontento o alimentando emociones relacionadas con la sensación de perjuicio 
inmerecido. Se orientan hacia una utopía futura para satisfacer las esperanzas de una 
comunidad, y los elementos del pasado servirían de sanción añadida para estas 
aspiraciones52. Al margen de la connotación negativa que le confieren Kołakowski y 
Babiuch-Luxmoore, esta función ideológica, de hecho, quedaría englobada dentro de las 
características de los mitos propuestas por Barbara Törnquist Plewa, para quien es aquél 
un aspecto intrínseco, y no opcional, de los mitos, algo que en principio ratificarían los 
resultados de nuestra investigación.  
Desde el ámbito de la filosofía y la historia de las religiones, Mircea Eliade 
sugiere la existencia de dos teorías del “Gran Tiempo” de carácter cíclico en las 
cosmogonías de las civilizaciones arcaicas: la tradicional, fundamentada en una 
regeneración periódica infinita, aunque ninguna cultura la haya formulado de forma 
clara e inequívoca, y la “moderna”, sustento, entre otras, de la religión cristiana. Ambas 
concepciones expresan, según el autor, una actitud antihistórica, siempre y cuando se 
entienda por “histórico” una progresión lineal e irrepetible del tiempo. Por una parte, la 
percepción tradicional intenta rechazar, ignorar o abolir la historia a través de la 
repetición y la regeneración periódica del tiempo, que alimenta la conciencia de estar 
viviendo un eterno presente. En la percepción mesiánica, por otro lado, la clave está en 
el futuro, pues el peso de la historia se soporta sólo porque se sabe que ésta algún día 
acabará; es decir, en un tiempo que aún está por venir se producirá una sola 
regeneración que restablecerá el paraíso primigenio, cerrando, de esta forma, un ciclo 
único. Por tanto, la alternancia de momentos sacrum y profanum que contienen ambas 
teorías asegura un eventual retorno del “tiempo sagrado” a la comunidad que ha 
experimentado una derrota o catástrofe, proporcionándole consuelo y el convencimiento 
de que la “edad de oro” es algo recuperable y repetible, infinitas veces en la orientación 
tradicional, y una sola vez en la escatológica de tiempo finito53.    
Eliade señala que, pese a la emergencia y predominio de nuevas teorías basadas 
en el progreso lineal de la historia entre los siglos XVII y XIX, estos esquemas cíclicos 
                                                 
50
 Babiuch-Luxmoore: Portrety i autoportrety..., 29, citando a KOŁAKOWSKI, Leszek: Obecność mitu, 
Paryż, Instytut Literacki, 1972, 16. 
51
 Babiuch-Luxmoore: Portrety i autoportrety..., 26-27. 
52
 Babiuch-Luxmoore: Portrety i autoportrety..., 27-28, citando a Kołakowski: Obecność mitu, 95-96; 
también en Törnquist Plewa: The Wheel…, 254. 
53
 Eliade: El mito del eterno…, 110-112; Törnquist Plewa: The Wheel…, 16.  
19 
 
nunca han desaparecido del todo a lo largo de la historia del pensamiento, en buena 
parte gracias al desarrollo científico de la astronomía durante ese mismo período, que 
dejaba atrás los viejos postulados astrológicos. Durante el siglo XX, además, estos 
patrones se retoman  o introducen en muchos campos académicos, tales como la 
economía política (rehabilitación de las nociones de ciclo, fluctuación u oscilación 
periódica), la filosofía (Nietzsche y el mito del eterno retorno) o la filosofía de la 
historia (dedicación de Spengler o Toynbee al problema de la periodicidad)54.    
Pero Eliade no se detiene ahí: también argumenta que buena parte de la población 
de Europa, y por supuesto de otros continentes, maneja aún, a la altura de los años 50 
del siglo XX (cuando publica El mito del eterno retorno), una perspectiva anti-
historicista del tiempo fundamentada en una regeneración cíclica infinita, que no sólo va 
asociada a las sociedades tradicionales campesinas, sino también en general a aquellos 
países cuya trayectoria histórica ha sido especialmente complicada y dolorosa: 
 
el ‘historicismo’ fue creado y profesado ante todo por pensadores que pertenecían a naciones 
para las cuales la historia jamás fue un terror continuo. Esos pensadores quizá hubieran 
adoptado otra perspectiva si hubiesen pertenecido a naciones señaladas por la ‘fatalidad de la 
historia’. En todo caso, quisiéramos saber si la teoría según la cual todo lo que sucede está ‘bien’ 
justamente porque sucedió habría podido ser abrazada alegremente por los pensadores de los 
países bálticos, de los Balcanes, o de las colonias.55  
 
Es decir, recurrir a mitos de tipo cíclico y rechazar el historicismo no sólo sería 
propio de sociedades “arcaicas”, sobre las que el autor trabaja principalmente, sino 
también de aquellas naciones modernas que se han sentido vejadas o injustamente 
tratadas de forma prolongada a lo largo de su historia. ¿Podríamos añadir, entre las que 
menciona Eliade, a Polonia? Ya desde aquí adelantamos que la respuesta es, sin duda, 
afirmativa. La conciencia histórica polaca tiene un origen traumático que se sitúa en el 
último cuarto del siglo XVIII: a raíz de los repartos entre los imperios ruso, austriaco y 
prusiano de una República de las Dos Naciones56 debilitada y en decadencia (1772, 
1793 y 1795), Polonia desapareció, no sin resistencia, del mapa de los Estados 
europeos, perdió su soberanía y su territorio quedó desmembrado durante más de 120 
años. A partir de entonces, y sobre todo durante una época romántica jalonada por 
rebeliones y levantamientos, la realidad, y por extensión la historia, se volvió 
sumamente hostil y dolorosa a ojos de muchos polacos, y su cultura fue 
transformándose, en palabras de Ewa Domańska, en una “cultura de la herida” (wound 
culture), basada en experiencias de trauma, sufrimiento, victimismo y melancolía, cuyas 
huellas pueden rastrearse prácticamente hasta la actualidad, pues forman parte intrínseca 
de su acervo mítico57. Sólo una autopercepción trágica, doliente, de la historia polaca 
muy arraigada y extendida, y que comparten algunos de nuestros intelectuales en los 
años 70 y 80 del siglo XX, explicaría la reacción contraria de otros, que aspiraban a la 
“normalidad” en vez de a la “excepcionalidad”. Así lo manifestó durante una de sus 
últimas entrevistas Stefan Kisielewski, una de las figuras más destacadas que 
estudiaremos: 
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… nunca nos ha faltado gente que percibe en el destino de Polonia señales mesiánicas, algún tipo 
de rol especial que nuestro país debería desempeñar en la historia mundial. (…) Es una carga para 
la nación de la que debemos renegar cuanto antes. Renegar – y buscar una Polonia normal, una 
Polonia como otros países del mundo.58  
 
Una sociedad recurre a sus mitos especialmente en períodos convulsos e 
inestables, de malestar social, crisis, revoluciones o levantamientos, y en lugares donde 
la población se considera “víctima de la historia”. Por tanto, al tener un detonante o 
catalizador común, conciencia histórica y mito se entrelazan y comparten escenario casi 
desde su mismo origen durante la Edad Contemporánea en casos como el polaco: 
 
En esos tiempos, la comunidad es consciente de su participación en la historia, en hechos de gran 
importancia, y además tiene la sensación de estar ejerciendo una influencia real en el curso de los 
acontecimientos. Esta sensación genera la necesidad de expresar una voluntad común, la necesidad 
de configurar nuevos comportamientos y también de renovar los viejos, firmemente asentados en 
la conciencia social. Mientras la sociedad altera el orden establecido, también tiene la necesidad de 
una integración particularmente fuerte para incrementar la fuerza de su protesta. En esos 
momentos el mito es la solución a estas fuertes emociones y necesidades colectivas.59  
 
En palabras de Hayden White, los desastres conllevan situaciones a las que una 
comunidad no puede hacer frente con sus recursos cognitivos y morales habituales. En 
su lugar, y con la intención de (re)constituirse, la comunidad integra esos desastres en 
un discurso mítico, creándose una narrativa dramática de tipo moral donde el relato de 
los hechos (transformados en “catástrofe”) girará en torno a las ideas de virtud y 
justicia, en vez de basarse en una explicación causal60.  
Conviene recordar que, además de utilizarse en momentos trágicos, los propios 
mitos suelen narrar acontecimientos de una gran carga dramática. Los mitos políticos 
modernos, en los que cualquier creación o fundación se entiende como un nuevo 
comienzo, escenifican frecuentemente un choque violento con el antiguo sistema que, 
en su forma más radical, se representa a través de un mito revolucionario. Este nuevo 
comienzo puede ser presentado como resultado de una acción violenta deliberada o 
como un destino inevitable61. De hecho, la catástrofe cíclica, según Ewa Domańska, es 
vista como algo bastante normal en Polonia, y el “mito del eterno retorno” no ha dejado 
de ser actual, hasta el punto de convertirse en una especie de arquetipo o metarrelato en 
el país. La reiteración a lo largo de su historia del ciclo de derrotas militares, partición 
política, liberación y renacimiento hace que la “muerte” sea vista por muchos polacos 
como una fase ineludible e indispensable para una posterior regeneración62. Jan 
Ifversen, en cambio, considera que también puede concebirse una puesta en escena del 
mito en circunstancias menos extremas, como en acciones políticas orientadas hacia el 
futuro, cuando el mito puede ayudar a reducir la sensación de incertidumbre63.  
Más que una rebelión contra el tiempo histórico, Eliade interpreta la 
revalorización del mito de periodicidad cíclica en el siglo XX como una tentativa de los 
contemporáneos  de “... reintegrar ese tiempo histórico, cargado de experiencia humana, 
en el tiempo cósmico, cíclico e infinito”64, en suma, como un deseo colectivo de 
                                                 
58
 Testament Kisiela. Ze Stefanem Kisielewskim rozmawia Piotr Gabryel, Poznań, Agencja Wydawniczo-
Reklamowa Wprost, 1992, 47, conversación del 6-IX-1990, traducc. propia. 
59
 Törnquist Plewa: The Wheel…, 17, traducc. propia. 
60
 White: “Catastrophe, Communal…”, 49-53. 
61
 Ifversen: “Myth in the Writing…”, 456. 
62
 Domańska: “(Re)creative Myths…”, 256. 
63
 Ifversen: “Myth in the Writing…”, 456. 
64
 Eliade: El mito del eterno…, 147. 
21 
 
trascendencia, de dar sentido a la vida humana y a los sufrimientos padecidos hasta hoy. 
No obstante, mientras el grueso de la sociedad se desenvolvería con categorías míticas 
en su vida cotidiana sin apenas cuestionarlas, las élites sociales, como la inteligencja en 
Polonia, se encontrarían ante el dilema de continuar empleando los esquemas míticos, y 
satisfacer así su afán de pasar a la posteridad (en clave nacional o como grupo elitista), 
o bien optar por una lectura más “científica”, compleja o historicista del paso del 
tiempo, desprovista de una respuesta reconfortante ante lo incierto, lo incomprensible y 
lo fortuito: 
 
… en primer lugar es a las élites a las que se plantea el problema, puesto que son las únicas 
obligadas, cada vez con mayor rigor, a tener conciencia de su situación histórica. Ciertamente, el 
cristianismo y la filosofía escatológica de la historia no han dejado de satisfacer a una parte 
considerable de esas élites. Hasta cierto punto, también puede decirse que el marxismo ─sobre 
todo en sus formas populares─ constituye para algunos una defensa contra el terror a la historia. 
Sólo la posición historicista, en todas sus variedades y en todos sus matices ─desde el ‘destino’ de 
Nietzsche hasta la ‘temporalidad’ de Heidegger─ sigue desarmada.65  
 
Dicho de otra manera, tanto la historia como el mito forman parte del corpus de 
tradiciones que constituyen la “identidad narrativa/ discursiva de una cultura” y, en 
consecuencia, desde una perspectiva moderna, las funciones racionalizadora y 
organizadora del mito deben contemplarse como un discurso más que compite y se 
compagina con otras formas distintas de ordenación y racionalización66.  
Esta cuestión nos remite a un dilema básico dentro de la disciplina histórica que, 
pese a ser de índole general, destaca aún más en el contexto polaco debido a sus 
especificidades políticas (ausencia de Estado durante más de un siglo, posterior 
inclusión en la órbita soviética…). Se trata, nada más y nada menos, de dilucidar la 
función de la historiografía y, por tanto, de los propios historiadores. ¿La investigación 
histórica debe centrarse únicamente en preguntas y explicaciones académicas, o también 
debe prestar atención a las necesidades y demandas de las comunidades no académicas 
de las que forman parte los historiadores (sociedad, nación, otros colectivos)? Ambos 
puntos de vista proceden de dos tradiciones historiográficas del siglo XIX: la rankeana, 
que considera al historiador un observador neutral de la realidad y apoya la búsqueda 
imparcial de la verdad, y la idealista-romántica, que hace hincapié en el liderazgo 
espiritual de la nación, y de la que Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) fue un destacado 
exponente en el caso polaco67. Siguiendo esta última línea, algunas personas entienden 
la escritura histórica como una “misión” y un deber de los historiadores hacia la 
sociedad, a la que hay que educar en valores “nacionales” (independencia, libertad, 
patriotismo); en Polonia, esta postura se materializa a día de hoy, por ejemplo, en el 
Instituto de Memoria Nacional (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN68), y sería contraria a 
la visión “cientifista” y “objetivista” que trata de luchar contra una “mitificación de la 
historia” sin tomar en consideración el giro cultural experimentado por las 
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Humanidades en las últimas décadas. No obstante, ambas concepciones forman parte de 
la práctica historiográfica cotidiana y, pese a su aparente oposición, interactúan con 
frecuencia69. 
En una aproximación similar a la de Eliade, pero con matices, Babiuch-Luxmoore 
distingue tres visiones o maneras de relacionarse con el pasado y de experimentar el 
tiempo entre los inteligenci polacos:   
En primer lugar, la “visión histórica” concibe el pasado, el presente y el futuro 
como esferas claramente diferenciadas, aunque interconectadas en cierto modo. En esta 
concepción del tiempo, el cambio es el factor fundamental. El pasado se percibe como 
algo singular, irrepetible y cerrado, y no como un nicho de enseñanzas morales.   
La “visión tradicional”, en cambio, se orienta hacia la duración. En este sentido, la 
definición de “tradición” se aproxima a la de mito, pues es la forma en que una 
colectividad experimenta su pasado mediante la transformación de hechos pretéritos, 
ricos en significados, en un valor del presente con significado único. El conjunto de 
símbolos, modelos y precedentes que constituyen la tradición se fundan principalmente 
en la fe y la permanencia, mientras que la historia lo hace en la búsqueda de 
conocimiento y la descripción del pasado y su mutabilidad. Por tanto, desde la 
perspectiva “tradicional”, las acciones y hechos pretéritos se convierten en modelos, y 
se trata de hallar en el pasado valores absolutos y duraderos que sirvan de inspiración a 
los contemporáneos y sean un referente socio-moral inalterable en épocas difíciles o 
cambiantes. El esquema temporal propio de esta postura es el tiempo mítico, entendido 
como un pasado que no deja de transcurrir y que se reproduce en el presente.    
Por último, la “visión indiferente hacia el pasado” prefiere, como su mismo 
nombre indica, concentrarse exclusivamente en el presente y en el futuro y construir 
nuevos modelos de comportamiento, evitando la reflexión sobre el pasado70.  
Lejos de lo que pueda parecer, dentro de los discursos de la inteligencja polaca las 
dos primeras percepciones del pasado no son totalmente antagónicas y se encuentran, en 
algunas ocasiones, entremezcladas. En otras palabras, a lo largo de esta disertación 
veremos cómo la disyuntiva o dilema ante el que se encontró la élite intelectual en 
Polonia, plasmado más arriba (y sobre el que volveremos posteriormente), también se 
resolvió, en ciertos casos, alternando propuestas de continuidad y de cambio. Además, 
la consciencia de la propia situación y participación en la historia que mencionan tanto 
Törnquist Plewa como Eliade será, aplicado a nuestro objeto de estudio, uno de los ejes 
temáticos principales que desarrollaremos en la investigación y que hemos denominado, 
como veremos más adelante, “conciencia histórica” e “historización del tiempo 
presente”.  
Pero la inteligencja no sólo recurrió a estructuras míticas para reelaborar el 
presente y el futuro en sus discursos, sino que la propia figura del inteligent o intelectual 
tiene la categoría de mito nacional en la conciencia histórica polaca, lo que le da una 
entidad particular y específica a este caso.  
 
 
2. Intelectualidad/ Intelligentsia-inteligencja 
 
En los sujetos de nuestra investigación confluyen dos identidades colectivas 
estrechamente ligadas entre sí que conviene estudiar con mayor profundidad. En primer 
lugar, examinaremos los conceptos de “inteligencja” e “intelectualidad”, tratando de 
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proponer una definición para el caso que nos ocupa y de abordar su entronque (y 
evolución en paralelo) con la intelligentsia rusa71 que, entre otras cuestiones, comprende 
su estrecha y especial relación con el pensamiento histórico y el progreso, así como con 
las ideas de nación, verdad, ética y moral, además de su sensación de alienación y de su 
relación ambigua (y, en muchas ocasiones, conflictiva) con el poder y el Estado, lo que 
nos llevará a ocuparnos de la “oposición/ disidencia”, el segundo término definitorio  
sobre el que nos detendremos. 
La idea de inteligencja o inteligenckość ha estado presente en el discurso público 
polaco desde hace aproximadamente 150 años, aunque es probable que comenzase a 
cristalizar como grupo social medio siglo antes, a finales del XVIII72. Fue a partir de 
entonces cuando, según Krystyna Zienkowska, se produjeron cambios en la forma de 
crear opinión, vinculados a la invención y expansión de medios más eficaces de transmitir 
la información, como la prensa, y además se establecieron aparatos gubernamentales 
bastante centralizados de tipo estatal que se hicieron cargo de la educación de su 
población, iniciando así su proceso de secularización. En este contexto histórico, tres 
grupos profesionales se perfilaron como inteligenci en potencia: en primer lugar, personas 
de elevada formación que se dedicaban a algún tipo de oficio literario, y que formaron un 
nuevo estamento libre a raíz de la gradual desaparición del mecenazgo; en segundo lugar, 
los profesores, dado que las reformas educativas tendieron a unificar los criterios de 
búsqueda de personas con conocimientos y moral para trabajar para el Estado y aceptar 
sus normas, y en tercer lugar, los funcionarios del nuevo aparato estatal. Las tendencias 
que compartirían e identificarían a los integrantes de la inteligencja en esa época 
comprenden, entre otras, la tendencia al empleo de un léxico nacional-patriótico; una 
tendencia igualitarista, expresada en su aspiración por democratizar posturas y puntos de 
vista, y relacionada con la progresiva fusión de la burguesía con la nobleza empobrecida; 
y una acentuada tendencia al idealismo político73.  
Se cree que el término intelligentsia procede de la Rusia de Catalina la Grande. Al 
parecer, Johann Georg Schwarz, el alemán que transformó la masonería rusa a finales 
del siglo XVIII, lo empleó por vez primera en el sentido que tiene el vocablo latino 
intelligentia (inteligencia), pero le dio su transcripción rusa característica 
(intelligentsiia) y un halo de autoridad o poder especial que perduraría hasta el 
presente74. Ivan Aksakov fue, por lo visto, el que introdujo el concepto como palabra de 
uso común en el Imperio ruso en la década de 186075, mientras que en tierras polacas 
apareció por primera vez en el foro público dentro de una obra de Karol Libelt, ideólogo 
del “trabajo orgánico” (praca organiczna) en la región de Wielkopolska, titulada O 
miłości ojczyzny (1844), que pronto se convirtió en el catecismo del patriota ilustrado76.  
En ella, por ejemplo, Libelt afirma que la educación, elemento separador y 
distintivo, otorga a la inteligencja un papel de liderazgo en el que tiene tanto el 
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privilegio de ser guía de la nación, como la obligación de ser fiel a la comunidad que 
depende de ella77. Los inteligenci del siglo XIX formaban, por tanto, un estrato social 
educado que se ganaba la vida con su trabajo intelectual, pero casi desde el comienzo se 
les atribuyó, además, el cumplimiento de una importante misión social y nacional, con 
lo que los lazos que les unían rebasaron ampliamente la esfera profesional78. A partir de 
entonces, la problemática de sus deberes y responsabilidades hacia el resto de la 
sociedad pasó a ser objeto de discusión habitual entre la inteligencja79.  
Si nos basamos en estudios sociológicos recientes (2005, 2008), la inteligencja80 
englobaría a aquellas personas que cuentan con una posición similar en la estructura 
social, estrechamente vinculada a su profesión y a su formación superior, y 
caracterizada, además, por determinadas posturas, orientaciones, estilos de vida y etos 
semejantes (si bien variables en el tiempo) que también involucran de diversas formas al 
resto de grupos sociales81. Al igual que sucede con otros colectivos como la burguesía o 
la clase obrera, la definición de sus límites es compleja y continúa siendo un tema de 
debate importante en diversos campos académicos82.  
Partiendo de la clasificación de la inteligencja, elaborada por Henryk Domański, 
en seis categorías profesionales no excluyentes, de acuerdo con sus funciones reales en 
la sociedad polaca83, podemos extraer una definición bastante precisa del sujeto 
colectivo de la presente investigación, además de plantear una serie de reflexiones y 
preguntas abiertas acerca de este término:  
Según el autor, una parte de la inteligencja desempeña puestos relacionados con 
su rol de organizadora, como son los de dirección y liderazgo, entre los que se incluyen 
las elites gubernamentales tanto a nivel local como nacional. Domański considera que 
los miembros de este colectivo han sido siempre, incluso después de 1989, la fuente 
principal de la que se ha nutrido la clase política polaca. 
En segundo lugar, la parte más numerosa de la inteligencja la integran 
especialistas procedentes de distintas esferas de producción y del sector servicios. 
Serían el foco principal de modernidad en el país y los encargados de cubrir las 
necesidades indispensables de la vida cotidiana de la población. Esta categoría incluye a 
ingenieros, profesores, médicos, abogados o científicos, cuya profesionalización se 
habría incrementado después de 1989.  
Por otra parte, la alta burocracia y los servicios de expertos que trabajan para el 
Estado formarían un tercer grupo profesional. 
En cuarto lugar, los intelectuales constituirían un nivel superior de la inteligencja. 
Escritores, estudiosos, científicos, periodistas de prestigio, y también los artistas en 
parte, darían voz en el foro público a este colectivo en su conjunto a través de los 
diversos medios de comunicación (radio, televisión, prensa, libros, Internet…). 
Podríamos considerar a esta subcategoría como una élite social y simbólica con una 
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influencia decisiva en la vida pública, en tanto en cuanto ejerce un grado considerable 
de autoridad moral sobre la población y es “creadora de opinión”84.  
 Una de sus actividades más típicas ha sido siempre la crítica a la clase 
gobernante, independientemente del tipo de sistema político vigente85. Según Janusz 
Żarnowski, la “inteligencja-intelectualidad” rara vez ha mantenido una posición neutral: 
en los períodos represivos álgidos de la época estalinista, por ejemplo, sus miembros se 
sentían prácticamente obligados a autodefinirse ideológicamente de manera pública. El 
ser conocidos por todos, en este caso, les beneficiaba a la hora de manifestar su opinión, 
pues los gobiernos de la PRL siempre temieron la repercusión mediática que produciría 
su persecución. Disfrutaban, por tanto, de una cierta (aunque limitada) “garantía” de la 
que no disponía la inteligencja anónima86.  
En su clasificación, Henryk Domański no sólo emplea el concepto de intelectual 
como una subcategoría de la inteligencja, sino que además lo considera muy similar 
para todos los sistemas sociales, rompiendo así con la clásica división (que trataremos 
más adelante) que asocia el término inteligencja únicamente con Europa Oriental y a la 
intelectualidad con los países occidentales. Otros autores también señalan las 
semejanzas o paralelismos, en el plano profesional y desde un punto de vista 
sociológico, entre intelectualidad e inteligencja, pero situándolas a un mismo nivel y sin 
hacerlas totalmente equiparables: por un lado, Hanna Palska denomina “inteligencja 
creadora” (inteligencja twórcza), que considera próxima en significado a “intelectual”, a 
una élite dentro de la inteligencja encargada de la creación cultural; en otras palabras, 
comprende a todas aquellas personas que, a través de su actividad, participan en la 
formación de la conciencia y de la mentalidad del resto de la sociedad, construyendo 
una base o jerarquía de valores y despertando la sensibilidad estética87. Por otro lado, 
Jerzy Mikułowski Pomorski opina que tanto la inteligencja como la intelectualidad 
pueden dividirse profesionalmente en tres grupos: creadores de ideas, funcionarios o 
trabajadores de la administración (clerks) y managers o cargos relacionados con la 
economía88.  
Al estar tratando, en la división de Domański, con grupos funcionales no 
excluyentes entre sí, puede producirse el solapamiento de dos categorías aparentemente 
antagónicas: un “inteligent-intelectual” crítico con el poder político y el Estado que, en 
un momento determinado, pasa a desempeñar un cargo en la vida política.  
Quizás este patrón se reproduce con más frecuencia durante una fase de transición 
a la democracia, como sucedió en Polonia y otros países de Europa Centro-Oriental a 
finales de los años 80 y principios de los 90, cuando una serie de intelectuales 
prominentes, que anteriormente habían sido la “contra-élite” de la oposición, fueron los 
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encargados de iniciar una nueva etapa política, pasando de la clandestinidad, la 
represión y las propuestas alternativas a la oficialidad89.  
Se encuentra bastante extendida la idea de que, a partir de entonces, la trayectoria 
política de estas personas fue corta y decepcionante: al parecer, eran demasiado 
independientes o, sencillamente, se volvieron demasiado “incómodos” para ser buenos 
políticos, y sus ideas supuestamente “idealistas” y “nobles”, tan valiosas durante el 
período comunista, no tenían ya cabida en la política cotidiana y la Realpolitik de un 
régimen democrático estable, con lo que el retorno a su posición social marginal de 
origen fue algo inevitable. Sin embargo, la realidad dista mucho de parecerse a este 
relato, ya que los intelectuales polacos siempre han sido una élite social; por tanto, rara 
vez se han encontrado en una posición “marginal”, ni antes ni después del momento 
álgido de la oposición al comunismo en el país. Al comienzo del régimen de la PRL, la 
inteligencja abiertamente opositora no abundaba, pero siempre gozó de cierto prestigio 
a pesar de las persecuciones y difamaciones del gobierno. Por otro lado, después de 
1989, personas como Jacek Kuroń, Bronisław Geremek o Adam Michnik contribuyeron 
de manera decisiva a construir y consolidar una cultura política y nuevas instituciones 
democráticas en Polonia gracias a sus iniciativas, a su compromiso y a los puestos que 
desempeñaron. Algunos de ellos pudieron desarrollar una dilatada carrera política; 
otros, en cambio, abandonaron sus responsabilidades en la primera línea del poder más 
pronto que tarde, pero continuaron participando activamente en la vida pública y 
manteniendo posiciones de liderazgo en asociaciones independientes, tal y como habían 
hecho antes90.  
Pese a esto, hay estudiosos y pensadores que creen que existe una 
incompatibilidad radical entre el talante de un inteligent y el de un político profesional. 
Podríamos utilizar el paralelo cercano de un escritor como Javier Cercas, quien resume 
de manera muy gráfica este punto de vista:  
 
... en mi opinión, un político es lo contrario de un escritor (o de un novelista), y (…) por eso los 
buenos políticos suelen ser tan malos escritores, y los buenos escritores, tan malos políticos. Un 
buen político toma un problema complejo y lo reduce a sus líneas esenciales para solucionarlo por 
la vía más sencilla y más rápida; un buen escritor, en cambio, toma un problema complejo y lo 
vuelve más complejo todavía o (esto sólo lo hacen los mejores) convierte en un problema aquello 
que antes no era un problema para nadie. Un buen político toma una pregunta y le da una respuesta 
contundente; un buen escritor no hace más que formular preguntas sin respuesta (o con una 
respuesta ambigua, contradictoria, esencialmente irónica). Un buen político es un seductor; un 
buen escritor es un incordio, un rompepelotas o, como dice Vargas Llosa, un aguafiestas.91  
 
Timothy Garton Ash, experto en historia de Europa Centro-Oriental, comparte en 
buena medida el punto de vista de Cercas, pero reformula el problema introduciendo 
explícitamente en la ecuación el término “verdad”, entendida aquí como una categoría 
moral, tal y como se empleó con mucha frecuencia en los círculos opositores del Bloque 
del Este, y sobre la que ahondaremos tanto en esta introducción como a lo largo de todo 
el trabajo. En este sentido, según Garton Ash, más que de incompatibilidad, cabría 
hablar de rivalidad natural entre políticos e intelectuales, porque mientras los primeros 
dirían “verdades a medias” para defender una causa concreta, los segundos aspirarían a 
contar toda la verdad, y considerarían que es su deber denunciar públicamente cualquier 
falsedad e intento de manipulación92.  
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Frente a esta posición, otros pensadores creen que la labor crítica de los 
intelectuales en un sistema democrático debe ejercerse desde dentro de la política y no 
desde fuera. El escritor checo Václav Havel defendió y practicó firmemente la idea de 
que política e intelectualidad son dos esferas compatibles y compaginables, entre las 
que hay fluidez. Como ex-opositores y defensores de unos valores, los intelectuales de 
Europa Centro-Oriental, cree Havel, tienen la oportunidad de cambiar la forma de hacer 
política para darle una mayor dimensión moral, en lugar de permitir que la política les 
cambie a ellos93.  
Retomaremos este debate al finalizar, pero de momento diremos que la relación 
entre la inteligencja (o, si se prefiere, los intelectuales) y el poder siempre ha sido 
variopinta y compleja, no sólo durante períodos dictatoriales y de transición, sino 
también en democracias “maduras”, cuando algunos inteligenci pasan a formar parte de 
gabinetes de “expertos”94 o a ser los asesores de políticos profesionales, ajustándose 
más al perfil de la tercera categoría descrita más arriba, que a la primera. En cualquier 
caso, e independientemente de la constatación creciente, en todos los países, del 
descenso del peso social y político de los intelectuales como categoría, podemos dar por 
hecho que su actividad en la esfera pública, sea cual sea, es una forma de hacer 
política95. 
Dada la importancia de su faceta pública, y en relación con lo anterior, conviene 
adelantar que la labor de la “intelligentsia intelectual”96 va indisolublemente unida a lo 
lingüístico en sus distintas manifestaciones: oral, plástica, performativa y, 
especialmente en nuestro caso, escrita. En este sentido, para la intelligentsia el lenguaje 
no sólo es comunicación sino, ante todo, una de sus principales formas de acción en la 
sociedad y, en consecuencia, también un rasgo diferenciador respecto de otros grupos 
sociales. Así parece percibirlo Jonathan Schell en su introducción a una obra de Adam 
Michnik, una de las figuras más relevantes del panorama opositor polaco que 
estudiaremos en esta investigación:      
 
His [Michnik’s] writings, like the Federalist papers of Madison and Hamilton, or the articles and 
letters of Gandhi, are not only reflections on action but a form of action themselves. With 
equal justice, one might say that his actions -together with those of countless others in Poland- 
are a kind of writing, for action, when it is creative, has a power to disclose new possibilities 
which is as great as that of any book. Michnik's writings, then, both mirror and help to 
shape the new possibilities that have been and are being brought into existence by the Polish 
people.97  
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Vuelve a plantearse aquí, nuevamente, una posible complementariedad o 
antagonismo entre política e intelectualidad en torno al lenguaje: si asumiésemos que la 
forma escrita permite una reflexión pausada, desarrollos amplios y revisiones, y la oral 
implica inmediatez, simplificación, mayor brevedad y respuestas más contundentes, sin 
ambigüedades, parece que la primera encajaría más con “lo intelectual” y la segunda 
con “lo político”. Por supuesto, no se trata en absoluto de prácticas excluyentes, pues 
suelen estar bastante entremezcladas en la práctica98, como hemos señalado antes; 
además, muchas de las cualidades que acabamos de asignar aquí a una y otra son, en 
muchos casos y contextos, intercambiables. Pero también es cierto que la primacía de la 
transmisión escrita sobre la oral (o viceversa) parece otorgar un matiz distinto a las 
cavilaciones de una persona. La cuestión es saber, en cada coyuntura, qué grado y tipo 
de interacción existe entre los distintos elementos presentes en la comunicación: si es el 
emisor quien, en última instancia, tiene potestad sobre la forma y contenido de su 
mensaje, independientemente del canal que utilice para difundirlo o de la reacción de 
sus receptores, o si el canal condiciona más de lo que creemos tanto el contenido como 
la forma del mensaje, y la manera en que el receptor lo capta.  
La quinta categoría propuesta por Henryk Domański, los “creadores de cultura”, 
incluye a artistas plásticos, músicos, actores y, nuevamente, a escritores. Por ejemplo, 
Czesław Miłosz es, según esta división, intelectual y “creador de cultura” 
simultáneamente. Para el polaco medio, éste sería el segmento de la inteligencja más 
reconocible, según las encuestas. No obstante, a nuestro entender, tanto “artistas” como 
“intelectuales” podrían quedar englobados en una misma categoría, pues el arte es una 
forma más de discurso público.  
Siguiendo esta línea, otros autores, como Mikułowski Pomorski, plantean que la 
actividad creadora sería uno de los cuatro criterios básicos para diferenciar a la 
intelligentsia de otros grupos99. En este sentido, ¿sería un requisito indispensable 
“crear” algo para ser un inteligent? Si considerásemos el verbo “crear” en un sentido 
amplio, la mayoría de la intelligentsia  podría calificarse como “creadora”, dado que 
recurre a sus ideas e ingenio para desempeñar su labor. Una labor que no 
necesariamente debe tener como fruto una obra de arte, una teoría o una propuesta de 
índole general, sino también algo mucho más delimitado, con un fin preciso o una 
aplicación práctica muy concreta, como la creación de un sistema de producción para 
organizar una empresa, la mejora de un dispositivo, o la preparación de un alegato para 
defender a un cliente en un juicio.  
Por tanto, lo más importante en la intelligentsia  sería, de acuerdo con Mikułowski 
Pomorski, su interpretación de la realidad y sus reflexiones, independientemente de su 
formación y conocimientos académicos, pues el criterio educativo se vuelve difuso y 
problemático en la práctica, sobre todo cuando existe una sobreabundancia de personas 
con estudios, como sucede desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX100.  
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El sexto y último grupo funcional lo formarían los inteligenci-społecznicy. Este 
segundo término puede traducirse como “activista social”, y abarca a todas aquellas 
personas que desempeñan una labor desinteresada en favor de otros y sienten que tienen 
la misión de ayudar a los necesitados y de luchar contra las desigualdades. Esta idea de 
hecho sería, según Domański, un ingrediente del etos de la inteligencja, pero la 
representan sobre todo profesores, médicos y, en ocasiones, científicos. De acuerdo con 
este autor, dicho etos no habría desaparecido en Polonia pese a las transformaciones que 
ha experimentado la figura del inteligent-społecznik con el cambio a una economía de 
mercado (profesionalización, etc.), pero es una cuestión que sigue siendo objeto de 
debate y controversia101. 
Una vez dicho esto, podríamos apuntar, como primera tentativa de definición, que 
la inteligencja opositora sobre la que he investigado está formada por estudiosos, 
pensadores y profesores, habitualmente con formación especializada en historia, 
filología, filosofía o periodismo, o bien involucrados en actividades de edición y 
difusión de textos. De acuerdo con Maciej Chojnowski y Hanna Palska, desde la 
primera mitad del siglo XIX existirían en Polonia dos formas de entender la cultura y, 
en consecuencia, dos tipos de inteligencja:  
A) En primer lugar, tendríamos a los inteligenci creadores, que promueven y 
desarrollan una cultura “autodidacta” (samowiedna) concentrada en problemas 
ideológicos, y suelen recalcar la idea de auto-conciencia, manejando en exclusiva los 
discursos sobre la inteligencja en su conjunto y reservándose, además, el rol de guías de 
la nación.  
B) En segundo lugar, tendríamos a la inteligencja profesional (zawodowa) o de 
“expertos”, que concibe la cultura de una forma más instrumental. Estos otros 
inteligenci suelen caracterizarse por un mayor sentido práctico y por serles más ajenas 
las reflexiones teóricas o de carácter espiritual.  
Pese a que esta división es, como admiten los propios Chojnowski y Palska102, un 
tanto artificial, los opositores que estudiaremos encajan mejor en la primera forma de 
ser y de entender la cultura que en la segunda, si bien también nos encontraremos con 
personas que, a partir de una educación y trayectoria profesional más acorde con la 
inteligencja de “expertos” o de técnicos, como Zbigniew Bujak, dieron el salto a la 
categoría “autodidacta”, ya que la publicación de sus reflexiones en ensayos o artículos 
pasó a formar una parte muy importante de su actividad cotidiana y fue lo que les 
permitió alcanzar reconocimiento social103. Como veremos a lo largo del trabajo, 
espiritualidad e ideología no estuvieron necesariamente (ni siquiera habitualmente) 
reñidas con el pragmatismo en el pensamiento de la inteligencja opositora polaca de los 
años 70 y 80.  
Otro factor, ya esbozado más arriba, que caracteriza a la inteligencja opositora de 
estos años es el empleo del discurso público como forma de comunicar sus ideas; al 
reflexionar públicamente sobre cuestiones, primordialmente de tipo ético o de valores, 
que le preocupan y a la vez interesan (o generan un renovado interés) en amplios 
sectores de la población, el inteligent no sólo es “creador de opinión” y tendencias, sino 
también autoridad moral, convirtiéndose de hecho en una élite social dentro de la propia 
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inteligencja, tal y como señalaba Domański para el caso de sus “inteligenci-
intelectuales”. Esto se combina con un impulso prometeico de ayudar al resto de grupos 
sociales, que en nuestra investigación se materializa habitualmente en el deseo de 
averiguar y llevar la verdad a los demás. La inteligencja ocuparía, al desempeñar estas 
funciones de servicio, una posición intermedia en la escala social, entre las clases más 
elevadas y las más bajas104, y en muchas ocasiones sería el nexo o la intermediaria entre 
el poder político y el resto de la población, como veremos más adelante. Por tanto, mis 
sujetos de estudio son, esencialmente, una mezcla de la cuarta, la segunda y la sexta 
categoría funcional elaboradas por Domański, que pueden conllevar también el rol de 
“experto” o asesor (tercera categoría) o el salto a la política (primera categoría) desde 
una posición de contra-élite donde, en buena medida, ya desempeñaba ese rol político 
extraoficialmente, en el marco de la oposición.  
Adam Michnik, en uno de sus muchos ensayos, distinguió tres comportamientos 
de la inteligencja: 
 
... reality is viewed in one way by the active oppositionist, in another by the intellectual who 
is giving an account of it, and still differently by the moralist who is judging the ‘visible 
world’. Each of these points of view has its light and dark side. The oppositionist’s view, for 
example, is inevitably tainted by one-sidedness; this helps him to reshape the world but prevents 
him from perceiving its many different dimensions. Moralism enables the individual to notice the 
ethical traps that lie in wait for anyone who takes on active responsibility, but it also favors an 
exaggerated cult of ‘clean hands’. The spectator’s view more easily encompasses an understanding 
of the complexity of the human condition but clouds the search for solutions to such questions as 
‘What should be done?’ and ‘What is good and what is evil?’. 
One’s view of the world depends on whether one wants to change the world, understand it, or 
pass moral judgment upon it.105  
 
Acción, observación y juicio moral se combinan en distintas proporciones, de 
hecho,  en la mayoría de los pensadores que estudiaremos, incluido el propio Michnik. 
La inteligencja que nos ocupa la integran personas que ejercían una labor intelectual (o 
empezaron a ejercerla a partir de su actividad opositora) con una clara escala de valores, 
que estaban involucradas activamente en la oposición y que, además, fueron testigos y 
cronistas de acontecimientos socio-políticos y culturales de gran calado en Polonia. En 
suma, si reunían las tres funciones descritas por Michnik, y aún más si aceptamos el 
planteamiento de Schell de que la escritura, o cualquier otro lenguaje, puede ser una 
forma de acción y la acción una forma de escritura, ¿quiere esto decir que su visión del 
mundo y de la situación polaca era más “completa” y equilibrada, haciéndoles más 
competentes a la hora de tomar decisiones? La pregunta quedará, por el momento, en el 
aire, pero aprovechamos para apuntar aquí que equilibrar y combinar será, 
precisamente, una tónica habitual entre algunos miembros de la inteligencja a la hora de 
evaluar tanto el presente como el legado histórico de Polonia.   
Hasta ahora hemos partido de la base de que la inteligencja es un grupo social que 
tiene una existencia real. No obstante, otros especialistas prefieren tratarla 
primordialmente como una categoría mítica. En este sentido, la inteligencja sería, según 
Jolanta Babiuch-Luxmoore, un elemento intrínseco muy importante de la conciencia 
histórica y nacional de Polonia, una formación moral-intelectual con orígenes en la 
inteligencja del siglo XIX que los polacos identificarían con la tradición y la mentalidad 
del país, con un modelo de sensibilidad y con un etos social determinados. Es decir, la 
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inteligencja también puede ser entendida como un sistema de valores (“lo que hay en 
nosotros”) y como un patrón de comportamiento o unas normas de actuación (“lo que 
hay entre nosotros”). Sólo así se explicaría, dice esta autora, la recurrencia y virulencia 
del debate acerca de la inteligencja en el país, que se remonta a la segunda mitad del 
siglo XIX, y se retoma sobre todo en momentos de cambios políticos difíciles y a 
menudo dramáticos, como sucede con otros mitos, especialmente cuando la posición o 
la existencia de la propia inteligencja se ve amenazada106. Las tesis sobre su posible 
desaparición o la formación de otra de nuevo cuño cubren cientos de páginas en 
periódicos y revistas desde principios del siglo XX, sobre todo durante años tan críticos 
y llenos de significado como son los de 1905-1907, 1918, 1926, 1945, 1956 y 1989107.  
De acuerdo con Babiuch-Luxmoore y Jerzy Jedlicki, el mito de la inteligencja 
polaca surgió a la par que el convencimiento de que ésta desempeñaba un rol 
suprahistórico vinculado a la pervivencia de la tradición nacional, y también al mismo 
tiempo que nacía y se desarrollaba la moderna conciencia nacional en Europa. La 
inteligencja representó, durante el siglo XIX, un sistema de valores y un etos social 
específicos, entre cuyos componentes destacaba un fuerte sentimiento de 
responsabilidad hacia la nación. Paradójicamente, cuanto más se desdibujaba su 
contorno sociológico en la realidad, más se tendía a escribir, debatir y generalizar sobre 
ella. Sin duda, la división del territorio polaco entre los imperios ruso, austríaco y 
prusiano desde finales del siglo XVIII fue un factor clave a la hora de situar la 
problemática de la teoría nacional en el centro del pensamiento nobiliario y 
revolucionario108.    
Además, en una cultura donde la comunidad y lo colectivo ocupan un lugar 
especial, como sucede en la polaca (fuertemente influida, entre otros factores, por el 
catolicismo), la sociedad demanda mitos sobre un grupo que sea receptivo a las 
cuestiones nacionales y se dedique a servir a los demás, especialmente a los más 
desfavorecidos109. En Polonia, los intelectuales-inteligenci serían, paradójicamente, 
tanto el objeto de esta petición colectiva como el sujeto al que va dirigida, 
especialmente si se ocupan de escribir y reflexionar sobre la historia, con lo que no 
siempre es fácil determinar dónde acaba uno y empieza otro. Como planteábamos más 
arriba, cuando los historiadores u otros humanistas participan en los debates públicos 
sobre el pasado, pueden verse en la tesitura de tener que confrontar su discurso y 
formación “científicos” con la demanda pública de una historia que sustente una 
identidad colectiva110. Sólo que, además, en el contexto polaco, el mito nacional que se 
les solicita versaría en buena parte sobre sí mismos, como abanderados que son (o se les 
considera) de la inteligencja. 
Que la mayor parte de las reflexiones sobre la inteligencja las hagan los propios 
inteligenci conlleva una limitación de perspectiva, pero también la oportunidad de 
desarrollar una profunda autocrítica, que surge precisamente del sentimiento de 
pertenencia a la inteligencja y de la responsabilidad que implica, tanto a nivel colectivo 
como individual, ser su representante en el foro público. La autoconciencia de los 
inteligenci tiene, por tanto, un carácter discursivo y procesual, y se conforma a partir de 
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las (meta)narrativas y los términos que ellos mismos elaboran111. Las palabras y los 
conceptos son su “arma” y, a la vez, su “alma”, pues a través de ellos perciben y definen 
la realidad y, por extensión, a sí mismos112.  
La cuestión, en nuestro caso, es saber cómo percibían o definían su labor los 
propios intelectuales opositores polacos para determinar si realmente se les planteó esta 
disyuntiva en algún momento y, de ser así,  conocer cómo la resolvieron. ¿Creían, en la 
misma línea que sus contemporáneos Witold Kula y Jerzy Topolski, que su misión 
consistía esencialmente en “desmitificar”? Si, como apunta Ifversen, los mitos justifican 
un determinado orden y autoridad en una comunidad113, y la inteligencja forma parte de 
esos mitos, ¿no se exponía ésta, precisamente, a la pérdida de su autoridad moral sobre 
la sociedad polaca si renunciaba a los mitos en sus discursos históricos? ¿No estaría 
también, en cierto modo, “aniquilando” su identidad colectiva? 
Frente al antagonismo tajante entre historia y mito, cabe otra posibilidad: que la 
inteligencja, conscientemente o no, estuviera desenvolviéndose en un terreno 
exclusivamente mítico. Es decir, que los inteligenci, en su faceta tradicional de 
“creadores de modelos” y propuestas alternativas114, se estuvieran dedicando a revisar 
los mitos que conforman la tradición histórica polaca para decidir cuáles eran 
“positivos” y merecía la pena preservar, y cuáles habían sido perjudiciales internacional 
y socialmente para Polonia y, por tanto, debían descartarse de ahí en adelante115. Esto 
les permitiría, claro está, salvaguardar su propio mito, o bien someterlo a una revisión y 
redefinición en caso de que lo considerasen necesario116.  
Como la autodefinición es una cuestión de contrastes que lleva implícita la 
definición de aquello contra lo que se lucha, también debemos tener en cuenta en este 
punto qué opinión tenía la inteligencja opositora sobre la política histórica y educativa 
del régimen de la PRL: si la consideraba un intento de destruir los mitos clásicos de la 
cultura polaca a través del materialismo histórico y el cientifismo (para suplantarlos, en 
todo caso, por otros que carecían de arraigo en la tradición nacional), o bien las veía 
como un intento de mitificación de nuevo cuño a través de la posterior doctrina del 
“nacional-comunismo”117. 
Otra cuestión recurrente en los foros académicos de humanistas y científicos 
sociales consiste en determinar la diferencia entre “intelectualidad” e intelligentsia.  
El caso más conocido y estudiado en Europa occidental es el del “intellectuel” 
francés, directamente relacionado con el affaire Dreyfus (1894-1906) y con los 
escritores que salieron en defensa pública de este militar de origen judío acusado de 
espionaje, especialmente Émile Zola, que en 1898 publicó su famoso artículo 
“J’accuse” al respecto118.  
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Según muchos estudiosos, los intelectuales y los inteligenci habrían aparecido en 
regiones del mundo con trayectorias históricas distintas: mientras que la intelectualidad 
sería propia de los países occidentales, la intelligentsia se habría originado en los países 
de Europa Oriental, lo cual explicaría sus diferencias. De acuerdo con esta línea, los 
intelectuales son el resultado de la fusión de la élite educada de Occidente con su clase 
media (educación + propiedad); en el Este, en cambio, esa unión no llegó a producirse 
debido a la debilidad y poco atractivo de su burguesía. En tierras polacas, 
concretamente, en lugar de existir una clase media autónoma, se contaba con un 
estamento noble bastante amplio que se había ido empobreciendo de generación en 
generación debido a la ausencia de una ley de mayorazgo que evitase la fragmentación y 
el reparto de las propiedades entre todos los herederos. Por tanto, tampoco existía la 
figura del “segundón” que, en otros países, había tenido que buscar su sustento 
engrosando las filas del clero o del funcionariado estatal. Con la pérdida, además, de su 
independencia como Estado en 1795, el acceso de polacos educados a los cuadros 
gubernamentales se vio seriamente limitado por motivos políticos e ideológicos, y el 
atraso socio-económico de la zona se acentuó. La nobleza polaca, una vez perdido su 
liderazgo político y económico por la destrucción del orden tradicional, buscó nuevas 
formas de aceptación social basadas en la educación, la cultura y el sentimiento de 
responsabilidad patriótica. Esto causó que un nuevo elemento estructural de la sociedad, 
la inteligencja polaca, se desarrollara más allá del sistema funcionarial de un Estado 
opresor (a cargo de imperios extranjeros hasta 1918) y se convirtiera en antagonista de 
éste de forma abierta o latente. En este contexto, la inteligencja desarrolló su idea de 
misión, de servicio permanente y de sacrificio, y se encargó de desempeñar las tareas de 
carácter nacional que los Estados particionistas no estaban dispuestos a hacer. En otras 
palabras, aquellos cometidos que en Occidente realizaban un aparato estatal moderno, 
instituciones territoriales y profesionales, empresas, etc., fueron asumidos en Polonia 
por la inteligencja, al menos en la teoría119. 
No obstante, otros autores, como Denis Sdvizhkov, rechazan estas tesis y afirman 
que la intelligentsia es más un fenómeno “global” que propio de la “periferia” europea, 
con sus circunstancias específicas de atraso, regímenes autoritarios o absolutistas, etc., 
caso de Polonia o Rusia. Según este investigador, el concepto de intelligentsia surgió 
cuando la idea de un “tercer estado” uniforme, característica del siglo XVIII, fue 
desafiada en el siglo XIX. Se produjeron entonces numerosos debates en toda Europa, 
primero entre los publicistas y en 1848 en los parlamentos, acerca de si únicamente 
daba derecho a la representación política y al poder la combinación de educación 
(Bildung) y propiedad (Besitz), o si el factor educativo podía actuar de forma autónoma. 
La intelligentsia, de acuerdo con esta postura, habría mantenido tanto en Oriente 
como en Occidente una relación conflictiva no sólo con la burguesía, sino también con 
el Estado, al que habría tratado de esquivar y empujar fuera de la política a través del 
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concepto de nación y apelando a distintas fuerzas, como la comunidad, la religión, el 
proletariado o la bohemia. Igualmente, la contradicción entre el progresismo liberal de 
la intelligentsia y su radicalismo revolucionario también se produjo en diversos países 
europeos, no sólo en territorio ruso o en los choques entre las corrientes insurreccionista 
y positivista polacas120. No obstante, a lo largo del siglo XX los términos fueron 
transformándose, y fue en ese momento cuando la palabra “intelectualidad” se asignó al 
Oeste y la intelligentsia se reservó exclusivamente para el Este, lo que se vio reforzado 
por el posterior empleo de esta última por parte de los regímenes comunistas121. 
Independientemente de si la división entre intelligentsia e intelectualidad tiene 
raíces geográficas e históricas, o, como apuntan otros, podemos hallar tanto 
intelectuales como inteligenci conviviendo en una misma sociedad, lo cierto es que, al 
margen de compartir determinadas características externas, como su nivel educativo o 
su profesión, a unos y a otros se les atribuyen rasgos y comportamientos distintos. Por 
una parte, a la intelligentsia le guía su sentido del deber social y moral hacia la nación y, 
aunque sus miembros tengan ideologías muy dispares, todos dan prioridad a lo 
inmaterial y lo espiritual, y también a lo colectivo, frente a la prosperidad o el progreso 
materiales, además de albergar pretensiones de liderazgo nacional122.  
Por otra parte, los intelectuales valoran sobre todo la individualidad y la 
autonomía, y muestran, desde un punto de vista sociológico, una mayor profesionalidad, 
creatividad y competitividad, pero menor fidelidad hacia unas determinadas ideas y 
también menor compromiso con la sociedad. Es decir, si para un inteligent lo más 
importante son las consecuencias sociales que tiene su trabajo, más que la realización de 
éste en sí, para un intelectual la meta es cumplir con su tarea de la mejor forma posible, 
sin tener en cuenta para quién trabaja o lo que eso puede generar después. Se produce 
entonces, según Mikułowski Pomorski, una suerte de división de tareas, de forma que la 
intelligentsia se encarga de defender las virtudes humanísticas y ciudadanas mientras 
que los intelectuales tienden más a la búsqueda de la verdad123.     
Sin embargo, en nuestra opinión, es posible que la realidad europea desde el 
mismo siglo XIX, y más aún en la actualidad, rebase este tipo de compartimentaciones. 
Por ejemplo, lo que en muchas ocasiones se llamó “intelectual” en Europa Occidental, 
desde  Émile Zola y su “J’accuse” hasta aquellos escritores y pensadores que se 
comprometieron con la causa de la oposición polaca en los años 70 y 80 del siglo XX, 
tiene más que ver con el perfil de la intelligentsia descrito más arriba que con el de 
intelectualidad, pues se trataba de personas que defendían el bien común y los valores 
cívicos, denunciaban las injusticias y atropellos cometidos dentro y fuera de su país, 
criticaban las políticas o la pasividad de sus estados y trataban de movilizar a la 
sociedad. De hecho, como se ha visto antes, otros autores polacos plantean la 
terminología a la inversa: inteligencja como colectivo numéricamente muy amplio y en 
su mayoría más centrado en su profesión que en la participación en la esfera pública y, 
dentro de ésta, los intelectuales, un grupo reducido que trasciende los márgenes de su 
especialidad y desea influir en la vida pública (moral, tendencias culturales, actitudes 
sociales, elecciones políticas) a través de su opinión libremente expresada, y no en 
calidad de expertos a los que se les pide consejo. Es decir, personas, sabias o necias, que 
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se inmiscuyen (por lo menos “de vez en cuando”) en asuntos ajenos, defienden 
determinados valores y poseen cierta autoridad o prestigio moral124.  
Probablemente la diferencia más notable y crucial entre el pensamiento de la 
intelligentsia occidental y el de la intelligentsia europeo-oriental ─debido, ahora sí, a la 
trayectoria divergente de sus respectivas regiones─ es el factor nacional, que era (aún 
es) determinante en la segunda, pero se encuentra muy difuminado o ausente en la 
primera, que suele tomar otros colectivos más amplios (ej. las sociedades democráticas 
capitalistas), más reducidos (una región, una ciudad), o diferentes (sociedad, 
ciudadanía) como interlocutores en sus discursos.    
Si vinculamos todo esto con la relación entre política e intelligentsia-
intelectualidad, parece más plausible que sean aquellos intelectuales que dan prioridad a 
los valores e intereses colectivos, frente a su propia individualidad y autonomía, los que 
respalden o se pongan al servicio de un poder político que, al menos en apariencia, 
encarne esos mismos valores y busque el bien común. De hecho, así explican y 
justifican muchos inteligenci opositores en Polonia su inicial fascinación y apoyo a la 
ideología y estado comunistas, de los que se desengañaron y separaron posteriormente 
al comprobar, según ellos, que la teoría no se correspondía con lo que finalmente ponían 
en práctica los gobiernos soviético y de la PRL.  
Señala Barbara Falk que, en cierto sentido, es posible interpretar la creciente 
disidencia de los intelectuales polacos posterior a 1968 como un intento de “revertir” o 
“enmendar” su “desviación” previa a través del desarrollo de un compromiso social, 
basado en la independencia de pensamiento y de acción, el respeto de los derechos 
individuales y la reintroducción de la moralidad en la política. No obstante, a 
continuación la autora destaca que, irónicamente, estos inteligenci volvieron a cometer 
el mismo “error” por el que fueron criticados, sólo que al servicio de otras ideas y 
prácticas políticas (pluralismo, democracia…)125. En definitiva, todo parece apuntar que 
en este tipo de contextos la noción de inteligent no sólo es difícilmente separable de la 
política, entendida en un sentido teórico, sino también de un concepto igualmente 
amplio pero mucho más práctico, el “ejercicio del poder” (o el compromiso político-
cívico activo), con todos los obstáculos y contradicciones que median entre una y otro, 
y los consiguientes dilemas morales que suscitan éstos últimos. 
Por último, y en relación con lo dicho anteriormente acerca de la falta de 
correspondencia entre dichos y hechos en los regímenes comunistas, también resulta 
difícil concebir que la intelligentsia no persiguiese de alguna forma la verdad (teniendo 
en cuenta, eso sí, lo dicho previamente sobre el discurso mítico), pues ésta se integra, 
como avanzábamos antes, en su corpus de valores y forma parte habitual de sus 
reflexiones, más aún al vivir bajo un sistema dictatorial donde se manipula la 
información y los relatos sobre el pasado, como en el caso que nos ocupa.  
Dicho esto, ¿quiénes encajarían, entonces, en la definición anterior de 
“intelectual”? Posiblemente un amplio sector de las clases medias con formación 
especializada y cargos de “expertos” en distintos ámbitos; sin embargo, el grado de 
compromiso con la comunidad y la escala de valores puede variar considerablemente de 
una persona a otra, aunque tengan un nivel socio-económico y profesional muy 
semejante. Esta cuestión, por supuesto supera con creces nuestro ámbito de trabajo y 
exige análisis mucho más pormenorizados de los que seríamos capaces de proporcionar 
en estas páginas. No obstante, creemos que, a la luz de todo lo dicho hasta aquí, ser un 
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inteligent comprende, ante todo, una determinada actitud ante los demás y hacia uno 
mismo, que va, eso sí, indisolublemente unida, en el caso de Europa Oriental, a un 
componente nacional que ha sido clave en el pensamiento y la cultura de países como 
Rusia y Polonia durante la Edad Contemporánea, tal y como apuntaremos brevemente a 
continuación. 
De acuerdo con Denis Sdvizhkov, la primera mitad del siglo XIX es una 
prolongación de la “era de la racionalidad” (siglo XVIII) y, simultáneamente, la “era de 
la nacionalidad” impulsada por el movimiento romántico, con lo cual la intelligentsia es 
percibida, por un lado, como racional y progresista, y por otro como representante de la 
nación. De esta forma, la conciencia histórica nacional recién adquirida involucrará y se 
asociará, desde el principio, a los inteligenci126:  
 
«We» is no longer capitalised and related to the person of the monarch, the statement ‘we also 
have intelligence’ is equated to ‘we belong to the world history’. This is the social interpretation of 
cogito ergo sum ─the nation is only possible as an ‘intelligent’ nation. And the reverse ─a true 
intelligentsia may only be a national one.127  
 
Posteriormente, en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, impera en Europa la visión de la 
comunidad como actor principal. Esta comunidad es un nuevo “organismo autoconsciente” 
que necesita y encuentra su “sensor/ termómetro social” (social sensorium) en la 
intelligentsia, el “órgano pensante de la nación”, que pasa a ser el “tesoro” y el objeto de 
sacrum de la comunidad. La intelligentsia se convierte también entonces en representante 
de la “nación cultural”, opuesta, en muchos casos, al Estado, con lo que el anterior “we 
also have intelligence” se transforma en “only we have intelligence”128. 
En este sentido, las trayectorias de la intelligentsia rusa129 y la inteligencja polaca 
han discurrido casi en paralelo, si bien con ciertas diferencias relacionadas con su 
desigual situación política e internacional: Rusia atraviesa esta fase como una gran 
potencia en expansión, Polonia como un Estado desmembrado; los rusos se enfrentan a 
las tendencias extranjerizantes, arbitrariedades y políticas represivas de su propio 
Estado; los polacos, en cambio, hacen frente a tres gobiernos extranjeros.  
En la síntesis que hace Orlando Figes sobre la cultura rusa podemos ver 
reflejadas, de hecho, muchas de las características que también definieron a los 
inteligenci polacos, y que ya han sido mencionadas a lo largo de esta disertación: 
 
Durante los últimos doscientos años las artes rusas han sido el escenario de los debates 
políticos, filosóficos y religiosos precisamente por la ausencia de un parlamento o de una 
prensa libre. Como escribió Tolstoi en “Unas pocas palabras sobre Guerra y paz” (1868), las 
grandes obras en prosa de la tradición rusa no son novelas en el sentido europeo. Son 
enormes estructuras poéticas que deben considerarse de manera simbólica, no muy diferentes de 
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los iconos, auténticos laboratorios en los que experimentar con las ideas. Y, al igual que una 
ciencia o una religión, fueron impulsadas por la búsqueda de la verdad. El tema común a todas 
esas obras es Rusia: su personalidad, su historia, sus costumbres y tradiciones, su esencia 
espiritual y su destino. De una manera extraordinaria, tal vez exclusiva, la energía artística del 
país estaba dedicada casi por entero al intento de aprehender el concepto de su nacionalidad. 
En ningún otro lugar del mundo el artista ha sufrido tanto la carga del liderazgo moral y de ser 
profeta nacional, ni tampoco ha sido más temido y perseguido por el Estado. Aislados de la 
Rusia oficial por los políticos y de la Rusia campesina por su educación, los artistas rusos se 
dedicaron a crear una comunidad nacional de valores e ideas a través de la literatura y del 
arte. ¿Qué significaba ser ruso? ¿Cuál era el lugar y la misión de Rusia en el mundo? ¿Y dónde se 
encontraba la verdadera Rusia? ¿En Europa o en Asia? ¿En San Petersburgo o en Moscú? ¿En el 
imperio del zar o en la aldea embarrada y de una sola calle donde vivía el “tío” de Natacha [en 
Guerra y paz]? Ésas eran las “preguntas malditas” que ocuparon la mente de todos los escritores, 
críticos literarios, historiadores, pintores, compositores, teólogos y filósofos de verdad de la edad 
dorada de la cultura rusa, desde Pushkin hasta Pasternak.130  
 
De todas las “preguntas malditas” que atormentaban a los inteligenci rusos, las 
que más nos interesan en esta investigación, y están estrechamente emparentadas con el 
pensamiento polaco contemporáneo, son las relacionadas con el sentido de la historia, 
que pasamos a desgranar ahora. 
En el último cuarto del siglo XVIII se inicia el proceso de formación de la 
intelligentsia rusa, que se extiende a lo largo del siglo XIX hasta la década de 1860, 
cuando se manifiesta como grupo social autoconsciente con la creación de la doctrina 
populista131. Aproximadamente hacia la mitad de ese proceso, la vivencia en primera 
persona de la Gran Guerra Patriótica contra Napoleón (1812) alteró la visión del mundo 
de toda una generación de combatientes de origen noble, lo que les alejó de la forma de 
vida de sus padres y les hizo adquirir una nueva conciencia histórica que marcó el final 
del reformismo aristocrático132. En este sentido, un miembro del movimiento 
decembrista manifestaba: “Habíamos participado en los acontecimientos más 
importantes de la historia, y era insoportable regresar a la existencia hueca de San 
Petersburgo, a escuchar las charlas sin sentido de los viejos sobre las denominadas 
virtudes del pasado. Habíamos avanzado cien años”133. Luchando mano a mano con sus 
siervos campesinos (los mujik), había florecido en estos jóvenes un sentimiento de 
pertenencia a una nueva comunidad de virtud patriótica y fraternidad, la nación, donde 
nobleza y campesinado debían vivir en armonía. De este modo, en lugar de regresar a 
esa “existencia hueca”, algunos excombatientes comenzaron a dedicarse 
profesionalmente, pese al rechazo de sus familias, a distintas actividades artísticas, que 
concebían como una forma de servicio a la nación en contraste con el servicio al Estado 
característico de la nobleza rusa134. 
Durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX, la filosofía, la historia y la crítica literaria 
sustituyeron a la política y a la religión a la hora de responder a las “preguntas malditas” 
acerca del sentido de la historia, de la cultura y de la vida misma. Gracias a la influencia 
de la filosofía alemana, especialmente de las obras de Schelling, los pensadores rusos 
volvieron a creer en la existencia de un ideal y en que tanto la vida como la historia 
tenían un propósito, lo que, aparte de proporcionar cierta seguridad y consuelo, fomentó 
posturas sociopolíticas conservadoras y, paradójicamente, también fue el punto de 
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partida del pensamiento revolucionario ruso135. Por otro lado, en el campo de la filosofía 
de la historia las tesis de Herder tuvieron un impacto notable, especialmente las ideas de 
que la verdad se encontraba dentro de la historia y de que cada cultura se desarrollaba y 
alcanzaba su esplendor en el mundo de una forma distinta136. 
Herder creía, además, que Rusia iba a jugar un papel excepcional en la siguiente 
etapa histórica, lo que, combinado con el pensamiento schellingiano ruso y la influencia 
de distintos credos cristianos, dio paso a la convicción de que Rusia debía redimir 
espiritualmente a una civilización europea occidental decadente y materialista. De esta 
forma, el sufrimiento y la humillación que Occidente le había infligido a Rusia a 
principios de la Edad Contemporánea fue entendido como un proceso purificador que 
garantizaba al país un papel redentor y sanador de las heridas espirituales europeas137.  
No obstante, estas ideas mesiánicas calaron aún más hondo en los movimientos 
nacionalistas de los territorios anexionados por el Imperio ruso, con poetas como los 
polacos Adam Mickiewicz, Zygmunt Krasiński y Juliusz Słowacki, o la Hermandad 
ucraniana de los Santos Cirilo y Metodio138. De hecho, el catolicismo fue un elemento 
clave en la protección de la identidad nacional polaca y dentro de su corriente 
nacionalista durante el siglo XIX. La creencia en una misión histórica de salvación y 
redención donde Polonia es (en palabras de Mickiewicz) “el Cristo de las naciones”, 
constituye, según Ewa Domańska, uno de los discursos míticos provenientes del 
Romanticismo más importantes y duraderos de la tradición cultural polaca, junto con el 
de la insurrección. El mesianismo polaco viene determinado por otros tres componentes 
míticos: la creencia en la especificidad de Polonia como nación y la creencia de que 
Polonia era el “bastión de la cristiandad”, ambas con raíces en el período barroco (siglos 
XVI-XVII), y, por último, la localización geográfica del país, de carácter más reciente 
(situación entre dos grandes potencias: Rusia/Unión Soviética y Prusia/ Alemania). 
Asimismo, los dos mitos polacos clásicos sobre Occidente son muy semejantes o 
equiparables a los de la tradición rusa: por un lado, la idea de que Occidente está en 
deuda con Polonia, que acarrea la expectativa de su ayuda en el futuro; por otro, la 
convicción de que Occidente sufre una crisis de valores debido a su materialismo139. 
Volviendo de nuevo a Rusia, dentro de la controversia entre las corrientes 
eslavófila y occidentalista, que tienen su origen en el idealismo romántico, surgen 
tendencias que desarrollan o completan los primeros sentimientos patrióticos nacionales 
de 1812, como la idealización de la comunidad campesina y del “espíritu del pueblo” 
(narodnost), que se conciben como la fuerza vital regeneradora de la historia (también 
entre los revolucionarios polacos de entonces), o la idea, inspirada en Saint-Simon, de 
que la “edad de oro” rusa no pertenece a un pasado remoto, sino que aún está por venir, 
cuando Rusia asuma el liderazgo del resurgimiento de la civilización europea140. La 
convicción de que se tenía una importante misión que cumplir generó entre los artistas y 
escritores rusos (al igual que entre los polacos, como ya hemos recalcado anteriormente) 
un fuerte sentido de responsabilidad hacia la colectividad, en este caso hacia la nación, 
que encontramos, por ejemplo, en Nikolái Gogol y Alexander Ivanov141.   
A partir de la década de 1838-1848, además, el pensamiento hegeliano tuvo una 
influencia crucial en el Imperio ruso, pues ofreció una filosofía de la historia racional y 
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global que reforzaba, una vez más, la idea de que la historia tenía un sentido, y que llevó 
por vez primera a los occidentalistas (Stankevich, Belinski, Bakunin, Herzen...) a 
plantearse la revolución como una opción seria, dado que se interpretó que la dialéctica 
de la historia rusa exigía (justo al contrario que en Alemania) la destrucción total del 
Estado. Hegel puso las bases para que los pensadores rusos se apoyasen más en una 
filosofía profética de la historia que en la elaboración de un programa de reformas 
práctico para su país, urgiéndoles a la acción “en nombre de la necesidad histórica y no 
de imperativos morales”142. En los movimientos revolucionarios polacos también 
podemos apreciar ese gusto por la profecía histórica y la acción armada, sólo que, en 
este caso, los levantamientos se realizaban en nombre de principios tales como la 
libertad y la independencia, y después de 1863 las corrientes reformistas empezaron a 
tener más peso y plantaron cara al idealismo romántico. 
Con todos estos ingredientes, en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX se produjo un 
giro de lo filosófico a lo social en el pensamiento ruso. Basándose en las ideas de Comte 
sobre el progreso histórico143, los artistas vislumbraron un ideal al que servir: el 
advenimiento de una nueva edad de oro sin siervos ni burocracia, ni propiedad privada o 
autoridad central represiva. Estos pensamientos fueron encarnados a partir de la década 
de 1860 por la doctrina del populismo (narodnichestvo) que, a grandes rasgos, fue la 
versión autóctona del socialismo utópico moralista y un producto cultural de síntesis 
entre las corrientes eslavófila y occidentalizante previas. Desde ese momento, la 
intelligentsia recibió oficialmente su nombre y comenzó a considerársela como la fuerza 
motriz de la historia; una historia que se contemplaba, por influencia del positivismo y 
del pensamiento de Proudhon, con una gran fe y optimismo. Los populistas combinaban 
la protesta y la lucha por las mejoras sociales con la conciencia de ser herederos del 
pensamiento social ruso, es decir, continuadores de las tradiciones críticas. Se produjo 
también entonces un importante conflicto no resuelto entre dos posturas en el seno de la 
intelligentsia: entre aquella que veía las cosas como realmente eran, en toda su crudeza, 
y aquella otra que deseaba fervientemente mejorarlas, aunque se consideraba que ambas 
eran dos aspectos de una Verdad única144.  
Aparte del populismo evolucionista, otros movimientos surgidos a partir de la 
Revolución iconoclasta rusa, tan dispares como el imperialismo paneslavista 
reaccionario y el jacobinismo revolucionario, también sostenían que estaban a punto de 
suceder cambios dramáticos en la historia humana y apoyaban la búsqueda de la verdad 
absoluta, con lo que parecía más fácil, a juicio de Billington, pasar entonces de una 
ideología extrema a otra que conformarse con un enfoque liberal más mundano que sólo 
buscase el placer o verdades a medias145.  
Con motivo de todo lo dicho anteriormente, la propia historiografía experimentó 
también, cómo no, un boom durante el siglo XIX, convirtiéndose en uno de los campos 
de batalla predilectos entre corrientes que tenían visiones opuestas de Rusia y su 
destino. Aparecieron numerosas obras, cátedras universitarias y sociedades para el 
estudio dedicadas a buscar en el pasado lejano los rasgos o puntos fuertes de Rusia que 
les habían llevado a la victoria de 1812. La Historia del Estado ruso (1816-1826) de 
Nikolái Karamzin, dividida en doce volúmenes, fue la primera historia escrita por un 
ruso que representaba el pasado de Rusia como una narrativa nacional. En ella, el autor 
proporciona una visión estatista y monárquica de la historia del Imperio, combinando el 
academicismo con técnicas narrativas propias de la novela y acentuando las 
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motivaciones psicológicas de los protagonistas históricos (Boris Godunov, Iván el 
Terrible…), lo que inspiró numerosas obras artísticas de todo género, como las óperas 
históricas de Rimsky-Korsakov o Mussorgsky. En cambio, los decembristas, con su 
tendencia democratizadora y sus contactos con los revolucionarios polacos, hacían 
hincapié en el espíritu rebelde y amante de la libertad del pueblo ruso e idealizaban no 
sólo las repúblicas medievales de Pskov y Nóvgorod (con su veche o asamblea) o las 
revueltas cosacas de los siglos XVII-XVIII, sino también la tradición parlamentaria 
(sejm) de la antigua unión polaco-lituana en la República de las Dos Naciones, cuando 
Polonia aún conservaba su independencia como Estado. También tuvo mucha 
importancia en su pensamiento histórico una obra del lituano Timoteo Bok, que 
contribuyó a difundir la idea romántica de la existencia de un gobierno popular en 
Europa Oriental previo al Drang nach Osten alemán a finales de la Edad Media146. 
El interés por la historia y la preocupación por el verdadero destino de Rusia se 
acentuaron aún más después de la derrota de los decembristas en 1825, pues a partir de 
entonces pareció claro que el Imperio no tomaría el camino que habían seguido los 
países occidentales hacia un Estado constitucional moderno. Los debates sobre los 
orígenes históricos de Rusia también fueron habituales, sobre todo entre los populistas, 
que defendían una mezcla de costumbres reales de la antigua Rusia y de pasado 
parcialmente idealizado e imaginado, y sentían fascinación por los viejos creyentes y el 
período histórico que se extiende entre la Era de las Turbulencias y el reinado de Pedro 
el Grande147.   
Por otro lado, en el caso polaco, la inteligencja decimonónica concibió la 
democracia republicana sármata como el modelo histórico de sus ideales, pues, a sus 
ojos, potenciaba lo colectivo (en contraste con la democracia liberal, que resaltaría la 
independencia y autosuficiencia del individuo), el compromiso, la co-participación y la 
solidaridad grupal, el servicio al bien común…, en una palabra, todo aquello que los 
inteligenci querían representar en su sociedad. Más aún teniendo en cuenta que, debido 
a sus orígenes nobiliarios, se consideraban descendientes directos de la nobleza sármata, 
y por tanto legítimos herederos y continuadores de su etos148.  
Dejando atrás el siglo XIX, y sobre todo desde que Polonia recuperó su 
independencia en 1918, los debates y controversias acerca de la posible desaparición de 
la inteligencja o la transformación de sus cometidos cada vez fueron más frecuentes. El 
empeño por perfilarla y aprehenderla podía manifestar tanto el deseo de continuidad de 
la tradición que ésta representaba (presentando la identidad social de los autores que 
escribían sobre ella) como la necesidad de ruptura, reinterpretación o modificación de 
su contenido (cometido ideológico), además, claro está, de un intento de descripción 
“objetiva” del fenómeno (cometido cognoscitivo)149. Fue en este contexto de 
replanteamiento socio-cultural, especialmente desde el período de entreguerras, donde 
la futura inteligencja opositora de los años 70 y 80 vivió y se desarrolló. 
De acuerdo con Jolanta Babiuch-Luxmoore, a lo largo de todo el período de la 
República Popular de Polonia (1948-1989) los debates en torno al mito de la 
inteligencja pivotaron sobre dos ejes: 
El primero de ellos, más propio del pensamiento oficial del régimen, consistía en 
desmitificar a la inteligencja argumentando, en primer lugar, que el mito del siglo XIX 
no se correspondía con la realidad actual, pues la inteligencja moderna no aspiraba a ser 
una élite intelectual y moral, sino que era técnica y debía construir las bases materiales 
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del nuevo Estado tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial (M. Miskowiec, Stanisław 
Kwiatkowski, Józef Czyrek); o bien, en segundo lugar, que, directamente, ese mito 
siempre había sido falso. En este caso, se proyectaba una imagen negativa de la 
inteligencja decimonónica: se le reprochaba su aislamiento, su sentimiento de 
superioridad, su falta de realismo político, su tendencia al conservadurismo o a la 
anarquía, su servilismo, su admiración por Occidente, su falta de compromiso para 
resolver problemas sociales concretos, sus gustos pequeño-burgueses, etc. Mantuvo esta 
postura durante los años 40 y 50, por ejemplo, Józef Chałasiński, uno de los iniciadores 
y principales participantes de los dos grandes debates de la posguerra sobre la 
inteligencja (1946, 1958).  
No obstante, pese a que desde este punto de vista el mito se percibía 
aparentemente como un elemento irracional y nocivo que expresaba valores obsoletos, 
Babiuch-Luxmoore apunta que este eje del debate no deja nunca de desenvolverse en 
una estructura mítica de pensamiento: sencillamente se estaba tratando de sustituir un 
mito por otro más acorde con las exigencias del presente, respondiendo a la necesidad 
de construir un nuevo sistema con estructuras sociales distintas donde, por ejemplo, el 
elitismo que se atribuía a la inteligencja decimonónica no tenía cabida. 
El segundo eje, que compartían tanto líneas más próximas a la oficialidad como 
las opositoras y otros grupos diversos, consistía en aprovechar el mito de la inteligencja 
decimonónica con fines ideológicos y políticos propios, dada su importancia en la 
historia de Polonia, su contribución a la creación de lazos sociales o su vinculación a la 
idea de servicio nacional y de vanguardia social150.  
Así pues, durante los años 40 y 50 la visión oficial marxista de la inteligencja fue 
esencialmente negativa: se la consideraba una clase inútil, hermética, elitista, 
improductiva y antisocialista151 que disfrutó de privilegios inmerecidos en el pasado. 
Simultáneamente, el régimen comunista polaco aspiró a crear una “nueva” inteligencja 
fiel a la ideología imperante, aprovechando, de manera utilitarista, algunas 
características de la “vieja”, al igual que hicieron décadas antes los soviéticos152. En 
unos momentos en los que el nuevo régimen de la PRL buscaba fuentes de legitimidad 
para reconstruir las estructuras sociales y el país, el modelo de guía y vanguardia que 
había encarnado la inteligencja podía ser útil si se asimilaba a la idea marxista-leninista 
de vanguardia revolucionaria y se sustituía la protección de la cultura e identidad 
nacionales por la defensa del aparato estatal153. Obreros y campesinos afines al 
comunismo constituyeron las bases de esta “nueva” inteligencja con la que se pretendió 
copar los puestos burocráticos y de dirección política de la PRL. Su servicio a la nación 
ya no tendría que ver con valores humanistas o la lucha por la independencia, sino con 
una postura profesional, racional y pragmática154.  Este experimento de sustitución, en 
cambio, no sólo no tuvo el éxito esperado, sino que produjo, además, efectos 
contraproducentes en décadas posteriores, pues los “nuevos” inteligenci empezaron a 
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asemejarse por voluntad propia a la “vieja” inteligencja en cuanto a estilo de vida y 
sistema de valores. Con lo cual, con el tiempo, el origen de la oposición intelectual a los 
regímenes comunistas no sólo provino de una “vieja” inteligencja empobrecida y 
degradada socio-profesionalmente, sino también de esas nuevas élites comunistas que se 
habían transformado en disidencia155. 
A partir de 1956, en el espíritu de un “camino polaco hacia el socialismo” (polska 
droga do socjalizmu), el gobierno de Władysław Gomułka comenzó a apoyarse más en 
las tradiciones nacionales como fuente de legitimación en lugar de en el marxismo, y la 
“vieja” inteligencja pudo ocupar cierto espacio que antes no tenía en esta nueva 
configuración156.  
Durante los años 60, pero sobre todo en los 70, el retrato que se hace de la 
“nueva” inteligencja en la prensa se aproxima al modelo de intelectual o de grupo 
técnico profesional, es decir, un grupo de carácter universal, no asociado a la idea de 
nación ni a Polonia en particular, y carente de compromisos políticos. Sin embargo, a la 
altura de 1971 Bohdan Cywiński, miembro de círculos católicos críticos con la PRL, 
publicó una obra sobre los intelectuales polacos del siglo XIX que, pese a no poder 
esquivar la censura hasta más de una década después, se convirtió desde el principio en 
una contrapropuesta del relato oficial y en una fuente de inspiración para muchos 
futuros integrantes de la oposición del país. En este libro, titulado Rodowody 
niepokornych (Los orígenes de los insumisos) ─del que hablaremos también en el 
Capítulo 1─, Cywiński reivindica y reaviva el espíritu irredento e insumiso de la 
inteligencja polaca clásica y muestra a sus lectores cómo ésta siempre trató de ser fiel a 
sí misma en tiempos trágicos y de protesta social157.    
En las dos últimas décadas del período comunista, las nociones sobre la 
inteligencja en el debate público siguen, sin grandes cambios, en las líneas y con las 
funciones ya mencionadas anteriormente, que se ajustan grosso modo a las tres maneras 
de relacionarse con el pasado que tenían los inteligenci polacos (descritas en el apartado 
sobre los mitos). Desde las publicaciones oficiales se continúa presentando a la 
inteligencja técnica de una forma más positiva que a la clásica humanista, y se le da un 
valor casi exclusivamente profesional. Se argumenta también que la “vieja” inteligencja 
forma parte del pasado, o bien, recurriendo al materialismo histórico, que se trata de una 
clase “residual” de la fase capitalista-burguesa, muy secundaria, que desaparecerá 
definitivamente una vez que termine el proceso de transición al socialismo en Polonia, 
cuando la división entre trabajo intelectual y trabajo físico deje de existir. 
Por otro lado, y sobre todo desde posiciones críticas con el régimen comunista, 
persiste el retrato tradicional mítico de la inteligencja, que la vincula con un 
determinado etos social y la considera simultáneamente un fenómeno histórico y 
suprahistórico. Los rasgos básicos, con connotaciones tanto positivas como negativas, 
que se le atribuyen a la inteligencja decimonónica en este tipo de discursos son: el 
cultivo de las tradiciones nobiliarias polacas (libertad, igualdad entre sus miembros, 
reticencias hacia la autoridad central), el servicio a la nación, un carácter elitista 
(autoridad moral, creación de modelos…) e insumiso y la indiferencia hacia valores 
pragmáticos.  
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Finalmente, además de estas dos posturas, también encontramos discursos sobre la 
inteligencja enfocados hacia el futuro, que suelen partir de una valoración negativa del 
presente y plantean un cambio o la creación de algo hasta entonces inexistente158. 
 
 
3. Oposición 
 
Los inteligenci sobre los que trabajamos proceden de esferas y grupos opositores 
con creencias e ideologías distintas, incluso muy dispares en ocasiones. No obstante, en 
esta investigación nos centramos especialmente en determinadas características 
compartidas, relacionadas con su identidad como inteligencja y con su forma de percibir 
la historia de Polonia y el paso del tiempo en general. En este apartado nos ocuparemos 
de la definición de “oposición” en el contexto polaco, recalcando el cambio de 
estrategia que supuso la fundación del Comité de Defensa Obrera.  
Tal y como sucedió con los “mitos” y la “intelligentsia”, la “oposición”, incluso si 
nos centramos exclusivamente en el caso polaco, no cuenta con una única definición y, 
además, compite o se complementa con otros conceptos que describen fenómenos 
bastante similares.  
Es lo que sucede, por ejemplo, con el término “disidencia” o “disentimiento” 
(dissent en inglés). En una enciclopedia española del año 1985, la palabra “disidente” se 
asocia, entre otras acepciones, a las personas de Europa Oriental que se oponían en 
aquellos momentos a la política oficial, especialmente los intelectuales159. En esta línea, 
Robert Zuzowski cree que la disidencia es un fenómeno propio de la era post-estalinista, 
que surge cuando se redujo la represión en la zona. Para este autor, “disidencia” supone 
hacer un esfuerzo de crítica, exhortar, persuadir e intentar ser escuchado, tanto a través 
de canales permitidos como no permitidos, mientras que “oposición” hace referencia a 
un grupo político organizado que tiene como objetivo echar al gobierno del poder y 
reemplazarlo por otro de su elección. El propio Zuzowski reconoce que, en este sentido, 
las fronteras entre “disidencia” y “oposición” son difusas en el contexto comunista, y 
apunta además que, a su juicio, “disidencia” e inteligencja son equiparables160. 
No obstante, tanto en la vieja enciclopedia de los años 80 como en el diccionario 
de la RAE, “disidencia” contiene otro matiz: implica una separación de lo oficial, o de 
una doctrina, creencia o conducta comunes. Por tanto, al hablar de “disidentes” 
estaríamos refiriéndonos a aquellas personas que apoyaron y se comprometieron 
inicialmente con el régimen comunista de forma abierta y que más adelante, por 
diversas discrepancias, se opusieron a él, caso de algunos inteligenci como Jacek Kuroń, 
Krystyna Kersten, Jerzy Holzer, Tadeusz Łepkowski o Jerzy Jedlicki. Es decir, dysydent 
y opozycjonista no serían sinónimos, sino que la disidencia sería un tipo concreto de 
oposición con unos orígenes determinados. Cuando empleemos los términos “disidente” 
o “disidencia” en este trabajo, en lugar de “oposición”, será siempre en este sentido más 
restringido161. 
Por otro lado, establecer con precisión en qué consiste ser un opositor no es tan 
fácil como parece a primera vista. Andrzej Friszke, uno de los investigadores que más 
ha trabajado sobre los movimientos de oposición en la PRL, se pregunta cuáles son los 
límites entre “oposición” y “conformismo”, y si podrían llamarse “opositores” aquellas 
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personas e instituciones que sólo pretendían mejorar o corregir el sistema existente. Eso 
lleva, a su vez, a preguntarse qué clase de régimen y de Estado fue la República Popular 
de Polonia162.  
De acuerdo con Friszke, el Estado polaco entre 1945 y 1989 tuvo una naturaleza 
dual: por un lado, la PRL tenía muchos rasgos de un Estado polaco auténtico, organizó 
la vida colectiva y permitió la supervivencia y desarrollo de la nación (reconstrucción y 
modernización del país, industrialización, urbanización, reforma agraria, amplio acceso 
a la cultura y la educación, mejora de las condiciones de vida de los más necesitados, 
ausencia de desempleo…); por otro, se había formado bajo los designios de la URSS, y 
el control soviético sobre Polonia era una forma de ausencia de libertad (falta de 
soberanía y de independencia en política exterior, fuerte represión durante la 
posguerra…). Cada logro o aspecto positivo del nuevo Estado tenía, por así decirlo, una 
contrapartida.   
En 1944, tras el fracaso del Levantamiento de Varsovia contra los nazis, la 
“liberación-ocupación” de las tierras polacas por el Ejército Rojo y la creación de un 
gobierno de facto para Polonia desde Moscú (el Comité Polaco de Liberación Nacional, 
PKWN), la población, agotada y diezmada por la Guerra, asumió en su mayoría la 
nueva situación y transigió con los resultados falseados de las elecciones de 1947, que 
dieron la victoria al partido respaldado por el Kremlin, el comunista PPR (Polska Partia 
Robotnicza, Partido Polaco de los Trabajadores), rebautizado como PZPR en 1948. 
Muchos polacos estaban descontentos por la falta de libertades y las carencias 
materiales, además de por las discrepancias ideológicas, mientras que otros aceptaron 
conscientemente el nuevo régimen porque, a su juicio, había mejorado las condiciones 
respecto de la preguerra. Simultáneamente, el terror generado por la represión política y 
la vigilancia generalizadas, la sensación de no poder cambiar las cosas y el temor a una 
nueva guerra hizo que buena parte de la población percibiera ese statu quo como el 
menor de los males163. Aunque resulte de entrada paradójico, muchas veces resistencia 
(opór) y adaptación (przystosowanie) van de la mano, y precisamente aclimatarse a 
algunas cosas y resistirse a otras fue lo que hicieron la mayoría de los polacos que se 
quedaron en el país después de 1945, también los inteligenci no-comunistas164, que 
aceptaron las nuevas reglas de la vida pública para poder participar en ella y manifestar 
su opinión hasta donde se lo permitiese la censura165.  
Pero, como recalca Friszke, no es lo mismo “resistirse” que “oponerse”: la 
“resistencia” supone un intento de boicotear ciertas medidas o realidades, 
principalmente en una esfera simbólica, es de corta duración y tiene un carácter 
relativamente espontáneo. La “oposición”, en cambio, requiere una actividad 
prolongada en el tiempo y consciente, respaldada por un programa ideológico destinado 
al logro de determinados cambios políticos planeados de antemano por un grupo de 
personas166. Esta definición, más amplia que la de Zuzowski, engloba a la inteligencja 
sobre la que trabajaremos.  
Otros autores, como Piotr Szwajcer, consideran que la oposición también forma 
una comunidad diferenciada porque sus integrantes han padecido distintos tipos de 
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represión  a causa de sus “crímenes no criminales”167, es decir, por ser ideológicamente 
contrarios al régimen imperante y tratar de ejercer distintas libertades (política, de 
expresión, de prensa, de reunión…) que éste calificaba como “delitos” si constituían una 
amenaza a su monopolio del poder y escapaban a su control. Esto plantea nuevos 
interrogantes: ¿para ser un opositor es necesario (si bien no suficiente) haber sido 
represaliado alguna vez? ¿Se puede ser opositor y evitar la represión? ¿Y qué es 
exactamente “represión”?   
Empezando por la última pregunta, cabe señalar aquí que, en el ámbito de las 
ciencias sociales, la represión queda englobada dentro de los estudios sobre “violencia 
política”, término que Eduardo González Calleja define como “... el empleo consciente 
(aunque no siempre premeditado), o la amenaza del uso, de la fuerza física por parte de 
individuos, entidades, grupos o partidos que buscan el control de los espacios de poder 
político, la manipulación de las decisiones en todas o parte de las instancias de gobierno 
y, en última instancia, la conquista, la conservación o la reforma del Estado”168. En 
nuestro caso, la violencia política es practicada primera y principalmente por un Estado 
autoritario, de signo comunista y mediatizado por una potencia extranjera, en un 
contexto de creciente disconformidad de la población hacia sus políticas.   
El espectro represivo de una autoridad es muy amplio y las formas de persecución 
de individuos y colectivos por parte de un poder van desde las más brutales e 
impactantes hasta las más sutiles. La violencia física, los arrestos de distinta duración, la 
cárcel o los despidos son sólo las más evidentes. La censura, por ejemplo, también 
puede entenderse como una forma de represión intelectual, y como presión psicológica 
el acoso en el trabajo, los registros y destrozos de domicilios, las amenazas a familiares 
y amigos, o hacia uno mismo, que convencieron a muchos de que emigrar era su única 
salida. Existen, además, numerosas demostraciones de fuerza de carácter público: 
marchas, actos, manifestaciones, mítines, maniobras… Como mínimo, el poder 
imperante trata de obstaculizar y limitar la influencia en la sociedad de las corrientes 
opositoras169. Pero, además, el simple temor a la represión (a estar siendo vigilados, a 
ser denunciados por manifestarse o hacer algo “ilegal”) es otro tipo o grado de represión 
en sí, pues altera el comportamiento de las personas inhibiendo su participación activa 
en iniciativas contrarias a la autoridad170 . Los opositores, en tanto tales, son plenamente 
conscientes de que el poder puede castigarles por las actividades políticas que 
desarrollan y de que, por tanto, tienen algo que perder (libertad, puesto de trabajo, 
integridad física, compañeros y familia, incluso su propia vida), pero aún así asumen, en 
mayor o menor medida, ese riesgo. La amenaza de la represión siempre está presente; 
eso no significa que ésta se materialice en algún momento, pero es lo más habitual si se 
adquiere un compromiso a largo plazo y se realizan actividades opositoras asiduamente.   
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La fundación en 1976 del Comité de Defensa Obrera (Komitet Obrony 
Robotników, KOR), sobre el que hablaremos más adelante, supuso un cambio 
estratégico trascendental para la oposición política en Polonia. Las protestas 
desarrolladas antes, en marzo de 1968 y diciembre de 1970, no suponían un ataque 
directo al sistema comunista: los manifestantes exigían mejoras y la puesta en práctica 
de determinados derechos y libertades, pero consideraban a la PRL su patria. En 
cambio, el KOR trascendió la esfera de la protesta e inició una lucha sistemática y 
organizada, de carácter pacífico, contra el gobierno comunista. En lugar de situarse 
dentro del sistema, de aceptar sus pautas y costumbres y de tener como interlocutor 
fundamental al Estado, como había sucedido hasta entonces, la nueva oposición centró 
su atención en la sociedad polaca y en la presión que ésta podía ejercer desde fuera del 
sistema a través del KOR o de otros movimientos similares. De esta forma, se ponía 
directamente en cuestión a la PRL como Estado y las aspiraciones de independencia se 
generalizaron como nunca antes. Sin embargo, el sistema de la PRL no sólo se veía 
como un elemento ajeno a la sociedad o como el defensor de los intereses soviéticos en 
territorio polaco, sino también como un poder intermediario entre Moscú y su propia 
sociedad, del que podían obtenerse concesiones en nombre del bienestar de la nación; en 
definitiva, un incómodo pero imprescindible compañero de viaje en el camino hacia el 
cambio político. 
Desde 1976, los movimientos de oposición se encargaron de reivindicar los 
derechos sociales, nacionales y ciudadanos; lucharon por la libertad de creación, por el 
acceso a la cultura creada por la comunidad emigrante polaca, por la recuperación de 
tradiciones nacionales falseadas o silenciadas, por poder reflexionar libremente sobre la 
historia y la cultura y, finalmente, por despertar entre los polacos el deseo de tener un 
estado soberano e independiente. Sin embargo, aunque sus propuestas estaban mucho 
más orientadas hacia los cambios políticos que hacia los económicos, fueron reacios a 
diseñar un modelo preciso del Estado al que aspiraban171. 
El entramado opositor que se tejió a lo largo de la segunda mitad de los años 70 
necesitaba considerables ingresos tanto para llevar a cabo sus proyectos sociales (ej. 
ayudar a los obreros represaliados en junio del 76 y sus familias) como para subsistir y  
mantenerse. Además de pagar a los opositores “a tiempo completo”, todos los 
trabajadores del sistema editorial clandestino drugi obieg, que se desarrolló 
exponencialmente a partir de entonces, cobraban un sueldo (articulistas, periodistas, 
editores, distribuidores, secretarias, conferenciantes, managers, conductores, 
libreros…), y requerían imprentas, papel, tinta, máquinas de escribir, grabadoras, 
coches, ordenadores o cámaras de vídeo para desempeñar su labor. Una parte del dinero 
y de la maquinaria se obtenía gracias a la propia venta de las publicaciones drugi obieg 
y a la generosidad de simpatizantes, personas anónimas u opositores que ponían, por 
ejemplo, su coche o su piso, así como todo el material útil que pudieran reunir, a 
disposición de un movimiento o de una editorial para transportar mercancías, celebrar 
reuniones, etc.  
Otra parte muy importante de su financiación procedía de países occidentales: 
había donaciones y suscripciones organizadas por particulares, sindicatos, organismos 
gubernamentales y distintas organizaciones políticas o de emigrantes polacos, además 
de varias becas o premios, como las del Congreso de Estados Unidos. Algunas personas 
también trabajaban para los corresponsales de prensa extranjera haciendo de intérpretes 
o facilitando contactos. Los pagos se efectuaban entonces de distintas formas: bien en 
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metálico (preferentemente en dólares), bien en especie (artículos occidentales, una 
invitación a un restaurante de lujo…).  
La distinción entre ingresos para uso privado e ingresos para la organización 
opositora no estaba, generalmente, del todo clara, tanto menos cuanto menos 
formalizado estuviera el movimiento. Durante el período legal de Solidarność (agosto 
1980-diciembre 1981) la transparencia fue mayor en este sentido, pero tras la aplicación 
de la Ley Marcial y el paso a la clandestinidad, las cuentas de los movimientos 
opositores volvieron a su estado previo de opacidad. Evidentemente, los opositores más 
conocidos y con más contactos tenían un mayor interés para la prensa internacional y, 
por tanto, más oportunidades de ganar dinero que otros, además de ciertos privilegios o 
mejores oportunidades para ellos mismos y su círculo más cercano (posibilidad de 
publicar fuera sus libros y artículos, salidas al extranjero, becas, compra de vivienda...). 
Optar por la emigración, en ese caso, no parecía la mejor solución: al quedarse en 
Polonia y asumir los riesgos que eso conllevaba (encarcelamiento, registros de sus 
apartamentos, confiscación de libros, amenazas y chantajes…), los opositores más 
activos o destacados ganaban prestigio social entre sus simpatizantes y la población en 
general, pues parecían estar haciendo lo moralmente correcto a pesar de las 
adversidades; podían quedarse al menos cerca de su familia y amigos, conservar su 
vivienda, y disponer de más dinero gracias al pago en dólares y su cambio ventajoso a 
złoty (la moneda polaca).  
Curiosamente, el hecho de que entre la clase gobernante y los comunistas hubiera 
una especie de “aristocracia” que disfrutaba de privilegios totalmente inaccesibles para 
el resto de la población (productos occidentales, carne en abundancia, coches de lujo, 
casas…) fue siempre algo muy criticado desde las filas de la oposición; sin embargo, de 
forma más o menos inconsciente, en el seno de ésta también se fueron formando 
paulatinamente élites económicas. Aún así, mientras que en el ámbito oficial todo eran 
ventajas, en el caso de la oposición los inconvenientes eran considerables, pues sus 
miembros se exponían mucho más que otros a la represión gubernamental y algunos 
pasaron escondidos meses o incluso años para eludir la cárcel después de 1981, por lo 
que sus privilegios eran una especie de sistema compensatorio socialmente aceptado172. 
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4. Las reflexiones históricas de la inteligencja y las tesis “Sobre el concepto de 
historia” de Walter Benjamin. Conciencia histórica e historización del tiempo 
presente  
 
We may like to consolidate our own identities by 
ascribing to them antecedents that make the end result at 
least feasible, but more important is the resultant 
recognition of our own historicity - of the fact that we are 
ourselves a part of history, not only a product of past 
history but also a potential agent for history in the future. 
(…)  
Viewed from an alternative perspective, our own position 
no longer appears as inevitable and as the necessary 
outcome of some predetermined historical process. It is the 
result of numerous contingencies (of things that, by chance, 
turned out one way rather than another, and affected future 
events accordingly), and we can see that, for the future, we 
actually do have a choice. 
 
Beverley Southgate: “Intellectual history/ history of ideas”  
 
La historia es más que lo ocurrido. 
 
Walter Benjamin 
 
Si nos aproximamos a las reflexiones y trabajos históricos publicados por los 
intelectuales polacos de la oposición, podemos detectar ciertas semejanzas entre ellos y 
las tesis “Sobre el concepto de historia” de Walter Benjamin173, entendidas éstas últimas 
como un enfoque teórico y epistemológico acerca de los “vencidos” y las “víctimas de 
la historia”, además de como una advertencia sobre las trágicas consecuencias del 
supuesto o mal llamado “progreso”174.  
Según Benjamin, sólo aquellas personas que sean víctimas o víctimas potenciales 
de la historia pueden tener acceso al conocimiento y la recordación del “pasado que no 
fue” en momentos de grave peligro, y son capaces de hacer una revolución política y 
hermenéutica haciendo saltar el tiempo vacío y homogéneo (continuum) impuesto por 
los “vencedores” a los “vencidos”. 
Esto puede aplicarse al caso que nos ocupa, como demostraremos más adelante. 
Sin embargo, empezaremos por señalar dos inconvenientes iniciales: los intelectuales 
polacos no eran ni el Lumpenproletariat ni los materialistas históricos a los que Walter 
Benjamin aparentemente se refería en sus tesis. Como se ha visto antes, eran, y aún son, 
un grupo social privilegiado. Además, pertenecían a movimientos que, de hecho, se 
oponían a un gobierno comunista. No obstante, también podían ser considerados 
“víctimas por partida doble” en el siguiente sentido. 
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Para empezar, desde finales del siglo XVIII existe una tradición cultural muy 
extendida en Polonia que Domańska definió como “cultura de la herida”175, aunque 
también podría describirse como cultura de la derrota, de las víctimas o del dolor. Tal y 
como señalábamos antes, esto se encuentra estrechamente relacionado con la 
observación de Mircea Eliade acerca de los mitos en tiempos modernos: los habitantes 
de las naciones modernas que perciben su historia como un “terror continuo” no pueden 
apoyar ni creer en el historicismo, porque el “progreso” que éste invoca únicamente 
supone mejoras para otros a costa de más dominio y humillación para ellos, por lo que 
no es de extrañar que recurran a otros tipos de percepción, como la cíclica. En el caso 
polaco, algunos “pasados frustrados” no han dejado de ser recordados periódicamente, 
especialmente en los ámbitos intelectual y artístico. Por tanto, la cultura de la 
recordación nacional en Polonia se ha construido en buena medida a partir de 
desenlaces negativos, conflictos, derrotas, oportunidades malogradas e intentos fallidos. 
El cuadro de Jacek Malczewski “Melancholia” (1890-1894) es un buen ejemplo 
de ello176: mientras un pintor trabaja en su estudio, más de cincuenta personas salen 
desfilando de su lienzo, llenando la estancia (Imagen 1). Malczewski retrata a los 
kosynierzy177, los participantes y los caídos en los levantamientos polacos del siglo XIX, 
niños, viudas desesperadas, sacerdotes, músicos y artistas, a los desencantados y los 
indiferentes encadenados como convictos… Muchos de ellos llevan armas, como 
bayonetas, guadañas de guerra, sables y escopetas, mientras que un trío en primer plano 
porta un violín, un libro y un pincel, como si las artes fueran otro instrumento 
igualmente válido para preservar y luchar por la identidad polaca. Asimismo, en la parte 
inferior del cuadro puede verse a un hombre sujeta un reloj de arena y un cetro: una 
referencia a Crono o Saturno, es decir, al inexorable paso del tiempo y la destrucción 
que conlleva, quizás también al tiempo que los polacos habían “perdido” debido a las 
particiones. La mayoría de los personajes se dirige en varias filas hacia la ventana del 
lado derecho del estudio, y por tanto hacia la luz, la libertad o, en otras palabras, 
adelante. Sin embargo, nadie es capaz de saltar fuera: la negra figura encapuchada que 
representa al destino y la muerte se lo impide, de modo que caen, se contorsionan, giran 
y dan vueltas en un incipiente caos de perspectivas, como sugiriendo un sino 
inevitablemente cíclico. Pero además de una alegoría del destino trágico de los polacos 
faltos de su propio Estado, “Melancholia” es también una reflexión sobre el papel del 
Arte y los artistas polacos como visionarios y su misión hacia sus compatriotas, el 
desarrollo del ciclo de la vida desde la infancia hasta la muerte y, finalmente, un intento 
de descubrir el misterio del futuro de la nación polaca178. Artistas-inteligenci, el lamento 
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de un pasado palpitante, el presente letárgico y cautivo y la incógnita de un futuro que, 
no obstante, se toma muy en serio, unidos e inmortalizados en un mismo lienzo. 
 
 
 
 
Imagen 1 
 
 
Historia y memoria se entrelazan con frecuencia en los países de Europa Centro-
Oriental. En Polonia, el recuerdo de los caídos, de los levantamientos reprimidos 
(especialmente los de noviembre de 1830 y enero de 1863, junto con las revueltas y 
protestas en la etapa de la PRL) y de los intentos de reforma fallidos (como la 
Constitución del 3 de mayo de 1791, o 1956) constituyen una parte integrante de la 
tradición histórica polaca. Esto incluye las białe plamy (manchas blancas), es decir, 
episodios del siglo XX polaco que las autoridades del régimen comunista negaban o 
rehusaban abordar, convirtiéndose en una especie de tabú oficial, como el período de la 
Segunda República (1918-1939), los conflictos entre rusos y polacos o la masacre de 
Katyń (abril-mayo de 1940). Desde el siglo XIX hasta, al menos, el período de la 
República Popular de Polonia, muchos polacos compartían un amargo sentimiento de 
pérdida: se veían a sí mismos como “vencidos” y a la nación polaca como a una 
“víctima” de la historia. Una historia que pensaban que, en muchas ocasiones, les había 
venido impuesta desde más allá de sus fronteras. 
En esos tiempos, la inteligencja polaca se convirtió tanto en creadora de mitos 
como en un mito en sí misma, y sus miembros se autoproclamaron portavoces de los 
valores morales y los intereses de la nación. Si tomamos el significado y las tareas de la 
inteligencja en su sentido europeo-oriental más clásico y restringido, este estatus 
suponía mantener una actitud crítica hacia el poder político, cierto prestigio social y, 
sobre todo, ser la conciencia y la voz de la sociedad polaca en el foro público. Así pues, 
los intelectuales opositores polacos serían, por un lado, el altavoz de una “nación-
víctima” y, por otro, víctimas ellos mismos, porque su compromiso social y político les 
llevaba a actuar en circunstancias peligrosas o correr riesgos que muchas veces 
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acababan en fracaso o algún tipo de represión, como deportaciones a Siberia, 
ejecuciones, sentencias de muerte, cárcel, despidos, palizas, amenazas, etc., por no 
hablar de la emigración, una de las consecuencias más destacables de las derrotas en el 
país: las oleadas de emigrantes forzosos tras un levantamiento o revuelta frustrados han 
sido recurrentes y, por ende, tristemente “tradicionales” hasta los años 80 del siglo 
pasado. 
Además, algunos de los intelectuales polacos que eran historiadores o escribieron 
sobre historia tenían mucho más que ver con el historiador Marxista heterodoxo que 
Benjamin imaginaba de lo que en un principio pudiera parecer. Esto resulta 
especialmente claro en el caso de los disidentes (esto es, opositores que eran antiguos 
defensores y miembros del Partido Comunista) que, pese a ser muy críticos después con 
el gobierno y el sistema polacos, se mantuvieron fieles a sus ideales de izquierdas (Jerzy 
Holzer, Krystyna Kersten, Tadeusz Łepkowski…). Otro ejemplo destacado es 
Bronisław Geremek porque, desde sus primeros años como estudiante de Historia 
Medieval, empezó a mostrar un gran interés hacia aquellos que sufrían y centró sus 
principales investigaciones en los pobres y los marginados, así como en el poder estatal 
que quería controlarlos o deshacerse de ellos en la transición hacia la Edad Moderna.  
En ese sentido, los intelectuales polacos de la oposición pueden considerarse 
“víctimas por partida doble” y, como Benjamin apuntaba, sólo aquellos “vencidos” que 
perciben el peligro (es decir, una amenaza para la existencia bien de un individuo o de 
todo un pueblo y sus tradiciones) pueden experimentar la “revelación” y atisbar el 
panorama de la historia al completo, que incluye la gran miríada de víctimas olvidadas. 
Son los únicos que están cualificados para escribir una historia llena de “tiempo ahora” 
(Jetztzeit) y no la historia fáctica de los “vencedores”. No obstante, para lograrlo las 
víctimas del presente también deben luchar, como hacen algunos de los personajes de 
“Melancholia” y el propio Malczewski al recordar a los caídos, porque las tesis de 
Benjamin van dirigidas a aquellos que asumen conscientemente la experiencia del 
sufrimiento y se posicionan contra sus causas. Por tanto, el proceso de toma de 
conciencia absoluta de la propia historicidad tan sólo puede completarse a través de la 
acción, pidiendo justicia y demandando recordación179. 
El conocimiento y recordación del “pasado que no fue” es una lucha hermenéutica 
y política que requiere, en palabras de Benjamin, un “salto de tigre al pasado” (der 
Tigersprung ins Vergangene). El filósofo alemán tenía una visión profundamente 
personal no sólo del marxismo/materialismo histórico, sino también del mesianismo 
que, aparte de ser otro ingrediente fundamental de sus tesis y pensamiento, 
curiosamente también es un elemento crucial en la tradición cultural polaca en un 
sentido más ortodoxo180. Según Reyes Mate, el mesianismo de Benjamin se basaba en 
una convicción filosófica en lugar de religiosa: los “vencidos”, vivos o muertos, están 
esperando una experiencia de redención mundana que dé un significado a su sufrimiento 
pasado. Alimentan la esperanza de que un día sus proyectos fracasados sean llevados a 
cabo por generaciones futuras y adquieran finalmente sentido. Hoy, los “vencidos” 
pueden ser “vengados” de algún modo a través de la recordación181, un tipo especial de 
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memoria que interpreta los proyectos frustrados de la historia no como meros “efectos 
colaterales” del progreso sino como injusticias pendientes. El pasado posible, 
malogrado por la violencia humana y por motivos más allá de la voluntad de las 
víctimas, tan sólo puede estar presente si se “redime” su fracaso. Constituye una especie 
de segunda oportunidad para un pasado; por tanto, una experiencia frustrada se 
convierte en una expectativa de la historia. Si la vida de todos, y no sólo de los 
“vencedores” o de aquellos que siguen vivos, importa, las vidas frustradas de los 
muertos quedarían conectadas a los intereses de los vivos y cualquier proyecto que 
conllevase odio u olvido hacia los caídos sería rechazado, dado que olvidar a las 
víctimas supone añadir un crimen hermenéutico al crimen físico182.  
Las Tesis de Benjamin son una advertencia acerca de la Modernidad y el tipo de 
“progreso” que ésta conlleva a costa de otros seres humanos. Igualmente, los inteligenci 
polacos de la oposición en los años setenta y ochenta pensaban que ya había habido 
demasiadas víctimas en su historia nacional, de modo que tomaron la no-violencia como 
su nuevo signo de identidad y desarrollaron un proyecto intelectual de progreso real e 
inclusivo, basado en los deseos de libertad política y autogobierno de la sociedad 
polaca. En este sentido, sus reflexiones y propuestas tenían simultáneamente un carácter 
holístico y dualista, puesto que su objetivo era tomar lo mejor de cada tradición pasada 
y unirlo. La idiosincrasia polaca, argumentaban algunos de ellos, tan sólo podía estar 
completa y ser plenamente comprendida cuando todas las tradiciones intelectuales y 
políticas del país fuesen tenidas en cuenta, incluso si se consideraban opuestas. Trataban 
así de fomentar un pensamiento constructivo y la cooperación entre aquellos que 
pensaban distinto pero compartían los mismos objetivos básicos (libertad e 
independencia), a fin de que nadie se quedase atrás. 
En un texto escrito en 1982, el profesor emigrado Bronisław Baczko señalaba que 
la historia y la memoria colectiva jugaron un papel liberador dentro de Solidaridad en 
1980-1981 porque permitieron a la sociedad polaca ejercer libremente el derecho a 
conocer el pasado y contribuyeron a denunciar y condenar el sistema comunista. 
Recordar y conmemorar a las víctimas con monumentos, ceremonias y distintos 
símbolos era una forma de dejar patentes los resultados catastróficos del “radiante 
futuro” prometido por las autoridades, en cuyo nombre se habían cometido numerosos 
crímenes y masacres. Resulta interesante el hecho de que una de las primeras y 
principales peticiones de los huelguistas de los astilleros de Gdańsk, en agosto de 1980, 
fuese la construcción de un monumento en memoria de los compañeros de trabajo 
asesinados durante las huelgas de diciembre de 1970. Las generaciones más jóvenes de 
Solidarność recordaban los hechos de 1970 y 1976 como sus experiencias trágicas más 
próximas, mientras que los miembros de más edad también tenían en mente la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial, el estalinismo o 1956. La construcción de facto de los monumentos 
conmemorando 1970 y 1956 fue sentida como una “venganza” y una revisión de 
aquellas derrotas, además de como una garantía de que tales hechos no volverían a 
repetirse. Los fracasos y las desventuras del pasado se habían convertido en símbolos 
que pregonaban una victoria definitiva y hacían que los opositores percibiesen la lucha 
actual como la continuación de un pasado intergeneracional, lo que aumentaba las 
esperanzas en el futuro. Además, la recuperación de las libertades democráticas (ejercer 
el derecho a la huelga, libertades sindicales y de expresión, derecho a la identidad 
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nacional…) significaba ir por delante del sistema totalitario comunista en términos de 
progreso real183.    
Pero la recordación no sólo provee de significado a las injusticias pasadas, 
también hace que el presente tenga mucho más sentido que antes. Tal y como apunta 
Mate, el “encuentro entre un pasado declarado in-significante y un sujeto necesitado 
(…) [salva] el sentido del pasado al tiempo que proyecta una nueva luz sobre el presente 
gracias a  la cual entendemos mejor la realidad y descubrimos nuevas posibilidades 
suyas”184. Dar “un salto de tigre al pasado” no implica reconstruir o recrear el “pasado 
que no fue” como podría haber sido: no se trata, pues, de una cuestión de repetición, 
sino de inspiración y motivación para poner en marcha un progreso verdadero a partir 
de entonces. Al igual que el historiador-trapero de Benjamin recoge del basurero de la 
historia los restos de pasados frustrados, los “vencidos” que adquieran conciencia 
histórica y quieran romper con los tiempos marcados por los “vencedores” deben 
construir un presente nuevo con los materiales de pasados fracasados, es decir, a partir 
de sus ruinas. Un salto productivo y revolucionario al pasado supone adueñarse de los 
aspectos actuales y pendientes del pasado y traerlos al presente. Y se realiza para 
cambiar la realidad ahora, de ahí su carácter esencialmente político185. 
El “tiempo ahora” (Jetztzeit) del que Benjamin habla en su decimocuarta tesis186  
supone contemplar el pasado frustrado como algo que continúa vivo, como una semilla 
(tesis XVII) llena de posibilidades por desarrollar, y el tiempo presente como el 
momento en que esas semillas-oportunidades todavía pueden germinar y por tanto 
hacerse reales. El instante en que un individuo o una colectividad toman conciencia del 
poder que tienen para cambiar el curso de los acontecimientos, pese a cualquier 
“objetividad racional” o “lógica” histórica, constituye una encrucijada de caminos, un 
momento crucial en potencia. Es, en otras palabras, un “tiempo pleno”, en contraste con 
el tiempo vacío y homogéneo (continuuum) impuesto por los “vencedores” 187. 
Barbara Törnquist Plewa define la conciencia histórica 
 
… como historia viva, es decir, una historia colectiva, política e ideológicamente relevante, que da 
orientación e identidad al ser humano en el mundo del presente. Se distingue de la historia 
entendida como ciencia, cuya meta es buscar la verdad objetiva acerca de los escenarios históricos 
y las relaciones causales existentes entre acontecimientos pasados.188 
 
Dicho de otro modo, a pesar de que el pasado es el punto de partida, la conciencia 
histórica radica principalmente en el tiempo presente, entendido por Ewa Domańska 
como “el tiempo oportuno” (kairos): “un momento especial en la historia del mundo 
para tomar decisiones que serán cruciales para el futuro”, en estrecha relación con el 
Jetztzeit de Benjamin189. Uno de los frutos de esta percepción del tiempo es un 
fenómeno que hemos definido como “historización del tiempo presente”. 
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Si consideramos que el término “historización” alude al proceso de construcción 
de un texto o historia190, “historizar” el momento presente implica la inclusión de otra 
dimensión temporal en el proceso cognitivo: el futuro. En otras palabras, además de 
buscar un referente y un apoyo en el pasado y de encontrar su propio camino en el 
presente, una sociedad o sus élites dan un paso más allá cuando imaginan colectiva o 
públicamente cómo se contarán y recordarán más adelante las experiencias que están 
teniendo ahora, esto es, cuando dan (si se me permite) “un salto de tigre al futuro” 
desde un presente que perciben como históricamente decisivo. Por tanto, si un grupo 
dado está buscando precedentes pero, al mismo tiempo, trata de sentar los suyos propios 
cambiando las cosas, la percepción del tiempo resultante contendrá una combinación de 
elementos lineales y cíclicos. 
Los efectos y reacciones que produce la “historización del tiempo presente” en 
una comunidad incluyen: la voluntad de recoger y preservar cualquier material 
susceptible de convertirse en una futura fuente para estudiar el período actual; 
especulaciones relacionadas con la idea de posteridad o con proyecciones como “¿qué 
se dirá más adelante de lo que está sucediendo ahora?”, a fin de emplearlas como un 
criterio adicional en la toma de decisiones; por último, las sensaciones de esperanza, 
poder y responsabilidad (más habituales), o bien de desesperación e impotencia si una 
comunidad llega a la conclusión de que no puede cambiar nada y se siente aplastada por 
el peso de una historia “ingobernable”.  
Los objetivos que se fijaron los opositores en los años setenta y ochenta hicieron 
que éstos volviesen la cabeza hacia el pasado en busca de inspiración. Por otro lado, el 
deseo de muchos inteligenci de saber más (y, por tanto, de permitir a otros saber más) 
sobre las históricas luchas y fracasos nacionales que el régimen comunista polaco 
despreciaba, manipulaba o silenciaba les hizo adquirir un compromiso más activo en la 
oposición, tejiendo nexos de significado más fuertes entre pasado y presente. Al 
reflexionar sobre acontecimientos pasados dentro estos movimientos, la conciencia 
histórica se recuperó, desarrolló y consolidó entre ellos.  
Fue en ese momento cuando los intelectuales polacos de la oposición comenzaron 
a “historizar” el tiempo presente, es decir, a insertar el presente en un discurso histórico 
o, mejor dicho, a escribir un discurso histórico sobre el presente, como si estuviesen 
pensando un poco más allá de su tiempo y concibiesen el “presente” ya como un 
“pasado”. Un pasado que protagonizaban, que querían registrar y que pretendían contar. 
Muchos inteligenci creían que lo que estaba sucediendo en Polonia con los movimientos 
opositores desde 1976 iba a ser crucial no sólo para la historia del país, sino 
posiblemente para todo el Bloque comunista, especialmente desde la formación de 
Solidaridad. Estaban convencidos de estar escribiendo algunas de las páginas de los 
libros de texto y manuales de historia del futuro y de que, por tanto, tenían el poder no 
sólo de decidir cómo sería esa historia (en función de su actuación) sino también de 
decidir cómo sería contada, qué incluiría y qué no, qué fuentes potenciales debían 
conservarse y cuáles no, etc. En este sentido, estaban escribiendo su propia historia por 
adelantado, o preparando los materiales necesarios para que ésta se escribiese de la 
forma en que ellos la habían percibido.  
Nos acercaremos a este fenómeno a través de algunas de las reuniones de la 
Comisión Nacional de Solidaridad en 1980-1981, de las obras sobre la historia de los 
movimientos opositores polacos y del caso de Archiwum “Solidarności”.  
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Fuentes  
 
Las fuentes estudiadas en esta tesis doctoral forman parte del discurso público de 
los inteligenci opositores polacos, es decir, de las expresiones públicas de estos grupos 
sociales en concreto y de los medios de comunicación que les respaldaban. 
Técnicamente, cualquier discurso podría considerarse “público”, pues siempre hay un 
interlocutor, real o imaginario, hacia el cual se articula. No existe, por el contrario, la 
categoría de “discurso privado”. Sin embargo, los discursos públicos, en contraste con 
los que empleamos cotidianamente, implican una mayor ritualización y unas normas de 
comportamiento más estrictas, y pueden apreciarse diferencias notables entre ellos en el 
vocabulario, las expresiones, los tipos de argumentación y el estilo del lenguaje. 
También en los fines, pues el discurso público aspira a una difusión amplia, más allá de 
las personas presentes en el momento de su transmisión, y viene marcado por una 
“agenda” de cuestiones de actualidad que interesa tratar y debatir en foros públicos191. 
En esta investigación hemos trabajado fundamentalmente con los textos que la 
inteligencja opositora escribió y publicó bajo diversas formas entre 1976 y 1991, 
principalmente ensayos o artículos, pero también cartas abiertas, manifiestos, 
introducciones a colecciones y trabajos, entrevistas, o, esporádicamente, poemas y 
canciones de temática opositora. Dentro del capítulo dedicado a la autopercepción de la 
oposición y su conciencia histórica serán estudiadas, además, algunas transcripciones de 
las reuniones de la Comisión Nacional de Solidarność y de ciertos procesos judiciales, 
que también fueron publicadas en su mayor parte. Por tanto, los diarios, memorias, 
obras literarias y artículos con fines netamente informativos han quedado (por lo 
general) excluidos de nuestro espectro de análisis.    
Dentro del léxico polaco existen varios términos de uso común que definen los 
tipos de textos a los que nos aproximaremos: los popularno-naukowy y naukowy son, 
respectivamente, obras de divulgación y textos académicos al uso (fruto de una 
investigación previa, con su correspondiente aparato crítico), mientras que la 
publicystyka abarca los debates o discusiones sobre temas de actualidad que tienen lugar 
en el espacio público, especialmente a través de los medios de comunicación escritos. 
Dentro de la prensa, la publicystyka suele adoptar la forma de felietony, es decir, de 
columnas o secciones de opinión, muchas veces fijas, de un autor, escritor o 
periodista192. Todos estos tipos de ensayo, mejor definidos en la esfera de publicación 
habitual (controlada por el gobierno comunista polaco), tenían, en cambio, contornos 
menos precisos dentro del ámbito de las publicaciones clandestinas, no censuradas 
(drugi obieg), debido tanto a las limitaciones técnicas y materiales como a la mayor 
urgencia informativa propias de esta esfera193.    
Al margen de estas especificaciones genéricas, nuestro criterio de selección ha 
sido primordialmente temático. En primer lugar, hemos escogido aquellos textos en los 
que se muestra un interés destacado por el pasado y por la historia polaca, bien porque 
se trate de obras de investigación o divulgación sobre ésta, bien porque sean escritos 
dedicados a asuntos políticos del presente que contienen alusiones o referencias 
históricas. En segundo lugar, nos hemos centrado específicamente en los discursos que 
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giran en torno a las siguientes cuestiones: a la identidad de Polonia en general y su 
aproximación a otros países europeos; al rol de los inteligenci en la historia de Polonia y 
en el presente, y, por último, a la percepción del paso del tiempo. Dado que en la 
Polonia comunista la reflexión histórica trascendía con creces tanto la esfera 
estrictamente académica como el límite entre publicaciones censuradas y no censuradas, 
no nos hemos restringido a la autoría de historiadores profesionales ni tampoco 
exclusivamente al ámbito clandestino de libre expresión. 
También nos ha parecido oportuno detenernos a analizar una selección de fuentes 
iconográficas como forma de complementar y apuntalar lo visto en los textos, porque 
los movimientos de oposición en Polonia contaron con un caudal simbólico muy 
potente194 que quedó plasmado en carteles, posters, sellos o tarjetas, y vale la pena 
poner en relación unas formas de expresión con otras cuando los discursos son 
compartidos. 
 
Drugi obieg 
 
Muchos han sido los nombres que se le han dado en Polonia al material que 
circulaba más allá del control estatal: literatura prohibida (literatura zakazana), 
clandestina (tajna, zakonspirowana) o “subterránea” (podziemna), más allá de la 
censura (pozacenzuralna), ilegal (nielegalna), extraoficial (nieoficjalna), independiente 
(niezależna) o, enlazando con tradiciones pretéritas, bibuła. Otros, más ortodoxos, 
prefieren emplear el adjetivo bezdebitowa, que hace referencia a las editoriales 
extranjeras y de la emigración polaca que carecían del derecho de difusión de sus 
publicaciones en Polonia195, pues casi desde el comienzo del período comunista, antes 
de que florecieran y se multiplicaran las iniciativas editoriales clandestinas autóctonas 
(años 70 y 80), existía un contrabando de libros y revistas que venían de fuera196.   
Sin embargo, quizás la expresión más utilizada a día de hoy sea la de drugi obieg, 
que significa “segunda circulación”. Aunque hacia mediados de los años 70 ya se 
planteaba, por ejemplo, la creación de “otro” teatro, “otra” literatura u “otro” lenguaje 
(drugie teatr, literatura, język)197, distintos de los oficiales, realmente el término drugi 
obieg se gestó durante la década de los 80 en círculos pro-gubernamentales para 
referirse despectivamente a la oposición después de la formación de Solidarność, 
además de al mercado negro y lo ilegal en general, pero los opositores también 
empezaron a usarlo y se popularizó198. Por contraste, lo legal o autorizado (muchas 
veces previa censura) sería pierwszy obieg, “primera circulación”.  
Drugi obieg fue un sistema alternativo de comunicación resultado del desarrollo 
de actividades contraculturales en la PRL; se oponía, por tanto, al orden y a las normas 
existentes con el fin de sustituirlas o contrarrestarlas con unos objetivos, valores y 
principios diferentes. Esta definición no sólo comprende los contenidos de las obras que 
se distribuían, sino todo el proceso de elaboración y publicación de textos, además de 
otras manifestaciones y actividades alternativas (como reuniones, charlas y seminarios), 
registradas a menudo en distintos soportes (cintas magnetofónicas, videos, posters…). 
Por último, drugi obieg también puede entenderse, desde el punto de vista de los que 
                                                 
194
 Kubik: The Power of Symbols…, esp. cap. 7. 
195
 Definiciones de debit igualmente en: http://sjp.pwn.pl/ y http://sjp.pl. 
196
 Sowiński: Zakazana książka..., 13-14 y 75. 
197
 En polaco, la palabra “drugi” (segundo) también se emplea con el sentido de “otro”. Por ejemplo, 
cruzar al otro lado de la calle se diría Przejść na drugą stronę ulicy.  
198
 Mikołajczyk: Jak się pisało…, 13; Sowiński: Zakazana książka..., 15-17. 
57 
 
participaron en él, como todo un estilo de vida más allá del control y las reglas estatales, 
un espacio propio y de encuentro199.  
Las editoriales drugi obieg solían formar parte o colaborar con algunos grupos 
opositores y, al no tener un status legal, no sólo no recibían apoyo y ayudas de 
instituciones oficiales, sino que debían distribuir sus obras no censuradas al margen de 
la red de puntos de venta habituales200. Hasta 1976, estas iniciativas clandestinas fueron 
bastante esporádicas, si se exceptúan algunos precedentes destacados (publicaciones 
periódicas de excombatientes entre 1944-1947, textos después de la purga de marzo del 
68 o iniciativas de los comités de huelga de 1970), pero a partir de la formación del 
KOR comenzaron a florecer en torno a distintos movimientos críticos201. 
No obstante, no todos los textos o editoriales drugi obieg tenían necesariamente 
fines opositores. Algunos autores prefieren, de hecho, hablar de dos drugie obiegi: el 
primero habría sido fruto de la reacción de la oposición contra las políticas culturales 
del gobierno y facilitaba a los lectores el acceso a posturas y criterios políticos no 
tolerados por la censura, fomentando la creación de opinión, mientras que el segundo, 
aunque numéricamente menos significativo, abarcaría otras temáticas (religiosas, 
visionarias…), a veces incluso argumentos contrarios a los predominantes en la 
oposición (opciones de lucha armada, pervivencia del antisemitismo…), y supeditaría 
los criterios intelectuales y políticos a la obtención de los máximos beneficios 
posibles202.  
Por supuesto, los editores drugi obieg vinculados a la oposición también tenían en 
mente consideraciones comerciales y económicas, que frecuentemente venían 
determinadas, como en cualquier negocio editorial, por la actualidad nacional o 
internacional y el interés por ciertos asuntos o personas: se reimprimieron, por ejemplo, 
muchas obras de Czesław Miłosz después de que éste recibiese el Premio Nobel de 
Literatura en 1980, y se re-editaron las homilías del papa Juan Pablo II antes y después 
de sus visitas a Polonia, así como las del sacerdote Jerzy Popiełuszko, estrechamente 
vinculado a Solidarność, después de su asesinato en 1984… Y, desde luego, 
despertaban mucha curiosidad los propios movimientos de oposición, sus líderes y sus 
ideas, siendo una tendencia en sí mismos203.  
El tono político de las obras drugi obieg, pese a la ausencia de censura, casi nunca 
era tan diáfano y directo como al que estamos acostumbrados en las sociedades 
democráticas. Se trataba, en palabras de Paweł Sowiński, de expresar lo político en un 
lenguaje no político. Se criticaba algún aspecto del sistema o al sistema en general 
desde posturas antitotalitarias, pero a través de recursos y géneros literarios, o bien 
entretejiendo los argumentos con reflexiones y ejemplos históricos, que estudiaremos en 
este trabajo. Rara vez se decía abiertamente que era necesario salir de la esfera de 
influencia de la URSS, ni se animaba a los lectores a protestar en la calle o a organizar 
huelgas y partidos políticos. Tampoco los estatutos, programas y manifiestos 
abiertamente políticos abundaban en la “segunda circulación”204. Este carácter sutil del 
contenido político en un ámbito de libre expresión podría percibirse como una forma de 
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prudencia y autocontención o, si se prefiere, de autocensura por parte de muchos 
opositores, pero también debe tenerse en cuenta que, en aquellos momentos, el 
desmantelamiento del Bloque del Este y la desintegración de la Unión Soviética eran 
escenarios que la mayoría de la población polaca ni siquiera contemplaba como posibles 
o viables, menos aún a tan corto plazo. Además, la noción de “política”, monopolizada 
y pervertida tras 30 años de gobierno comunista, arrastraba consigo connotaciones 
negativas de las que muchos grupos opositores querían disociarse, prefiriendo centrar 
sus esfuerzos en lo “social” y lo “ciudadano”, es decir, en crear desde la base una 
sociedad más libre e independiente.  
Aún así, la finalidad del drugi obieg fue objeto habitual de discusión en el seno de 
los propios círculos editoriales clandestinos, pues mientras algunos de sus integrantes lo 
contemplaban, desde un ángulo más cultural, como un mundo de pensamiento libre para 
grupos reducidos y un valor en sí mismo, otros, sin embargo, querían darle un giro más 
político, centrado en la lucha contra el comunismo y en minar el sistema con 
publicaciones patrióticas, propagandísticas o didácticas205.   
Por otra parte, más allá de su lectura e interpretación potenciales, el mero hecho 
de comprar o poseer una publicación drugi obieg era, para muchas personas 
disconformes con el régimen comunista, un signo de identidad y una manifestación 
política, además de la llave de acceso al mundo de la oposición. Como en cualquier 
mercado, convencional o alternativo, la calidad material e intelectual de las obras podía 
llegar a ser muy dispar, sólo que, en el caso de las drugi obieg, su valor principal y su 
credibilidad radicaban en su carácter ilegal206.  
El sistema drugi obieg no se encuentra en el origen del descontento y la crítica 
sociales en Polonia, pero una vez en marcha actuó como un catalizador, 
enriqueciéndolos, difundiéndolos, complementándolos, fortaleciéndolos y ofreciendo, a 
su vez, inspiración, apoyo y consuelo a muchos207. Su relación interdependiente con el 
entramado opositor (con distintos grados de autonomía y disensión en cada caso) no se 
limitaba sólo a los libros y revistas que producía, sino que se extendía a otro tipo de 
actividades clandestinas, como la impresión de pasquines para actos de sabotaje o la 
falsificación de documentos para ocultar a personas en busca y captura. Además, las 
editoriales independientes más importantes establecieron canales para hacer llegar 
material de imprenta a Polonia desde Occidente208.  
La “segunda circulación” proporcionó también un medio de vida a escritores y 
periodistas, principalmente jóvenes o menos conocidos, que habían sido vetados o 
despedidos de los medios de comunicación pierwszy obieg. Para ellos, su actividad 
laboral era lo cotidiano, pero también algo que les separaba y distinguía del resto de la 
sociedad. Los lazos sociales y contactos entre los miembros de este entramado eran 
fluidos, muchas veces circunstanciales, y no siempre era sencillo discernir a los 
trabajadores de una editorial de aquellos que sólo eran colaboradores. Por motivos de 
seguridad, las actividades solían desarrollarse en un ámbito privado, más informal, y el 
sistema de comunicación más eficiente y discreto entre sus participantes y lectores era 
el “boca a boca”. Sin embargo, también se aprovechaban las ventajas y recursos de las 
instituciones estatales, como las universidades, gracias a aquellos miembros del sistema 
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independiente empleados en la esfera oficial, creando “islas” extraoficiales en su 
seno209.  
Entre las casas editoriales drugi obieg anteriores a la fundación de Solidarność 
destacaron Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza (NOWa, antes llamada Nieocenzurowana 
Oficyna Wydawnicza, la más grande y de mayor éxito en Polonia, con muchos 
contactos con Occidente y los emigrantes opositores), Głos o Krąg (escisión de Głos), 
todas próximas al KOR, Wydawnictwo 3 Maja y Wydawnictwo Polski, vinculadas al 
Movimiento de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos y Ciudadanos (Ruch Obrony Praw 
Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO).  
En cuanto a las publicaciones periódicas, Komunikat y Biuletyn Informacyjny 
fueron, respectivamente, el órgano oficial y extraoficial del KOR; muchos 
colaboradores de la revista U Progu, fundada en 1976, contribuyeron a la formación del 
ROPCiO, cuyo altavoz, acto seguido, pasó a ser Opinia; el Comité de Resistencia Social 
(Komitet Oporu Społecznego), por su parte, distribuía cada 2 semanas la revista KOS y 
estaba al cargo de los Cuadernos de Educación Nacional (Zeszyty Edukacji Narodowej, 
ZEN). En octubre de 1977 se creó la revista para jóvenes católicos Spotkania, y también 
Puls, cuyo comité editorial estaba formado por miembros del KOR de la ciudad de 
Łódź. Por otra parte, Krytyka, con un nivel académico y teórico elevado, empezó a 
circular en el verano de 1978 respaldada por algunos integrantes del KOR y opositores 
checoslovacos y húngaros, mientras que entre 1979 y 1980 aparecieron dos revistas 
intelectuales con una visión más conservadora, Res Publica y Alternatywy. Había 
publicaciones de índole informativa, como Przegląd o el ya mencionado Biuletyn 
Informacyjny, que transcribían y traducían noticias extraídas de la prensa internacional, 
o Robotnik, también conectada al KOR y pensada para los trabajadores urbanos, y otras 
que, como Zapis, se dedicaban a publicar íntegramente obras literarias que estaban o 
eran susceptibles de ser censuradas210. En muchos otros casos, las revistas y editoriales 
se dedicaban, más que a recopilar material original para publicar, a copiar y reproducir 
textos de interés para los lectores, total o parcialmente, con o sin permiso, de ahí la 
coletilla habitual “bez zgody i wiedzy autora” (sin conocimiento ni permiso del autor): 
re-ediciones de obras clásicas, publicaciones de otras épocas, que tuvieron poca difusión 
o son difíciles de encontrar, escritas en otros países del Bloque u Occidente, 
transcripciones de locuciones de Radio Europa Libre211, etc.212  
Durante el período de existencia legal de Solidarność (agosto 1980-diciembre 
1981), aprovechando la coyuntura de mayor libertad, continuaron apareciendo nuevas 
publicaciones y editoriales drugi obieg213, dando un salto cualitativo en su organización 
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y dinámica gracias a la compartimentación regional y sectorial del sindicato libre y al 
apoyo masivo que éste obtuvo entre los trabajadores y el resto de ciudadanos. La 
primera publicación periódica de cobertura nacional, independiente y legal (por tanto 
sujeta a la censura) que tuvo Solidarność fue el semanario Tygodnik Solidarność, que se 
publicó entre el 3 de abril y el 11 de diciembre de 1981214, pero otras publicaciones 
mostraron su simpatía hacia el movimiento y colaboraron desde el ámbito drugi obieg 
sin necesidad de estar subordinadas a él. Al establecerse la Ley Marcial, el 13 de 
diciembre de 1981, muchas de estas publicaciones fueron requisadas y se desmantelaron 
numerosas casas editoriales, arrestando y encarcelando a buena parte de sus miembros. 
La propia Solidarność, más desmembrada y dispersa a causa de la represión, no siempre 
era capaz de mantener el contacto entre sus órganos centrales y regionales, y se 
plantearon distintos conflictos y separaciones que contribuyeron a fragmentar, a su vez, 
las iniciativas editoriales que, en consecuencia, no dejaron de incrementar en número. 
Además, al crearse el Fondo de Editoriales Independientes (Fundusz Wydawnictw 
Niezależnych), aumentó la separación y la sensación de autonomía de las editoriales 
drugi obieg con respecto al sindicato215. Desde principios de 1982, el órgano de 
comunicación principal drugi obieg más popular de Solidarność a nivel nacional fue el 
semanario Tygodnik Mazowsze. 
Los límites de este trabajo no nos permiten profundizar más en la complejidad, 
funcionamiento y ramificaciones de estas y otras muchas iniciativas drugi obieg, más o 
menos modestas, estables o efímeras, pero nos remitimos a aquellas investigaciones 
que, desde distintos enfoques, se han aproximado al fenómeno con más detalle216. 
 
 Permeabilidad entre pierwszy obieg y drugi obieg 
 
Lejos de ser antagónicas, la “primera” y la “segunda circulación” mantenían una 
relación bastante estrecha en Polonia. Debe tenerse en cuenta que un campo alternativo 
sólo prospera cuando existe otro oficial al que dar la réplica; por tanto, aunque las 
publicaciones drugi obieg fueron fruto de la ausencia de libertad de expresión en ese 
contexto, existía cierta reciprocidad y permeabilidad entre éstas y las del pierwszy, a las 
que nunca aspiraron a sustituir, sino más bien a mejorar y complementar. De acuerdo 
con la filosofía de los promotores de la “segunda circulación”, ésta sólo existiría hasta 
que pudiera volverse a publicar libremente, sin censura ni controles, momento en el que 
volvería a haber un único obieg con cabida para todos217. 
Era habitual que los simpatizantes o miembros de la oposición dedicados a la 
escritura, la investigación o al periodismo recurriesen a ambas vías para tratar de vivir 
de sus obras, sobre todo si trabajaban en alguna institución pública, como las 
universidades o la Academia Polaca de Ciencias (Polska Akademia Nauk, PAN). 
Muchos intentaban publicar primero su trabajo en pierwszy obieg, y cuando no lo 
lograban o se lo censuraban probaban en el drugi. Algunos simultaneaban empleos en 
uno y otro ámbito, incluso habiendo sido despedidos de publicaciones periódicas 
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censuradas (como Dariusz Fikus, Jacek Maziarski o Stefan Bratkowski), pues preferían 
seguir teniendo unos ingresos seguros y regulares procedentes del pierwszy obieg 
aunque fuera escribiendo en una revista para ciegos, horóscopos, secciones de noticias 
regionales o novela negra por entregas. En función de las circunstancias personales, el 
tipo de texto a publicar o las convicciones políticas, el salto podía darse del pierwszy al 
drugi obieg, o a la inversa.  
El gobierno polaco ejercía un mecenazgo cultural muy fuerte y se valía de la 
dependencia de los autores para lograr sus fines; además de criticar y desprestigiar a los 
integrantes del drugi obieg tachándoles de anti-comunistas, colaboradores de agentes 
extranjeros o literatos frustrados, en ocasiones permitía el “retorno” de algunos 
escritores a la esfera oficial a condición de que no volviesen a publicar 
clandestinamente, o trataba de atraer a su terreno a aquellos del drugi obieg que tenían 
talento. En cambio, los opositores más jóvenes, señalados por las autoridades 
comunistas desde el comienzo de su implicación política (sobre todo los estudiantes 
represaliados en marzo de 1968, como Adam Michnik), no tenían opción, y se volcaban 
exclusivamente en la esfera alternativa para manifestar su opinión, en especial a través 
de las revistas y periódicos218.   
Pese a tener el denominador común de la supervisión del censor, no debe olvidar-
se que en el pierwszy obieg existía una amplia variedad de editoriales y publicaciones 
periódicas, con lo que escribir de forma legal no implicaba necesariamente adhesión 
ideológica o apoyo al régimen. No significaba lo mismo, por ejemplo, publicar un traba-
jo en una revista especializada en literatura que en un órgano de propaganda de la PRL, 
como fueron Żołnierz Wolności (“El soldado de la libertad”) y Trybuna Ludu (“La tri-
buna del pueblo”)219. Dentro de la propia prensa de orientación comunista también ha-
bía líneas editoriales más pro-gubernamentales y otras menos ortodoxas o más proclives 
a la crítica. Además, hubo varias publicaciones periódicas promovidas por grupos cató-
licos críticos con el régimen; éstas permitían una mayor libertad de expresión en sus 
páginas y ejercieron de contrapeso a lo estrictamente oficial dentro de los límites del 
sistema, convirtiéndose en un “refugio” para muchos profesionales vetados, desarraiga-
dos o desencantados220. Tal es el caso de Tygodnik Powszechny221, en funcionamiento 
desde 1945, con el carismático Jerzy Turowicz a la cabeza hasta 1999; el también cra-
coviano Znak (desde 1946, con una interrupción entre 1953 y 1956); o Więź (desde 
1958), ligada al Club de Inteligencja Católica (KIK) de Varsovia y con Tadeusz Mazo-
wiecki como redactor-jefe hasta 1981. Los integrantes del movimiento “Znak”, fundado 
en 1957 como grupo parlamentario católico alternativo, procedían de estos tres entor-
nos, lo que pone de relieve, una vez más, la proximidad entre la oposición y la lucha por 
la libre expresión en los medios de comunicación escritos.  
Por otro lado, las ideas, la actualidad, las tendencias y las demandas de los 
lectores en muchas ocasiones no entendían de barreras entre lo legal y lo ilegal, pues 
cualquier casa editorial se hacía eco de ellas, si bien con enfoques y limitaciones 
propios de cada ámbito. Por ejemplo, durante los años 60 y 70 estuvo muy de moda 
escribir diarios y memorias, pero mientras que en el pierwszy obieg se organizaban 
concursos de escritura de diarios dirigidos a los lectores de determinados sectores 
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profesionales o centrados en temas concretos (como la familia o el trabajo)222, en drugi 
obieg circulaban diarios y memorias de víctimas anónimas de la represión comunista, de 
judíos polacos, de deportados a Siberia, de participantes en el Levantamiento de 
Varsovia y miembros del Ejército Nacional (Armia Krajowa, AK), de los líderes 
políticos del gobierno polaco en el exilio223 y, por supuesto, de opositores como el 
escritor Kazimierz Brandys (Miesiące, titulado en su traducción inglesa A Warsaw 
Diary) o de Tadeusz Mazowiecki durante su estancia en la cárcel (Internowanie, 1982). 
La novela también era un género habitual y muy versátil a la hora de esquivar la censura 
en el pierwszy obieg; según Anna R. Dadlez, durante la época de la PRL fueron un canal 
recurrente para tratar cuestiones políticas y sociales, expresar disconformidad y plasmar 
críticas, y subyace en ellas un continuum de búsqueda de libertad, con distintas formas y 
contenidos en función del período224.  
Las cuestiones históricas, como ya hemos señalado antes, siempre han estado muy 
presentes en una y otra esfera, bajo la forma tanto de obras académicas como de 
publicystyka, aunque la historia polaca del siglo XX fue un dominio casi exclusivo de 
los autores y las editoriales drugi obieg hasta la segunda mitad de la década de los 
ochenta debido a los criterios censores. 
Tampoco era extraño que los sistemas de publicaciones legal e ilegal compartieran 
un porcentaje significativo de lectores. Tanto en uno como en otro caso, el público 
lector estaba formado fundamentalmente por los círculos intelectuales de las ciudades 
(estudiantes, científicos, literatos, periodistas…) y, en menor medida, por obreros. Los 
aficionados a lecturas drugi obieg solían ser miembros o simpatizantes de los 
movimientos opositores, además del propio servicio de inteligencia y policía secreta (la 
SB), que las interceptaba y estudiaba minuciosamente  (no sólo por obligación, sino a 
veces hasta con devoción); pero no todos los que tenían oportunidad de leer una obra 
clandestina percibían su acción como un acto de desconfianza hacia el gobierno 
comunista225. Por lo demás, el drugi obieg no era ni quería ser puramente endogámico: 
sus propios integrantes, autores y trabajadores de las editoriales, estaban pendientes de 
las novedades del mercado legal y eran clientela habitual. Cuando encontraban obras 
interesantes publicadas en pierwszy obieg, no tenían reparo en hacerlo saber; de hecho, 
existen algunos catálogos drugi obieg dedicados a fomentar un conocimiento y 
educación independientes en los que se recomiendan y comentan indistintamente obras 
legales y clandestinas226.   
 
Samizdat y tamizdat 
 
Dos conceptos que, si bien no son de origen polaco, están muy relacionados con 
las publicaciones independientes en Polonia son samizdat y tamizdat. 
El término samizdat fue acuñado, al parecer, por un poeta moscovita a finales de 
los años 50 para definir una colección de poemas que había editado él mismo. Poco 
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tiempo después, ya se aplicaba en general a la distribución por iniciativa propia de 
textos (u otros materiales) sin el permiso de las autoridades ni el respaldo de una casa 
editorial y, por supuesto, sin censurar227. La palabra que más se le aproximaría en 
castellano sería “autoedición” o “autopublicación”.  
Probablemente sea éste el concepto más empleado a nivel internacional para 
referirse a las publicaciones clandestinas producidas en los países del Bloque del Este y 
la Unión Soviética, incluido el drugi obieg. Sin embargo, los propios integrantes del 
sistema independiente en Polonia sólo hablaban de samizdat para aludir a textos 
clandestinos soviéticos, muy rara vez a los propios. Además, con el transcurso de los 
años las diferencias técnicas, de cantidad y de calidad respecto de otros países del 
entorno se acrecentaron228. Tradicionalmente, el samizdat soviético o checoslovaco, y 
también al principio el polaco, consistía en una obra escrita a máquina, encuadernada de 
manera más o menos rudimentaria (con grapas, cosida, con unos cartones como 
tapas…), que podía reproducirse simultáneamente varias veces gracias al papel-carbón. 
Al margen de las iniciativas editoriales independientes que fueron surgiendo en cada 
país, como la máquina de escribir estaba presente en muchos hogares, la decisión de 
mecanografiar unas cuantas copias de un texto samizdat dependía de cada lector, y era 
probablemente el método más discreto e indetectable de difundir un texto y multiplicar 
su alcance e impacto entre la población interesada229. El samizdat supuso, por motivos 
políticos, un retorno a formas de impresión y publicación menos eficientes y, aunque a 
todas luces es una exageración hablar de una vuelta a la era pre-Gutenberg, resulta 
interesante que en la URSS se plantearan alternativas tales como la memorización de 
textos para su transmisión oral230.  
En cambio, como apuntábamos más arriba, la situación inicial y la evolución de 
las publicaciones clandestinas en Polonia fueron sustancialmente diferentes. Como 
resultado del cambio de liderazgo en el Partido Comunista y de los préstamos que 
contrató el Estado con diversos países occidentales, durante la primera mitad de los años 
70 Polonia experimentó un desarrollo material notable y la política oficial de 
publicaciones se hizo más laxa; es decir, se tenía acceso por vía legal a revistas, 
periódicos y libros, tanto polacos como extranjeros, que no habrían podido ver la luz en 
otros países del Bloque. Más adelante, cuando proliferaron las publicaciones ilegales, la 
actitud de las autoridades polacas también resultó ser más permisiva que la de otros 
estados; se trataba, sin lugar a dudas, de materiales no permitidos, pero no estaban 
terminantemente prohibidos, ni las actividades clandestinas se perseguían y castigaban 
con tanta brutalidad e intransigencia como en la Unión Soviética o en los países 
gobernados por la línea dura del Partido Comunista (RDA y Checoslovaquia). Esta 
tendencia oficial más aperturista (aún con sus vaivenes), así como la permeabilidad de 
ideas, temas, autores y lectores entre el pierwszy y el drugi obieg polacos, fueron algo 
bastante excepcional en la Europa Central y Oriental de la década de los ochenta, donde 
la separación entre lo oficial y lo extraoficial era prácticamente insalvable231. Además, 
en Polonia pronto se introdujo la reproducción de textos con maquinaria propia de una 
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imprenta al uso; esta mecanización dio como resultado una sistematización del proceso 
de producción y una diversificación de editoriales y publicaciones sin parangón, con lo 
que puede hablarse con propiedad de una prensa clandestina. En este sentido, el drugi 
obieg rebasa la definición clásica de samizdat, más artesanal y con mayores 
impedimentos técnicos232.  
 De la palabra samizdat se derivaron otros vocablos más especializados, como 
radizdat (transcripciones de programas de radio) o magnizdat (lo que se grababa en 
cintas de audio). Tamizdat, por otra parte, se utilizó por primera vez en la editorial 
milanesa Feltrinelli Editore con motivo de la publicación en ruso de la obra de Boris 
Pasternak Doctor Zhivago. Aunque significa literalmente “lo publicado allí”, su sentido 
varía en función del punto de vista del observador, pues puede referirse bien a las obras 
que los escritores del Bloque publicaban más allá del Telón de Acero, o bien a aquellas 
otras que llegaban al Bloque desde “fuera”, en ambos casos necesariamente de 
contrabando. En cualquier caso, su puesta en marcha ha sido vista como una estrategia 
para superar la división política y económica de Europa a través del pensamiento libre y 
la cultura, especialmente después de la firma de los acuerdos de Helsinki (1975)233.   
Al igual que en el siglo XIX los libros polacos “prohibidos” tuvieron su origen en 
los círculos de emigrantes y exiliados políticos, durante el comunismo la emigración 
polaca jugó un papel fundamental para la puesta en circulación de ediciones extranjeras 
en la PRL y, en definitiva, para la creación del sistema drugi obieg. Desde el mismo 
final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, algunas capitales europeas occidentales, 
especialmente París o Londres, se convirtieron en las sedes de nuevas revistas y 
editoriales dirigidas por y para ciudadanos polacos, de entre las que destaca, por su 
influencia y diversificación, Instytut Literacki, liderada por Jerzy Giedroyć, pero 
también Odnowa, Éditions Spotkania, Polonia, Polonia Book Fund, Wydawnictwo 
Aneks o Puls234. 
El sistema tamizdat, por tanto, estuvo en funcionamiento en la PRL mucho antes 
que el samizdat, sobre todo a partir de la muerte de Stalin y la crisis de 1956, que 
supuso la llegada al poder de Władysław Gomułka. Fue entonces cuando se abrió un 
efímero paréntesis de mayor libertad y los contactos con Occidente se hicieron más 
fluidos en todos los niveles, especialmente los académicos, cosa que no sucedió en otros 
países comunistas. Aprovechando esta coyuntura, y casi en paralelo a Pasternak, 
algunos autores polacos se animaron a publicar sus obras en las editoriales dirigidas por 
emigrantes.  
Había innumerables métodos para pasar textos de un lado al otro del Telón. En 
general, las personas libres de sospecha autorizadas a viajar por el extranjero (artistas, 
diplomáticos, literatos, deportistas, bibliotecarios, miembros del PZPR…) podían 
ocultar algún texto entre su equipaje o en el compartimento de un medio de transporte 
(coche, tren, barco…). Los inteligenci que se desplazaban a menudo a Europa 
occidental ejercían en ocasiones de “correo” para otros compañeros: Władysław 
Bartoszewski, por ejemplo, se encargó de llevar las obras de Stefan Kisielewski cuando 
éste no podía salir del país. Pero el contrabando no se limitaba a la pequeña escala: 
muchas publicaciones anglófonas y francófonas llegaban a Polonia gracias a los envíos 
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que hacían organizaciones internacionales como el International Literary Centre235 a 
bibliotecas, universidades y particulares, siempre con otras instituciones y editoriales 
extranjeras o emigrantes como intermediarios. 
En esta época, muchos futuros opositores tuvieron acceso por primera vez a los 
tamizdat, no sólo gracias a sus contactos, sino también a las “grietas” del sistema 
censor: la propia Biblioteca Nacional de Polonia, por lo visto, conservaba ejemplares y 
sus empleados permitían leerlos in situ. No obstante, ser cogido in fraganti con uno o 
varios tamizdat podía suponer ser arrestado y sometido a investigación judicial, con lo 
que su intercambio y lectura debían tener lugar en entornos lo más seguros posible, 
normalmente de carácter privado. Por otro lado, como el número de títulos disponibles 
era bastante reducido, casi todos los aficionados a la literatura clandestina acababan 
leyendo los mismos libros y revistas, y desarrollaban, por tanto, ciertas ideas e 
inquietudes comunes, o puntos de vista similares236.  
La nueva ola de emigración que se produjo después de los acontecimientos de 
marzo de 1968 hizo que una generación más joven, con experiencias distintas, se 
desplazara a otros puntos de Europa Occidental; el París de Giedroyć y tantos otros 
emigrantes de la posguerra “compitió” a partir de entonces con nuevas iniciativas 
desarrolladas en Londres (como Aneks), Suecia, la República Federal Alemana o Italia. 
Para estas editoriales, la fundación del KOR en 1976 supuso contar con un aliado mejor 
organizado y estructurado dentro de Polonia que facilitó el paso y la distribución de las 
obras por el país, creándose incluso algunas bibliotecas de “libros prohibidos”237. 
Desde mediados de los años 70, con el desarrollo sistematizado y mecanizado de 
la esfera drugi obieg, los tamizdat empezaron a fluir con más frecuencia de Este a Oeste 
que de Oeste a Este; gracias a los nexos y estrecha colaboración entre polacos 
emigrantes y opositores que se quedaron en la PRL, muchas obras publicadas 
originalmente por una editorial clandestina recibían más difusión fuera que dentro de su 
propio país, incluso con traducciones a varios idiomas. Además, a partir de la formación 
de Solidarność, el interés que despertaba Polonia en los medios de comunicación 
internacionales fue aún mayor, y se disparó la demanda occidental de información sobre 
la oposición y sus líderes. 
Las fronteras entre lo producido “dentro” y lo producido “fuera” se hicieron, en 
esos momentos, más difusas. Tanto si hablamos de samizdat en general como de drugi 
obieg polaco en particular, los textos hacían muchas veces uno o varios viajes de ida y 
vuelta; por ejemplo, siendo publicados primero como samizdat, llevados fuera, y 
retornando al Bloque del Este como tamizdat (como sucedía con las revistas Krytyka, 
Res Publica o Zapis), o bien a la inversa, como si de un boomerang se tratase. De este 
modo, en drugi obieg al final se publicaba casi de todo: textos originales, re-ediciones 
de obras llegadas de fuera (con o sin permiso de la editorial extranjera), o copias de re-
ediciones extranjeras de un original drugi obieg238.     
En cualquier caso, la importancia de las publicaciones samizdat y tamizdat radica 
en que desempeñaron varias funciones: en primer lugar, fueron un medio por el que las 
personas pudieron mantener su integridad intelectual y alcanzar cierto grado de libertad 
en condiciones represivas; en segundo lugar, fueron una forma de diálogo silencioso, de 
carácter político y cultural, entre movimientos e individuos críticos de la Europa 
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comunista y de otras partes del mundo, que les permitió adquirir un cierto sentido de 
grupo y les suministró fortaleza moral en momentos complicados (prisión, huidas, 
amenazas…); en tercer lugar, fueron un canal para expresar la disconformidad de 
muchos con el sistema comunista y hacer propuestas para construir una sociedad más 
libre y humana; y, por último, proporcionaron información tanto dentro como fuera del 
país que ayudó a contrarrestar las campañas de propaganda y desinformación de los 
propios regímenes comunistas239. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Inteligencja Found There. Polish 
Opposition Intellectuals’ Self-Perception through the Assessment of the Past 
 
 
Die Vergangenheit führt einen heimlichen Index mit, durch den sie 
auf die Erlösung verwiesen wird. Streift denn nicht uns selber ein 
Hauch der Luft, die um die Früheren gewesen ist? ist nicht in 
Stimmen, denen wir unser Ohr schenken, ein echo von nun 
verstummten? haben die Frauen, die wir umwerben, nicht Schwestern, 
die sie nicht mehr gekannt haben? Ist dem so, dann besteht eine 
geheime Verabredung zwischen den gewesenen Geschlechtern und 
unserem. Dann sind wir auf der Erde erwartet worden. Dann ist uns 
wie jedem Geschlecht, das vor uns war, eine schwache messianische 
Kraft mitgegeben, an welche die Vergangenheit Anspruch hat. 
 
 Walter Benjamin: “Über den Begriff der Geschichte, These II” 
 
... the past few years in Polish public life have been marked by a 
renaissance of nonconformist attitudes. Their common denominator 
lies in the goal of self-determination and the formation of a program 
for a Polish politics of activism. Reflection on analogous endeavors 
from some eighty years ago can create an intellectual bridge between 
the era of our ancestors and now, when it is our turn to strive for 
independence. All the more so since an important element of the 
struggle for self-determination lies in an authentic knowledge of our 
own history. It is necessary to develop one’s own approach to the 
national heritage, to form one’s own ideological tradition and place 
oneself in it. Disputes over history are frequently equivalent to 
quarrels over our identity.  
 
Adam Michnik: “Conversation in the Citadel” 
 
 
A) Introductory remarks 
 
We have already commented in the general Introduction that inteligencja, 
understood as a myth (that is, a cluster of values and behavior patterns), and hence its 
nature, roles or imminent disappearance, has been an abiding concern in Polish public 
sphere ever since the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Jolanta 
Babiuch-Luxmoore, to speak and discuss about it has two possible purposes: firstly, it 
enables the promoters of such debates to fulfill their need of sharing their view of the 
world, and thus of expressing their social identity and its alleged origins. Secondly, to 
use such a polysemous term as inteligencja also allows a total or partial re-interpretation 
of its contents, therefore its adaptation to the present context and its specific demands. 
To put it another way, the first goal is linked to the continuity of a tradition represented 
by inteligencja, whereas the second has more to do with modifying or even breaking 
with this tradition. In both cases, the word inteligencja acts as a kind of “pretext” to 
propose a model of group to which a person or persons (most probably inteligenci 
themselves) would like to belong240. Along this chapter we will have the chance to see 
how these two positions unfold in a complementary way within Polish opposition’s 
narratives.   
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Of course, one must also bear in mind that, in many occasions, oppositionists took 
the past as a reference in order to avoid censorship, which was generally more focused 
on controlling clearly present-day topics. This way, a comparison, but also a bridge 
between past and present was established, and the historical dimension provided a given 
problem with a more universal and supra-temporal sense241.  
The resort to a mythic portrait of the inteligencja in Polish opposition’s texts of 
the 1970s and 1980s can be regarded as well as a response to what critical intellectuals 
may have perceived as a threatening situation, that is, to the transformation of values 
and traditions, and thus of the classic image of the inteligencja, that was taking place 
within Polish society. This is related, of course, to the periodic attempts of the 
Communist establishment to discredit the “traditional” inteligencja, rendering it 
“obsolete”, and to fashion simultaneously a new one “in its image and likeness”. The 
negative descriptions of the “old” inteligencja, however, probably contributed to the 
shaping and better definition of the positive ones.  
Besides the critical views about inteligenci present in official media since the 
beginning of PRL times, after Martial Law was applied, criticism concentrated on the 
role played by the inteligenci who were close to Solidarność. According to these reports 
and comments, opposition inteligencja had debased itself, betrayed Socialism, forgotten 
about its proletarian and peasant origins and broken its commitment with the “masses” 
which had enabled their education or studies. Critical inteligenci were called “internal 
émigrés” (emigracja wewnętrzna) and were accused of isolating themselves from 
society. Their elitism, alienation and lack of rational thought, together with the 
influence of nineteenth-century liberal values and a “noble-bourgeois” cultural sphere, 
had the fault of this supposed “deviation” of some intellectuals.  
Debates about whether inteligencja had a duty to the nation or, rather, to the State 
also arose then. Those inteligenci who inspired themselves in Polish unsubmissive 
tradition (niepokorni) considered that “authentic” intellectuals should remain faithful to 
national resistance and critical with governmental institutions, plus be solidary with 
workers and socially disadvantaged groups. They inspired themselves in the past and 
assumed, to a great extent, the old mythical inteligencki role because they perceived that 
the main problem for Polish society was their own State, due to its dependence on a 
foreign power, bad management, abuses and repression. On the other hand, official 
sources insisted on the need for inteligencja to collaborate with the government in a 
practical way during the increasing economic crisis in the country242. 
 
 
B) Historical inspiration. Nineteenth and twentieth-century ideas and political 
ideologies 
 
The sociologist Jerzy Szacki pointed out in 1971 that, by accepting or rejecting a 
tradition, a group imposes a certain political, philosophical and moral order on the past, 
appropriating itself of it for a present-day pedagogic use243. This is one of the key points 
underlying in many Polish opposition discourses: the search, in Irving Howe’s words, of 
“a usable past”244, and will be approached in detail in the following pages.  
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In her work about drugi obieg historical works of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Magdalena Mikołajczyk remarks that the political and social consciousness of 
participants in underground publishing houses had been shaped to a great extent by 
certain traditions, such as opposition and revolt or conspiratorial self-organization, 
together with doctrinaire and ideological debates passed on from generation to 
generation245. Similarly, Marcin Meller considered that Solidarność’s historical identity 
was basically created by a recent, revolutionary heritage in combination with a 
“restoration” one. The first, originated in PRL times, was nourished by the previous 
workers’ protests of 1956, 1970 and 1976, and had among its goals and ideals the 
achievement of human, labor and citizen rights. The second, dating back to the interwar 
period (1918-1939), openly called into question Communist government’s legitimacy, 
regarded the Polish Second Republic as its main historical reference and took 
November 11th (when Poland regained its independence and statehood, in 1918) as a 
highly symbolic commemorative date246. 
However, I would like to nuance these observations by explicitly adding two 
fundamental traditions: idealism and realism, which acquired a new meaning in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and have been discussed and re-interpreted 
over and over again since then in Polish inteligenckie circles in general, and very 
particularly in opposition ones. Usually, idealism is identified with Polish Romanticism 
(total opposition against partitioning powers, fight for values and ideals, especially for 
freedom and independence of the country, frequently through conspiracy, armed 
uprisings or violent outbursts…), whereas realism tends to be on a level with Positivism 
and praca organiczna (organic work), consistent in changing things and aiming for the 
highest degree of autonomy, or independence, through everyday work, economic and 
social development, constructive initiatives, etc.247  
In our case, the re-evaluation of Romantic and Positivist past contains a main, 
implicit question concerning the present that each intellectual tries to answer according 
to his or her convictions: How should inteligenci face an adverse, repressive and 
illegitimate power (Communist State under Soviet supervision), and work in favor of 
the Polish nation and their own interests? And especially: how could they promote 
freedom of expression, in order to be able to carry out their job in an honest way and 
show their dissent? From this starting point, inquiries multiply and branch out: Could 
more be done from within the system, that is, with partial reforms, or resorting to PRL 
institutions (high schools, universities, the harcerstwo248, the press, etc.) and using the 
system’s instruments to transmit their thoughts and values, and make pluralism prosper? 
Or should they create autonomous organizations, an alternative and more representative 
system of their own, beyond the official? And should this be done “openly”, or made 
“underground” from the start? Should there be a negotiation with power? And if so, 
when? And which were its limits? Should there be non-negotiable points? In other 
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words, what could be given up and what never should? For now, we may advance that 
the re-assessment of these trends of Polish thought took, first and foremost, to the 
proposal of syntheses and hybrid solutions. 
In political myths, besides collective actors, there is also a special place for 
prominent individuals who are considered heroes or founding fathers249. A society with 
a complicated past and multiple heritages such as the Polish one is indeed a fertile 
scenario for this. During the 1970s and 1980s, many in-depth biographies, short 
sketches and portraits about historical political characters, their thought and the groups 
they created or co-created, were published both openly and in drugi obieg250. The range 
goes from the leader of the Second Republic Marshall Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935), the 
ideologue of the National-Democratic Party Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) or the Prime 
Minister in exile during World War II Władysław Sikorski (1881-1943), back to the 
Medieval Ages’ thinkers and law experts approached by Stefan Bratkowski in his Nasi 
ojcowie-założyciele [Our founding fathers], which was confiscated twice by Communist 
censorship in the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny and finally published unabridged in 
1985 by underground press.   
The texts about idealism and realism we are going to deal with had, among others,  
two very direct “precedents”, chronologically and thematically speaking: Wojciech 
Karpiński’s and Marcin Król’s Sylwetki polityczne XIX wieku [Political figures of the 
nineteenth century] (1974), which consists of a collection of essays by these authors 
issued previously in Tygodnik Powszechny, and Bohdan Cywiński’s Rodowody 
niepokornych [The origins of the unsubmissive], published in 1971 in I obieg after 
undergoing censorship, but available in full version since 1984 in the underground 
market.    
Bohdan Cywiński (n. 1939), a Catholic oppositionist in PRL times, was since the 
1960s an outstanding member of Warsaw’s Club of Catholic Intellectuals (Klub 
Inteligencji Katolickiej, KIK). He began working for the journal Znak in 1967, and was 
its chief editor between 1973 and 1977. From 1978 he took part in the Uniwersytet 
Latający and Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych initiatives, and in 1980 he became a 
member of the Experts’ Commission of the Gdańsk Shipyards’ Strike Committee, as 
well as of Solidarność. He was abroad when Martial Law was established and decided 
not to return to Poland until 1990. As an émigré, he continued with his opposition 
activities, collaborated with Radio Free Europe’s Polish Section and was lecturer in 
several European universities.  
Rodowody niepokornych contained Cywiński’s views about the rebellious, non-
conformist and pro-independence traditions of Polish lay inteligenci at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. The author argued that, regarding social issues, these intellectuals 
followed an ethical radicalism very close to the Gospels. Having found a common 
ground for believers and non-believers within critical milieus, the book became an 
inspiration for many oppositionists of the time, like those belonging to the Catholic 
association Znak or KSS “KOR”, including Adam Michnik, who wrote his Kościół, 
lewica, dialog (1979)251 as a response to it. The work is, as Jolanta Babiuch-Luxmoore 
remarked, a significant testimony of contemporary Poles’ search of a past social ethos 
which could be recovered or continued to a great extent in (present) circumstances of 
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crises, revolts and discontent, when moral elections must be made and stances should be 
taken252.  
Wojciech Karpiński (n. 1943) studied Philology and Philosophy at Warsaw 
University and worked for several cultural magazines in the 1970s. In 1975 he signed 
Letter 59 (List 59) against the changes in Polish Constitution and later on became part 
of the opposition group Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe (PPN). He was a 
member of the editorial board of Res Publica, an outstanding drugi obieg political 
journal, since its foundation in 1979. When Martial Law was applied, Karpiński went 
abroad and, after spending some months in the U.S., decided to settle in Paris. He works 
since 1982 in the still ongoing émigré literary journal Zeszyty Literackie, and until 2008 
in the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). Some of his texts 
were also published in Jerzy Giedroyć’s “Instytut Literacki”, probably the most 
outstanding Polish émigré’s publishing house in those years, with close connections 
with the opposition at home.  
On the other hand, Marcin Król (n. 1944), who devoted himself professionally to 
intellectual history, was one of the authors of March 1968’s Deklaracja ruchu 
studenckiego [Declaration of the student movement] and became a member and lecturer 
of the Society of Scientific Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, TKN) in 1978. 
In 1979 he co-founded the afore-mentioned journal Res Publica (Res Publica Nowa 
since 1992) and was its chief editor between 1979-1981 and 1987-1992. The aim of this 
moderate, liberal-conservative publication during PRL times was to provide Polish 
intellectuals with information about the new trends in Western political thought. In 1980 
Król became counselor of Solidarność’s Mazovian Section, and began working for 
Tygodnik Powszechny in 1982. He also participated in the 1989 Round Table Talks and 
in 1990 was part of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s election committee. He is currently 
professor at Warsaw University253. 
Karpiński’s and Król’s Sylwetki polityczne XIX wieku is considered one of the 
bedside books of young Polish oppositionists during the second half of the 1970s254. 
The profiles and political activities of the historical figures chosen for the volume are 
very varied: a Romantic leader, like Maurycy Mochnacki, Adam Czartoryski, head of 
the political émigré faction “Hôtel Lambert” in Paris, and the members of the liberal 
party of the Kaliszanie, who all, regardless of their political differences, took part in the 
November 1830 Uprising and emigrated afterwards; the philosopher and publicysta 
Henryk Kamieński; count Stanisław Tarnowski, who participated in the January 1863 
Uprising and later was MP in the Galician Sejm; the Romantic writers and poets Juliusz 
Słowacki, Cyprian Norwid and Zygmunt Krasiński; politicians and other professionals 
who worked for partitioning powers, or had a more conciliatory, Positivist attitude, like 
Aleksander Wielopolski, Włodzimierz Spasowicz and Cracow School’s historian 
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Michał Bobrzyński; influent religious figures such as the Zmartwychwstancy fathers 
Kajsiewicz and Semenenko, etc.   
As we have pointed out above, the debates about whether to adopt an idealistic or 
a realistic position in Polish public affairs are recurrent since mid-nineteenth century. 
We could say, therefore, that what was being discussed in official, censored and 
underground press in the 1970s and 1980s is nothing new in this sense. However, the 
key points and proposals issued from these cyclical discussions have differed according 
to the context and circumstances. Since 1976, after the mirage of socio-economic 
improvement had vanished and another workers’ protest had been repressed, a different 
way of opposing Communist regime was being developed and was aiming to join 
efforts from different spheres of society, especially from Catholic and left-wing 
inteligencja, plus industrial workers. According to the new opposition “strategy”, 
society, or the nation, should be as autonomous and self-organized as possible and put 
pressure on the government in a peaceful fashion from beyond the system. But how 
could so many different positions and interests be put together? How could this 
“paradigm”, which Maryjane Osa defines as “us vs. them”, materialize?255 
I support that Polish inteligenci contributed to achieve this through the re-
interpretation of the idealistic-realistic dilemma, coming up with different balanced or 
conciliatory formulae. The works of Król, Karpiński and Cywiński can be considered an 
immediate “prelude” of what came next, due to their attempts either of giving a whole 
picture of the richness of Polish political and intellectual thought, or of rapprochement 
of lay and Catholic inteligenckie traditions.   
 
 
B.1) Romanticism-idealism 
 
One of the basic ideas in Polish Romanticism is that of the independence of 
nations through a revolutionary process, a feature connected in a certain way with 
Walter Benjamin’s emancipation proposal, as Michael Löwy pictures it: 
 
… Benjamin’s reflection allows us to think about a revolutionary project with a calling for general 
emancipation. 
This is the condition in order to face the ethical and political demands of our time and to revive 
the undoubtedly boundless ambition (but what interest could a restrained, moderate, mediocre 
utopia have for human action?) of ending with the dominion of one class over other, of one sex 
over other, of one nation over other, of human beings over nature. It is a universal goal, inspired in 
the unfulfilled promise of 1789: liberty, equality, fraternity, or, rather, solidarity, because it 
includes both brothers and sisters.256  
 
There are several myths associated to Poland’s nineteenth-century Romanticism 
that have become part of Polish identity, according to Ewa Domańska: on one hand, 
Messianic ideas involved regarding Poland as “the Christ of Nations” (Christological 
myth), as the leader of the Slavic peoples submitted to great European Empires (“for 
your freedom and ours”) and, continuing with the previous Noble-Sarmatian tradition 
dating back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries257, as the “Bulwark of Christendom” 
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(Antemurale Christianitatis). This also included the so-called “myth of the West”, based 
on the conviction that Western European countries are indebted to Poland due to its 
“sacrifices” in the name of freedom, and must certainly come to its aid. On the other 
hand, the Insurrection myth covers the death for Homeland (Tyrtean myth), the image 
of the “Pole-conspirator” (a martyr, tragic hero or loser), which takes to the cult of 
insurrection veterans; the figure of the “noble-traitor” and, finally, the “black myth of 
the West”, that denounces an alarming lack of values and spiritual roots in Western 
countries. Common to both Messianism and Insurrection myth are the image of the 
Polish Mother and the idea of mission, which entails suffering, death and sacrifice, but 
also resurrection258. We will go through the majority of these myths in Polish 
opposition’s narratives along the next three chapters of our research. 
Moving now on to inteligencja’s specific views of idealism in our time scope, it is 
frequent to spot in oppositionists’ texts an identification of Romantic traditions with the 
core of Polish ethos.  
Following Andrzej Micewski’s felietony in Tygodnik Powszechny, idealism would 
be the spiritual redoubt of the deepest emotions and convictions, as well as of ideas 
(inteligencja’s field of mastery), without which a nation simply cannot survive, as 
Poland’s complicated past had proven─ with ultimate success259. He further 
exemplified: 
 
Without Romantic tradition one cannot imagine social education, democratic and freedom 
aspirations, the guarantee of human rights and social justice, a free and many-sided development 
of culture and of human beings themselves, and neither a nation’s untransferable right to ensure its 
spiritual identity. It is therefore, from an educational point of view, the most important tradition, 
transmitting basic values.260  
 
Values which, above all, it is essential never to give up regardless of 
circumstances and adversities, as Adam Michnik constantly reminded his colleagues, 
though in a much more universal way than Micewski. Imponderables are, in sum, what 
gives meaning to a person’s existence: 
 
And so you find yourself engaged in a philosophical debate with them [police officers and secret 
service agents while in jail after December 13th 1981, C.A.] about the meaning of your life, about 
the meaninglessness of their lives, about giving meaning to every human existence. You are 
engaged in the argument of Giordano Bruno with the Inquisitor, of the Decembrist with the tsarist 
police superintendent, of Walerian Lukasinski with the tsarist angel of annihilation, of Carl von 
Ossietzky with the blond Gestapo officer, of Osip Mandelstam with a member of the Bolshevik 
party dressed in a uniform with the blue piping of the NKVD. You are engaged in the never-
ending argument about which Henryk Elzberg261 once said that the value of your participation 
cannot be gauged in terms of your chances of victory but rather by the value of your idea. In other 
words, you score a victory not when you win power but when you remain faithful to yourself.262 
 
That faithfulness to oneself is, for Michnik, a key requirement in order to be an 
“authentic” inteligent and, therefore, live up to the task of defending values and 
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formulating alternatives. This mission was carried out before by those whom he 
considered his models: the “unbowed” inteligencja of the early twentieth century, 
represented by Brzozowski263, Wyspiański264, Żeromski265 and Nałkowski266. Despite 
the fact that the voices of their followers were “still faint”, Michnik said, “it is they who 
create independent, public opinion and develop nonconformist attitudes”267. This shows 
his conviction regarding tradition and his perception of time: the “seeds” sowed in the 
past are still capable of bearing fruit in the present. And by putting together intellectuals 
with divergent or even opposite convictions, ranging from critical Marxism to patriotic 
neo-Romanticism, Michnik was also betting on a more global, trans-ideological 
definition of inteligencja, characterized above all by its feeling of national and social 
duty, engaged with the nation’s problems and needs and encouraging collective 
awareness through different fields of education and art. The message for his colleagues 
is clear: it was time to join the efforts of all the worthy persons who, despite their 
attachment to different intellectual backgrounds, aimed for the same goals-ideals. It was 
precisely that diversity of Polish traditions, plus the right to develop them freely, what 
should be preserved and defended by inteligenci.  
Following with the idealistic trend, Tadeusz Łepkowski spotted in “Polish 
national character” a fondness for emotions and principles, even for intuition rather than 
reason, and in general a Romantic tendency to “thinking with the heart” up until present 
time (1983), for better… but also for worse, as Solidarność’s political imprudence or its 
internal quarrels and divisions had shown268. However, Micewski considered that, 
contrary to what official media argued, Romanticism cannot be said to have reactionary 
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aspirations: “As far as I know”, he remarked ironically, “no-one of us wishes to re-
establish feudal or bourgeois exploitation, thus there is nothing to fear”269.   
On the other hand, Tadeusz Stański (n. 1948), co-founder of the first opposition 
political party, the Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodległej, KPN), took Romanticism in its best sense when he appealed to the 
uprising traditions of his birthplace region during the trial against KPN leaders in 
Warsaw’s Military Court (September 23-October 5, 1982). Podlasie, he said then, has 
always given priests, soldiers and clerks to the Polish Republic, and during the January 
Uprising, in 1863, kosynierzy and the rest of the men were ready to fight. This was also 
the way he perceived his political activities in KPN, and asserted that, before the 
Communist court, he felt like a soldier270.  
But Stański’s last words during the hearing contained two other more specific 
historical references in an attempt to connect or compare the past with his present 
circumstances: the trials against filareci (1823)271 and the Patriotic Society 
(Towarzystwo Patriotyczne), the latter taking place in 1828-1829272. What linked these 
early nineteenth-century cases with KPN’s, according to Stański, was their common 
patriotic struggle in favor of an independent Polish State, either through education or 
through an armed uprising, and stressed that Poles simply couldn’t be condemned for 
their national feelings273. If looked from the opposite angle (that of the court of 
“justice”), we also spot in Stański’s words the perception of a common enemy. All the 
examples he provided have to do with the former Russian part of Poland, as if there was 
also a continuity in terms of dominion and hence of injustice: from the Romanov empire 
to the Soviet one. These kinds of parallels between Partition and PRL times were 
frequently drawn in opposition narratives.  
Apart from purely positive opinions, we may also find among opposition 
inteligenci some justifications for extreme idealistic behavior (insurrectionism), with a 
tinge of fatalism at times. For instance, in his preface to Wojciech Karpiński’s and 
Marcin Król’s Sylwetki polityczne XIX wieku, Henryk Wereszycki274 considered that, 
due to the exceptional situation of Polish territories during the nineteenth century, 
political Romanticism and uprisings looked like the only possible self-defense in a 
period of intense dreams of greatness275. Similarly, within the framework of the 
idealism-realism controversy between columnists of the Catholic critical weekly 
Tygodnik Powszechny and the more open-minded but still official Polityka (1977-1978), 
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Marcin Król and Andrzej Micewski agreed with the idea that, in the past, there were 
circumstances in which one could be a realist out of choice, and others when 
Romanticism was simply the single way out. Romanticism provided people who had 
been deprived of every other possibility of action a series of means to try to achieve 
their goals and take an active stance against what was going on in Partitioned Poland’s 
social life. This situation was defined by Król as “compulsory Romanticism” 
(Romantyzm z przymusu)276.  
Tadeusz Łepkowski also shared this opinion, and related it, as his colleagues did, 
to Poland’s special circumstances, which couldn’t be compared to those of Western 
European countries. Idealism, in the former’s case, was not tantamount to unattainable 
targets, inefficiency and failure, but to safeguard of Polishness, which, in his opinion, 
would have gradually disappeared if more “realistic” attitudes had been taken, rendering 
Poland a “soulless nation”. In other words, Polish idealistic and realistic trends were 
product of national history, hence of Polish idiosyncrasy: 
 
In France, England or Sweden, the policy representing the touchstone of values is efficiency: it 
establishes rational activities to achieve goals that are, in the given conditions, achievable. In 
Poland the aspiration is to achieve theoretically unachievable goals. The ideal-utopia is our 
cornerstone. Typical of revolutionary thought, typical of revolutionary deeds. Easy inference: a 
permanent feature of Polish politics, and therefore a national feature, is idealism, Romanticism and 
utopianism, in other words, inefficiency. Is it really so? Not completely. Poland’s supposedly 
naïve and emotional political activities have proved to be surprisingly efficient. It allowed us to 
exist as a nation, it once allowed the achievement of that which, in “normal conditions”, was 
acknowledged as an unachievable independence (1918) and several times what looked like a 
hardly attainable autonomy of semi-independence (1807, 1815, 1945). 
It is frequently said, especially lately, that the lack of political acumen and culture is 
characteristic of Poles. But if we were “realist” in the same way as stable states with favorable 
geopolitical conditions, this wouldn’t be any longer our nation. A real “realist” in Poland must be a 
defeatist. A defeatist can only aim to preserve a nation without a soul, a people of prisoners 
speaking better or worse Polish, a façade-State, a feigned State and national reality. Nothing else. 
To condemn Polish political irrationalism, or to lament the Polish bloodsheds from 1794 up until 
the victims of the anti-Polish military counterrevolution of 1981-1982277 proves a lack of 
knowledge of our history as well as a lack of authentic political realism.278 
 
“In our conditions”, concluded Łepkowski further along in his text, “national 
politics without farsightedness, without great goals, without imagination, without mad 
fantasy and without utopia is unrealistic”279. 
The idea of a “last resort Romanticism” was “taken back” to the present in a more 
explicit way by Adam Michnik, who admitted in his article “On Resistance” (“O 
oporze”) that, before Martial Law, he was not in favor of conspiracy strategies within 
opposition circles but that, after it, General Jaruzelski had left Poles no other option: “I 
am one of those who in the past ten or so years have criticized the idea of conspiratorial 
activity. Today I am for organizing an underground. We have no choice. Jaruzelski has 
made the choice for us”280.  
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B.2) Positivism-realism 
 
Despite there being more or less latent political trends along the nineteenth 
century, fully-fledged Positivism and “organic work” spread in Polish lands especially 
after the last major repressed uprising of the 1800s, that of January 1863.  
This defeat made inteligenci react in different ways and consolidated the 
previously incipient division of generations and world views. It also changed or 
challenged inteligencja’s self-perception, ideological stances and its fondness for 
Romantic traditions, generating negative opinions about past Polish nobility and 
uprisings which were taken up again by Communist official media during PRL times281. 
In the last third of the nineteenth century, a conservative, critical Positivism was 
especially promoted by a group of scholars known as the Cracow School of 
historiography, headed by Walerian Kalinka, Józef Szujski and Michał Bobrzyński, 
among others. Its members condemned Polish nobility’s (szlachta’s) past freedoms and 
excesses because, according to them, they led to Partitions and to desperate armed 
insurrections that had only worsened Poland’s catastrophic situation282. However, many 
opposition inteligenci of the 1970s and 1980s tended to stress that this wasn’t the single 
(nor the best) option available within the realistic spectrum back then.  
Despite speaking rarely about Polish contemporary history or getting involved in 
publicystyka’s “idealism vs. realism” discussions, in an entry written for a French 
historical dictionary professor Bronisław Geremek seemed to take a clear stance for 
another kind of Positivism which, according to him, envisaged a better future and never 
ceased to work for it: that promoted by the Warsaw School of history.  
After the January uprising, he said, many Polish scholars and intellectuals began 
to ask themselves about the causes of Poland’s downfall. This assessment of national 
past in search for responsibilities took to controversy and disagreements between 
inteligenci who had a more pessimistic view and those who had a more optimistic one. 
The members of the Cracow School, who were deeply monarchical and worshipped the 
State and the law system, considered that Poland’s loss of independence was caused by 
the Poles’ own faults and mistakes, and they opposed to liberation movements because 
they were an expression of the conspiratorial tendencies of Poles. On the other hand, the 
historians of Warsaw School followed Joachim Lelewel and rejected Cracow School’s 
theories. They placed the nation above the State in their analyses and claimed that it was 
foreign violence what provoked the loss of Polish independence. Tadeusz Korzon 
(1839-1918), for instance, proved that the Rzeczypospolita’s division took place 
precisely when it was recovering from past problems and gathering new strength. Thus, 
Geremek summarized, it was during this period when present-day political options took 
shape “...concernant le choix entre la politique de la soumission à l’occupant et les 
aspirations à l’indépendance”, that is, between a short-sighted “realism” or rather 
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defeatism, which simply and unquestionably accepted foreign dominion, and a Realism 
which never forgot about its principles and ultimate aspirations283. 
Back in 1975, Adam Michnik already argued that Polish “organic work” was 
conceived as a way to achieve independence, and that it was destined to fulfill the aims 
of the nation, and not those of partitioning empires. Therefore, to be an “organicist” 
didn’t mean to  
 
… accept legalism, since what was legal had been declared such by the legislation of the invader 
and matched the interests of the invading power. The main criterion should be not legalism but 
reality. To put it more succinctly: the actions to be stipulated and favored were those that had as 
their point of reference not the law formulated by the invader in accordance with the invader’s 
reason of State, but rather the needs of the Poles for an independent existence.284 
 
Among the multiple classifications one could come up with for the heterogeneous 
Polish political spectrum at the turn of the century, Michnik suggested a simple division 
“between those who believed that realism entailed activity within the limits defined by 
the partitioning power and those who favor the concept of building an active Polish 
politics outside those limits”285. Hence, he re-located in the first years of the twentieth 
century his present concerns about the building of a politically conscious social sphere 
beyond Communist officialdom. This connection does not provide a mere continuity in 
political views and attitudes between yesterday and today, but one based specifically on 
hope: since the groups and parties formed back then (especially the Socialist Party and 
National Democracy) promoted independence and attained it after the Great War, the 
implicit message is that Poles could take once again that road towards a freer country 
through the formation of a more autonomous society, since, in their case, a nominally 
independent State already existed. The methods used by the national democrats in the 
decades previous to independence were of a special interest for Michnik during his 
imprisonment in the Białołęka Jailhouse286: 
 
Self-determination consists of internal national self-organization and external activist policies with 
determined goals. Internal self-organization means respecting the nation’s own norms and 
demands, independent of the penal code that exists in accordance with the wishes of the 
partitioning power. It means satisfying a maximum of national needs regardless of the institutions 
imposed by the invader. It means the positive creation and functioning of an independent public 
life in which the supreme national ambitions are discussed, formulated, and socially accepted. A 
conscious politics of activism means the implementation of these goals by both legal and illegal 
methods ─legal ones by seeking out the gaps in the invader’s organizational and legal systems, 
illegal ones by creating secret institutions and organizing actions condemned by the legal code. 
Activist politics also consists of the cool analysis of political situations and their comparison with 
current tactics and the hierarchy of demands. It requires an assessment of what can be achieved 
today and what should be put off until later.287 
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Andrzej Micewski also divided Polish Realism at the end of the nineteenth 
century into two historical traditions: one in which its members limited themselves to 
what was possible right then (eg. the “polityka realna” of the conservative circle) and 
another that took on account what could become possible tomorrow as well. He linked 
the latter to the right-winged National-Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Narodowodo-
Demokratyczne or Narodowa Demokracja288); in fact, Micewski even wrote in the early 
1970s a biography of the endecja co-founder Roman Dmowski289. However, within that 
Realism which led to the recovery of Polish statehood, the author still perceived a 
Romantic backdrop: “Though I consider that (…) [National Democracy] contributed to 
achieve independence through education and by ensuring Poland’s presence in [the 
meeting and Treaty of] Versailles, there can be no doubt that the Romantic nucleus of 
our whole partition period played a decisive role in this achievement”290.  
Stefan Bratkowski, on the other hand, disagreed with the hypothesis that 
Romanticism was such a crucial, or entirely positive, component of national identity. 
During the 1970s, he took on the task of vindicating eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment’s and nineteenth-century Positivism’s less known achievements in order 
to provide another, more balanced version of how modern Poland was built. Closer to 
1956’s theses of reform of Communism from within291, he was against the glorification 
of Romantic poets and rejected the idea that only words were a worthy method of 
defending Polish nation. He considered that Polish philologists specialized in Slavic-
Polish studies292, like Maria Janion, encouraged this kind of biased perception of the 
past, and criticized them for it293.  
In a revised and extended version of his compilation of articles entitled “Where do 
we come from?” (Skąd przychodzimy?, 1978), Bratkowski aimed for a much broader 
view of these trends, beyond a purely political public sphere. He argued that Positivism 
didn’t just consist of publicystika and literature, but also of all kinds of educational and 
technical improvements, such as those brought about by engineers and managers294. He 
devoted many of these essays to specific figures of Polish history, not just to highlight 
their merits and show how they contributed to Poland’s advance, but also to look for 
inspiration for the present and re-establish a continuity with an underestimated or 
almost forgotten part of the past, both on the official and the critical intellectual’s side.  
For instance, he revisited Stanisław Konarski (1700-1773)295, who, in the mid-
eighteenth century, betted on a lay education supplied by the State and, during his late 
years, founded the Collegium Nobilium (1740) and focused on training the sons of the 
decadent Polish noble elites, in whom he saw a chance for the Rzeczpospolita’s 
regeneration, being, thus, a forerunner of the later Commission of National Education 
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(Komisja Edukacji Narodowej, KEN296)297. He criticized the absence of certain 
important figures in popularizing historical works, such as count Karol Brzostowski 
(1796-1854), founder of the autonomous community of free peasants “Rzeczpospolita 
Sztabińska” (Republic of Sztabin), just because he didn’t match the stereotype of a 
cosmopolitan betrayer-magnate favored by Communist officialdom298. Or pointed up 
the convenience of not resorting to violence in order to change things through the 
examples of the enlightened newspaper Monitor, published in 1765 for the first time299, 
and of the almost Protestant work ethic of Stanisław Staszic (1755-1826)300, founder of 
the peasant community Towarzystwo Hrubieszowski (Hrubieszów Agricultural Society) 
in 1816301. Writing about them, as well as about Piotr Michałowski (1800-1855) or 
those who contributed to the development of Greater Poland when it was part of Prussia 
(Hipolit Cegielski, Walenty Stefański, father Piotr Wawrzyniak…)302, Bratkowski 
vindicated aspects and qualities of Realism which, despite being present in Polish 
traditions, had been generally neglected in history books, like rational organization, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, self-government and industriousness. In sum, for the 
author, the best form of patriotism and active commitment was based on orderly, 
constant everyday work driven by the wish of building a freer and fairer society.  
 
 
B.3) “Romantivism”. Preserving the best of both traditions 
 
… only the weak are sent out on paths without perils. But 
never forget what I have told you so often: our mission is to 
recognize contraries for what they are: first of all as contraries, 
but then as opposite poles of a unity. 
 
Hermann Hesse: The Glass Bead Game (Magister Ludi) 
 
In a work published in the 1960s, Adam Bromke supported that the dualism 
between idealism and realism in Poland could be explained to a great extent by 
geopolitics, or, as the author puts it, by the country’s “security dilemma”: its location in 
the midst of two great powers, Prussia/Germany and Russia/the USSR. Since this 
dilemma had, in his opinion, remained unchanged until present time (1967), so had 
these political options, despite the great socio-economic changes experienced in PRL 
period303. External factors determined the shift from one political program to the other, 
according to him; hence, in a moment when realism was predominant, “the prospects 
for a revival of political idealism hinge above all on the Poles securing satisfactory 
support from without”304.    
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One must bear in mind, however, that since organized networks of dissidents and 
collaboration between different critical groups hadn’t yet been fully arranged and 
developed, Bromke was referring mainly to official positions and tolerated Catholic 
associations’ media. Without denying the fundamental importance that international 
elements and affairs had for Poland, especially in the 1970s-1980s, and finally during 
the country’s transformacja (eg. the election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope, the liberal-
conservative governments in the US and the UK, Gorbachev’s rise to power in the 
USSR, or the émigrés’ contribution), within Polish opposition movements this was 
experienced slightly otherwise. The sources I have analyzed prove that, although 
inteligenci’s plans and proposals certainly took on account foreign circumstances and 
risks, like a possible adverse reaction of the Soviet Union to PRL government’s 
concessions to opposition (the previous invasions of Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 were much taken on account), their idealistic and/or realistic 
stances also stemmed from an inner factor ─perhaps the innermost: the belief in Polish 
society’s power to change things (Chapter 2). Hence their insistence, as we will see in 
Chapter 3, on discarding the myth of the “betrayal of the West” and their warnings 
about relying exclusively on external help to solve Poland’s problems. The answer to 
them would have to emanate, on the contrary, from the Poles themselves. No-one else 
could take the initiative. These proposals of creating an autonomous and self-organized 
society were probably more clearly stated and developed by lay, left-wing inteligencja, 
but it is also true, and so the latter acknowledged it too305, that they were in part shaping 
a theory which the Church and Catholic inteligencja had already been putting into 
practice in a smaller scale before, contributing to the formation of many “freedom of 
expression oases”, like the KIKs (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej: Catholic Inteligencja 
Clubs) or Tygodnik Powszechny.   
What interests us more for the present chapter is, nevertheless, Bromke’s 
suggestion about the compatibility and complementarity of idealistic and realistic 
traditions. It was not something new, the author explains, or characteristic of PRL times 
only: first line political leaders like Roman Dmowski, the main ideologue of the 
National Democracy party, looked in the first decades of the twentieth century for a 
synthesis of the moderate versions of both tendencies306. Other specialists, like Andrzej 
Walicki, go further back and spot conciliatory trends in some inteligenci’s political 
thought since approximately the 1840s (Libelt, Cieszkowski, Szczepanowski, 
Orzeszkowa…)307. Despite the specificities of the moment in which Bromke published 
his book and the difficulty to foresee exactly how the Polish situation would change 
along the following decade, his argument about balanced formulae and position shifts 
remains valid for opposition circles in the 1970s and 1980s: “… to oscillate between 
moderate versions of political idealism and political realism has served the interests of 
the Polish nation well. (…) If anything, by alternating between romanticism and 
positivism the Poles have consolidated their strength”308.  
The “self-limiting revolution” idea, stated previously by Jacek Kuroń or Adam 
Michnik and taken up in 1980 by the new-born Solidarność movement309, is perhaps the 
clearest and most widespread example of a combination of elements from idealistic and 
realistic traditions. Solidarność made Polish Communist government acknowledge the 
existence of an independent, self-governing trade union for the first time. Therefore, it 
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was not just another movement: it put into question PRL’s legitimacy and set up an 
alternative one based on democracy and the liberation of civil society. The workers had 
taken the initiative, organized and coordinated themselves with other social groups to 
face the power that was supposedly representing them. These critical circles achieved 
unprecedented goals by taking this path. That was, indeed, something revolutionary, as 
some oppositionists and external observers pointed out back then. But there were also 
self-limiting components: Poland’s geopolitical situation and dependence on the USSR 
made the main opposition groups take a moderate stance and not put openly into 
question the “alliance” with the Soviet Union. Periodic repression waves after previous 
protests both in the country (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976) and abroad (Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia), were borne seriously in mind, hence the determination to avoid 
violence and to press Communist authorities to negotiate with opposition in spite of 
their mutual distrust310.  
We will now go through other balanced or conciliatory proposals which can be 
found in opposition’s historical narratives, connecting inteligencja’s view of Polish past 
with a present they perceive “in need”. Moderate formulae were elaborated by 
inteligenci in at least one of these three different ways: firstly, by recovering neglected 
trends, figures and aspects of Polish history; secondly, by challenging the idealistic-
realistic dichotomy through the suggestion of alternative chronologies or, especially, the 
redefinition/ reinterpretation of these concepts; and thirdly, by pointing out the negative 
outcomes of extreme idealism or realism and putting forward a “middle path” solution, 
usually based on education and social consciousness.   
 
 
B.3.1) Recovering neglected aspects and figures in Polish history 
 
The first step towards the formulation of a balanced tradition involved the access 
to an equally balanced and wide-ranged historical knowledge that saved from oblivion 
ignored or underestimated events and processes, acknowledged the patriotic 
contribution of the promoters of improvement and, at the same time, avoided one-
sidedness and stereotypes. Polish historiography and historical publicystyka, however, 
whether published officially or unofficially, did not always fulfill these conditions, 
according to some intellectuals.  
We have seen before, for instance, that Stefan Bratkowski complained especially 
about the negligent treatment given to many outstanding eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Polish organic and positivist reformers in favor of so-called “romantics”. 
Through short biographical essays, compiled in the volume Skąd przychodzimy, he 
insisted on the fact that prominent figures such as Karol Brzostowski, Stanisław Staszic 
or Stanisław Konarski, actively involved in the nation’s development, were nonetheless 
hardly mentioned in fundamental Polish history books and encyclopedias, were not paid 
public tribute or still lacked a complete biographical study311.   
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Despite not sharing Bratkowski’s enthusiasm for Staszic due to the latter’s 
political evolution312, Adam Michnik was also concerned about past and present 
prejudices favoring a Manichean and sterile historiography, and therefore tried to 
highlight the complexity of each historical figure and moment. In response, for 
example, to what he considered a biased attack to the “conformist” attitude of 
intellectuals in PRL regime313, Michnik resorted to the nineteenth-century conflict 
between organic work and insurrectionist positions to argue that, bearing in mind the 
context and perceptions which conditioned people’s decisions, one may not support the 
reasons for their behavior or changes of mind, like those of Staszic or Hugo Kołłątaj314, 
but can at least understand them better and at the same time recognize their merits315.  
Precisely regarding changes of mind and adaptations, Marcin Król considered, in 
a more understanding tone, that circumstances could greatly influence the personal 
evolution of an intellectual or a politician, thus limiting or even determining what one 
could do in each situation. To act according to circumstances didn’t mean to give up 
one’s goals, but to act logically and look for a different method to achieve them. 
Maurycy Mochnacki316, for instance,  
 
… was a romantic before and during the November Uprising, after its fall he became a realist, but 
his former allies and supporters never ceased to remind him that, somehow, he had betrayed their 
cause. But where’s that betrayal? And what was that cause? Mochnacki rationally recognized that 
after the fall of the Uprising it was necessary to fight to preserve so-called national substance and 
not risk another failed and simultaneously impossible uprising.317 
 
In other words, inteligenci like Król or Michnik tended to stress that the history of 
contemporary Poland was the result of a sum of different efforts, intellectual trends and 
political initiatives, plus the contexts in which they flourished, and therefore couldn’t be 
fully understood without taking them all on account: 
 
… there existed different ways of fighting for the Polish cause, and they varied in their 
effectiveness. Those who took part in the armed insurrections were not the only ones fighting 
for the nation's existence. At times it was accommodation which brought good results, at other 
times legal opposition; still other times the people were virtually condemned to organic work. 
If at the time of Kościuszko318 or of the Polish legions in the Napoleonic wars, or of the 
‘November night’ [November 23, 1830], the tactic of rising up made sense (and I believe that it 
did, even though this is still questioned even today), it is nevertheless likewise certain that the 
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insurrectionist conspiracies in the Kingdom of Poland during the era of Governor Paskevich 
were in all probability political nonsense. We identify most closely with the tradition of 
uprisings. And no wonder. Without this tradition we would be a different nation today ─a more 
submissive one, far easier to subjugate. It makes sense, then, that the Poles’ spiritual self-image 
is based on personages such as Kościuszko, Prądzyński319, Traugutt320, and Piłsudski. But what 
would our national consciousness look like without all the other people who sought out 
different roads? Without Staszic and Stanisław Potocki321, without the Hôtel Lambert322 and 
the Galician conservatives, without Świętochowski323 and Spasowicz324?325 
 
In his determination to show a richer and more varied history of Poland, 
Bratkowski not only spread knowledge about eighteenth-century constructivists and 
nineteenth-century positivists, but also highlighted a different, less known face of 
classic figures of Polish Romanticism and insurrectionism. For instance, the romantic 
poet par excellence Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) would suit much better, according 
to his description, the image of a Renaissance or Enlightenment man, due to his vast 
knowledge in the most varied disciplines, such as Mathematics, Sciences, Political 
Economy, Law or History. He was certainly a remarkable intellectual, but not the single 
one: other filomaci326, like Tomasz Zan, Jan Sobolewski or Franciszek Malewski were 
excellent students and specialists too, besides devoting some of their time to poetry, 
literature and pro-independence activities. Similarly, the famous nineteenth-century 
painter Michałowski was also an outstanding manager and economist; Karol 
Brzozowski (1821-1904), a competent engineer who built telegraphic lines in the 
Ottoman Empire, is rather remembered as a writer, when that was actually a late and 
secondary occupation for him; and Ludwik Nabielak (1804-1883), the prototype of the 
Polish romantic, directed a gas factory in Barcelona and a mine in the Atlas mountains 
before taking part in two uprisings (1848, 1863). With these examples, among others, 
Bratkowski pointed out that, back then, literature, arts and humanities were still 
                                                 
319
 Ignacy Prądzyński (1792-1850) was a Polish military commander and general of the Polish Army, 
veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. He was one of the most famous and successful commanders of 
November 1830 uprising. 
320
 Romuald Traugutt (1826-1864) was a military commander of 1863 January Uprising. Between 
October 1863 and August 1864 he became the Dictator of the new-born national government. Once the 
Uprising had been crushed by Russian authorities, he was sentenced to death and hanged near the Warsaw 
Citadel.  
321
 Stanisław Potocki (1751-1805) was a Polish magnate and military commander. He opposed May 3rd 
Constitution and led the Targowica Confederation with Russia’s help in order to maintain the ancient 
Polish institutions and revert the previous reforms (May 1792). This took to the Polish-Russian War and 
to the second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
322
 The “Hôtel Lambert” was a Polish monarchic liberal-conservative group constituted in Paris in 1831, 
after the November 1830 Uprising, and headed by Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. Its members belonged 
to the well-off circles of the Great Emigration. They defended May 3rd Constitution’s principles and 
hoped for the intervention of Western European countries in the “Polish question”. Its headquarters were 
located in a palace named “Hôtel Lambert”, hence its name.  
323
 Aleksander Świętochowski (1849-1938) was a Polish writer, educator and philosopher. He was the 
champion of Positivism after the failed January 1863 Uprising. He betted on scientific, educational and 
economic development and on equality of rights.  
324
 Włodzimierz Spasowicz (1829-1906) was a Polish-Russian lawyer, social activist and writer. He was 
in favor of a conciliation policy regarding Polish-Russian relations and of Poland’s cultural autonomy 
within the Russian Empire. 
325
 Michnik: “Maggots and Angels”, 173-174. 
326
 Members of the secret Philomath Association (1817-1823), formed by students and some academics of 
Vilnius University (within the Russian Empire), including Mickiewicz. At the beginning it had mainly 
self-educational goals, but eventually focused on a more active support of Poland’s independence. 
Discovered by Russian authorities in 1823, the Association was dissolved and many of its members were 
on trial (1824), being sentenced to prison, deported to Siberia or dismissed from their posts. 
85 
 
perfectly compatible with entrepreneurship and organization tasks, and ideals with 
practical, constructive work. One didn’t have to be necessarily (or exclusively) a poet, a 
conspirer or a soldier to have patriotic feelings and contribute to Poland’s progress327.  
In that line, Bratkowski also reproached historians for magnifying past Polish 
failures and glorifying the victims of defeats, to the point of almost forgetting about 
successes which were attained after many years of effort and everyday work328. To 
illustrate this, and as a good-humored response to the letter of one of his readers, who 
said it was easier to write and read about Joan of Arc than about potatoes, he devoted an 
essay precisely to these tubers and to the people who contributed to make their crops 
thrive:  
 
Joan of Arc has hundreds of plays and monuments dedicated to her. No-one has built a monument 
to the potato, which has saved the lives of millions of people, though maybe it’s due to its poor 
photogenic qualities. Its monuments are pots and platters, and recipes make play-writing easier. 
How about a monument to those who saved the potato?329 
 
In the face of Polish historiography’s “tragic one-sidedness”, Bratkowski aimed to 
bring historical discourses back to balanced proportions. He betted on the writing of a 
different, not so frequently told history of Poland in which the narratives of heroic deeds 
and the “exceptional” are preceded by narratives focused on the daily achievements and 
constant, silent contributions that make those great events possible. Adam Michnik 
shared this point of view too when he commented that more “showy” and popular 
political-military episodes, built upon intense emotions, threatened to overshadow the 
steady and patient everyday labor that bore crucial socio-economic and cultural 
improvements: 
 
The profiles of the insurrectionists stimulate the imagination and emotions much more. An attack 
from the battle of Samosierra [sic.]330 is more photogenic than the tedious organization of 
education or the modernization of agriculture, not to mention the construction of a network of 
sanitary facilities. But let us remember that we would not have been able to organize our statehood 
had it not been for the work done in the spirit of ‘organicism’ and ‘accommodation’, especially in 
Galicia. And let us also remember that our grandfathers often had to pay a high price for their 
decision to undertake these tasks, risking moral reproach from their antagonists.331 
 
 
B.3.2) Challenging the dichotomy: redefinition/reinterpretation of concepts and 
suggestion of alternative chronologies 
 
By questioning in their texts either the meaning of the terms “Idealism” and 
“Realism” or their time frameworks, critical inteligencja drew Positivist and Romantic 
traditions closer together and proved they were narrowly related in the past, or could be 
somehow reconciled in the present.  
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Stefan Bratkowski, for example, pointed out that the Romantic movement 
represented by the poet Adam Mickiewicz was actually enrooted in the Enlightenment 
and late eighteenth-century proto-romantic Sturm-und-Drang, which had little to do with 
the reactionary, anti-enlightened and suicidal version Romanticism is usually associated 
with332.  
While Bratkowski alternatively stressed “romantic” and “positivistic” features in 
many of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century figures he portrayed, the author of some 
of the underground “best-sellers” on Polish Postwar history, Krystyna Kersten, argued 
that professional historians were conscious of the complementary nature that opposite 
ways of thinking had, and that national history was the outcome of the apparently 
incompatible activities of romantics and positivists, socialists and nationalists, 
supporters of uprisings and of “organic work”, pro-East and pro-West, opportunists and 
rebellious, those who surrendered and those who never yielded, etc.333. Historians, 
therefore, gave (or should give) priority to a holistic perception of the past over a 
Manichean one, because they understood that a given tendency simply couldn’t do 
without its opposite, or claim to be absolutely right at all times.  
Close to Kersten’s opinion, Andrzej Micewski thought that, in a broader historical 
perspective, Romanticism and Realism were not only complementary, but also 
culturally and politically necessary for the country334. Adam Bromke had already 
expressed a very similar view in his 1967 research, when he asserted that 
 
… each of them [idealism and realism in their moderate versions, C.A.] represents values which in 
the long run are indispensable for the survival of a nation ─particularly a nation placed in as 
difficult a position as Poland. Political idealism emphasizes the need for cultivating the high 
morale of the people, while political realism stresses the necessity of developing the human and 
material resources of the country.335 
 
Or, in Andrzej Kijowski’s words, Polish realists “protected the country against 
misfortune”, whereas romantics “protected it from death”336. 
In the same line, but going one step further, Tadeusz Łepkowski repeatedly 
insisted in the 1980s that there had never been a clear-cut separation between 
Romanticism and Positivism in Polish history. According to him, a single political 
nation was formed out of the combination of both trends. In some of his texts and 
speeches, he aimed to define this phenomenon with the self-made terms “Romantivism” 
(in Polish, “Romantywizm” = Romantizm + Pozytywizm) and “romantivist” 
(“romantywistyczny” = romantyczny + pozytywistyczny), which he further described as 
“positivist Romanticism” or, better still, “romantic Positivism”337.  
However, if we take a closer look at each period, the proportion of romantic and 
realistic elements varied, as Micewski and Łepkowski admitted: when one tradition 
outstood during a period, and then degenerated or became too extreme, the other 
inevitably predominated during the next. For instance, according to Łepkowski, 
between the second half of the eighteenth century until approximately 1815, the ruling 
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noble elite had a rational, enlightened and reforming spirit, but it eventually began to be 
contested by Polish Jacobins and Romantics avant la lettre. By 1830-1864 the 
prevalence of Romanticism was a fact, but after the failure of the January Uprising 
Positivism became the leading trend, until at least the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  This recurrent oscillation made other intellectuals like Marcin Król speak of 
the incapability of an harmonic co-existence of Romanticism and Realism in nineteenth-
century Poland, or conclude that the real debate between Romanticism and Realism 
shouldn’t take place in a general scale (in reference to Polish past in its whole), but in 
each specific circumstance338.  
In his article “O wariatach i niewariatach” [“On madmen and non-madmen”], 
Andrzej Kijowski resorted to the original meaning of Realism and Romanticism in 
history of art to argue that both trends fulfilled a common task: to unveil through 
literature or painting a reality that was “cursed” or unsightly in the eyes of classicists. 
Thanks to this, the Poles discovered the political reality of their divided, subjugated and 
degraded country.  In this sense, romantic artists were the main “realists” of their times, 
because they realized that spiritual life was as actual and powerful as political life and 
therefore had a more complete perception of reality than others. That’s the reason, 
according to Kijowski, why they believed that conspiracy and uprising was the smallest 
risk for Polish nation, if compared to the bigger threat of losing their national spiritual 
identity for good under the government of partitioning powers. Romanticism was 
therefore pictured by intellectuals as a “realistic” option, sometimes the only possible 
choice for nineteenth-century Poles to try to change what they perceived as an 
exceptionally adverse situation in Europe: the division of their territory between three 
empires. Extreme historical conditions would explain and justify the abundance of 
“compulsory romantics” (Marcin Król’s aforementioned “romantycy z przymuszu”) and 
“dreamers” in Polish society. We can spot analogous comments in Tadeusz 
Łepkowski’s texts, already quoted further above. However, Andrzej Kijowski also 
pointed out that, contrary to what was thought, non-conformist attitudes were far from 
being unanimously labelled as “romantic” back then: radical, liberal, republican, or 
simply revolutionary were actually more frequently used adjectives, as was later 
socialism─ in clear opposition to PRL’s political practice, the author added. In any case, 
as Micewski and Łepkowski stated, renegade attributes, whether called Romantic or 
otherwise, would have been preserved up until today and become part of Polish national 
identity339.   
We have already seen above how Geremek, Micewski or Michnik re-interpreted 
Realism and distinguished between “legalists”, who, at bottom, accepted Poland’s 
submission to other countries, and “authentic” realists, who gave priority to national 
needs, aspired to an eventual Polish independence and worked to make it real. But they 
were not the single ones: other re-definition proposals were put forward by some of 
their colleagues. For example, Stefan Bratkowski, using a similar word game as 
Kijowski when he said romantics were behaving “realistically” in a long-term 
perspective, described nineteenth-century entrepreneurs, experts, economists and 
technicians, like the above-mentioned Piotr Michałowski, as more “mature” romantics, 
who conceived professional ethics and daily enthusiastic work in industrial and 
agricultural development as a patriotic service for the Polish nation. In consequence, 
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organic work was not only undertaken by Poles who supported partitions and were 
ready to accept indefinitely that statu quo, but also by those who thought that it was 
necessary to restore Polish economic and cultural strength first for the nation to survive 
and be able to carry out successful pro-independence activities. Positivism, Bratkowski 
explained after a conference, simply was “the Romanticism of patience”340.  
Marcin Król, on the other hand, defined nineteenth-century Realism as a “Realism 
out of terror” (realizm z przerażenia), because each wave of organic work came about 
after an unsuccessful and fiercely repressed uprising. Being basically a radical reaction 
to a previous radical action and rejecting everything that had to do with Romanticism, 
Polish Realism was born incomplete, in his opinion. Unlike Łepkowski, Król believed 
that the vicious circle of romantic-positivist antagonism hadn’t been broken until almost 
present day. In his appeal to PRL authorities for more social freedom and governmental 
confidence in its own citizens, he argued that, since the end of the Second World War, 
Polish society had undergone many changes, gained civic consciousness and displayed 
a realistic predisposition in practical terms. A few years later, after the Martial Law, 
Adam Michnik also supported the idea that the Poles were mature enough, and that it 
was Communist government’s turn to change its ways and make a different move. In 
contrast to the previous “Realism out of terror”, this more mature attitude was defined 
by Król as “Realism out of choice” (realizm z wyboru), which he believed possible if 
only authorities trusted society. If there was any difference of positions, the author 
commented, was between a “closed realism” and an “open realism”, the latter being 
perhaps even more realistic than the former, because it offered a wider range of choices 
and stimulated imagination in search of alternatives and creative solutions. What could 
not be considered realistic, Król said, was the behavior of those who just defended their 
own interests and perceived any change as a threat to their established social position, in 
clear reference to Communist nomenklatura341. 
Past antagonisms, Kersten argued, were the result of the clash between two 
stereotypes which were frequently manipulated by power: that of the insurrectionist, 
heroic Pole fighting in the barricades and battlefields of the whole world, who suffered 
the most and shed more blood, only to be paid back with his allies’ betrayal; and that of 
the moderate, sensible Pole, an “organic worker” engaged in the rebuilding of the 
country. In her view, rather than becoming more “realistic”, as Król supported, the new 
generation of Poles had simply rejected this superficial and obsolete comparison and 
searched for different ways of defining their thought and activities342. 
 
 
B.3.3) The excesses of both traditions and finding a “middle path” formula. The role 
of education and social consciousness 
 
The third way to formulate a balanced solution to the idealistic-realistic dilemma 
was to point up the negative aspects and excesses of both traditions, in order to induce 
readers to bet on a moderate position and be receptive to eclectic proposals. Adam 
Bromke even suggested back in the 1960s that Polish society as a whole had a kind of 
“self-regulating mechanism” which prevented extremist programs from enjoying a wide 
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support. Something that, in our opinion, could also be applied to other nations and 
contexts: 
 
The equilibrium between political idealism and political realism is preserved in a largely self-
regulating manner. (…) The shifts from romanticism to positivism take place automatically mainly 
because when pushed to the extreme both programs are self-defeating. Political idealism which, in 
order to advance national independence, submits a nation to the peril of biological extinction, and 
political realism which, in order to promote national survival, exposes a nation to the danger of 
losing its identity ─both of these contradict their own goals. Thus, whenever the exponents of 
romanticism or positivism go too far in their respective directions, they become subjected to an 
automatic penalty. The people simply refuse to follow their lead.343 
 
Some authors, like Andrzej Micewski, Adam Michnik or Stefan Bratkowski 
considered that, if idealism-Romanticism was taken to extremes, it could lead to political 
adventurism 344 and the loss of talents, or to the damage of democratic spirit. Bratkowski, 
for instance, regretted how the intellectual potential of gifted youths belonging to the 
Philomath Society got tragically wasted too early345, as well as of all the Poles who were 
forced to emigrate due to their participation in different uprisings, not even having the 
consolation of being remembered by their fellow-countrymen: 
 
... this emigration was the single one that created and managed to preserve its cultural institutions 
since the fall [of Polish State, C.A.], what’s more, it developed and became stronger; it was the 
single one that run its own higher technical school; the single one that knew how to organize itself 
during the decades spent abroad. (…) 
(…) After every uprising ─as a rule, but also in-between─, after every crushed conspiracy, the 
doors unbolted and we lost the most talented, lively and go-ahead part of our blood. (…)  
Maybe this is another way to look at the period of submission, but it’s however more respectful 
with reality. At times when the most gifted French and Germans could work for the technical and 
economic development of their countries, young Poles went abroad to work for others. And 
working for others, they even lost the right to have a place in popular memory.346 
 
Much closer to political realism than to idealism, Bratkowski thought it would have 
been better to be a stereotyped positivist than a stereotyped romantic, because if an 
initiative led to an upsurge of violence, and was finally repressed and aborted, all efforts 
would have been in vain, no matter how well-meaning or brilliant the initial idea was.  
And despite initial ideas usually had to do with high values and imponderables, the 
side effects of conspiracy could be, according to Adam Michnik, precisely the opposite: a 
corruption of moral principles. The peril of conspirators eventually losing touch with 
social reality and radicalizing their views was high. It was not strange that, after some 
time gone into hiding, they began to believe themselves superior, despising as “too mild” 
any other different proposals on how to restore freedom and Polish sovereignty: 
 
The conspirator who perceived conformists as resembling slaves found in himself and his friends 
the pathos and tragedy of the romantic heroes. Seeing maggots in the cowed population, he 
‘angelized’ himself and his friends, fighters for a sovereign and just Poland. The ‘angelic’ 
character of the picture he had of himself led him ─often subconsciously─ to assign himself 
special rights.347 
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Hence, the path towards the destruction of pluralism and equality is built. 
Conspirators risked becoming a kind of exclusive, too hierarchical sect with a language of 
its own, that could disregard other points of view and, in fact, any value which was not 
directly convenient for its purposes: 
 
There is a unique type of activist-conspirator, whose characteristics make him as useful in the 
underground as they are dangerous later on. Such an activist has to make arbitrary decisions, to 
distrust newcomers and strangers. A spirit of democracy is not one of the virtues required by a 
conspiracy; pluralism is not the style favored by it. Underground activity isolates people from the 
taste and smell of everyday life, skews perspectives, gives birth to dangerous absolutism and 
intolerance.348 
 
Tadeusz Łepkowski shared similar concerns about excessive idealism. For instance, 
he hinted that the behavior of some political groups that adopted irrational neo-
Romanticism as their creed during the Second World War led to nothing good and that, 
despite the relevance of Warsaw Uprising’s ideological and political content, its failure 
caused many victims and hardly any practical improvement of Poland’s situation349. 
Joining the past with present-day problems, Michnik argued that the involvement in 
opposition politics in a totalitarian dictatorship frequently oscillated between two human 
motivations: the need to give moral testimony, on one hand, and political calculation, on 
the other. In putting them together, one part of each was inevitably lost. But since political 
motivations usually took over any other in clandestine circumstances, Michnik thought it 
was necessary for a conspiratorial organization to count with morally strong people who 
were not aiming to become the country’s future political elite, and who understood that 
their political involvement would end once the democratic goal was achieved. Once the 
country was stabilized, he believed, different qualities would be required for governing, 
and not the ones acquired in such a special and different context as conspiracy350.  
On the other hand, an excess of realism could take to conformism and 
opportunism351. In the past, the mistakes of adopting a too conciliatory attitude involved 
lowering aspirations and believing that only through surrender and passiveness to the 
partitioned power some concessions could be attained, whereas Michnik supported that 
any achievement was only possible through Polish society’s autonomous activities and 
pressure352.  
In sum, irredentism should be complemented and balanced with organicism, and 
vice versa, as Michnik already stressed back in 1975: 
 
Once again an old truth was confirmed: thinking about history is simply part of reflections about 
the present and the future. 
Irredentism that was limited to planning for insurrections and that on principle rejected organic 
work was tantamount to adventurism. Irredentism that lacked a program of social change, a 
program for the education of the peasants and the urban poor, had no chance of working 
effectively for independence. Programs for social struggle which departed from the need to build 
factories and modernize agriculture, to develop schools and health services, were neglecting 
important and essential realities and making the struggle for social ideals more difficult to win. 
But a program of organic work that abandoned the struggle for an independent Poland and for 
reform of social relations served as justification for the passivity of conformism. Organicism that 
limited itself to economic activity or administrative service turned into the ideology of egotistical 
                                                 
348
 Michnik: “On Resistance…”, 60, also 61.  
349
 Łepkowski: “O polskim charakterze...”, 43. 
350
 Michnik: “On Resistance…”, 62. 
351
 Micewski: “O maksymalizmie…”, 330. 
352
 Michnik: “Conversation in the Citadel”, 280. 
91 
 
careerists, who couched their loyalty toward the partitioning power in the cloak of a 
pseudopatriotic philosophy of history.353 
 
Given the risks and flaws of each tradition if interpreted too exclusively or 
literally, most opposition inteligenci bet on a hybrid solution consisting of an idealistic 
theory and a realistic practice.  
First of all, core values and imponderables should never be denied, no matter what 
the context or the circumstances were, as we have already seen when dealing with 
Romantic trends alone. Inteligenci considered that one must not experiment with 
principles: they should be transmitted through traditions and always be the result of 
knowledge and historical experience. They were, in sum, the spiritual basis of a 
community354. Therefore, a nation couldn’t actually exist without imponderables, as 
Michnik said back in the early 1970s:  
 
A nation that lives without the essentials, that forgoes the defense of things that are sometimes 
elusive and indefinable, thereby renounces its own culture, retreating to the level of a tribe. 
Realism and readiness to make concessions can be virtues in a politician, but they are virtues that 
must be closely watched.355 
 
In this text, Michnik expressed his admiration for one of the most important 
figures of the Polish twentieth century: Marshall Józef Piłsudski, and inspired himself in 
his thought to stress the importance of never giving up imponderables and fighting for 
them when they are in jeopardy:   
 
Pilsudski educated with newspapers, books, and above all by action. Acquiescence to servitude, he 
told us, must never be permitted. We are not allowed to remain silent when our fundamental 
values are being violated. To give up those imponderables is to give up cultural identity, to consent 
to cultural annihilation.356 
 
For Michnik, to recover lost sovereignty and independence in Poland were targets 
which must never be given up but, at the same time, new methods must be found to 
achieve them357. 
Tadeusz Łepkowski, on the other hand, spotted in Polish twentieth-century history 
two examples of “Romantivism”, that is, of successful (albeit ephemeral) balance 
between idealism and realism. Firstly, before and during the recovery of statehood 
(1905-1921), Polish pro-independence political groups displayed all their ability to 
benefit from a favorable international context in order to attain their national goals. 
They negotiated politically in different international meetings and, simultaneously, 
established some “red lines” by also putting forward what they understood as non-
negotiable demands. Secondly, after a period of prevalence of rational and positivist 
contents, Romanticism bloomed once again with the August 1980 revolution and the 
creation of Solidarność, settling a kind of balance. However, soon romantic trends 
strengthened much more and became dangerously predominant after the establishment 
of Martial Law358. 
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Adam Michnik shared a similar opinion to Łepkowski’s when he remarked that, 
in his view, the antagonistic clash between idealism and realism was overcome in the 
turn of the nineteenth century. In a new time and a different context, new questions 
arose for a younger generation to answer them: “The dualism of romanticism versus 
positivism was ingrained in Polish political thought, and the alternatives of armed 
insurrection versus organic work a part of Polish practice. It was absolutely necessary to 
overcome these alternatives in order to create a new style of political thinking359. 
Despite having different perceptions of Poland’s needs, priorities and international 
situation, besides serious flaws and hardly desirable views in some crucial issues, both 
Polish socialists and national democrats, who would be so relevant in the Second 
Republic period (1919-1939), betted on an independent country and the building of 
social self-determination, rejecting passivity and conciliation policies. This common 
substratum was, according to Michnik, what made the members of both political parties 
take part in the demonstration commemorating the national patriot Jan Kiliński (1760-
1819), who participated in Kościuszko’s uprising in 1794, during the latter’s 100th 
anniversary (Warsaw, April 17th 1894). They all shared, in other words, the same past 
references and turned to them in search of inspiration, besides appealing to national 
feelings and traditions360. A selection and blend of the best and most outstanding ones 
was a natural (besides sensible) reaction to previous antagonisms, that finally gave birth 
to new proposals. This took place at the end of the nineteenth century, but could also 
happen again now361:  
 
Do we not often argue about the past, thinking that we are arguing about the truths of the present? 
Is it not the case that out of the melting pot of the past, new programs, new ideologies, new 
expressions of old conflicts are bound to emerge? Is it not the case that the plans which are 
being made today for a self-governing republic must be a synthesis of the motifs that clashed 
yesterday and could not be reconciled, but which today are complementary and natural 
allies, mutually enriching each other? 
I believe this is exactly the case today.362 
 
In the same line, Andrzej Micewski’s balanced formula consisted of combining 
idealistic or even maximalist goals with realistic methods that bore in mind each 
circumstance. He believed, together with Michnik and Łepkowski, that idealism or 
Romanticism did not necessarily entail armed actions: they could also have a peaceful 
and constructive output in accordance to present demands. There was room for brave 
Romanticism, albeit not risky; ready for pragmatic calculations, but without forgetting 
values and, in extreme case, ready also for sacrifice. Compromises must be reached, but 
always within the framework of the ideals of a community363. Opposition initiatives 
required this balanced formula, and balanced, ethical persons to carry it out in order to 
prosper: 
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If both the insurrectionists and the organicists are necessary, then we need people who are 
organicists in form and insurrectionists in substance. We need people who do not lie publicly, 
whom we can trust, who reject compromise with the system of government that has been imposed 
on this nation ─yet who do not ask for rash actions, call for terrorism, or organize urban or rural 
guerrillas. In other words, the classic dilemma can be described as grass-roots activity versus 
collaboration, not just as grass-roots activity versus insurrection.364 
 
Those inteligenci who were more partial to idealistic traditions within their 
conciliatory proposals also argued that romantics, far from not taking reality on account, 
were actually one or several steps ahead of realists, for they had more visionary 
capacities365. Kijowski explained it this way:  
 
Who did history prove right [idealists or realists, C.A.]? 
Both of them. Bien pensants made less practical mistakes, however “madmen” foresaw the 
future accurately. The former were mainly right at the moment, immediately, the latter along the 
centuries.366 
 
For Adam Michnik, as we have seen, the “ideal inteligent-oppositionist” would 
respect national imponderables and behave realistically in practice. But it was also 
essential for him (or her) to search for support and lessons in the past and establish a 
connection between former struggles and his/her own, creating a sense of continuity 
between previous traditions and the ones being forged now:  
 
A realist is not a person who simply understands the ineffectiveness of insurrectionist activity but 
rather one who is able to analyze the causes of the defeats of national uprisings, to inscribe the 
achievements of past freedom fighters in the ethical and political consciousness of his 
contemporaries, and to build of those actions a living tradition and a weapon more effective 
than the rebel’s double-barreled gun. The realist must understand that the need for national and 
civic liberty, inherent in the human soul, is no less real than the realities of jail and foreign 
domination.367 
 
The immaterial “weapon” Michnik spoke about was based primarily in memory 
and historical consciousness, and the most efficient and peaceful way to provide the 
Poles with it was through education.  
Polish inteligencja had always played a leading role in this educational task. For 
instance, historians like Wereszycki or Łepkowski highlighted that, along the nineteenth 
century, inteligenci forged a feeling of national duty that wasn’t limited anymore to the 
noble elite, but spread to workers and peasantry too. The first wave promoting national 
consciousness was a more “romantic” one, based on armed fights, but after 1863-1864 it 
turned more positivistic through the idea of “work on the foundations” (praca u 
podstaw). According to this view, the spirit of inteligencja, regarded as Polish national 
spirit, was “democratized” back then thanks to the initiatives of inteligenci themselves, 
similarly to Prometheus’ feat when he handed fire to humankind. So, in a way, these 
authors suggest that the core of Polish national feeling, of the Poles’ patriotism, 
emanated from an inteligencki ethos combining realistic and idealistic elements. Though 
it seems it was always the latter which prevailed: “Polish inteligenci”, Łepkowski said, 
“co-created people’s and workers’ movement, brought national consciousness to 
working class movements, a specific fondness for freedom, idealistic altruism, 
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rebelliousness and a spirit of opposition against power”368. We find analogous 
comments in Łepkowski’s work Polska-losy państwa i narodu (1992), which was 
prepared between 1987-1989 (that is, until the author’s death) and was accepted by the 
Polish Ministry of Education in 1991 as a textbook for high school students369. Janusz 
Kuczynski points up the positive general assessment Łepkowski made of Polish 1864-
1905 period, as well as his conciliatory spirit: 
 
Lepkowski’s history-writing represented another non-Marxist presentation of the Positivist 
thought. Positivism was looked at withing (sic) the framework of a larger, political transformation 
of primary importance lasting for four decades. The process of the building up of a national 
conscience and the disseminating of it to new social layers finally led to the restitution of Polish 
national independence, in Lepkowski’s view. 
Lepkowski deliberately seemed to avoid emphasizing conflict and strife in the Polish society of 
the Positivist period. In his opinion even those involved in conspiracy, those of an activist attitude 
accepted resistance without violence as their option. On the other hand, as time passed, the 
Positivists often began to admire in their hearts Romantic and Insurrectionist ideals.370  
 
According to some oppositionists, such as the members of the Society of 
Scientific Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, TKN)371, education had always 
been a pending matter in Polish lands, especially in Partition times. Precisely to make 
up for these deficiencies and to provide alternative, uncensored knowledge, independent 
educational associations, such as TKN itself, have been set up continuously, becoming 
part of Poland’s most cherished patrimony: 
 
The inadequacy of official education and the political and ideological limitations imposed to free 
science are known and have been criticized for centuries. Aiming to correct this, societies have 
created and still create institutions, together with forms of teaching and of self-education, beyond 
the official educational systems. Similarly, Polish history counts on that score with the wonderful 
traditions of many education associations: the ‘flying university’ [Uniwersytet Latajacy], the 
‘vademecum for autodidacts’ [poradnik dla samouków] or the ‘Free Polish University’ [Wolna 
Wszechnica Polska] in the Interwar period.372 
 
It is also significant that some Polish educational initiatives in the 1970s took their 
names from previous ones, dating back to Partition period: the first (aforementioned) 
“Flying University” was founded in 1885 and initially provided higher education for 
women, who weren’t allowed to study at universities, in a clandestine way. Courses of 
social sciences, philology and history, pedagogy, mathematics and natural sciences, 
lasting up to 5-6 years, were taken by students (among them Maria Skłodowska, later 
known as Marie Curie) in private homes in Warsaw. In 1905, the association began to 
carry out its activities openly and changed its name for Society of Scientific Courses, 
from which PRL times’ TKN also took its name. It was characteristic of all of these 
educational associations not to have a fixed location for their courses, in order not to be 
tracked down and dismantled by the police.  
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In his felietony devoted to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century figures, Stefan 
Bratkowski also stressed the importance of educational reforms and initiatives along 
Polish history. We have already mentioned some of them, like Stanisław Konarski’s or 
Staszic’s373. Another outstanding case commented by this author is that of Walenty 
Stefański (1813-1877), founder of the Związek Plebejuszy374, who introduced the lower 
classes of Poznań region into politics and contributed to the blooming of Polish 
patriotism in the Western borders375.  
In his reflections about Polish socialists and national democrats, Adam Michnik 
was interested in National Democracy’s activism, because its goal was to build 
independent social life both through legal and illegal methods, the latter including self-
education circles, educational activities and the distribution of forbidden writings and 
independent publications. It was a way to prepare society for independence, once there 
was a favorable chance to recover it, for it was better to make a long term investment 
than run the risk with a short-term upheaval, less solid and planned, that would entail 
worse consequences. “In this conception”, Michnik remarked, “the fight for 
independence ceased to be a one-time act (armed uprising, for example) and became a 
process of change planned over a period of years”376. Thus, regarding the present, the 
differences between traditions, as well as the achievement of their targets, should also 
be channeled through education and have primarily an educational meaning377. 
 
 
B.4) Inteligencja and Edward Abramowski’s precedent 
 
In their determination to dig up past theories, methods and tactics that could be 
valid for opposition programs today, inteligenci didn’t limit themselves to eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century idealistic and realistic traditions, nor to the most outstanding turn-of-
the-century political trends, that can be considered “triumphant”, albeit short-lived, in the 
period of the Second Republic (Piłsudski’s socialist current, Dmowski’s endecja, besides 
Witos’ Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe “Piast”/ Stronnictwo Ludowe)378. There was also 
room for the re-interpretation of less-known or less politically fortunate proposals of that 
time. We are going to focus here on a single case: that of Edward Abramowski, due to its 
intrinsic importance in the Polish context and to the way it incarnates some of Walter 
Benjamin’s guidelines. 
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Edward Abramowski (1868-1918) was a Polish masonic thinker, philosopher, 
sociologist and psychologist who underwent an interesting political evolution in his life. 
He was born in Stefaninie (nowadays in the Ukraine) within a well-off family of 
landowners and, after the death of his mother, he moved with his father and elder sister to 
Warsaw (1879). He was raised up in a Romantic atmosphere, where the memory of 
uprisings was still fresh. Instead of attending regular schools, he had a series of private 
teachers, including prominent intellectuals of the time such as Maria Konopnicka (1842-
1910)379. Through her, he had the chance to meet the members of the I Proletariat380 
Zygmunt Pietkiewicz and Konrad Prószyński.  
In his youth, Abramowski familiarized himself with positivist literature and with the 
works of Spencer, Marx and Darwin. In his early articles “Pogadanki o rzeczach 
pożytecznych” (1883) [“Talks on useful things”] and “Pogadanki z gospodarstwa 
społecznego” (1884) [“Talks of social economy”] he unfolded his first ideas on poverty, 
social education, mutual help, cooperation and, especially, on human fraternity.  
In Cracow’s Jagiellonian University, where he studied in 1885, he got in touch with 
circles of socialist youths and collaborated in the smuggling of illegal foreign literature. 
Between 1886 and 1889 he studied Philosophy at Geneva University and got involved in 
political agitation as an activist of the Polish students’ association Zjednoczenia 
Młodzieży Polskiej. He also had contact with revolutionary groups in Poland and taught 
workers.  
Once he returned to Warsaw, he devoted himself to publicystyka and to the II 
Proletariat. In his articles, he made a critical Marxist approach to capitalism, he identified 
private property as the source of oppression and betted on a social revolution to change 
things. Due to his opposition to resort to terror as a political weapon, Abramowski quitted 
the II Proletariat and founded the organization Zjednoczenie Robotnicze, focused on 
propaganda and educational activities for workers. In November 1892, he participated in 
the meeting of Polish socialists held in Paris where the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was 
created, and was appointed to direct the new Związek Zagraniczny Socjalistów Polskich, 
in charge of PPS’ publications and foreign relations. 
Later on in that decade, and seriously ill, Abramowski gave up his political 
activities and travelled to Switzerland to heal himself. There, he studied Psychology and 
Sociology, and eventually distanced himself from orthodox Marxism and the workers’ 
movement, evolving towards anarchist postulates. His new, personal theory of socialism 
regarded the State and State-controlled institutions as something essentially negative. In 
connection to Lev Tolstoi’s ideas, Abramowski’s new ethical proposal stressed that, in 
order to carry out the desired social changes, a previous moral transformation was needed 
among the people. He was a close friend of the writer Stefan Żeromski, who also insisted 
on the need of (re)introducing morality in public and everyday life. 
Back in Warsaw at the beginning of 1897, he primarily devoted himself to develop 
and spread his new ideas through texts such as Zagadnienia socjalizmu [The problems of 
socialism], Pierwiastki indywidualne w socjologii [Individual elements in sociology], 
Program wykładów nowej etyki [Program of conferences of the new ethics] or Etyka a 
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rewolucja [Ethics and revolution]. Besides giving priority to moral revolution over social 
revolution, in these works he highlighted the importance of cooperation and self-
organization within a society. In 1898-1900 he got involved in self-educational circles and 
clandestine courses to spread independent education and pro-independence ideas. He 
promoted groups based on ethical principles that demanded a moral renovation, and also 
became interested in Psychology.  
Despite harshly criticizing the Church and religion as institutions, Abramowski 
understood Christianity as a social and moral expression of human rights and freedoms, as 
well as an ideology sponsoring equality, love and fraternity. Hence, in his view, the Ten 
Commandments were the most revolutionary manifesto for a better life, grounded on the 
above-mentioned values.   
In 1904, Abramowski published his dissertation Socjalizm a państwo [Socialism 
and the State], where he criticized the State, state socialism and the idea of creating a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat”. According to his theses, the bases of a society should be 
free, autonomous and creative individuals who freely decide to form non-State 
associations in order to organize themselves as a group. After the failure of the 1905 
revolution in the Russian empire, he focused on the idea of cooperation in his works 
Zasada respubliki kooperatywne [Principles of a cooperative republic], Znaczenie 
współdzielczości dla demokracji [The meaning of collaboration for democracy], Idee 
społeczne kooperatyzmu [Social ideas of the cooperative movement] and Kooperatywa 
jako sprawa wyzwolenia ludu pracującego [The cooperative as the liberation of the 
workers]. Abramowski wanted the tsarist State to be gradually and peacefully replaced by 
cooperatives. These cooperatives would be formed out of free will by individuals who 
consciously engaged in social life and fulfilled their duties responsibly. Freedom, 
solidarity and fraternity would be key elements in his project of a new socialist system 
without a State. Along this period, he co-founded the magazine Społem and continued 
with his ethical proposals. 
In his late years, Abramowski concentrated in psychological praxis and studies. In 
1917 he began to deliver lectures on metaphysics at Warsaw University, where he held 
a chair in Psychology since 1915. His health worsened along this time and, finally, he 
died in June 1918.  
Polish opposition inteligenci in the 1970s and 1980s tended to highlight three 
aspects or ideas of Edward Abramowski’s life and thought: society’s self-organization, 
moral values, such as fraternity or solidarity, and the reduction, or eventual 
disappearance, of State power. The journalist Wojciech Giełżyński (n. 1930), who 
quitted the magazine Polityka during the Gdańsk strikes in 1980 and finally returned his 
PZPR membership card after the establishment of Martial Law, devoted a book to 
Abramowski in the mid-1980s. The opening quote of the work, located in the inner 
cover, was extracted from one of the thinker’s texts: 
 
A nation’s strength and individual freedom rests on associations. Where associations are multiple 
and varied, human life is free of police administration, and every governmental attack against 
freedom encounters invincible resistance. On the other hand, where there are no associations, the 
police rules with omnipotence, manages and governs over everything and doesn’t pay attention to 
the different needs and interests of the inhabitants. Non-associated people cannot oppose to any 
governmental violence, they are dependent of it.381 
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Abramowski’s proposals were never supported by a majority during his life and, 
after his death, at the dawn of Poland’s rebirth as a State, they simply seemed to fade 
away. On the contrary, other pro-independence political currents that Abramowski had 
alerted against, because he saw in them manifest or underlying pre-totalitarian habits 
(especially Dmowski’s and Piłsudski’s), flourished and took the lead since the end of 
the nineteenth century, becoming in the interwar period the most popular among the 
Poles382. Thus, not only were Abramowski’s socio-political ideas “swept away” by 
others that achieved a broader national approval: they also foretold some of the evils 
that would shortly threaten Poland, as well as other parts of the world.  
Due to his heterodox left-wing approach to socio-economic and political reality, 
to the priority of ethics and the importance given to each individual within society, as 
well as to his (also heterodox) closeness to religious and spiritual thought, the figure of 
Abramowski curiously resembles, in general lines, that of Walter Benjamin. They also 
shared similar concerns and immediate fate: let us remember that, a couple of decades 
after the Polish thinker’s death, Benjamin’s warnings against the perversions of 
progress and its already full-fledged consequences (Nazi, Fascist and Communist 
totalitarian systems) also fell into general oblivion for some time, in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, only to be rediscovered and re-interpreted afterwards. 
Years before the October Revolution, Abramowski criticized the totalitarian drift 
he perceived in Polish socialist thought and, according to Giełżyński, predicted the 
ordeals people would endure in a totalitarian bureaucratic State hidden behind the mask 
of socialist principles. In other words, he foresaw, as a kind of “Cassandra of 
modernity”, the eventual establishment of actually existing socialism in Eastern 
Europe383.  
Adam Michnik admitted that, from today’s perspective, one may spot a pre-
totalitarian seed, as well as traces of Russian authoritarianism, in both Dmowski’s right-
winged nationalist program and Piłsudski’s socialist party, since they were inevitably 
influenced by the context in which they were forged. The national self-determination 
these movements sought had to be implemented, or even imposed, from above. This 
demanded military virtues like hierarchical organization, obedience and self-sacrifice, 
rather than those pursued by a democratic community, such as pluralism and tolerance. 
On the other hand, he remarked, Edward Abramowski had warned against political 
groups whose major goal was to attain power and control the State institutions. Michnik 
considered that Abramowski’s plan to achieve self-determination was opposite to 
Piłsudki’s and Dmowski’s, but also partially complementary, especially in terms of 
strategy (creation of associations beyond the State’s reach, awakening of social 
consciousness). The main danger for the former lay in the State itself: the elites that 
attained State power would use it to defend their new privileges and properties. Sooner 
or later, they would rule just for themselves and manipulate the masses, so that the 
preached revolution would become a mere substitution of one elite for another in a still 
oppressive system for the working class.  
Instead of the typically State-sponsored political organizations, education, courts, 
police and military forces, Abramowski suggested that people should organize 
themselves in cooperatives and independent institutions to promote different forms of 
management, work ethics and moral values. He supported that the successful building 
of a free, self-determined and conscious society could only start from below and by 
boycotting the coercive State, because “in the very process of struggling with the 
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partitioning power” it would be “possible to construct social mechanisms based on 
solidarity and ties of friendship”. Michnik wanted to highlight, in other words, that for 
Abramowski the methods and means had a crucial influence in the goals and in the 
shape political change would finally acquire. Changes should not come from above (the 
State system) or, following the Leninist model, through an elite of “professional 
revolutionaries” (“bureaucratic revolution”), but through the workers themselves, who 
should cease to be political objects to become political subjects-agents out of their own 
free will: “In order to be able to govern, the workers must gain experience in the course 
of the struggle for power. Only during this struggle can they learn about self-
organization, attain a political self-awareness, and understand the nature of their most 
important weapon ─worker solidarity.”384. 
Michnik further described Abramowski’s ideas as “a program of national rebirth 
and liberation”385. However, Abramowski would have probably removed the adjective 
“national” from the sentence, for, in line with his anarchist and socialist philosophy, he 
was quite critical with patriotism and the idea of nation, though it is also true that he 
engaged in Polish pro-independence activities during his years in Warsaw. Bronisław 
Geremek, on the other hand, stuck more to Abramowski’s words when he connected the 
latter’s philosophy with his own apprehension towards the State386. In a speech deliv-
ered in Warsaw’s French Institute in November 1986, Geremek said that, for 
Abramowski, “state socialism” was an obstacle for universal morality and could lead to 
the omnipotence of bureaucracy and police and the subsequent submission of a person’s 
individuality. He softened, nevertheless, part of his message by asserting that his guide-
lines for democratic politics involved limiting State power, rather than making it com-
pletely disappear. His ideas, Geremek asserted, were far from destructive anarchism or 
anarcho-syndicalism. Their goal was to make a political subject-agent out of individu-
als, who should become citizens, and hence out of society, which should transform into 
a civil society. The way to fulfill society’s political podmiotowość387 would be for peo-
ple to associate voluntarily and due to common interests, as the co-owners and rulers of 
the “common good”. Geremek drew from Abramowski a clear lesson for Polish present 
circumstances: the more democratic and independent a government was, the easier it 
would accept society’s sovereignty and independence; and, in parallel, self-organization 
of society would limit the State’s meddling in individuals’ lives and frustrate its poten-
tial “totalitarian temptation”388.   
Therefore, Geremek believed, together with Michnik, that Abramowski’s thoughts 
sounded contemporary not only regarding his worries, but also his hopes. Wojciech 
Giełżyński also agreed with this, but he took it even much further semantically and 
spiritually speaking, for, whilst Geremek considered that Abramowski’s model, together 
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with Stanisław Ossowski’s (1897-1963)389, was never materialized in Poland, though it 
was within reach in 1980-1981 through Solidarność390, Giełżyński thought that 
Abramowski actually resurrected three times after his death. Of course, the journalist 
meant that the social and philosophical principles he quoted from Abramowski at the 
beginning of his book had re-emerged and/or been put into practice on at least three 
different occasions in Polish twentieth-century history, but it is nevertheless very 
significant the way he used verbs like odżyć or zmartwychwstać391 to express this, 
because it connects directly with Benjamin’s philosophical-messianic ideas about the 
rebirth of the defeated through remembrance, and the key role played by hope in the 
process. Giełżyński put it specifically in this way: 
 
Abramowski is reborn when people have hope; when they dream about renovating society 
according to principles they agree with, and not following imposed laws. 
When the State becomes the Monster that was so graphically described by Abramowski, he 
dies, he falls into oblivion ─ only to resurrect when something dawns.392 
 
The first time Abramowski was brought back to life, according to Giełżyński, was 
not long after his death, when the Poles recovered their statehood. It was a period in 
which society had to learn many things in a very short time, including all kinds of 
democratic procedures, but citizen initiatives soon multiplied and prospered despite the 
country’s many pending issues and poorness. However, these efforts were ill-fated after 
the State apparatus increased its power and control over people in the Sanation regime, 
and were completely destroyed with the beginning of the Second World War.  
The second time Abramowski’s spirit returned was right after the disasters of the 
War and the Nazi invasion, in 1945-1947, when there was still an atmosphere of 
expectation in Poland and the majority of society didn’t conceive a permanent 
Communist monopoly of power. The Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe)393 was broadly supported and Stanisław Mikołajczyk394 had returned to 
Poland, so it was yet a moment of hope. Some parts of the PSL program, Giełżyński 
believed, reminded of Abramowski’s theses, and his humanistic socialism was also 
present in a few circles of the Polish Socialist Party. In the mid-1940s, the socialist 
sociologist Jan Strzelecki (1919-1988) reflected on fraternity, dignity and human 
identity in his work O socjalizmie humanistycznym [On socialist humanism] (1946) 
following both Abramowski and his teacher Ossowski. Just like his predecessors, he 
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envisaged a social organization based on ethics395. However, by 1948 the Communist 
party had eliminated its political adversaries and taken absolute control of the State with 
the aid of fake elections. The Stalinist era had begun, and with it the successive waves 
of repression that destroyed society’s independence and self-governing elements. 
Except for some occasional references within the Club of the Crooked Circle (Klub 
Krzywego Koła)396, Abramowski had perished again.   
Up to now, two attempts: two failures. But what about the third “resurrection”?  
According to Giełżyński, the next “return” of Abramowski’s theses came more 
than thirty years later with the creation of Solidarność, hence the title of his work: 
Edward Abramowski. Zwiastun “Solidarności” [Edward Abramowski. The herald of 
“Solidarność”]. In his view, Solidarność was a heterogeneous association combining a 
Catholic basis with nuclei of humanistic socialism and anarcho-syndicalism. Soon after 
its formation, some of its leaders and counselors began to refer to Abramowski as an 
inspiration. Even the very name of “Solidarity”, coined by the prominent dissident 
Karol Modzelewski (n.1937)397, has its roots in these philosophical traditions. Together, 
all of these trends permitted in 1980-1981 the rebirth of free political thought in a 
massive scale, the recovery of social podmiotowość and of national aspirations. In other 
words, the pre-eminence of moral values, self-organization and the reduction of State 
power that Abramowski imagined more than eight decades before as the cornerstones of 
a free society, had finally materialized in Solidarność. Despite Communist 
government’s attempts to dismantle this initiative, Giełżyński described it as “still 
ongoing”, for not even the Martial Law managed to put an end to Polish society’s 
demands. Therefore, contrary to the two previous attempts, the third one, in spite of 
everything, had managed to triumph398.    
But it is not a question of applying all of Abramowski’s theories today, Giełżyński 
said. In the first place, many of their aspects are simply obsolete; and, in the second 
place, one must bear in mind that any ideology, when put into practice, experiences 
some “erosion” and hardly keeps up with the constant changes occurring in a 
community. What he betted on in his work was the retrieval of the “wise” and “right” 
(trafne in Polish) ideas of Abramowski, not the “failed” ones. But how to tell which 
were “right” and which are “wrong”? Despite not being excessively clear in this point, it 
seemed that, for Giełżyński, the main criterion to select the “debris” from the “rubbish 
dump of history” was determined, as in Walter Benjamin’s case, by today’s ethical 
needs. He believed that some of Abramowski’s moral and philosophical proposals, as 
well as his suggestions to transform the political system (all of which have been 
mentioned before), were surprisingly innovative and up-to-date. So why not perform, in 
Benjamin’s words, a “tiger’s leap into the past” and bring them to present time?399 
                                                 
395
 Strzelecki would later on develop opposition activities (Club of the Crooked Circle, lecturer for the 
Society of Scientific Courses, co-author of Doświadczenie i Przysłość’s reports, Solidarność adviser). 
396
 Freethinking debate club founded in Warsaw (1955-1962). Its members dealt with political, cultural, 
philosophical and artistic problems. Among its participants: Leszek Kołakowski, Antoni Słonimski, 
Władysław Bartoszewski, Jacek Kuroń, Jan Józef Lipski, Stefan Kiselewski, Jakub Karpiński, Adam 
Michnik or Karol Modzelewski.  
397
 See Opozycja w PRL…, vol. 1 and Modzelwski’s interview with Magdalena Bajer: “Żyję w historii. 
Rozmowa z profesorem Karolem Modzelewskim”, in BAJER, Magdalena: Blizny po ukąszeniu, 
Warszawa, Biblioteka “Więzi”, 2005, 118-139.  
398
 Giełżyński: Edward Abramowski…, 135-138. See Chapter 2 for more on Martial Law’s failure. 
399
 Giełżyński: Edward Abramowski…, 138-139. 
102 
 
This is exactly what he thought Władysław Frasyniuk400 achieved with his 
program to organize social forces, published in Tygodnik Mazowsze in January 1985401. 
In it, Giełżyński asserted, Frasyniuk had managed to adapt the essence of 
Abramowski’s philosophical work Zmowa powszechna przeciw rządowi [Universal 
conspiracy against the government] (1905) to today’s political conditions. It combined 
long-term goals (workers’ self-government, formation of co-operatives, self-training, 
fight for the right to vote in democratic conditions), with short-term demands and partial 
targets that workers must continuously defend against the Communist government, such 
as a minimum income to compensate for price increases, free Saturdays, the right to 
strike, provide defense against wrongful dismissals of companions and protection 
against police violence (register abuses, make them public, take them to the courts…), 
carry out peaceful demonstrations or write up collective requests. Frasyniuk’s proposals 
were realistic and practical: without looking for quick and showy results, they 
encouraged large- and small-scale non-violent activism not only to restrain everyday 
governmental abuse of power, but also to eventually create an autonomous society in 
Poland 402.   
Wojciech Giełżyński also referred in his work to other intellectuals who had 
recently stressed the importance of Edward Abramowski and shared similar opinions 
about him. For example, the oppositionist Leszek Szaruga403, in his underground essay 
Szkoła polska [Polish school]404, saw Abramowski as the unfairly forgotten “signpost” 
of Polish contemporary thought because, despite his work was remarkable for its 
independence and imagination, it had always been underestimated or despised by the 
left. Today, rather than promoting a direct application of his ideas, the figure of 
Abramowski could be “recovered”, firstly, to make people realize that Polish 
consciousness is dominated by a single political branch of the left, and, secondly, to 
encourage the re-construction of the rest of the branches in order to make more 
conscious choices. On the other hand, professor Ryszard Paradowski argued against 
Ruta Światło’s proposal of forgetting Abramowski (since, according to her, he hadn’t 
endured the test of time) by claiming that history hadn’t ended, and that the 
philosopher’s ideas could perfectly come back to life in the future. He also reminded 
that, contrary to what his critics said, Abramowski supported anarchism, i.e. a way to 
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organize society without State institutions, but not anarchy, that is, complete chaos and 
lack of organization405. 
Since Solidarność was a melting pot of different socio-political traditions united 
under the motto “us versus them”, or “Polish society versus Communist State”, 
Abramowski’s ideological eclecticism and anti-State theories suited perfectly the spirit 
of the movement. That’s why Giełżyński stressed along the conclusions of his book the 
heterodox, open and plural character of the thinker’s works. He spotted multiple past 
influences in them, like utopianism, Marxism, anarchism, Kant’s philosophy, 
cooperative movement or syndicalism, but he also drew some comparisons with more 
modern trends, like contemporary Catholic thought406 (especially after the II Vatican 
Council) and Gandhi’s doctrine, including the priority of moral principles, non-
violence, search of truth or the importance of social consciousness in the process of 
historical transformations. For Giełżyński, therefore, the best way to describe 
Abramowski was as “a complete man” (człowiek kompletny). His general principles: 
fraternity, solidarity, the creation of an autonomous society based on pluralistic 
associations and free individuals, or the limitation of State power, could be ratified by 
almost every democratic oppositionist in Poland, including Catholic circles, left-winged 
humanists and anarcho-syndicalists under Solidarność’s “umbrella”407.  
Finally, Giełżyński and Michnik agreed in defining Abramowski as a utopian. Far 
from being a pejorative assessment, this adjective drew him closer to past idealists who 
were exceptional visionaries, despite being ignored or scoffed in their times. The ideas 
that didn’t succeed before, as were Abramowski’s, might be precisely the ones that 
could most help to organize Polish society today, Michnik thought: 
 
Abramowski was naïve. He appeared so to the National Democrats and the socialists, and he was 
so in reality. His plan for a ‘cooperative republic’ was crushed on the battlefields of the world war. 
Poland regained its sovereignty by other means and its political shape was different. But 
Abramowski could be described in another way: he was trusting. He trusted the good in the human 
condition, he trusted the sense of humanist values, he trusted the potential of man’s labor, he 
trusted friendship. He did not trust ideologies based on hatred or on political practices that 
degraded man to the role of an unthinking creature that must be ruled by coercion and inspired by 
tribal or class passions. 
How much we need Edward Abramowski’s trust and distrust today!408 
 
To begin with ethics is never a bad start, especially if, as it happened with 
opposition inteligenci, your moral stand is the cornerstone of your collective identity. 
Besides practical or strategic inspiration, it is in this universal and spiritual sense that 
Abramowski’s proposals came back to life in oppositionists’ minds.  
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B.5) The danger of recovering past political ideologies  
 
Despite continuously looking back at Polish history, opposition inteligencja was 
usually cautious about the possible re-creation of previous political programs and 
ideologies. As we have seen with Abramowski’s case, when intellectuals performed a 
“tiger’s leap into the past” they preferred to concentrate on general, inclusive aspects 
and transhistorical values rather than on specific or controversial policies that could 
seriously damage the consensus and cooperation atmosphere created between 
opposition groups.    
But the danger was real. In their aim to recover an allegedly “lost Polishness” and 
distance as much as possible from anything that could be related to PRL regime, a 
considerable part of Solidarność members, for instance, wanted to return to the 
traditions of the interwar II Republic, which were far from being flawless: they referred 
to the constitutions of that period, reintroduced past national symbols, rebuilt the 
tradition of former political parties and organizations and encouraged the uncritical 
admiration of statesmen and politicians like Piłsudski. The dangers of nationalism and 
xenophobia were ingrained in those myths and symbols of the past, but few noticed or 
criticized this growing problem of radicalization in opposition ranks409 before general 
Jaruzelski’s government used it as an ideal excuse to apply the Martial Law in 
December 1981410.  
After this happened, more inteligenci began to pay attention to the threat of taking 
historical experiences too literally or of misusing the past by recovering potentially 
dangerous attitudes and ideologies. They reconsidered their own previous mistakes or 
lack of interest on the topic and showed their reticence more explicitly than before411. 
What they generally stressed is that it was not a question of returning to the past in order 
to stay there, but of bringing to present time the positive, constructive elements that had 
been destroyed to use them as a starting point in the building of a new, different future. 
In other words, the past should be seen as a springboard to face present-day challenges 
in a wiser way412.   
According to Andrzej Micewski, the reverence for the past in Poland was partly 
due to postwar historiography’s biased interpretations. Worried about the consequences 
this manipulation might have in the preservation of Polish spiritual and cultural identity, 
many Poles felt an increasing concern about the knowledge of recent history. The 
problem about the successive waves of historical interest and literary booms, Micewski 
argued, was that they frequently contained nationalist elements and brought about 
“revival” attempts of certain political trends by groups that have an idealized view of 
the II Republic period. In the author’s opinion, past political ideologies, such as 
Dmowski’s or Piłsudski’s, were the products of a particular moment in national life and 
of a very different geopolitical situation. Nowadays, these policies were completely 
anachronistic, so it was not advisable to recover them413.   
Unlike cultural or spiritual aspects, that can gather up strength from history, 
politics must benefit from present circumstances and be focused primarily on the future. 
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Polish identity was not the monopoly of one single political movement, but a shared 
heritage. And it was not possible to re-create, for example, National Democracy or the 
interwar Socialist party out of their original contexts:  
 
The cultural and spiritual identity of Polishness has a fundamental meaning in a divided world, 
given our strong connection with Latin and Christian culture. However, one cannot link 
independent cultural and spiritual identity with a specific orientation of political thought. (…) … 
one cannot amount it [Polish spiritual identity, C.A.] to the mechanical attempts to revive one 
political orientation or another from the turn of the nineteenth century.414 
 
In his determination to find a “usable past” for opposition movements and to go 
beyond the traditional left-wing reservations about National Democracy, Adam Michnik 
pointed up the inclusive strategy the latter had in their struggle for independence as 
something positive and profitable in today’s situation: 
 
The NDs [national democrats, C.A.] promoted broad participation in the movement of national 
resistance. They aimed to construct a political camp, not a party of those who believed in a 
particular doctrine. This is why they never said ‘all or nothing’ but rather, in every situation, 
pointed out the activities accessible to every citizen which could improve the nation’s lot.415 
 
However, Michnik was perfectly conscious too of how controversial Roman 
Dmowski was, and of the consequences that his ideas had for Polish life. In many 
senses, he represented the best and the worst of national character. His works, despite 
containing very accurate analyses of Poland’s situation between the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, were also a declaration of his personal phobias and narrow-
mindedness. His view of Polishness was very exclusive and he betted on the use of 
force in international relations in order to achieve Poland’s survival. His xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism and aggressive nationalism, as well as his policies based on instinct and 
power instead of human rights and ideals, brought much trouble in the past. Therefore, 
the repetition of such mistakes was simply not an option today, in Michnik’s opinion416. 
Besides a totalitarian drift, there were dangerous expansionist elements too in both 
National Democracy’s and Polish Socialist Party’s programs. Dmowski’s idea of a 
“national Poland” entailed the subordination of individuals to national goals and a 
violent, physical expansionism. On the contrary, Piłsudski’s socialists inspired 
themselves on the Jagiellonian myth of “Poland of nations”. According to it, Poland 
should be the open and tolerant motherland of all the nations of the former 
commonwealth (Ukrainians, Germans, Jews, Belarusians, Lithuanians), spreading 
national values and culture in a patronizing way417. However, by the end of the 
twentieth century, the realistic methods and maximalist goals promoted by opposition 
intellectuals  must not override other national feelings present in Europe or oppose to 
Christian principles418.  
Uprising and conspiracy cases raised similar debates about up to what point could 
Poles look for answers in the past. The resort to arms or violence against the 
Communist State was completely ruled out by inteligenci, for instance, but not 
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clandestine activities. The most recent and major conspiracy that could be used as a 
precedent was the Home Army’s (Armia Krajowa, AK), which led to Warsaw Uprising 
against the Nazi troops in the Second World War (August-October 1944). 
 However, the convenience of that past insurrection was still a controversial issue 
among oppositionists, given the lack of resources and arms of AK members and the 
ultimately disastrous consequences it had for the city and its inhabitants. Besides this, 
AK’s organization was elitist and military, whereas Solidarność leaders and counselors 
supported civil conspiracy based on collaboration, small contributions and gestures 
from millions of sympathizers, especially after December 1981. This kind of “passive 
resistance” and widespread, bit by bit backing was defined by Czesław Bielecki as 
“social conspiracy” (zmowa społeczna)419.  
Of course, the memories and relationship with Warsaw Uprising were particularly 
strong (sometimes due to opposition membership or to direct family ties) and also 
convenient for oppositionists in practical terms: active participants and workers in 
critical groups or the underground media had frequent contact with former AK 
members, who supplied them with materials, machines, technical advice and their own 
experience in clandestine initiatives, discretion, etc. Nevertheless, the similarities 
between AK and Solidarność conspiracy networks were limited basically to techniques 
and tactics, for the latter’s scope, ideology and structure, apart from the context and life 
training of younger generations, was substantially different420.   
 
 
C) The role of inteligenci today (1976-1991) 
 
In one of his 1984 felietony for Tygodnik Powszechny, Stefan Kisielewski was 
astonished and comforted in equal shares to see that, despite all the catastrophes and 
transformations experienced by Polish society since the 1940s, one essential thing had 
remained: a patriotic inteligencja representing (or aiming to represent) the country’s 
interests. This made him reflect on the paradox of continuity and change in Polish 
history, which is also one of the cornerstones of our research: 
 
What an odd thing, this Polish inteligencja: during the War it was dispersed, completely 
impoverished, murdered and deported to camps, decimated due to various emigrations; later, in the 
changing postwar conditions, it looked as if it was condemned to disappear, to dissolve in the 
waves of the new times and the new people, and suddenly, after years, it is reborn in its old shape. 
And it is reborn with a new “ethnic” basis, it is formed by people from the countryside or from old 
urban “lower classes”, by promoted persons from different demographic and geographic 
backgrounds, or who had migrated. (…)  
… it seems new, but it’s old, it seems of the people, but it’s incredibly similar to the previous 
post-nobility one. A new system, a new land, a new people ─and the inteligencja is just the same 
as the one I grew out of421! Polishness-Fatherland completely unchanged, I give my word! 
(…) To observe and feel this (national) immutability in (social) mutability is, at any rate, 
something nice.422 
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Inteligencja’s ethos was seen as the original and permanent component of 
Polishness. In spite of the repeated attempts to destroy it or “use” it in the government’s 
own benefit, it came back to life when there was a “subject-agent in need”423 who was 
looking for a moral reference and wanted to save the part of history that was being cast 
to oblivion. Given its transhistorical character, each generation could take it up again 
and adapt it to the new context and specific demands of society. 
It is highly possible that many opposition intellectuals played in a self-conscious 
way the inteligencja’s traditional role of social engagement and political and moral 
leadership in PRL times424, even more so if they perceived that their own myth, 
collective identity and social position was being put in jeopardy by Communist 
authorities. This is especially clear in Adam Michnik’s case, who suggested a series of 
missions that inteligenci should accomplish today. Firstly, they must defend humanist 
values and truth, despite the sacrifices it might entail, in order to become a moral and 
trustworthy example that transmits knowledge, awakens society’s consciousness and 
encourages it to act collectively, from bottom to top. Secondly, they must lead the 
change with their proposals and, at the same time, join efforts with other social groups 
that can act as the main engines of transformation, like the workers. Thirdly, they 
should look for precedents that reinforce their position. The best way to fulfill this last 
assignment is by enrooting their activities and ideals in Polish tradition:   
 
To formulate alternatives and to defend their values is the task of the intelligentsia, or those among 
them who wish to follow the tradition of the ‘unbowed’ intelligentsia of the early twentieth century 
(…). I feel linked to this tradition and to those who continue it today. If their voices are still faint, 
it is they who create independent, public opinion and develop nonconformist attitudes. The 
synchronization of their voices with those of the workers will shape the political aspirations of 
young people and thus the character of political changes both in Poland and in Eastern Europe. In 
the absence of free Press or free organizations, the moral and political responsibility of these 
intellectuals is enormous. It calls for an attitude whose logical consequence is to renounce material 
advantages and official honours in order to live in truth.425 
  
“Living in truth” also meant risking repression. And it was precisely under this 
threatening pressure, for example after a house search, an arrest or while sitting in jail, 
when inteligenci assumed most consciously the role of representatives of the Polish 
nation. Leszek Moczulski, in his last declarations before the justice court in Autumn 
1982, considered that he and the rest of the leaders of KPN (Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodległej) were taking part in that trial “as the conscious part of the Nation” (“jako 
świadoma część Narodu”). Similarly, his companion Tadeusz Jandziszak assured that 
the most relevant aspect of their prosecution would not be the ensuing individual 
sentences, but the fact that, at the same time, Communists were attempting to carry out 
a trial against the nation to bring it down to its knees426.  
The search for truth could entail taking wrong decisions and making mistakes too, 
in the eyes of some intellectuals. Many oppositionists were former members of the 
PZPR or had supported PRL initiatives, and that pro-Communist past caused them 
certain uneasiness and remorse, hence their need to justify it or expiate it in the 
framework of their re-identification with Polish critical inteligencja’s ethos. Tadeusz 
Łepkowski, who had belonged to the Communist Party, considered that some 
inteligenci’s political position shifts could be explained precisely due to their 
                                                 
423
 Mate: Medianoche…, 26. 
424
 Falk: The Dilemmas..., XXVII. 
425
 Michnik: “The New Evolutionism”, 276. 
426
 Leszek Moczulski’s speech in Ostatnie słowa..., 31 and 30 respectively. 
108 
 
determination to pursue justice and truth427. Since Partition times, intellectuals had 
aimed for Poland’s complete independence and were interested in any proposal that 
might tend to this goal combining utopia and realism. In PRL’s early days, inteligenci 
had been absorbed and persuaded by the State apparatus with the promise of achieving 
these targets, so they gradually left aside their classic role in Polish society428.  
On the other hand, Krystyna Kersten argued that, in the 1940s, when the clash 
between Communists and non-Communists was beginning to take shape in the country, 
patriotism and moral ideals did not belong exclusively to one side. Many who supported 
the PPR429 believed that, despite the high cost in victims, the ideal of a fairer Poland 
would be accomplished, whereas non-Communists perceived that Polishness and their 
most cherished values were being threatened by sovietization. There wasn’t a division 
between a “true” and a “false” patriotism, neither between “good” and “bad” Poles 
according to political convictions, and many arguments were played down due to the 
extreme situations experienced in the War and postwar contexts430.  
However, massive repression waves and the degeneration of the imposed regime 
soon followed. By the 1970s the governmental elites were completely de-ideologized 
and fraudulent; they had actually, and paradoxically, transformed into a fearsome anti-
socialist power, in Łepkowski’s view. They cynically demanded society to “commit” to 
the system while socialist and humanistic premises were in clear contradiction with 
their behaviors and lifestyles. This political and public atmosphere had corrupted a 
considerable part of Polish society, especially the persons who worked for or were 
dependent on official institutions. Ideals only had an ornamental function and had been 
substituted in practice for the cult of the State, bribery, socio-economic privileges, lies, 
anti-Semitic campaigns, empty ceremonials and consumerism.   
In response to this, morality resurfaced with Catholic activism and democratic 
left-winged opposition movements. Catholics, despite being a majority in Polish 
society, were treated like second rate citizens by Communist authorities due to their 
creed. Thanks to the reforms undertaken after the Second Vatican Council, the Polish 
Church became more involved in people’s everyday problems (especially of the youth 
and the workers) and encouraged public activism among believers. Catholic 
inteligencja, grouped around Znak, Więź and the KIKs, found a common ethical ground 
with lay, liberal and socialist intellectuals, and contributed to the opposition cause with 
traditional national and Christian values and the new social doctrine of the Church. 
They proposed a peaceful struggle for society’s rights and demanded the re-introduction 
of truth and morality in public life. The appointment of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope 
John Paul II and his visit to Poland next year, in 1979, rounded up this process and was 
an additional moral stimulus for Polish population: 
 
This election was interpreted everywhere in Poland as a great change in the nation’s life, since it 
had attained a spiritual leadership with an enormous authority. Faith and hope ceased to be for the 
Poles a nice motto used only during celebrations. It became a force. (…) A considerable part of 
society understood since June 1979 that, if it was united and solidary, it was a great power, that 
“they” were nobody, a façade, morally speaking, and foreign to the nation. The Polish nation 
became spiritually independent after the Pope’s visit. Soon afterwards it wished to attain, through 
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the hands of the workers, independence in the working place, national freedom and self-
determination, and expected that the State worked for society.431   
 
The “other half” of critical movements would be constituted, according to 
Łepkowski, by left-wing democratic opposition groups that were aiming to give genuine 
substance to freedom, equality, justice, human dignity, autonomy and, of course, to 
democracy432. Many of the members of these associations (KSS KOR, TKN, 
Doświadczenie i Przyszłość, free trade unions…) were Communist dissidents who, like 
Łepkowski and Kersten, explained their political and intellectual evolution in ethical 
terms.   
Bronisław Geremek, for instance, argued that the same values that had led him to 
socialism and political engagement made him leave PZPR in 1968, when he realized not 
only that the Communist system was beyond reform, but that it was masking a 
totalitarian and anti-Semitic government. He then sheltered during some years in his 
professional activities (that is, his researches on Medieval History), but in the late 1970s 
he got involved in the new-born underground educational initiatives of Uniwersytet 
Latający and TKN. The questions that students had posed him during his temporary 
“political retreat” had restored his hopes and stimulated his return to active commitment 
to contribute to shape the political culture of young generations. It was then when he 
began asking himself if public engagement was a moral imperative. His final answer 
was yes: driven by a moral or citizen duty, or by the wish of looking for better solutions 
to the workers’ problems, he went with his colleague Tadeusz Mazowiecki from 
Warsaw to the Gdańsk shipyards in August 1980. 
To have supported the Communist government for a long period of time made 
Geremek feel both guilty and indebted to Polish society; he thought he should do 
something to counteract any previous evil he could have caused others by his acts or 
omissions in the political sphere: 
 
- (…) Je considérais même que j’avais une obligation particulière de m’opposer au 
totalitarisme, au communisme, au Parti, précisément parce que j’en avais été membre auparavant. 
Je me sentais tenu de rembourser la dette que j’avais contractée pour avoir gardé cette carte du 
Parti pendant vingt ans.  
- Vous vous sentiez coupable? [asked Jacek Żakowski, the interviewer] 
- Oui, mais je ne songeais pas à m’amender. En revanche, je pensais que je devais faire quelque 
chose qui serait dans mes possibilités pour m’opposer à ce totalitarisme désespérant. C’est pour 
cette raison que j’ai rejoint les groupes de recherche qui ont vu le jour dans les années soixante-
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dix, la Société des cours scientifiques [TKN], illégale, bien sûr, et leurs diverses activités 
indépendantes politiquement, qui précédèrent août 1980. Je trouvais cela naturel et nécessaire.433 
 
In other words, moral authority, lay or religious, was missed in Polish political 
life. Critical inteligenci aimed to fill this ethical power vacuum either through a more 
active commitment or through the correction of what they interpreted as a previous 
“deviation” in their lives due both to deceit and self-deceit. That was the reason why it 
was so important for inteligencja not to make the same mistakes as before. For example, 
not to emigrate after December 13th 1981 was a question of honor and loyalty to others 
and to one’s own principles, in Adam Michnik’s view. Exile would be understood as a 
capitulation and a desertion, and the government would use it in its propaganda to 
discredit opposition as a whole and undermine its influence on society. To stay in the 
country was the first step not to lose once again the nation’s confidence and hence to 
remain faithful to one’s national duties as inteligent and oppositionist434. The second 
step, if imprisoned, was not to give up and collaborate with the police to “buy” one’s 
own freedom. During Christmas Eve in 1981, Władysław Bartoszewski (1922-2015) 
addressed his fellow internment camp companions in this sense:   
 
“For the ninth time in my life I spend Christmas in jail435. It might not be tactful that I tell you this 
today. But I do it only to cheer you up: it is possible to be in prison during nine Christmas and not 
yield. I want to comfort you with this. I do not wish anybody to spend nine Christmas behind bars. 
One time is enough. But one must not lose hope. And it will come a time for us when we will 
again celebrate Christmas at home with our families. I do not wish above all that we return home 
promptly, despite each one of us desires it much. I wish that you return home in such a state that 
you can look your wives, children and all of your friends in the eye. We do not know when they 
will set us free. But more important than liberation is the outer and inner situation in which we 
leave this place.” 
After [I had said] these words almost everyone was on the verge of tears.436  
    
The Promethean mission of intellectuals was regarded primarily as a global, all-
embracing effort. However, according to TKN’s foundation statement (January 22nd, 
1978), PRL’s educational model promoted precisely the opposite: a sterile professional 
specialization to turn young intellectuals into mere “task performers”. This way, the 
“new inteligenci” would not only be excluded from participating in the formulation of 
those tasks, they would also be incapable of grasping their character and far-reaching 
consequences. Instead, TKN and KSS “KOR” members supported that young Poles 
should search for the truth about the world and about themselves to encourage a creative 
and autonomous citizenship. It was, hence, a question of values and general historical 
comprehension: individuals needed to understand social life in its wholeness and to 
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acquire a deep knowledge about how things had come to be as they were437. In sum, the 
founders of the Society of Scientific Courses outlined in their manifesto two mutually 
exclusive models of inteligencja: one dependent on political power and limited to the 
accomplishment of orders, and a critical, independent one that had a broad perspective 
of society’s problems, acted as its moral conscience and sponsored cohesion within 
diversity. The latter was the model that intellectual oppositionists were trying to save… 
in order to save themselves too.   
The discovery of the Communists’ lies and manipulations regarding past events 
forged the awareness and character of opposition inteligenci, especially of those who 
devoted themselves professionally to historical research. It is not strange that, as a 
reaction to this, opposition movements demanded truth from authorities and, at the same 
time, searched for the truth themselves. There were several ways of doing this, like 
filling in the official “blank spots” or by reinterpreting certain episodes of Polish 
history. Others, like Krystyna Kersten, wanted to provide their readers with “raw 
material” (surowiec) and recount things from the beginning and “as they really were” 
(“jak to naprawdę było”), or at least as impartially as possible, instead of providing a 
mere counter-narrative of PRL’s official version. A solid knowledge and understanding 
of recent historical facts, Kersten believed, was the key to independent critical thought, 
and thus the path leading to society’s intellectual emancipation438. 
In close connection to the latter, the next target on inteligencja’s list of tasks was 
political emancipation or, in other words, the recovery of Polish nation’s agency in 
public life. Through their personal example, by not throwing in the towel or running out 
of steam, intellectual oppositionists became society’s “cheerleaders” and made people 
realize that each person’s determination and contribution counted. This was an essential 
point in Michnik’s program:   
 
… above all, we must create a strategy of hope for the people, and show them that their efforts and 
risks have a future. The underground will not succeed in building a widespread national opposition 
without such a strategy ─without faith in the purpose of action. Otherwise, resistance will amount 
to nothing more than a moral testimony or an angry reaction. And the movement will cease to be 
one that is aware of its political goals, that is armed with patience and consistency and that is 
capable of winning.439 
 
Surely, it is easy to spot in many of these comments a certain patronizing tone. In 
a similar way as they imagined that former inteligencja had breathed national 
consciousness into the rest of their fellow countrymen a century or a century and a half 
ago, transforming them into Poles, opposition intellectuals pictured their own present-
day mission as the building or the recovery of national self-determination in the name of 
other social strata. This concerned especially industrial workers who, since 1976, had 
accepted opposition intellectuals’ aid. For example, Jarosław Kurski, a friend of 
Bronisław Geremek, described the latter’s close relation with Solidarność’s leader Lech 
Wałęsa in the following way: “Geremek is tantamount to żeromszczyzna440 (…). All the 
culture in which Bronek441 was raised up stemmed from Żeromski. And Wałęsa was the 
people to whom the nobleman must go and help. The Polish inteligent must serve the 
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Polish people, whose emanation was Wałęsa”442. Hence, collaboration between different 
social groups could be judged as an uneven exchange, for inteligenci assumed from the 
start that they were the “soul”, plus a good deal of the “brain” of the opposition body. 
Or, to put it in subtler terms, inteligencja was a kind of primus inter pares within 
opposition ranks.   
Given this perception, it was logical that inteligenci felt ultimately responsible for 
not foreseeing the upcoming repressive reaction of PRL State that ended up with 
Martial Law and Solidarność’s illegalization. Too much self-confidence, the lack of a 
well-defined political basis, underestimation of the government’s room for 
manoeuvre…  Adam Michnik’s and Czesław Bielecki’s mea culpa were already 
circulating by the first half of 1982:  
 
The responsibility for this situation doesn’t lie with the crew of workers, but with all those who 
(for instance, writing these words) were destined to shape the trade union’s political views through 
their intellectual production. Theoretical reflection ─which, by the way, is worth taking note of─ 
about the changes in the system trailed in the wake of events. Apart from the usual formulae there 
was hardly any political reflection. Practice liquidated theory. Not for the first time in Polish 
history… 
(…) There was in this [attitude, C.A.] naïveté, wishful thinking and a long tradition in Polish 
history, in which the attempt to terrorize Polish society by resorting to the Polish army was 
something difficult to imagine. The previous months [to December 1981, C.A.] engraved on social 
consciousness an image of the conflicts between the State and society in which there was no room 
for open violence.443 
 
From the start, the West considered an intervention and the “normalization” of the Poles as the 
obvious end of our revolution. We alone deceived ourselves by pretending that the problem didn’t 
exist. Each time that the outside world showed us tense military ranks and files of Soviet bayonets 
we turned a blind eye to them. (…) 
December 13th made us realize how reprehensively naïve was our faith in the historical 
compromise that was supposedly going to take place in Poland. Our faith in the possibility of an 
agreement between totalitarian Communism and an authentic social movement, that both parties 
would wish for a compromise in the name of higher national reasons.444 
 
In the same, slightly paternalistic line, inteligencja was to “offer society a vision 
of a democratic Poland” as well445. Such a mission, and hence intellectuals’ role in 
political life, stretched beyond PRL times and the fall of Communism to the transitional 
and democratic period, when it did not always achieve the expected success446. 
Nevertheless, former oppositionists like Geremek thought in the early 1990s that they 
could still act as a moral reference point in the political arena during hard and changing 
times, until professional politicians finally made their way to power: “Then there will be 
no more room for intellectuals who not only seek space for reflection but who have an 
ethical commitment rather than career aims. At that point”, he remarked with a twinge 
of bitterness and resignation, “an intellectual will be more in his place in a jury in 
Monte Carlo than in a parliament or government”447. But despite the fact that he 
actually was as a member of a jury for a television festival in Monte Carlo when he was 
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interviewed, as long as he felt that he could boost people’s awareness, transmit them 
democratic convictions and encourage them to get involved in socio-political affairs, he 
wouldn’t give up his public duty: 
 
Reluctant politician that he is, Geremek believes that an intellectual can help instill a notion of 
citizenship into people who have never known a democratic regime. 
‘The problem is to show the young how they can become citizens - not the objects of power 
but the subjects of power. (...) I think people must have their interests and their interests can 
coincide with high principles.’  
Geremek will be 60 years old next month (…). A year ago he decided to give up politics, then 
he found he couldn't. 
‘There were young people who said if you leave it means you have been broken and if you 
have been broken what is the point of our trying? Or it means that you have failed and you are 
abandoning us. And so,’ Geremek said, ‘I continued’.448 
 
Politics is based mainly on trust and delegation of power. If politicians believe 
that that power no longer emanates from others but from themselves, so that they 
“forget” they are the representatives of a society and believe they can act independently 
(Bourdieu’s political fetishism), that trust is betrayed. In former Communist countries, 
the detachment between the governments and the governed was so big and the distrust 
towards anything that reminded of political power so deep that intellectuals, as well as 
other social groups within opposition, were generally unwilling to define what they 
were doing as “politics”449. But, of course, it was; and, to a considerable extent, Polish 
oppositionists managed to build up the socio-political credit and acquire the symbolic 
power and authority that Communist politicians had lost (or never had). Critical 
intellectuals were conscious of the fragility of this bond between them and the rest of 
society, hence their insistence in sticking to their principles as a way to secure social 
support and preserve their moral authority, which was regarded as a fundamental aspect 
of their collective identity450. To instill a sense of community based on imponderables 
was a top priority, according to Václav Havel: 
 
The dissident movement was not typically ideological. Of course, some of us tended more to the 
right, others to the left, some were close to one trend in opinion or politics, others to another. 
Nevertheless, I don’t think this was the most important thing. What was essential was something 
different: the courage to confront evil together and in solidarity, the will to come to an agreement 
and to cooperate, the ability to place the common and general interest over any personal or group 
interests, the feeling of common responsibility for the world, and the willingness personally to 
stand behind one’s own deeds. Truth and certain elementary values, such as respect for human 
rights, civil society, the indivisibility of freedom, the rule of law ─these were notions that bound 
us together and made it worth our while to enter again and again into a lopsided struggle with the 
powers that be.451 
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Similarly, Geremek interpreted the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski’s proposal of 
a “conservative-liberal-socialist” program as an appeal for the subordination of political 
ideologies and interests to universal values. For him, these values included human 
dignity and solidarity, freedom of individuals, groups and nations, justice, equal chances 
for all, to overcome individual and class selfishness and to respect the heritage of the 
past452.  
Official and professionalized politics was undoubtedly discredited in Poland by 
the 1970s. Therefore, it was better for oppositionists (not only intellectuals, but workers 
too) to be seen as amateur politicians and not lose the “innocence” of the beginner in the 
political field. They should be always perceived as a part of society and avoid the risk of 
isolating from it. Furthermore, they were to give politics a renovated meaning by going 
back to what they considered its original purpose: to provide a public service. The 
engines of such a service to community must be sense of duty, commitment and 
responsibility instead of the thirst for power that ended up corrupting its essence and 
delegitimizing it. About his own experience as a politician, Geremek asserted: 
 
Dans ma biographie politique une chose sera toujours absente, c’est le goût du pouvoir: je n’en ai 
aucun; mais le goût de l’engagement, oui; autrement je ne serais plus dans la vie politique, surtout 
maintenant que j’ai le choix. J’ai par contre le sentiment d’un service à exercer. (...) Mais si 
j’essaie de me situer dans la vie, et si j’essaie parfois de me comprendre moi-même, je n’arrive pas 
à me comprendre en termes de carrière politique, ni d’honneurs que la vie politique peut donner, 
mais dans cette notion du ‘dû’ qu’un homme ressent à l’égard de son temps et de sa société.453 
 
That was the reason why he firstly refused to continue in Polish opposition’s 
political forefront when he was asked to be a candidate for June 1989 elections. He felt 
that the collective goals he was struggling for had been or were about to be achieved. 
This didn’t mean that inteligenci refused to exercise their share of power, only that this 
(delegated) authority, and hence their influence within society, was to be displayed in 
different albeit adjacent areas of the political field, such as political counseling or their 
previous work as opinion formers:     
 
Je pensais que c’était [to leave the political forefront, C.A.] une conséquence naturelle de ce que 
j’avais fait, persuadé d’avoir accompli ma part de la mission des intellectuels polonais, qui ont 
toujours servi avant tout la Pologne et non leurs ambitions ou leurs intérêts personnels. Je voulais 
que ce fût clair. Dans la mesure où j’étais un homme connu, j’estimais que mon refus de postuler 
pour des honneurs serait une certaine confirmation de cette tradition. Je m’imaginais que je 
resterais l’un des conseillers de Solidarité et de Walesa. Je voulais me trouver là où je serais 
vraiment utile.454 
 
Despite finally accepting to continue his political career (which lasted until his 
death), Geremek’s words and initial reluctance, similarly to Havel’s, suggest a certain 
incompatibility between the critical intellectual’s habitus and modus vivendi and the 
direct exercise of politics.  
But was it possible for an opposition inteligent to keep academic and political 
spheres separate, if moral principles were his/her basic reference point? Or was it 
inevitable that these facets mingled and coexisted in a more or less harmonious, 
complementary, even contradictory way? A more specific approach to Bronisław 
Geremek’s biography will provide us some clues to answer these inquiries. 
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D) Case study: On how reflection can lead to action and vice versa. Bronisław 
Geremek’s interest in the outcasts of history and his subsequent political 
commitment. 
 
Despite Polish modern history was never a central issue, not even a side topic, in 
Bronisław Geremek’s professional career, this historian and former oppositionist 
nevertheless experienced an evolution along his life that we would like to highlight in 
connection to the inteligencja’s self-perception, the historian’s role in society and his or 
her eventual political commitment.  
First of all, since very early in his academic life, Bronisław Geremek took an 
outstanding interest in the lower social strata and the outcasts, to the extent of becoming 
his main line of work for more than twenty years455. In 1990, when interviewed by 
Jacek Żakowski, Geremek reckoned that his sensitivity towards suffering was partially 
forged during his childhood, a period of his life which, nevertheless, he spoke very 
seldom and reluctantly about. Back then, he says, the world burned and fell apart 
continuously before his eyes, taking with it his small universe of family continuities, 
values and principles:  
 
Je ne suis jamais revenu à mes expériences d’enfance, qui pourtant sont celles qui m'ont formé. Le 
monde se consumait sous mes yeux. Comme se consumait le petit univers des continuités 
familiales qui renferme la durabilité des valeurs, des règles, des principes évidents. Dans ma vie 
d’enfant, le monde s’effondrait sans cesse. Cela aussi a façonné ma sensibilité ultérieure.456 
 
Bronisław Geremek, né Benjamin Lewertow, had Jewish origins457. Besides his 
father, who was a Zionist, the rest of the members of his family were orthodox Jews. 
According to his elder brother, Jerry Lewart (né Israel Lewertow), one of their 
grandfathers was even a magid, that is, an especially charismatic rabbi who led a Jewish 
community and was thought to have visionary abilities.  
From 1940 up to 1942, Geremek and his family (his mother, father and elder 
brother) were shut away in the Warsaw Ghetto. In 1942, his father prepared the flight of 
his wife and younger son Benjamin and sent them with a Polish citizen, Stefan 
Gieremek, to Zawichost, a small town in Małopolska (Lesser Poland). Geremek’s father 
died in Auschwitz sometime between Spring 1943 and late Autumn 1944. It was in this 
last date when Israel, Geremek’s brother, was also sent to Auschwitz and learnt about 
his father’s death. Fortunately, he managed to survive. After spending a few years in the 
new-born state of Israel and briefly reuniting with his family in Poland in the early 
                                                 
455
 GEREMEK, Bronisław: Le Salariat dans l’artisanat parisien aux XIIIe-XVe siècle. Étude sur le marché 
de la main-d’oeuvre au Moyen Age, Paris, Mouton, 1968; Les marginaux parisiens au XIVe et XVe siècles, 
Paris, Flammarion, 1976; Inutiles au monde: truands et misérables dans l’Europe moderne, 1350-1600 
présenté par Bronislaw Geremek, [Paris], Gallimard, 1980; La potence ou la pitié: l’Europe et les 
pauvres du Moyen Age à nos jours, [Paris], Gallimard, 1987; “Le marginal”, in LE GOFF, Jacques, 
CARDINI, Franco et al.: L’homme médiéval, Paris, Seuil, 1989; Les fils de Caïn. L’image des pauvres et 
des vagabonds dans la littérature européenne du XVe au XVIIe siècle, Paris, Flammarion, 1991; Histoire 
sociale, exclusions et solidarité: leçon inaugurale faite le vendredi 8 janvier 1993,  [Paris], Collège 
de France, 1993. See also SCHMITT, Jean-Claude: “L’histoire des marginaux”, in LE GOFF, Jacques, 
CHARTIER, Roger, REVEL, Jacques (dirs.) : La nouvelle histoire,  Paris, CEPL, 1978, 344-369, esp. 
347 and 369.  
456
 Geremek: La rupture..., 108. 
457
 “Mój wielki brat” (interview to Jerry Lewart, brother of Bronisław Geremek, carried out by Waldemar 
Piasecki), Przegląd, 30, 2008; BOJARSKI, Piotr and NOWAK, Włodzimierz (współpr. Joanna 
Szczęsna): “Bronisław Geremek ucieka z getta. Chudy chłopak w czterech swetrach”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
21-VII-2008; Kurski: “Bronisław Geremek...”. 
116 
 
1950s, he decided to establish himself in the United States, where he lived for the rest of 
his life458.  
On the other hand, Israel’s and Benjamin’s mother married Stefan Gieremek after 
the War; Benjamin, aged twelve then, changed his name for Bronisław and began using 
the surname of his adoptive father, which lost its “i”. The new family lived from 1945 
till 1948 in Wschowa, a town where many Poles from the ancient Eastern lands (now 
belonging to Lithuania, the Ukraine and Belarus) moved to, as it happened in other 
former German areas within Poland’s new Western borders.  
When asked a few years ago about him as a result of his unexpected death in a car 
accident (July 2008), Geremek’s acquaintances from Wschowa insisted that, as a 
teenager, Bronek always avoided to speak about his childhood459. This was also kept up 
throughout his adult daily life, as if his early years were behind a closed door whose key 
he didn’t want to find: “… cela [mes origines juives, C.A.]”, he told Żakowski, “est lié à 
mon enfance, que j’ai verrouillée en moi. (...) Dans la vie de tous les jours, c’est une 
porte fermée à double tour. Une de ces cases de ma biographie auxquelles je ne reviens 
jamais. Je ne veux pas en retrouver la clef...”460.  
It was no secret in the town of Wschowa that Geremek was adopted and had 
Jewish origins, but it was rarely talked about461. A colleague from gimnazjum462, Józef 
Wilczyński, remembered that when the Second World War was mentioned and 
commented, Geremek simply vanished. Only once he told him: “We went through 
Gehenna463. If it hadn’t been for peoples’ help, we wouldn’t be having this conversation 
today”464.  
It seems that this feeling of gratefulness never faded in Geremek’s memories, as 
can be deduced from a conversation he had during a dinner at his friends’ the Kurskis’ 
in February 2008, hardly six months before his fatal accident465. Apparently, in the 
Summer of 1942, the ten-year-old Benjamin Lewertow managed to escape from the 
famine that was devastating the inhabitants of Warsaw Ghetto and stayed for a few 
weeks at the house of some of his parents’ friends in the Arian zone, in order to heal 
from the diseases he had contracted. He told the Kurskis that he would never forget that 
first short journey in tram through the center of Warsaw, following his mother’s 
instructions to reach their friends’ home. He remembered that the people travelling in 
the “Polish part” looked at him in a very significant way, for it was evident where he 
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came from: a weak, exhausted, trembling child wearing four sweaters at the height of 
August certainly belonged to the Ghetto. But no-one informed against him. On the 
contrary, that time he perceived friendly attitudes and solidarity. Somebody told him to 
beware of the German who was sitting in the “nur für Deutsche” coach. He felt safe.  
In recent years, Geremek also explained to the journalist of the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter, Michał Winiarski, that he simply couldn’t speak about his 
boyhood because it contained experiences that were too hard to assume in a rational 
way. In the aforementioned dinner with the Kurskis, Geremek referred to a conversation 
he had had with Janusz Korczak466, whom he knew since 1939. He told him he wanted 
to be a writer when he grew up. Korczak replied that, besides being wise and reading a 
lot, a writer must also understand the world, even if it’s criminal, bad and unfair, and 
asked young Benjamin Lewertow if he would be able to do so. That was the reason, 
Geremek said, why he finally didn’t become a writer: he was never able to understand 
death, hunger and human despair, nor the nightmare that had surrounded him in the 
Warsaw Ghetto467.  
However, hope was very present too in Geremek’s thoughts and actions. This was 
highlighted precisely by Jarosław Kurski in the text he prepared in 2002 to celebrate his 
friend’s 70th birthday: “In an interview to Viva! Geremek told [Piotr] Najsztub about the 
optimism that never ceased to accompany him in his public activities, because ‘he saw 
many joyful and wonderful things even when there was hell all around… In the worst 
situation possible there is a chance… I learnt to bet on the chance’”468. 
But something began to change imperceptibly in young Bronisław’s views during 
the Postwar period in Poland. His family moved from Wschowa to Warsaw in 1948, the 
year when the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was created as a result of the 
inclusion of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) within the Polish workers’ Party (PPR). 
There, the boy who had belonged to a Catholic Marian Society469 discovered a new 
world of books (Barbusse, Vercors, Aragon, Sartre, Camus…), very different from 
those he had read until then:  
 
“Dans ces lectures il [himself, Bronisław Geremek, C.A.] trouve une réplique au malheur humain. 
Il y apprend des choses sur le monde, l’Europe ; il y rencontre l’idée de justice sociale et une 
critique de la démocratie occidentale; il y lit la nécessité d’un prix à payer quand on veut la 
justice sociale à grande échelle. A l’époque”, Geremek told Żakowski in 1990, “je pensais que le 
communisme était la jeunesse du monde.”470 
 
Thus, among his enthusiastic optimism, his hopes to improve the fate of the 
oppressed and do justice, and his wish to build a new country leaving his own tragic 
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past aside471, Geremek, more than forty years later, considered he assumed something 
else too when he joined the new-born PZPR in 1950: that progress always involved 
some “side effects”, otherwise certainly negligible...  
However, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with the participation of 
Polish troops made Geremek lose all hope of being able to reform the Socialist system: 
“Ce qui était apparu comme le prix à payer pour la justice s’est avéré être l’essence du 
mal qui s’était donné pour masque la justice. Mon départ du Parti [Communiste] n’était 
pas un acte politique mais un choix moral.”472. Geremek not only checked with 
disappointment that, ironically, Communist ideals were just dead letter for authorities, 
but also that some of those ideals, like the extreme belief in a certain “historical logic” 
and “purpose”, conveyed serious dangers for a society which aimed to be free: 
 
Dans la crise du communisme, je veux attirer l’attention sur un seul élément: le délabrement de 
cette charpente idéologique qui tenait à la conviction que le communisme était la jeunesse du 
monde, la logique de l’histoire, le passage obligé du développement, la réalisation du droit des 
masses populaires lésées jusque-là par l’histoire. Ces affirmations ne se limitaient pas au langage 
de la propagande, elles étaient également un instrument de domination idéologique.473 
  
In the 1990s, Geremek thought that, besides his ongoing professional formation as 
a historian, it was also his blurry memory of the Warsaw Ghetto what made him be 
suspicious about eschatological ideologies and refrain from political action, hence his 
modest engagement as a Party member. In sum, he was rather an observer than an 
activist: 
 
 Dans mon cas, ce dernier [l’engagement avec le Parti Communiste Polonais, C.A.] n’était pas 
grand. Peut-être parce que je plaçais l’histoire avant la politique. Peut-être aussi parce que l’image 
du ghetto de Varsovie, estompée dans ma mémoire personnelle, le temps de l’eschatologie vécue 
me protégeaient de l’eschatologie programmée. L’observation de la politique me passionnait mais 
je gardais mes distances avec l’action politique.474 
 
Now that we’ve seen the background motivations of Bronisław Geremek’s early 
interest on those who suffered and were excluded475, we move on to the second and later 
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aspect of his biography we want to highlight: how his historical worries took him to 
opposition politics and how politics, in its turn, altered and refined his perception of 
history.  
In 1987, owing to the publication in French of his book La potence ou la pitié: 
l’Europe et les pauvres du Moyen Age à nos jours476, which had been banned in Poland, 
Bronisław Geremek was interviewed, among others, by Michel Sot for the daily 
newspaper Le Monde. In the course of their talk, Geremek undertook a brief overview 
of his academic evolution and highlights.  
As a beginner in the field of historiography in the 1950s, he felt (and still did) 
especially close to historical materialism and the Annales school, in particular to 
Jacques Le Goff, Émile Cornaet and Maurice Lombard, besides Marc Bloch and 
Fernand Braudel, all of whom  he had the chance to meet personally for the first time 
(except, of course, for Bloch) either during his stay in Paris in April-November 1956 or 
further on, when he returned there with a stipendium of the École Pratique des Hautes 
Études’s VI Section477 for the whole academic year 1957-1958. Geremek affirmed that, 
already back then, he had a research project about the poor in mind478. He also lived in 
Paris between 1962-65, when he was director of the Centre d’Études et de Civilisation 
Polonaise and taught at the Sorbonne University479. By the 1970s, he was not focusing 
so much on class structures as on the phenomenon of exclusion:   
 
Marxiste, je cherchais une classe opprimée. Les Annales m’ont conduit aux comportements 
sociaux, à l’idée de pauvreté et à l'intérêt pour les groupes qui, selon le mot de Lucien Febvre, 
‘n’ont pas droit à l’histoire’. Depuis, je suis resté fidèle. 
Ce fut donc d’abord Le Salariat dans l’artisanat parisien aux XIIIe-XVe siècles (1968), une 
étude économique du marché du travail, la recherche des pauvres en tant que classe. Cela me 
conduisit aux marginaux.480 
 
Geremek defended his habilitation research in the Polish Academy of Sciences 
(PAN), which was published some years later in French as Les marginaux parisiens aux 
XIVe et XVe siècles (1976)481. He then approached the tramp’s life as a social 
phenomenon and, when he was correcting the proofs of his next book, in August 1980, 
got deeply involved in the workers’ protests of the Gdańsk shipyards. Fortunately, 
thanks to the help of some French friends, the work managed to come out that same 
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year482. Now, in 1986-87, Geremek believed that La potence ou la pitié showed his 
professional progress in the following way:  
 
J’ai le sentiment que les instruments habituels de compréhension historique ne suffisent pas à 
rendre compte du passé dans son épaisseur. Je porte un grand intérêt aux valeurs spirituelles dans 
les comportements sociaux qui ne se laissent pas réduire à des mécanismes simples. 
J’ai dès le début participé au séminaire de Michel Mollat à la Sorbonne sur les pauvres. Son 
enquête a eu l’immense mérite d’associer le spirituel, le culturel et le social pour donner aux 
pauvres un véritable ‘droit à l’histoire’.483  
 
It is something frequent that opposition inteligenci identify historical materialism 
with a historiographical practice which only takes on account purely economic and 
socio-economic aspects of the past, that is, the base or infra-structure part of human 
society according to Marxist theory (forces and relations of production), neglecting thus 
the super-structure, which included, among others, culture, politics or religion. 
Geremek would also insist on this further along in his life, for instance when he spoke 
about the French history of mentalities (histoire des mentalités) with Duby and the 
journalist Philippe Sainteny484.  
Patryk Pleskot maintains this is an excessively schematic view of orthodox 
Marxism, and resorts to the Marxist saying “existence forms consciousness”, as well as 
to the example of the renowned annaliste Georges Duby, to show that it was perfectly 
within orthodoxy to turn towards the study of mentalities (mentalités) starting from a 
socio-economic paradigm485. We will point out later as well that, despite the changes 
undergone during the Stalinist period and the taboo contemporary topics, Polish 
historiography during PRL times remained in essence quite classic methodologically 
and thematically speaking (Chapter 4).  
However, oppositionists like Geremek or Holzer had experienced first-hand 
precisely all the major, harshest changes of the 1940s and 1950s at Polish universities, 
before actually becoming dissidents. Later on, it was for them not just a combat against 
bad praxis (i.e. not practicing what was preached, or doing just the opposite), but also 
against part of the theory, its imposed character486 and ideological misuse, or its 
unsuitability for Polish case and epistemological disadvantages, even if it was only very 
rarely applied down to the last consequences in Polish academia487. Besides, it is 
undeniable that the main collective actor in history for classic Marxism is the 
proletariat, whereas Geremek’s tramps and prostitutes were, in the eyes of Communist 
politicians, not so “convenient” or even worth studying, because they didn’t form a 
class or have class consciousness anyway. Worse still: they were a problem, even a kind 
of threat, for the State. 
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During his interview with Michel Sot, Geremek maintained that the sixteenth 
century in Europe was a turning point in terms of policies and attitudes towards the poor 
and rejected: from then on, the new-born modern State took charge of them, decided 
who it would help or make work, expelled foreigners and eventually confined them. 
Reflecting about who were and are the poor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he 
concluded: “Je suis passé d’une question médiévale à une interrogation de fond sur la 
naissance de la société contemporaine et de ses attitudes sociales en face de la 
pauvreté”488.  
Nevertheless, when Sot suggested him that his works might be considered a slap 
on the wrist for the West, and he himself as a “witness from abroad” or the “explorer of 
the West’s bad conscience”, Geremek apparently answered on the defensive. The 
attempt to interpret his historical researches politically bothered him, he said. He 
wondered (rhetorically) whether the wish to form a medieval- and Christian-inspired 
community or a complete distrust towards the State could be found in his book. 
However, he added: “C’est en tout cas notre principal problème à nous, Polonais 
d’aujourd’hui: comment sauver une vie communautaire contre l’État qui la détruit”489. 
Somehow, probably unconsciously, or perhaps in a calculated way, we cannot know for 
sure490, Geremek sewed together with the thread of his concern about the State 
institution what he had at first wanted to keep clearly separate: past and present, 
historical practice about European Medieval-Modern Ages and Polish politics.   
About four or five years later, in other interviews, Geremek himself would admit 
this connection, regarding his life as a “flowing whole” this time.  “On ne peut pas faire 
ce découpage Geremek historien et Geremek politique. Je pense que j’ai essayé de 
forcer cette image”, he told Philippe Sainteny491, whereas Mary Blume reported: 
 
Looking back, he [Geremek] says it was normal that he should become a labor organizer and 
resistant to Poland's totalitarian regime, although for a long time he tried to separate his work as a 
historian from his political engagement. 
«I remember being annoyed that an Italian historian said he found Geremek the politician in 
my history of poverty. Then I realized he was right because he said he found in my book a certain 
distrust of power and the state. It is this distrust that drew me into the resistance and that makes my 
present life as politician difficult.»492 
 
As it happens with many other personal memories (though collective at bottom, as 
Maurice Halbwachs pointed out493), Geremek pictured his private and public life until 
then as a coherent ensemble which underwent a completely logical and “natural” 
evolution. Changes would have always been motivated, paradoxically, by the same 
immutable principles, such as a sense of justice, solidarity with the victims and, mainly, 
search for the truth. In his conversation with Sot, Geremek still linked the latter with the 
attempt to keep his political activities separate from his academic life though, curiously 
enough, it is precisely this interest in truth what drew them so close together: 
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Je reste un historien. L’homme politique que je suis devenu cherche à ne pas mêler les divers 
domaines, la recherche scientifique et la vie politique. Il est important que le travail intellectuel se 
fasse en toute rigueur et que l’historien ne fasse pas du passé une leçon pour le présent. Ce qu’il 
apporte, c’est la recherche de la vérité comme une valeur fondamentale. C’est cet engagement 
moral qui m’a amené, malgré moi, à la politique. Dans les situations où j’ai dû jouer un rôle 
politique, j’ai placé la vérité comme valeur de départ alors qu’en politique on se sert de la vérité. 
(…) Ce n’est pas très politique, mais c’est pour moi [la cherche de la vérité, C.A.] une 
exigence morale très profonde, qui est intimement liée à ma formation et à mon métier 
d’historien494  
 
This same pattern can be found in the memories and explanations of other 
opposition inteligenci, who usually match a profile of professional historians and former 
members of the PZPR until at least 1968, like Krystyna Kersten, Tadeusz Łepkowski, 
Jerzy Jedlicki and Jerzy Holzer495. Therefore, we can infer the existence of a shared 
“historian-inteligent-dissident memory” among them, based on the permanence of 
principles, which stem from their previous (sometimes religious) education and 
professional code of ethics, against the mutability of events and circumstances. Despite 
their past failures, misjudgments or mistaken choices, these inteligenci felt they 
remained, in essence, the same as they had always been496. 
If appraised this way, knowledge, “passive” consciousness and critical historical 
thought would stand only one step away from action, “active” consciousness and 
making history, as in Benjamin’s Theses, where “the role of the historian and of the 
historical agent approach and even mingle”. The idea that some outstanding, leading 
Polish opposition inteligenci “… are trying to understand history and to make it”497 was 
already a widespread, nice sounding cliché in the international media by the 1980s. 
Concerning solely Geremek, Timothy Garton Ash wrote in an article for The Spectator, 
which criticized the former’s dismissal from PAN in late April 1985, that, “suddenly, 
[in August 1980] the historian found himself making history”, whereas in August 1989 
Anthony Lewis headed his brief comment in The International Herald Tribune “Now 
this Polish historian is helping to make history”. A little later, in February 1992, Mary 
Blume pointed out that “Geremek will be 60 years old next month and would like to go 
back to studying history rather than making it”498.  
Apparently, everything falls into place: because of his traumatic childhood 
experiences, his commitment and sensitivity towards those who are excluded and 
suffer499, plus his professional and political choices, the combination of reflection, 
awareness and action suits Bronisław Geremek’s biography particularly well. However, 
it seems he also felt certain unease due to the “incompatibilities” he perceived between 
his academic and his political posts. To act according to the rules of one challenged the 
way of acting in the other, and vice versa. Up to now we have seen how, in Geremek’s 
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view, his search for the truth as a historian influenced his political stance and eventually 
led him to active commitment. But how did politics, in turn, affect his historical 
perception? 
First of all, we have to bear in mind Geremek’s admiration and close relation with 
the Annales School. He arrived as a young BA to the VI Section for “Economic and 
Social Sciences” of the École Pratique des Hautes Études in 1956, when Fernand 
Braudel took full charge of the institution after Lucien Febvre’s decease, and also when 
Polish-French academic relations began to increase after the Second World War and the 
Stalinist period. It appears that he had an outstanding ability to make new contacts and 
to befriend his French teachers and colleagues, especially Braudel himself, Georges 
Duby and Jacques Le Goff. After his long-term stay in France in the 1950s, Geremek 
also acted as the “host”, in the name of the IH PAN and the UW respectively, of 
professors Braudel (1958) and Duby (1960) when they were invited to Warsaw; that is, 
he was the young researcher in charge of looking after them during their visit500. 
According to Patryk Pleskot’s Ph.D. research results, the real influence of Annales 
within Polish academia in 1945-1989 wasn’t as direct, widespread or relevant as one 
might be inclined to think in the light of some Polish scholars’ demonstrations of 
support and adherence to it back then. For example, to put it in figures, out of the eight 
Polish historians who took part in a collective work dedicated to Braudel in the 
1970s501, only Bronisław Geremek’s text contained frequent and clear allusions to 
French historiography. However, in his work Les marginaux parisiens aux XIVe et XVe 
siècles, which earned the esteem and recognition of the Annales circle, the references to 
“classic” historians outnumbered those consecrated to annalistes502. Although, in my 
opinion, quantitative methods on their own fail to provide a complete picture of a 
qualitative phenomenon, such as the impact a movement or a trend might have in 
somebody’s life and thought, in this case they nevertheless contribute to reinforce the 
previously stated conclusion. The Annales School’s influence on Polish award holders 
at the EPHE/ EHESS was more of a civilization and cultural kind than of a scientific-
methodological nature. In this sense, the annaliste ascendancy was an inspiration for 
many503.   
We can appreciate this, for instance, with Braudel’s “long term” approach504. In 
Philippe Sainteny’s 1990-1992 series of interviews to Geremek and his friend Georges 
Duby, published together in the volume Passions communes (1992)505, Geremek 
thought that to be interested in history meant in the long run to look out more for 
similarities between past and present than for differences, and supported, together with 
his French colleagues Le Goff and Duby, that the Medieval Ages could actually extend 
till the eighteenth century506. The popularity of the longue durée in general in Poland 
was also considerable, in part due to the fact that it was officially well regarded. 
Throughout Communist times, many historians appropriated the idea and applied it to 
their researches. Pleskot considers that perhaps this loyalty to Braudel’s proposal was 
one of the reasons why Polish and French historiographies began to move away from 
each other since the 1970s, for, while in France the “long term” dogma began to be put 
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into question and new historiographical trends turned to individuals, events and 
microhistory, in Poland the longue durée was frequently employed until the end of the 
PRL period and the latest currents were barely present507.     
Through an anecdote occurred in 1979 between Geremek and Jacques Revel, 
Pleskot also shows that the fascination some Polish historians felt with Annales 
surpassed even that of the actual founders of the journal, since the former perceived the 
School as something legendary and “sacred” of its kind. Besides, the conviction that 
Annales had greatly influenced Polish historiography was seemingly an a priori dogma 
for Geremek, because the only proof he provided about this were his own academic 
experience and texts508.  
Since we are dealing with self-perception, what is relevant for us is that Bronisław 
Geremek experienced a feeling of belonging, of personal and intellectual indebtedness 
and, last but not least, of friendship towards the Annales circle, apart from an especial 
attachment, as a self-declared Marxist and Annales admirer, to the idea of longue durée. 
However, in his opinion, the intense political activity he carried out since the 1980’s 
nuanced his historiographical convictions in some ways.  
In his preface to the French edition of his interview Rok 1989: Bronisław 
Geremek opowiada / Jacek Żakowski pyta, which Geremek wrote in July 1991 (“Le 
défi”509), to mention the Annales School was certainly a must. Firstly, he explained that 
he hadn’t written anything about what happened in 1988-1989 before not only due to 
lack of time and his political commitments, but also because of his formation as a 
historian and his fascination with the Annales School. He claimed he had always taken 
on account that long processes, and not events, shaped history in the long run: “Fasciné 
depuis mes jeunes années par l’école des Annales, par les transformations des structures 
économiques, sociales et culturelles, j’ai été formé dans le dédain, voire le mépris des 
événements”. But, curiously, in the 1980s he found himself in the midst of a histoire 
événementielle which undoubtedly changed many things in Poland and its neighboring 
countries510. As a historian, he weighed up phenomena from a distance and bears in 
mind underlying long-term processes; however, one of the demands of his work as a 
politician was precisely the opposite─ immediacy; thus, he must also interpret and give 
a sense to ongoing events in order to be able to act: 
 
L’interprétation des situations en cours faisait partie de mon travail. Les politiciens savent mieux 
que les historiens qu’il faut rationaliser les événements, non pas leur donner raison, mais leur 
attribuer un sens. L’essentiel est de le faire immédiatement, lorsque l’événement a lieu, car à ce 
moment-là l'interprétation devient un facteur d’action politique ou d’action tout court.511 
 
Geremek aimed to harmonize the timings of two different professions, action and 
reflection, closeness and distance, the zoom-lens and the panorama. Allegedly, it was 
more through his political activity and his contact with journalists than through further 
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in-depth historical readings that he began feeling uncomfortable with a longue durée in 
which historical agents somehow “faded away” and lost their significance, fostering 
passiveness among people. Interestingly, Geremek had already referred to certain 
historiographical trends favoring passivity a few years before (1986), when writing 
about Polish historiography for the French dictionary of historical sciences directed by 
André Burgière. During the last third of the nineteenth century, he pointed out then, 
Warsaw School members opposed to Cracow School’s conservatism and to its 
justification of a passive attitude based on Polish history: “Les historiens de cette 
tendance [École de Varsovie] s’opposaient au conservatisme des historiens de Cracovie 
ainsi qu’à la justification d’une attitude de passivité qu’ils cherchaient à tirer de 
l’histoire de Pologne”512.  
Without ever questioning the relevance of great underlying historical processes, or 
ignoring all the elements which simply escaped him despite its decisive character513, 
Geremek also gave an important role to individuals and events, such as the ones of the 
year 1989, which upturned the situation of his country. This is how he explained why 
his 1990 interview turned on such a specific moment: 
 
L’année 1989 mérite une place particulière dans les annales de l’histoire de l’Europe et du monde, 
tant par ses conséquences politiques que par les méthodes qui ont été employées. Une chance 
merveilleuse est apparue cette année-là pour l’Europe et le monde, alors qu’il n’était pas du tout 
évident que cela eût lieu à ce moment-là et de cette manière-là. En cette année 1989 sont aussi 
apparus des dangers et des menaces dont il n’est pas du tout certain que l’on ne pouvait pas les 
prévenir. L’histoire des longs processus et des longues durées incite à accepter les déterminismes 
et l’inertie de l’agir. Les systèmes politiques comme la civilisation naissent et disparaissent selon 
des délais variables. Mais de ces différences dans le temps, dans l’espace, dans les formes, 
dépendent les destins des hommes et des générations. Dans ce livre, nous évoquons un instant 
historique, une année et son histoire politique banale, terre à terre, une suite d’actions visant à 
réaliser ce qui était possible et de désillusions dues aux limites de ce qui ne peut se concevoir 
qu’au travers du concret des faits et des hommes.514 
 
Along the first part of his interview, Geremek pointed out three events and first-
hand experiences which, in his opinion, made the difference for Poland and Solidarność 
in the late eighties: Firstly, the television debate between Lech Wałęsa and the chairman 
of the official All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) Alfred Miodowicz 
(November 30th, 1988), won by the former, broke the impasse of the preliminary 
discussions between Solidarność and the Polish government, and was a turning point in 
terms of public opinion, because Solidarność didn’t count then with the same massive 
support of 1980-1981 and Poles, despite wanting changes, also mistrusted them and 
grew impatient if they weren’t carried out soon515. Secondly, Wałesa’s visit to Paris in 
December 1988, accompanied by Geremek, was for the latter the beginning of the end 
of Communist system and the moment when he became fully conscious of the leading 
role Solidarność and Poland could play in the international arena:  
  
C’était un moment où non seulement Solidarité, mais aussi la Pologne reprenaient la place qui leur 
revenait en Europe et dans le monde. En voyant Lech Walesa salué par la Garde républicaine 
française comme un chef d’État, en le voyant discuter avec les plus éminents politiciens français et 
les principaux politiciens mondiaux, je me disais que je ne regrettais aucun des sacrifices que 
j’avais eu à faire pour pouvoir assister à cela. Je n’oublierai jamais la conversation avec 
Sakharov et ce moment très particulier où, durant la conférence de presse qui terminait ce voyage, 
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Lev Timofieïev a déclaré qu’il n’y aurait pas eu Gorbatchev et Sakharov à Paris sans Solidarité. 
N’oubliez pas qu’à ce moment-là on ne savait encore rien de la suite des événements ! Nous 
ignorions ce qui arriverait vraiment en Pologne et encore plus ce qui se passerait en Europe de 
l’Est. 
Pour moi, c’était un moment de changement radical, en ce sens que, pour la première 
fois, je me rendais compte d’une façon aussi claire et aussi univoque que nous occupions une 
position particulière qui consistait à ouvrir la voie allant du communisme à l’européanisation 
de l’Europe orientale. Vous avez commencé notre entretien par août 1988, mais, pour moi 
l’année 1989 a débuté précisément à Paris à la mi-décembre 1988. Il n’y aurait pas eu de 
perestroïka, de Gorbatchev sans Solidarité. Les mois suivants allaient allonger 
dramatiquement la liste des choses qui n’auraient pas eu lieu sans la Solidarnosc 
polonaise.516 
 
Thirdly, the live television interview Geremek gave during that journey with 
Wałesa was crucial in order to define clearly the position and roadmap of Solidarność in 
relation to Polish government, as well as to forge the image the West would have of 
Solidarność and the Polish situation in general, and thus its attitude towards it from then 
on. The interviewer asked Geremek about Polish Prime Minister Rakowski’s recent 
statement to the German weekly Der Spiegel, denying Solidarność the chance of 
registering as a trade union, but offering the movement the possibility of becoming 
immediately a political party:  
 
J’ai répondu alors que je m’attendais à ce que ce dirigeant changeât d’avis. Et tandis que je disais 
que je m’attendais à ce que Rakowski changeât d’avis, je savais que l’attitude de l’Occident à 
l’égard de Solidarité, et de tout ce que se passait en Pologne d’une manière générale, dépendait en 
grande partie de ma réponse. Je pris également conscience, d’une manière aiguë, de ce dont, d’une 
certaine manière, nous nous rendions déjà compte, à savoir qu’il ne pourrait pas y avoir d’accord 
entre Solidarité et le gouvernement de Rakowski, que nous ne pourrions pas nous entendre avec 
lui. 
Sa position [de Rakowski, C.A.] changea pourtant beaucoup plus vite qu’on aurait pu s’y 
attendre, puisque ce fut fait alors que nous étions encore à Paris.517 
 
Perhaps the French title of the book, La rupture, didn’t just refer to the end of 
Communist times in Poland, nor to the increasing distance between Geremek and Lech 
Wałęsa (who are portrayed in the cover of the French edition in very significant 
attitudes), but also to what Geremek perceived as his own, personal “rupture” with part 
of his previous intellectual basis, besides Marxism: that rooted in braudelian long term 
orthodoxy. A necessary split in order to provide Polish opposition movements and 
dissident inteligencja, hence his own life and choices, with a fertile meaning.   
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Chapter 2 
 
The nation seen by its representatives: opposition inteligencja’s view of 
Polish society  
 
 
A) Polish nation’s values and ideals 
 
Regarding themselves as the representatives of morality and ideals in the public 
forum, opposition intellectuals were prone to believe that, beyond material, political or 
geographical considerations, it was a tradition of ethical behaviors what bound Poles 
together as a nation518. For Adam Michnik, to act unselfishly in favor of the community 
to the point of sacrifice, plus respect for diversity and pluralism, were two of the best 
features of Polishness:  
 
I believe that when we try to account for history by limiting ourselves to the various social and 
economic factors which condition human fate, none of these factors can answer the question of 
why Father Maksymilian Kolbe519 or Janusz Korczak chose to die; or why in turn we surround 
their actions with such deep reverence. 
Two nineteenth-century rebels, Jaroslaw Dabrowski520 and Romuald Traugutt, who differed 
fundamentally in their ideas about ideological and political choices, nevertheless agreed on one 
thing: both were ready to bear witness to the highest national and human values ─with their own 
blood. This readiness has shaped a particular ethos in the Polish tradition, the ethos of sacrifice, in 
whose name our grandfathers and fathers never stopped fighting for national and human dignity. 
And this ethos cannot be understood without acknowledging the constant presence of Christ in 
Polish spiritual life. 
But this is not all. Also present in Polish culture there has existed the ethos of a multinational 
commonwealth constituted on the basis of tolerance and equality of nations. And even though in 
reality these ideals of equality and tolerance did not always prevail, still they always remained the 
dream of the best sons of this earth.521 
 
To a certain extent, critical inteligencja’s view of Polish society in PRL times 
resembled that which progressive intelligentsia had of the Russian and Baltic nation-
people in the nineteenth-century tsarist empire. This is especially clear in the case of 
Decembrists522, whose historical perception was pervaded with democratic tendencies. 
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For instance, they described the Russian people as rebellious and fond of freedom and 
admired Cossack traditions, together with their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
revolts; or they idealized the Medieval republics of Novgorod and Pskov and praised 
past institutions such as Novgorod’s assembly (veche) and the Polish-Lithuanian 
parliament (sejm). The romantic idea about the existence of a government of the people 
in Eastern Europe previous to the German Drang nach Osten became very popular too 
in the first half of the century. At the bottom of this perception lay the conviction that 
ordinary people were the concealed, mysterious force that pushed national history 
forward523.  
How was this “mysterious force” conceived by Polish intellectuals in our case? 
 
 
A.1) The origins: Western culture, Catholicism and the Commonwealth 
 
That Poland belonged to Europe, or, more specifically, to Western European 
culture, was one of the axioms with which almost every oppositionist agreed524. In the 
eyes of Andrzej Micewski, Polish identity (tożsamość) shared values and traditions with 
the rest of the continent (freedom, dignity, humanism…), as well as hopes and 
expectations. Hence, Poland’s roots should not be just a question of the past: historical 
consciousness wouldn’t make any sense if it didn’t focus on the future too525. In one of 
the first numbers of the quarterly underground journal Krytyka, Marek Beylin, Konrad 
Bieliński and Adam Michnik expressed similar views on that score:  
 
Poland lies in Europe. This statement is not a Eurocentric fit. It doesn’t mean either that Poland’s 
fate is going to be determined solely in a European scenario, nor that we believe that only the 
European cultural sphere produced values worth respecting. It is simply a reminder: Polish culture 
is a fragment of European culture, it is connected, more than with anything else, with its supreme 
values, with the ethos enrooted in the Ancient World and Christianity, as well as in the ideas of the 
Great French Revolution─ freedom, equality, fraternity. It is ─finally─ a way to express our faith 
in the permanent link that joins Poland’s destiny to Europe’s destiny.526   
 
For many inteligenci, “Europeanness” basically implied the establishment of a 
hierarchy of common values. Besides the three above-mentioned authors, PPN members 
and collaborators also believed that these principles dated back to Antiquity and to the 
origins of Christianity, and that they had been completed through the struggles for 
human rights along the last two hundred years, though unfortunately this didn’t mean 
they had always been respected or even put into practice. The old terms of 1789’s 
frustrated emancipation project (“freedom”, “equality”, “fraternity”)527 returned loaded 
with a “new” meaning, in a new context of dominion and submission. But they were not 
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the single ones: truth528, justice and human dignity were vital and timeless 
imponderables for oppositionists as well, together with pluralism and, above all, 
individual freedom529.  
The identification of Poland with Western European culture was regarded 
positively because it acted as a self-defensive recourse against two dangerous albeit 
opposite tendencies: acculturation and nationalism. In the first place, Poland belonged 
since the Middle Ages to the Latin-Catholic cultural sphere, and its position within it 
strengthened each time the country faced a foreign threat, such as the attacks of 
Ottoman troops or the expansion of the Grand Principality of Moscow, under Byzantine 
and Tartar influence back then. Later on, in the nineteenth century, the “Germanization” 
and “Russification” attempts of the Prussian and Tsarist empires became the primary 
menace for the partitioned Polish lands. Finally, Polish culture’s latest enemy was the 
still ongoing “Sovietization” initiated in the second half of the twentieth century. Many 
intellectuals believed that the only “weapon” powerful enough to overcome these 
recurrent hazards for Poland’s existence was the Western European supra-community of 
shared values530. The fact that Western Europe’s arms and ammunition didn’t play any 
relevant role in the Eastern Bloc crises, whereas Western ideals did, was used to ratify 
the accuracy of their assessment and the mightiness of the immaterial over the material:   
 
Les arsenaux militaires de l’Occident n’ont joué aucun rôle dans chacune des grandes crises qui 
ont secoué le monde communiste ou l’empire soviétique: ni en 1953, lors des événements de 
Berlin, ni en 1956, lorsque la Hongrie et la Pologne criaient leur soif de liberté, ni en 1968, au 
moment du printemps de Prague, ni en 1980, dans l’élan de Solidarité et dans son écrasement, le 
13 décembre 1981. En revanche, ce qui ne fut pas sans impact fut quelque chose que dans le 
langage politique routinier on peut qualifier d’“idéal occidental” et qui, en apparence, se composait 
d’un assemblage de valeurs anciennes, obsolètes, empruntées à la tradition européenne: la liberté, 
les droits privés et collectifs de l’individu, la justice des gouvernements de droit, la démocratie 
indirecte et directe et, la dernière mais non la moindre, la société civile.531 
 
In the second place, Poland’s cultural links with Western Europe were also seen 
as the best “weapon” to fight against the intolerant tendencies contained in nationalist 
myths, which fueled the idea of Polish exclusiveness and the rejection of any 
supposedly “foreign” traditions532. Interestingly, in PRL’ times chauvinist myths were 
not just an extremist or populist reaction against the threat of Communism and 
“Sovietization”, which would have been in any case thoroughly repressed, but basically 
the product of Soviet dominion itself: Polish Communist authorities tried to legitimize 
their power through nationalist watchwords and a pseudo-patriotic patina, resorting 
even to interwar right-winged political guidelines such as National Democracy’s (a 
single nation within the State, national unity, anti-German postulates…), especially 
when they felt their hegemonic position was seriously endangered533. Thus, rather than 
complete opposites, acculturation and nationalism were most probably perceived by 
critical inteligenci as two different anti-democratic strategies to ensure Poland’s de facto 
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dependence on the USSR, and hence “Europeanness” as the most effective way to 
counter-balance them.    
In the same vein, opposition intellectuals insistently assured that it was perfectly 
possible to belong to a broader community (Europe) without losing one’s own 
idiosyncrasy (Polish nation’s). For instance, Jan Józef Lipski believed that, 
paradoxically, Poland developed its most original ideas in the periods when it was most 
influenced by the rest of European countries, such as medieval times, the Renaissance 
and the nineteenth century. The enrichment, of course, would be mutual, for only 
through cultural exchange could the rest of Europe get to know outstanding Polish 
thinkers, painters or writers, like Adam Mickiewicz and Juliusz Słowacki534.  
But, as we hinted before, not all spheres of Polish life could be considered 
completely “European”: “In terms of regime, [Poland] is not [European]; the content of 
its traditions, yes; social relations, only partially; the aspirations of the majority of its 
inhabitants, to a considerably higher degree; its institutions, besides the Catholic Church 
and some cultural artistic societies, almost not; the daily activity of thinkers, artists, 
writers, priests, much more”535. The fact that only the Communist apparatus was 
emphatically described as not European, followed by public institutions, and that the 
rest of the categories lay closer to “Europeanness” suggests a combination of transition 
and impotence. Starting with the latter, and according to PPN members, the only system 
in harmony with the above-mentioned values was a parliamentary, democratic and 
liberal regime. However, given Poland’s unfavorable geopolitical situation, such a 
regime was generally deemed unattainable in the short or even medium term; as a result 
of this, other inteligenci like Andrzej Micewski feared that Poland would be “shut out” 
from Europe in the meantime, so they invoked another European value─ political 
pluralism, and argued that the choice of system was, for the moment, beyond Poles’ 
will536.  
As for transition, Tadeusz Łepkowski thought that Poland usually displayed an 
intermediate or borderline position between East and West along its history and that in 
present time its inhabitants were still influenced by both models in politics, social 
organization, mentalities and culture. In his view, the “Western way of life” was based 
on individualism, freedom and democracy, whereas populist egalitarianism, a liking for 
titles, social distances, gradations and ritualistic celebrations, such as army parades, 
drew Poles closer, after forty years in the Communist Bloc, to Eastern traditions537. A 
transitional condition meant that Poland could sometimes lean more towards the West, 
but also towards the East, and that Poles should assume their uniqueness in this sense 
and find their own development path without attempting to imitate others: 
 
We cannot change our geographical location. It is necessary thus to say something once again. 
Poland never was and will never be completely ‘western’ or completely ‘eastern’. It will be itself. 
It is a bit like that poem by Gałczyński about our national flag, about the banner that will never be 
white and will never be red538. It is and will be red and white539, and it cannot be otherwise. We 
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can curse our ‘transitional’ heritage, but we cannot free ourselves or keep away from it. Sadness, 
greatness, singularity and uniqueness intertwine in it. Poland must not copy the West, not the East. 
When it has done so, submitting itself, it has been defeated. Poland is doomed to originality. I fear 
it is also doomed to loneliness among the elements which are close to it, but are at the same time 
foreign.540  
 
Nevertheless, behind Łepkowski’s pessimistic and fatalistic tone it is fairly easy to 
“pick up” a lament about Poland’s political captivity, as well as a wish to get rid of the 
ballast of Eastern “bad habits”; though, of course, the country’s Communist period 
(once it was over) would remain in its annals and, to a certain extent, shape its future.   
We now move on to the other two fundamental pillars of Polish culture, from 
which, according to Michnik, stem the spirit of sacrifice on behalf of the community 
and pluralism, respectively: Catholicism and the political ethos of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth period.  
Communist authorities’ plans to destroy previous social structures and 
monopolize collective memory rendered worse results in Poland than in neighboring 
countries. This was due, on the one hand, to the peasants’ resistance to the 
collectivization of agriculture and, on the other, to the preservation of Polish Catholic 
Church’s strength and independence.  
After a relatively open and tolerant sixteenth century, the almost simultaneous 
defense against Islam, Orthodoxy and Lutheranism transformed Polish Catholicism into 
a fighting borderline religion. Many of its actual characteristics developed, according to 
inteligenci, precisely between Counter-Reform times and the nineteenth century. These 
included ceremonialism, a strong faith that sometimes degenerated into fanaticism, a 
deep-rooted cult to Virgin Mary, a great influence of religious orders on the 
organization of believers’ everyday life, a certain feeling of religious superiority and, in 
general, a poorly educated clergy, theologically speaking.  
Given this description, one might be inclined to think that Catholic faith in Poland 
was rather banal or superficial; however, Jerzy Holzer believed that the popular, 
ritualistic and traditional features present in Polish Catholicism were a reaction and 
served as a kind of shield against the repeated persecutions the Church and the Polish 
people experienced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, like Bismarck’s 
Kulturkampf in the lands under Prussian control, the Russification campaigns of the 
Romanov empire, the Polish-Bolshevik War or the Second World War. Rituals, for 
instance, became the best way to stage national-religious survival and give testimony in 
a large scale, linking the Messianic readiness for further redemptive sacrifices with 
pleads to God to console those who suffered and protect those who were fighting. As a 
consequence, through symbols, ceremonies and patriotic songs, among others, 
Catholicism gradually identified itself with a patient and sorrowful nation that wanted to 
preserve its essence and create an independent state, though (or maybe precisely 
because) this complex and painful process was never successfully culminated ─at least 
until 1918541.  
Despite the preeminent role of Catholic faith in Polish patriotism, Jan Józef 
Lipski, in his characteristically critical and pluralistic spirit, also wanted to remind his 
readers about other branches of Christianity that contributed to the formation and 
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preservation of Poland’s ethos from early Modern to Contemporary times, something 
they frequently paid with their own lives:  
 
What is non-Catholic in Polish history and tradition? Leaving aside the episodes that hardly 
influenced the course of our history, like for instance the Polish Hussite movement ─ we must start 
with Polish traditions of the Reformation and Protestantism. In the 16th and 17th centuries there 
were traditions like Mikołaj Rey’s542 and the Polish Brethren’s543, traditions based on the tolerant 
co-existence of different creeds, which were ratified in the Act of Warsaw Confederation544. We 
do not lack Protestants among our national heroes (for example, general Sowiński545), we do not 
lack Protestant pastors among Polish national activists. 
It is certainly true that the Catholic Church played a very important role in the preservation of 
Polishness, especially in the Prussian part of Poland and in the far-away borderlines of the Russian 
part. But in Cieszyn Silesia and Masuria546 protestant evangelic communities and their ministers 
took care of polishness. The last national heroic act of Polish evangelists was the martyrdom of 
unyielding pastors and activists during the Nazi occupation. The surname Bursche is symbolic in 
this sense547, but it is not the single one. The contribution of Polish Protestants to Polish culture 
and to the fight for the nation’s ethos is so big that any attempt to exclude them from our Polish 
national community must raise strong opposition.548 
 
Since the mid-1940s, the Church became not just a space to develop one’s faith 
but, most importantly, a sphere of freedom of speech and free memory in face of 
Stalinism and Communist rule, providing “a true barrier against the totalitarian power” 
and enjoying society’s trust549. As a social institution, it managed to preserve its 
organization and moral independence after 1956 and avoided collaborating with the 
authorities, unlike other churches in the Communist Bloc. In contrast with its public 
position during the Interwar period, once the Second World War was over the Polish 
Church unfailingly adopted fundamental human rights as its own (social justice, 
tolerance, freedom of conscience and expression) and continued safeguarding two basic 
elements of inteligencja’s ethos: firstly, the heroic halo surrounding opposition stances 
and the victims of sacrifice, which were vital in the struggle for the fatherland’s 
freedom; and, secondly, the virtues based on service to society. This fostered a 
rapprochement between intellectual opposition’s non-believers and Catholic institutions 
in the 1970s. Of course, as it happened in partition times and other moments of Polish 
history, the attitude of Church representatives towards protests and opposition initiatives 
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could vary substantially depending on the context, the hierarchical position and personal 
views, ranging from a completely open support to the usual cautiousness of its highest 
representatives550.  
In any case, critical non-believers greatly valued Catholic Church’s contribution 
to promote a freer and fairer society. In Michnik’s opinion, during the 1980s the Church 
should develop educational activities (not political) and disseminate a kind of “civic 
catechism” among the population. Besides this, it was specific help and protection what 
made its initiatives so important:  “The Church’s concrete actions ─defense of those 
who have been wronged and humiliated, assistance to the persecuted and their families, 
public defense of truth and concern for social peace─ are major accomplishments in the 
life of the nation”551. On the other hand, Lipski went back to the basics of Christianity, 
love and respect, as a way to prevent resentment, hatred and violence against other 
nations: 
 
We belong to a cultural sphere whose ethical ideas were shaped mainly by Christianity. Believers 
and non-believers ─we have been raised up in the commandment of love of one’s fellow men, the 
basic moral signpost of our culture. (…) 
I think that chauvinism, national megalomania, xenophobia, i.e. hatred towards anything that is 
foreign, national selfishness ─contradict the commandment of love of one’s fellow men. 
Patriotism, however, is in harmony with it. Just like specific love among a family should not be an 
obstacle to love our fellows, the specific love among the members of the same national community 
should follow the same superior moral rule. Patriotism comes from love, and to love it must return; 
any other of its shapes is an ethical deformation.552   
 
Since the first decades of the nineteenth century, Polish thinkers turned their 
heads towards the past to look for the origins of their nation’s ethos. This phenomenon, 
far from being exclusive, was in fact closely related to the historiographical 
development experienced simultaneously in the rest of the Russian Empire (the 
intelligentsia’s philosophical and metaphysical search of the “spirit” of the people)553, 
as well as within other European states. Joachim Lelewel’s “democratic interpretation” 
of Polish history, for instance, tracked down the roots of the country’s democratic 
principles back to Slavic prehistory and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and was 
in line with the ideas of other historians and “nation builders” such as the French Jules 
Michelet’s (1798-1874) or the Czech František Palacký’s (1798-1876). As a democratic 
politician, Lelewel wanted Poland to recover its independence through a revolution of 
European scope554. His views of the Commonwealth period, though with peaks and 
valleys in terms of popularity, have survived until today and imbued inteligencja’s 
reflections, especially in moments when, as in Lelewel’s days, politics, opposition, 
history writing and memory became almost inseparable. Like in the 1970s and 1980s.   
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, also known as Commonwealth of Both 
Nations (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów), is the name given to the federation formed 
by the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland (Korona Królestwa Polskiego) and the Great 
Duchy of Lithuania (Lietuvos Didžioji Kunigaikštystė) through the Union of Lublin in 
1569. Prior to this, the Great Duchy and the Kingdom of Poland had already established 
a dynastic union (Union of Krewo, 1386) which brought about the conversion into 
Catholicism of the up to then multi-confessional Lithuanian Duchy. Despite the 
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eventual deterioration of relations between both states and the attempts of the 
increasingly influential Lithuanian nobility to break the dynastic union, Muscovy’s 
advance towards the West and its territorial conquers, with the subsequent loss of lands 
of the Duchy, led to a greater alliance with the Polish Kingdom which, by the mid-
sixteenth century, finally materialized in the form of a Commonwealth. Within it, 
Lithuania had a government, an army and a treasury of its own, but it also had to 
transfer many of its territories to the Polish Kingdom and experienced a gradual process 
of Polonization. The federation system, headed by a single ruler elected by the noble 
parliament (sejm), lived flourishing times, but since the mid-seventeenth century its 
weaknesses and flaws became more evident: economic and political crises followed and 
it entered into the orbit of the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century. The Union 
lasted nominally until the passing of the ephemeral Constitution of May 3rd, 1791, that 
attempted to carry out important reforms and improvements which were quite radical 
for their time, and was brought to an abrupt end by the division of the Commonwealth’s 
lands between the Prussian, Austrian and Russian empires.   
Among Polish oppositionists in Communist times, the Commonwealth of Both 
Nations was positively regarded due to its advanced socio-political principles, including 
considerable freedom, religious and ethnic tolerance and proto-democratic procedure. It 
was a unique aristocratic political system where any noble, regardless of his rank or 
economic position, enjoyed the same ample rights and privileges (Nobles’ Democracy 
or Golden Liberty). All these features originated in the late Medieval Ages555 thanks to 
the gradual increase in number and importance of nobility (szlachta) and the relatively 
easy access to this status or to participation in public life: 
 
The monarchy formed in the late Middle Ages already developed a certain system of social control 
over the government, though I admit that control is probably an exaggerated word. At the same 
time, already in the Middle Ages, the system of noble privileges was formed, including numerous 
layers of the population. Around 15% of adult men began to take part in public life, in the 
government556. A new, original conception of a state serving serfs-citizens, and later just citizens, 
was gradually established. The social basis of the Nobles’ Democracy was broad, especially in the 
16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. This democracy shaped for a long time the political 
culture and life philosophy not only of the hereditary nobility, but to a certain extent of the 
bourgeoisie too, and even of part of the peasantry in the 16th century, before the oligarchy of 
magnates made of democracy a purely ornamental category, transforming it into empty words and 
liberation discourses.557  
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Concerning tolerance, both Stefan Bratkowski and Jan Józef Lipski agreed in 
describing Polish fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (the Golden Age) as peaceful and 
calm if compared to the situation of other European states. Wars, bloodsheds, 
lawlessness and murders spread back then like an epidemic from Italian regions and the 
Balkans to Scandinavia and the Volga’s riversides. In England, Henry VIII (1491-1547) 
disposed of his annoying former friends or wife of the moment by beheading them, 
whereas in Spain Jews were persecuted and thousands of people were burned at the 
stake by order of the Inquisition. On the other hand, in Polish lands nobody could be 
arbitrarily arrested and, when the Jewish quarter in Cracow was invaded, for instance, 
the city was fined for it and the perpetrators condemned. In sum, beliefs were not a 
major problem or a political obstacle:  
 
St. Bartholomew’s Days were unknown here. When Europe sank into religious wars and the 
principle cuius regio eius religio began to reign there, in Poland it was otherwise. The powerful 
king of united Poland and Lithuania, Sigismund II Augustus of the Jagiellonian dynasty, said 
proudly and decidedly: ‘I am not the king of your consciences’. With the approval of the members 
of parliament of all creeds, the Sejm of 1573 passed an Act that made non-Catholics equal in rights 
to Catholics and promoted tolerance and lasting religious peace.558 
  
“In the Golden Age everything was yet possible”, Lipski asserted: “a Jew could be 
dubbed knight, a peasant could be one of the most outstanding poets of the time, and 
townspeople could become an intellectual and even political elite”; in other words, 
estate divisions were not insurmountable and social integration was a fact559.  
The journalist and publicist Jerzy Surdykowski went even further in his analysis 
of the Rzeczpospolita’s political characteristics, comparing them to a kind of 
presidential parliamentary democracy, for proto-constitutional laws, social agreements 
and a parliament (sejm) limited the executive power of the elected “president-king” who 
had sworn, in addition, to serve the interests of the noble electors and accepted being 
controlled by the citizens’ representatives. Since the fifteenth century, three hundred 
years before Montesquieu’s theories were published, Polish justice courts were already 
independent from the king, and the monarch and the noble estate kept separate 
treasuries. In order to pass new laws or carry out other important activities, the king 
should reach an agreement with the lower and the higher chambers of the sejm, that is, 
the izba poselska and the senat, respectively. Once the Jagiellonian dynasty 
extinguished (1386-1572), the now elected candidate to the Polish-Lithuanian throne 
had to swear respect, in the first place, to the Henrician Articles (Artykuły 
Henrykowskie)560 ─a fixed, permanent contract with the Polish nation-nobility to protect 
the latter’s individual, political and economic rights and freedoms─ and, in the second 
place, to the pacta conventa, which comprised the particular and variable undertakings 
that each king-elect accepted before being crowned. Together, the Articles and the pacta 
represented, according to Surdykowski, the first de facto Polish constitution561.   
This journalist also considered significant the change of name of the Polish 
Kingdom and the Lithuanian Duchy after the Lublin Union: though it is usually 
translated in English as “Commonwealth”, in Polish Rzeczypospolita (or 
Rzeczpospolita) actually means “republic”. The etymological link to Roman republican 
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traditions suggested the intention of regarding the State once again as a “public matter” 
(res publica) instead of as the monarch’s private property. On the other hand, despite 
the clashes between Polish and Lithuanian nobles were harsh and frequent along those 
centuries, Surdykowski preferred to focus on the pioneering character of the federal 
State, highlighting that it had been achieved through agreements and not by force or 
invasion562, though Lithuanian history books will probably differ on the degree of 
compulsion and the general outcome of the Commonwealth period.   
In any case, the main points that Surdykowski wanted to make in his essay had to 
do with the indigenous nature of the Rzeczpospolita phenomenon and, most importantly, 
with defeat, memory and survival.  
As to the first point, the Commonwealth and its two precedent states turned out to 
be in practice more “Western” than Western Europe in the early Modern period, for 
they reformulated and applied ancient principles and imponderables that only later on 
began to be considered exclusively “Western European”. This way, “… the culture and 
civic consciousness of nobility became the basis upon which the Poles’ present-day 
national culture was built, together with their ideas about the State, its sovereignty, the 
democratic standards it must attain, about civil rights and duties”. “Therefore”, the 
author adds, “the dreams about podmiotowość (agency) and democracy have not been a 
Mediterranean illusion instilled into Central Europe”: the Polish ethos would have a 
perfectly legitimate, solid and autochthonous origin. Poland would belong to Europe in 
its own right, its strength and identity emanating essentially from within563.   
The second key aspect Surdykowski approaches is directly connected with the 
title of his article (“The spirit of the Commonwealth”, “Duch Rzeczypospolitej”) and 
supports our research hypotheses concerning Walter Benjamin’s “Theses” in a similar 
way as Edward Abramowski’s case (Chapter 1)564. According to the journalist, the 
“spirit of the Commonwealth”, representing all the above-mentioned ideological and 
political features (tolerance, freedom, democratic principles and controls), was still 
alive. And it is not a mere gratifying souvenir because a fight for memory is taking 
place today, so to think about this period of Polish history, about this great albeit 
unsuccessful democratic experiment, is to remember the “defeated” ─whom the 
“winners” want to slander and erase from history─, and what they defended ─the values 
that are missing in the public life of the countries under Soviet dominion:  
 
But after the ‘Republic of Nobles’ there remained in later Poland, toughly fighting against its 
Central European destiny, something more than the memory of yesterday’s excellence (…). … 
speaking about the traditions of the Commonwealth we deal with the essence of Polish and Central 
European destiny today, with the mechanism of political cataclysms that are still ongoing and drag 
this part of Europe.565 
  
A democratic society (or, in our case, one that aims to be such) is indebted to its 
fallen predecessors and has the capacity to redeem them:  
  
We are responsible for past generations for two reasons: firstly, because our present is built upon 
their shoulders. There is a continuity between those who fought for democracy in the past and 
today’s democracy. Many had to perish and see how their ideals were defeated in order for us to 
live in democracy one day. What Benjamin tells us is that without remembrance and recognition of 
those deaths, we will never understand what we now enjoy. Responsibility is not born out of 
metaphysical reflection (…), but out of historical consciousness. The second reason is more 
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mysterious: we have a messianic power ─weak, but messianic─ over the past that we must 
exercise if we want to be ourselves. Grandsons are responsible for the injustices committed against 
grandparents because grandsons have a messianic power over them which the latter are expecting 
us to exert. (…) the Messianism of that force comes from an echo of the past. The messianic 
power of grandsons over grandparents consists of the capability to answer their questions.566 
 
Thus, a moral and historical imperative weighs upon people, even more so when 
democratic goals have not yet been attained and the fight is still ongoing. In that case, 
one must paradoxically remember the past in order to have hope, for “still unfulfilled 
‘dreams’ of happiness palpitate in those places where the past lies asleep or unconscious 
and, if they awaken, they become the engine of action, they become an utopia”567. 
Surdykowski compares and contrasts the “spirit of the Commonwealth” (Duch 
Rzeczypospolitej), which, following Benjamin’s premises, we may consider the “spirit 
of the defeated”, with the “spirit of the Congress of Vienna” (Duch Kongresu 
Wiedeńskiego), which is tantamount to the “spirit of the winners”. They are, therefore, 
radically incompatible. Along the early modern period, the “spirit of the 
Commonwealth” decayed and was finally brought to an end from abroad, when, after 
the regeneration attempt of 1791, the lands of the Rzeczypospolita were divided between 
three empires and Poland lost its statehood for one hundred and twenty-four years. 
Then, in the short period of 1919-1939, the Poles re-activated the Republic’s civic spirit 
(duch obywatelskości), though it had to struggle against the absurdities of nationalism 
and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of rulers. The coup de grâce for this latest 
bid came, once again, from beyond Polish borders: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
allied to carry out the fourth partition of the country during the Second World War. As 
for today, Surdykowski explained, the “Rzeczpospolita” denomination is just a façade 
and the ruling Communist apparatus represents a considerably smaller percentage of the 
Polish population than the noble estate of the old Rzeczypospolita’s times.  
On the other hand, the international order established by the Congress of Vienna 
(1814-1815) is comparable to the resultant of the Conference of Yalta: as systems of 
“winners”, they ratified the dominion of despotic empires ─four in the first case 
(Ottoman, Russian, Prussian, Austrian), only one, the USSR, in 1945─ over other 
nations. Hence, the two most fruitful centuries for Western Europe (with scientific and 
technical revolution, building of democratic societies…) were the times when Polish 
pro-independence revolutions were crushed over and over again by the most 
antidemocratic and oppressive empires in the continent. 
Despite these setbacks, the civic spirit of the Commonwealth remained an 
untransferable part of the consciousness of yesterday’s and today’s Poles, so that the 
prevailing order established by the “winners” never proved to be completely successful 
due to the former’s constant struggle with it: “The spirit of the Congress of Vienna had 
to provide Europe with great peace and stability, but rendered a continuous flow of 
Polish uprisings and pro-independence revolts, from Kościuszko’s uprising up to 
Solidarność”568. In Surdykowski’s opinion, a nation simply couldn’t react otherwise 
when it was forced to accept a State framework that didn’t match its historically-forged 
political and ethical consciousness. That could only entail counter-productive results: 
 
Politics ─as it is usually affirmed, following Machiavelli─ has nothing to do with morality. But 
the history of the uneven combat of the spirit of the Republic against the spirit of the Congress of 
Vienna shows that immoral solutions, which violate the culture and consciousness of the nations 
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submitted to them, are effective only in the short term. Instead of development ─ [they achieve] 
stagnation, instead of richness ─blood.569 
 
In this sense, Poland was no exception: each country of the Eastern Bloc had its 
own historical road to democracy that must be re-discovered and followed. And, most 
importantly, one should never forget that the history of the “defeated”, what cannot be 
touched or seen but is yet remembered, is just as real as Realpolitik, as the Cold War 
system, the empty time continuum of the “winners” and the weapons they used to 
impose it: “This consciousness belongs to reality, just like the Warsaw Pact and the 
NATO, like ‘Pershings’570 and ‘SS-20’571, like the presence of foreign armies, like 
truncheons and gas”572.  
In contrast to Lelewel’s positive assessment of the Commonwealth, as well as to 
the later theory of “rebirth” of Warsaw School historians (i.e. the late eighteenth-century 
regeneration of the Rzeczypospolita thwarted by foreign powers), since the 1860s the 
members of the conservative Cracow School (eg. Michał Bobrzyński and Józef Szujski) 
developed a much more critical approach to Polish nobility’s traditions and habits573. 
Therefore, all that Communists had to do once they were in power was to take those 
negative interpretations further and use them in their own profit.  
In this sense, Tadeusz Łepkowski criticized the interpretations displayed in 
official propaganda about Polish szlachta because, in his opinion, they only showed or 
exaggerated its “dark side” in order to argue that Poland lacked old democratic 
traditions, that nobles devoted themselves to the oppression of peasants and speculation 
with national interests and, above all, that the Poles suffered since then from a 
pronounced tendency to anarchy and self-government that should be thoroughly 
controlled and appeased by the State. In Łepkowski’s opinion, any past or present 
liberalization proposals and democratic aspirations were curiously considered 
“anarchical” in the PRL574.   
On the other hand, the majority of opposition inteligenci who dealt with this topic 
took an intermediate view for, though they always insistently valued the achievements 
of that time, they also acknowledged the Commonwealth’s decadence and internal 
problems575. As the magnates increasingly tended to pursue their own benefit over the 
country’s, corruption became general, the Golden Liberty was distorted and the 
Rzeczypospolita entered a phase of instability and external weakness, making it 
vulnerable to the influences and attacks of stronger neighboring powers. Hence, while 
the eighteenth century was the epoch of Enlightened Absolutism in other parts of the 
continent, Poland plunged into “Enlightened Gangsterism”, in Bratkowski’s words. The 
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intellectual and moral vileness of the szlachta at those times was a fact, and the author 
of Skąd przychodzimy? censured those historians who, in his opinion, tried to soften or 
cover up the inconvenient truth in an attempt to mystify the Commonwealth. But 
matters should not be taken to extremes, oppositionists thought, for the aristocratic 
system of Poland-Lithuania was not harmful in essence. The building of democracy, for 
instance in England (considered the cradle of parliamentary system), required many 
years and experienced numerous setbacks, Łepkowski argued, but no one constantly 
reproached Englishmen for the slowness of the process or the celebration of corrupt and 
fake elections. Just like the Nobles’ Democracy was considered advanced for its time by 
inteligencja, and hence exceptional, the complications derived from the system were 
deemed normal and shared with other European nations that sooner or later took steps in 
similar directions576.  
If going into more detail, the principle of the Nobles’ Commonwealth that was 
most criticized by its detractors throughout time was the “free veto” (liberum veto). This 
parliamentary device demanded that decisions should be taken unanimously in the sejm; 
therefore, if just one member of the parliament did not agree with what was being 
proposed, all he had to do was to shout “I do not allow!” (“Nie pozwalam!”). When that 
happened, the meeting had to end right then and any laws that had been passed during 
the session were nullified. For many, the liberum veto represented the zenith of 
inefficiency and paralysis in the Rzeczypospolita and, by extension, of the anarchical 
and selfish behavior of the szlachta, turning into a source of bribery and blackmail. 
However, according to Surdykowski, the “free veto” was based on the conviction of the 
advantages of consensus and was initially conceived as a way to prevent hasty 
resolutions, as well as to ensure the rights of minorities that could have been 
continuously damaged by the settlements of majorities577. 
In the line of this balance between positive and negative, most oppositionists 
supported more or less explicitly Warsaw School of History’s “theory of rebirth” ─not 
from ashes, Bratkowski affirmed, but from a bog─, which is imbued in equal measure 
with hope and frustration: 
 
The arrangement of forces in Europe and the violence of powerful neighbors prevented the 
‘nascent Poland’ (using Lelewel’s words) from becoming Reborn Poland for good. It was a 
tragedy because the May regime578, which was dynamic, self-reforming and looked to the future, 
could have managed to sustain the priority of national interests ─carried out democratically─, the 
rights of different social groups and an extensive though self-limiting individual freedom.579  
 
Therefore, and contrary to the previous Commonwealth’s inner degeneration, the 
chance offered by May 3rd Constitution, rather than wasted, was spoiled by the ambition 
of others. 
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A.2) The nation, the State and the two faces of “Polishness”: patriotism and 
nationalism  
 
The nation was one of the fundamental levels or forms of Polish collective 
identity that Solidarność oppositionists appropriated, together with the working class 
and society ─the latter mostly used by critical left-winged intellectuals. The term was 
linked, in their eyes, to Romantic ideals, the defense of workers’ rights and a democratic 
will. On the other hand, since their seizure of power Communist authorities needed to 
be invested with a certain degree of legitimacy, but, instead of imposing a completely 
new socialist culture and re-socializing the population in order to attain it (as it 
happened, for instance, in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s), they chose a less costly 
formula, so that PRL’s official discourse became socialist in form but remained national 
in content. This became much clearer after the Stalinist period in public ceremonies and 
the display of symbols, especially since Edward Gierek was appointed First Secretary of 
the PZPR (1970-1980)580.  
“The beautiful and severe disease of Polishness, of national-religious symbols, of 
the conversations of compatriots in which we extend ‘historical arguments’, of the 
fatherland’s dilemmas ─is our reality”, Łepkowski asserts. Without patriotism, 
sovereignty or national identity, considered old-fashioned and meaningless in a world 
tending towards civilizational unity, the Poles would no longer exist as a nation581. 
Deprived of the statehood they enjoyed since the Middle Ages, and urged on by a long-
lasting sense of danger, they managed to preserve and boost their national feelings over 
more than a century and learnt that the nation was a top priority which should never be 
given up in the state-building process. Both Łepkowski and Micewski reflected 
lengthily about this, among other intellectuals:  
 
The nations that have always had their own State consider their situation as something given, 
natural, normal. It is not strange, then, that they usually think in state-nation terms, and not in 
national community or nation-people terms. In Poland, since the end of the 18th century, the nation 
became for all active and conscious persons the highest good and a supreme value. It was 
impossible to dream about the rebirth of the State without creating a mature nation that would be 
aware of its identity. 
In Poland’s specific case the national question was, and still is, the key question. Even 
apparently obsolete previous dilemmas about national history, dating back more than a hundred 
years, acquire new life in our eyes and live intensely, for as long as Poland is dependent, and if 
there is no State or it is not independent, the nation must preserve cultural and spiritual 
independence in order to maintain hope.582  
 
It seems to me that Poland has experienced probably the biggest civilizational and sociological 
changes in Europe, but that, at the same time, it has kept much better its personality, its cultural 
identity, traditions, the sense of historical continuity and its attachment to the values grown out of 
the soil of European culture. If this is so, our specific history of the last two centuries, our partition 
times and also the sixty years that have gone by after the recovery independence in November 
1918, have played a crucial role in the consolidation of our spiritual heritage and system of cultural 
values. What is unusual about Polish history is that the nation’s existence has been questioned 
along the last two hundred years, that for a long time the nation had to defend itself, that, longing 
for survival, it carried out not only uprisings but also the biggest cultural flowering of its history. 
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Our most important national works were created in the times when Poland did not exist as a 
state.583  
  
This mission of cultural development and defense was accomplished, not 
surprisingly, by inteligencja. In the nineteenth century, the spiritual government of the 
nation was formed by poets, historians, writers and scientists. Since the early twentieth 
century, Micewski explained, the task was taken up by the new political movements, 
which encouraged the participation of large portions of society in public life. Such an 
intertwinement of patriotism, intellectuality and politics took a hold in national 
consciousness and in family traditions that have been passed on until today, in spite of 
the transformations occurred during the last decades and Communists’ attempts to 
despise what they considered anachronistic remainders of negative, long gone-by 
times584. Regarding these widespread conceptions, could there be, in consequence, a 
specific Polish national character?  
Tadeusz Łepkowski was probably the most determined to define how Poles 
behaved in late Modern history. According to him, Polish people had a high self-esteem 
and described themselves as brave, firm and prone to resistance. They were capable of 
working well… though only when they wanted to; they also were inventive and good at 
manual activities. However, their arrogance and boastfulness concealed an acute 
inferiority complex. They lacked good organization and systematization, which 
prevented them from profiting from circumstances and achieving complete successes. 
They could be realist individually or in small groups, but not in a national scale. Many, 
especially inteligenci and townspeople, experienced fits of impotence caused by 
repeated failures and soon fell into defeatism. As it happened with Russians, sometimes 
they looked for consolation in alcohol. Perhaps mirroring the extreme territorial 
fluctuations of the Polish State, which along its history varied from being an important 
power to not existing at all, the Poles tended to be radical in their emotions and self-
perception: either they were the best or they were the worst, either they achieved a great 
success, or they despaired and gave up immediately. Others yielded to risk and fate, a 
habit which frequently had very high political costs for the country585.  
On the other hand, Adam Michnik, who also devoted some pages to this topic, 
considered that Solidarność and the Polish nation were, if not completely equal, very 
deeply connected, for the latter had given birth to the former. Hence, opposition’s 
virtues and flaws were akin to society’s; a society  
 
… that has lived for forty years without democratic institutions, beyond the sphere of political 
culture; (…) systematically deceived, stunned and humiliated; (…) unsubmissive and sensible at 
the same time; (…) where honor, freedom and solidarity are the highest values, and compromise is 
associated too frequently with capitulation, with desertion.586 
 
Jumping ahead in time, how would such a society face the challenge of the first 
half-free elections and be persuaded by oppositionists that they, and not Communists, 
(still) represented the Polish nation? A selection of graphic sources might shed some 
light on the matter.  
Designed for the campaigns of the parliamentary elections (June 4th 1989) and the 
local elections (May 1990), the following five placards587 transmitted a clear message: 
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to vote for Solidarność meant to vote for Poland. Each poster depicts a famous character 
of Polish history or, in the case of the mermaid, of its legends: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
The mermaid (Figure 1) is present in Warsaw’s coat of arms and has become a 
symbol of the town. She classically carries a sword and a shield but, in this case, the 
sword has been replaced by Solidaność’s logo, linking the movement to the defense of 
Polishness. The two most famous and typical representations of this character in the 
city’s streets are located right in the center of the old town square (Rynek Starego 
Miasta) and in the nearby neighborhood of Powiśle, beside river Vistula. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Fryderyk (or Frédéric) Chopin (1810-1849) certainly needs no further 
introduction (Figure 2). The author of the picture, the poster designer Anna Huskowska 
(1922-1989) chose to draw, in particular, a popular statue of the composer which was 
inaugurated, after years of delay, in 1926 in Warsaw’s Łazienki Park. Since wygrać can 
mean both “to win” and “to play a musical instrument”, it is very appropriate for the 
worldwide-known musician to resort to a word game and affirm that “I will win 
[perform] the elections” (Wygram wybory).  
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Figure 3 
 
Prince Józef Poniatowski (1763-1813) was an outstanding military leader and 
nephew of the last king of Poland, Stanisław August (Figure 3). He supported May 3rd 
Constitution and participated in Kościuszko’s uprising (1794). In 1807 he was 
appointed Minister of War and Head of the Army (later Commander in Chief) of the 
Duchy of Warsaw, the Polish satellite state created by Napoleon after the Treaty of 
Tilsit. As such, and remaining loyal to the Emperor until the end, he took part in the 
Napoleonic campaigns of Russia and Prussia, and incorporated many of the recovered 
lands under Austrian control into the new Polish Duchy (eg. Cracow). During the Battle 
of Leipzig he drowned, covered in wounds, in the Weisse Elster river.  
The equestrian statue of Józef Poniatowski that Huskowska drew in the poster is 
located in Krakowskie Przedmieście street, in front of Warsaw’s Presidential Palace, 
which was until very recently the official seat of the President of the Republic of 
Poland. The figure of the picture speaks precisely about his tragic death: “Instead of 
drowning in the Elster, let’s vote for Solidarność” (Zamiast topić się w Elsterze, 
głosujemy na Solidarność). This suggestion summarizes exceptionally well the crucial 
transformation that took place in opposition’s methods and discourse along the second 
half of the twentieth century. Now, in order to change things in Poland, armed struggles, 
dubious alliances or military campaigns in pursuit of independence, plus the typical 
romantic-heroic individual sacrifice, are simply out of the question, and must be 
substituted for a collective, conscious political act. This suits Jan Ifversen’s idea about 
the mise-en-scene of modern political myths in more conventional or everyday contexts 
focused on the future. However, for Ewa Domańska, the absence of violence during 
Poland’s transformation meant that the death and rebirth cycle embedded in Polish 
consciousness, which entailed sacrifice and spilling of blood, was not totally fulfilled 
this time. Thus, the mythical process remained strangely incomplete588. If her 
observation is fitting, did Polish national myths, including inteligencja’s, manage to 
survive the transformacja period? ─I will go back to this question at the end of the work 
(Conclusions). 
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Figure 4 
 
The fourth poster (Figure 4) shows another international figure: the mathematician 
and astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (Mikołaj Kopernik in Polish) (1473-1543). 
Warsaw’s monument to Copernicus was inaugurated in 1830 between Nowy Świat and 
Krakowskie Przedmieście streets, right in front of Staszic’s Palace ─the actual 
headquarters of the Polish Academy of Sciences. “To change the world beyond 
recognition” (Ruszyć z posad bryłę świata), to transform something that seemed 
unchangeable, like Communist regimes, was indeed a task for opposition (Tak, to coś 
dla nas), and just as revolutionary as Copernicus’ discoveries.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
The starring figure of the fifth and last placard is Jan Kiliński (1760-1819), a 
prominent burgher of Warsaw who led the city’s Uprising against Russian occupation 
forces in 1794 (Figure 5). Later that same year he participated in Kościuszko’s national 
Uprising with his militias. He was arrested twice by partitioning powers and imprisoned 
in Russia. After his release, he returned to Warsaw, where he died. He is buried in a 
crypt at the Powązki Cemetery’s Church.  His statue, built in the mid-1930s, is located, 
as the rest, in Warsaw’s old town, first in Krasiński square, and since 1959 in Podwale 
street.  
Kiliński, who was shoemaker by trade, refers in the poster to a popular children’s 
poem written by Jan Brzecha (1898-1966), who probably inspired himself in Charles 
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Perrault’s fairytale “Le petit Poucet”589: “It is time to use, as if they were new, these 
seven-league Polish boots” (Czas by uszyć,/ całkiem jak nowe,/ te polskie buty 
siedmiomiliowe). After a period of stagnation, what was needed was a “great 
(democratic) leap forward”, that is, to get moving and become involved in the 
transformation of the country. 
According to these designs, some of the most renowned figures of the country, 
who represented for many some of the best features of Polish identity (ancient identity 
roots, political, cultural and scientific advances, struggle for national freedom), were on 
opposition’s side.  Despite cleavages soon spread within Solidaność movement after 
these elections, starting with the Citizens’ Committees in charge of organizing them 
(Komitety Obywatelskie “Solidarności”), during the campaigns the image of national 
unity was still maintained. 
But the posters do not only take for granted or reassert the Polishness of these 
characters ─even if their nationality might be discussed given previous state borders, 
their birthplace, the multinational context in which they were raised up, the way people 
understood their identity back then or their later naturalization, just to mention a few 
examples. These placards are, in addition, specific depictions of very special lieux de 
mémoire characteristic of Warsaw’s landscape. Such city landmarks commemorating 
the past soon became part of national remembrance too, for they conceal a history of 
repression and resistance all by themselves.  
For instance, Józef Poniatowski’s statue, modelled after the Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius’ in Rome, was sponsored by Polish nobility and executed by Bertel 
Thorvaldsen between 1826 and 1832. It was meant to be placed in its actual location, 
but after the November Uprising the Tsar changed his mind and opposed to it. In the 
meantime, Ivan Paskevich, commander of the Russian troops in Congress Poland, 
definitely crushed the Uprising in 1831 and was awarded the post of Namestnik590 of 
the Kingdom of Poland for it. The period under his rule was especially repressive and 
Russification very intense, being frequently defined in Poland as the “Paskevich Night”. 
This has much to do with the fate of Poniatowski’s monument because, after different 
avatars, the statue ended up in Paskevich’s manor of Homel (actual Eastern Belarus), 
where it stood from 1842 to 1922. What’s more: after the 1830-1831 defeat the actual 
Presidential Palace turned into the Namestnik Palace, so that in 1870, shortly after 
Paskevich’s death, a statue in his honor was inaugurated right in front of it, that is, 
where Poniatowski’s effigy was meant to stand. The place was personally chosen by 
Tsar Alexander II, who was present in the unveiling. After the Polish-Soviet War 
(1920), the statue of the Polish commander returned to Warsaw, where it changed 
several times of location. However, at the end of 1944 it was blown up deliberately by 
the Nazis. Following the model of the Danish sculptor kept in his Museum in 
Copenhagen, the statue was recast and given to the PRL as a present from the kingdom 
of Denmark in the early 1950s, and since 1965 it stands once again before the Palace.  
The rest of the stories have to do with the ordeals undergone during the Second 
World War. Chopin’s effigy, for example, was the first monument that the German 
occupiers destroyed, in May 1940. A replica was cast from the original mold and 
replaced in 1958. With Copernicus the struggle was somehow different due to his 
origins: since the beginning of the occupation, the Latin and Polish inscriptions at the 
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base of the monument591 were covered by a plaque saying “Dem Grossen Deutschen 
Astronomen”, “To the Great German Astronomer”. In February 1942, a member of a 
Polish underground resistance group removed the plaque and hid it. In turn, the Nazis 
took revenge by dismantling Jan Kiliński’s statue and concealing its pieces in the 
warehouses of the National Museum. However, the monument’s hiding place was soon 
discovered, for somebody painted on the Museum’s wall the following message: 
“People of Warsaw, I am here ─Jan Kiliński”. Another “autographed” comment 
appeared then beside Copernicus statue: “In retaliation for the disappearance of 
Kiliński’s monument I order Winter to last six more weeks”. Curiously, that year 
Winter was longer than usual. During Warsaw Uprising, the statue of Copernicus 
disappeared. It was found after the War in the countryside and was returned to the 
capital. Its restoration ended in 1949. 
All these anecdotes prove that, beyond their initial purpose, such effigies became 
symbols of Polish national resistance and of the defense against cultural annihilation in 
the battlefield of collective memory. In PRL times, that struggle was taken up by 
oppositionists and the elections of 1989-1990 represented its last “round”. Hence, 
multiple echoes of the past and layers of meaning overlap and enrich such apparently 
very simply conceived posters when a Polish citizen takes a look at them.   
One of the permanent worries of some inteligenci was that, in line with the 
“extremeness” that Tadeusz Łepkowski perceived in his compatriots’ collective 
behavior, many Poles had frequently mistaken patriotism for nationalism and 
xenophobia.  
Stefan Kisielewski, in his usual no-nonsense and slightly pungent style, 
considered that national pride denaturalized and contained maniacal elements if it was 
based on such arguments as “because it is my country” or “because my fatherland is 
right”, or tried to justify itself through some kind of subjective mysticism. The Poles, he 
argued, should be proud of something, not just for the sake of having suffered in the past 
or mere survival. To be resentful or embittered and remember constantly other 
countries’ attitude towards Poland has never solved anything. All nations have 
exceptional features, and all, including Poland, would like to forget shameful episodes 
of the past. However, Poles regard their history as something sacred and deeply dislike 
criticism for it. That is why the Historical School of Cracow has never been very 
popular, he believed592.  
Poland’s “dark side” is condemnable, and it is inteligencja’s duty to remind about 
such events, give them their corresponding place in history books and not contribute to 
fuel stereotypes and falseness through indiscriminate “fondness”. In his influential work 
Dwie ojczyzny, dwa patriotyzmy [Two fatherlands, two patriotisms], Jan Józef Lipski 
displayed a detailed list of reasons why his fellow countrymen should not get carried 
away with “Polishness”:   
 
‘To love all that is Polish’ ─ that is a usual formula of national, ‘patriotic’ nonsense. Because the 
National Radical Camp593 was ‘Polish’, as well as the pogroms of Lwów, Przytyk and Kielce594, 
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 “To Nicolaus Copernicus from his Grateful Fatherland” and “To Nicolaus Copernicus from his 
Compatriots”, respectively. 
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 KISIELEWSKI, Stefan [pseud. Kisiel]: “Mój patriotyzm maniakalny” and “Starzy i młodzi”, in 
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 The Obóz Narodowo Radykalny (ONR) was a nationalist, extreme right, pro-violence, anti-semitic and 
anti-communist political party created in 1934 by young radicals who had left the ranks of National 
Democracy. Shortly after its formation it was delegalized and it split into two factions: ONR-Falanga, led 
by Bolesław Piasecki and ONR-ABC, led by Henryk Rossman. 
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and the ‘bench Ghetto’595, and the pacification of the Ukrainian countryside, and Brześć596, and 
Bereza597, and the camp of Jabłonna of 1920598, just to mention a few examples taking place in 
scarcely twenty years of our history. Patriotism does not only mean to love and respect tradition, 
but also to inexorably select the elements of this tradition, which is an intellectual duty in this 
sphere. The guilt for providing a false assessment of the past, for fueling national myths which are 
morally false, for helping national megalomania to hush up the dark stains of our own history, is 
probably less from a moral point of view than for causing direct harm to our fellow men, but is 
nevertheless the premise of today’s evil and the road to future evil. 
We do not like to remember about the conquest of the Jatvingians599 by fire and sword ─that 
would ruin the image we have of the Polish nation, that allegedly has never killed anybody. We do 
not like to include in our history handbooks information about the murder of the garrison of the 
town of Velikiye Luki after capitulation600 ─because that does not suit our knightly-humanitarian 
historical stereotype. We forget about the methods employed to fight against Ukrainian revolts and 
uprisings, about the raids of our national hero Stefan Czarniecki, who killed even the babies, 
village after village601; about the crazy chaos of mutual revenges and counter-revenges that are a 
mournful part of Polish-Ukrainian history since a couple of centuries ago. We are proud of Polish 
tolerance, but we only reluctantly remember when it ended and how. We are proud of the Polish 
participation in Napoleon’s Spanish campaign, as if Somosierra, the annihilation of soldiers who 
defended the independence of their country, was a glorious page of our history, and we try with all 
our might to forget about the shame of Saragossa, or to distort it.602  
  
Rather than a specific nation, Lipski supported that the main victims along history 
had been values like freedom, human dignity, independence and tolerance. When the 
Poles defended those imponderables, nation and principles overlapped, either in defeat 
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 Aimed against the Jews, the Lwów pogrom took place on November 21st-23rd, 1918, within the 
framework of the Polish-Ukrainian War (November 1918-July 1919); the Przytyk pogrom, the most 
tragical of the Second Republic period, on March 9th, 1936; and the Kielce one, initiated by Soviet-
backed Communist forces, took place on July 4th, 1946. 
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 The bench Ghetto (getto ławkowe) marked the peak of Polish anti-Semitism in the interwar period. It 
was a form of official segregation in the seating of higher education students that was initiated in 1935 at 
the Polytechnic of Lwów. By 1937, it was already applied in most universities. Jewish students were 
forced to sit on a left-hand side section of benches in the lecture halls, reserved exclusively for them, 
under threat of expulsion. When doing so, they were usually verbally and physically attacked by youths 
belonging to extreme right formations, such as ONR. 
596
 In 1930, when Brześć (former Brest-Litovsk, actually in Belarus) belonged to Poland, many moderate 
left-winged oppositionists (eg. Wincenty Witos) were enjailed in its citadel after a famous trial. 
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 The Bereza Kartuska detention camp (now in Belarus) was created in 1934 to enjail people who were 
considered a “threat for the security, peace and social order” without formal charges or trial for three 
months, with the possibility of prolonging detention indefinitely. At the beginning, most detainees were 
political opponents of the Sanacja regime (Communists, members of extreme-right parties, Ukrainian and 
Belarusian nationalists). 
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 The prison at Jabłonna, near Warsaw, was the first concentration camp for Jews established in Poland. 
An article in Polish about it can be read in “Racjonalista”, the webpage of the Rational-Skeptical 
Association Voltaire. Mariusz Agnoszewicz: “Polski obóz koncentracyjny w Jabłonnie”, 
http://www.racjonalista.pl/kk.php/s,8625 (accessed on August 25th, 2014). 
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 Also called Yotvingians or Sudovians, the Jatvingians were a Baltic people with close ties to the 
Lithuanians and Prussians, who lived in a territory now shared between Poland, Lithuania and Belarus 
(Yotvingia). In response to the raids of the Yotvingians in his territory, in 1234 the Duke of Cracow, 
Bolesław V the Chaste, organized an expedition against them. In the battle of Brańsk, the Jatvingians 
were defeated and their leader, Kumata, was killed. In the 1280s Yotvingia was partly conquered by the 
Teutonic Knights, and in 1422 was divided between them, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania.  
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 The siege of Velikiye Luki (actual Russia) took place on September 1st-5th, 1580 within the Livonian 
campaign of King Stephen Báthory. Polish-Lithuanian forces and Hungarian mercenaries set fire to the 
the fortress and also to the nearby town, in order to avoid townspeople helping the sieged army. The 
pillage continued after the garrison’s surrender. 
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 Stefan Czarniecki (1599-1665) was a nobleman and general of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
He made important contributions in the battles of the Russo-Polish War and the Polish-Swedish War. 
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 Lipski: “Dwie ojczyzny…”, 38, my transl. 
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(most frequently, one must admit) or in victory. However, when they became or tried to 
become “winners” by siding with intolerance, arrogance, greed and aggressiveness, the 
nation lost its way and real patriotism was at its lowest ebb.   
The “cure” for that illness could be to remind about the multicultural and multi-
national substratum of Polish lands. “Polishness”, or what is considered today as the 
highest expression of Polish identity, including the language, is imbued with the 
contributions of other nationalities and cultures living in the territory, especially 
Germans and Jews. The Middle Ages and early Modern period were generally times of 
exchange and peaceful coexistence and, out of them, emerged today’s Poland603.  
Polish churches, civil buildings and museums, the home of national heritage, 
contain many works made by artists and craftsmen of German origin. Such was the case 
of the sculptor Wit Stwosz604 (ca. 1450-1533), the author of the magnificent 
polychrome wooden altar at St. Mary’s Church in Cracow and of the tomb of king 
Kazimierz IV in Wawel Cathedral. But one may even go further ahead in time: Lorenz 
Christoph Milzer von Kolof, better known in Poland as Mitzler de Kolof (1711-1778), 
physician, musician, printer and editor, became the precursor of Polish Enlightenment 
and was in charge of publishing the famous popularizing newspaper Monitor (1765-
1785) at the initiative of king Stanisław August Poniatowski. And so on…605.  
The case of Jewish population was even more worrisome for Lipski: if people 
who were rejected and attacked had been living in Poland for generations, spoke Polish, 
had similar traditions, contributed to Poland’s improvement and fight for independence, 
or even shared beliefs, could the hatred against them be labelled as xenophobia? Or as 
nationalism? Not even religious reasons could be argued, especially after the Second 
Vatican Council. Thus, in Lipski’s view, that kind of blind fear and mistrust could only 
be described as pure racism. Contrary to the “patriotism” alleged by its supporters, anti-
Semitism meant to turn against other Poles. With the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1943) in 
mind, the author of Dwie ojczyzny… pointed out that Polish Jews were a specific part of 
the Jewish community and could not be murdered without also killing something deep 
inside Polish nation606.  
Faced with Communist power’s use of national discourses as a way of 
legitimization, oppositionists insisted on the idea that they represented the “right” 
patriotism, whereas PRL government’s concealed two extreme dangers: submission to 
the USSR and nationalism. Those were the two patriotisms Lipski wrote about in his 
homonymous essay: the first served national megalomania and was currently used by 
authorities as an instrument to divide Poles and stir up conflicts, as well as to divert 
attention from Poland’s real dependence on the Soviet Union and to avoid approaches to 
Western Europe. Communists’ efforts to suppress what was left of Poland’s 
multinational reality since the end of the War (deportation of Germans, limitation of the 
rights of Lithuanians and Kashubians607, pogroms…) were followed by the anti-Semitic 
campaign of 1968. The second patriotism, much more critical and balanced in its view 
of the past and its consequences, would be inspired in Stefan Żeromski’s works, where 
“Saragossa is both a tragedy and a national disgrace; the Austrian Empire’s legislation 
allowed certain social progress; the Polish peasant of January Uprising’s times [1863] is 
                                                 
603
 Łepkowski: Myśli o historii…, 6-8, 10; Lipski: “Dwie ojczyzny…”, 42-49 and 57-67. 
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 Vit Stoss in German. 
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 Lipski: “Dwie ojczyzny…”, 47; Bratkowski: “Jak być...”, 47-49. 
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 West Slavic ethnic group of Pomerelia, in north-central Poland. Their language is considered either a 
dialect of Polish or a separate language.  
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depicted in a naturalistic fashion, far from ‘patriotic’ vignettes; the power apparatus of 
independent Poland is harshly denounced in Przedwiośnie, and serves as a warning”608.  
Opposition inteligenci were sure about it: that was the patriotism Poland should 
embrace. But what about the rest of the Poles? Was it so clear for them, for the majority 
that stood between critical, humanist intellectuals and the (governmental or not) 
promoters of hatred? Referring to the latter during the anti-Semitic repression of 1968, 
Lipski asserted that: 
 
We do not have a shared fatherland and we do not want to have anything in common with them. 
But between the patriotism of Słonimski609, the Ossowskis610 or Jasienica611 (I especially choose 
creators who were very different among them, and at the same time shared humanism and 
patriotism; they’re the most recent patrons or even the co-authors of today’s democratic opposition 
movement) and the ‘patriotism’ of Filipski, Gontarz or Kąkol612 there is an enormous social space 
full of people for whom a battle still wages: which fatherland will they choose? Under no 
circumstances should we give up on all those who are intoxicated with xenophobia and national 
megalomania, but whose feelings and thoughts are not yet ultimately and hopelessly deformed by 
hatred and arrogance. The fight for the shape of Polish patriotism will be decisive for the moral, 
cultural and political fate of our nation.613  
 
That struggle should be based on (re-)education or, more specifically, on changing 
the way Poles remember their past. “History”, Lipski said, “must be the door to the 
future”; so, for instance, in the case of Polish-German relations, 
 
What do we want to choose as symbols for the future: Grunwald614 ─or Legnica615, where Poles 
and Germans stood (…) in Batu Khan’s way? Of course, Grunwald will always remain in national 
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 Lipski: “Dwie ojczyzny…”, 39, my transl.; also Łepkowski: Myśli o historii…, 8. 
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 Antoni Słominski (1895-1976) was a Polish poet, playwright, publicist, theater critic and activist. He 
advocated a multi-cultural and tolerant model of Poland, based on freedom and equality. He was one of 
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his dissident activities he was relentlessly persecuted by PRL authorities and, during a brief period before 
his death, his books were banned in the country. His funeral was attended by many dissidents and 
oppositionists, becoming a political demonstration against Communist regime. See Górny: “From the 
Splendid Past…”, 111. Jasienica’s Jagiellonian Poland, Piast Poland and the three volumes of The 
Commonwealth of Both Nations were firstly published in English by the American Institute of Polish 
Culture in 1978, 1985 and 1992, respectively. 
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 The actor and film director Ryszard Filipski and the publicists Ryszard Gontarz and Kazimierz Kąkol 
were PZPR members and politicians. They supported PRL regime in official media and participated in the 
anti-Semitic campaign of 1968, besides attacking oppositionists in several ways.  
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 Lipski: “Dwie ojczyzny…”, 41, my transl. 
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 The Battle of Grunwald (15 July 1410), one of the largest in medieval Europe, took place during the 
War of the allied Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against the Teutonic Knights 
(1409-1411). Also known as the First Battle of Tannenberg or Battle of Žalgiris, it is considered one of 
the most important armed victories in the history of Poland (as well as of Lithuania and Belarus) and a 
favorite topic in romantic times, becoming a source of national pride and a symbol of struggle against 
invaders. 
150 
 
memory ─but does it have to be just Grunwald? What must predominate in our consciousness, the 
destruction of Polish culture by the Nazis during the Second World War ─or its enrichment by Wit 
Stwosz and hundreds of less-known, excellent artists? Do we want to retain just Oświęcim’s 
[Auschwitz’s] tormentors in our memories, or also those Germans, even if they were just a 
handful, who fought against evil not only as prisoners but also as personnel of the camp? (…) Can 
Germans only be Gestapo agents and members of the SS in our consciousness? Weren’t the heroes 
of the Weisse Rose in Munich Germans too, taking up the hardest of struggles right in the midst of 
darkness, a struggle against ‘their people’ in wartime?616 
   
As self-appointed representatives of the nation and alchemists of discourses, 
intellectuals are the right persons to undertake this re-configuration of Polish historical 
narratives, and hence of Polish consciousness. It was simply conceived as part of their 
responsibilities towards society.  
One of the most noteworthy theses within inteligencja’s counter-hegemonic 
discourses was the historical antagonism between the Polish nation and the State 
apparatus. Even though in the Communist period, as in any other, the interaction, 
collaboration and coexistence between private and public was frequent in many fields of 
life, a very clear State-society division began to take shape in people’s minds. The 
powerful narrative about Polish society’s imperviousness to Communism and its 
constant resistance, with the Church’s aid, to a regime imposed by a foreign power 
survived the disappearance of the Eastern bloc and is still present in more recent, 
democratic stages617.   
One may add, of course, some nuances to this. For instance, in his determination 
to overcome dualisms in Polish history writing, and similarly to his “romantivist” blend 
proposal (Chapter 1), Tadeusz Łepkowski suggested the existence of a “third nation” in 
his analyses of the PRL decades up until the early 1980s. Between people-nation and 
state-nation, the “third nation” would be the common ground or field of interaction of 
the other two spheres, a kind of tacit “federation” containing the vast majority of Polish 
population. During more stable periods in the country, the number of people standing in 
that intermediate field would increase, whereas in unstable times a polarization of 
positions would take place and it would considerably decrease. There would never be, 
however, a complete symbiosis: either a person belonged simultaneously to the nation-
people and to the “third nation”, or to the state-nation and the “third nation”, no other 
combinations were possible. In addition, Łepkowski supported the idea that, after the 
creation of Solidarność, the secular division between the State and the people became 
very clearly defined and prolonged itself at least until the very end of the 1980s. Thus, 
going back to our first point, one must acknowledge that, despite attempts to minimize 
it, the dualist tendency was deeply enrooted in inteligencja’s thought and Polish 
consciousness, and became a mighty weapon to stimulate change618.   
Intellectuals supported that Polish people’s mistrust of the State came from the 
times when, instead of marching in unison, the latter turned against the nation’s 
interests. In a way, to split up State and society was “unnatural” because, at least in 
theory, the State is simply a form of social organization in charge of protecting a 
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 In the Battle of Legnica, also known as the Battle of Liegnitz or Battle of Wahlstatt (9 April 1241), a 
combined force of Poles, Czechs and Germans commanded by the duke Henry II the Pious of Silesia 
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nation’s freedom, culture and development, they argued. However, due to the lack of 
statehood or to the arbitrary measures taken by following state apparatuses, the 
responsibility of safeguarding Polish identity and the feeling of historical continuity in 
times of hardship had fallen almost exclusively on the nation’s shoulders. Hence, since 
Partition times, the people became the leading voice in the issue of national and 
historical consciousness619.   
According to Łepkowski, the Poles were only in favor of legitimate governments 
that respected individual rights and counted with society’s support. Despotism and 
tyranny were foreign to Polish traditions, and sovereignty had to emanate from the 
nation, not from the State. This definition, however, did not rule out dictatorial systems:    
 
Our strength and, at the same time, our weak spot (certainly threatening in Poland’s geopolitical 
situation) was that we really didn’t and do not like despotism and we do not have absolutist state 
traditions of our own. However, it is not true that Poles oppose to strong governments and reject 
any kind of dictatorship. Within our tradition we find acceptance of a strong power, though at the 
nation’s service, chosen and supported by it. We had national dictators (but not despots and 
tyrants) at the nation’s request during the hardest times: Kościuszko, Chłopicki620, Krukowiecki621, 
Mierosławski622, Traugutt, Piłsudski… We rejected them when they wanted to use the nation’s 
support to rule against its will, when they deceived society or when they remained in office longer 
than what was needed in extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless, we do not acknowledge 
usurpers or dictators imposed without society’s mandate, no matter how much they embellish 
themselves with ultra-national feathers and brandish patriotic clichés. Our device is simple: a 
strong power emanated from society, law-abiding and respecting individual rights ─yes, any other 
─no.623 
 
Following that argument, Łepkowski believed that 1980 protests were, among 
other things, a reaction against Communist attempts to “statalize” society.  
The totalitarian bureaucratic socialist model had given birth to new state 
structures and classes that aimed to substitute the old ones, or at least push them into the 
background. According to oppositionists, on the top of this novel order stood a reduced 
and very endogamous oligarchy that directed the political game. United by necessity in 
order to defend their privileges (eg. wealthy homes, Western cars, Western currencies, 
unofficial incomes of dubious origin), its members were popularly known as “the 
owners of People’s Poland”. On the other hand, the intermediate and more numerous 
levels in the PRL system were formed by docile people willing to serve the elite. This 
socialist “middle class” included a great part of the Party, governmental and repressive 
apparatuses, army cadres and a considerable amount of journalists and scientific 
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bureaucrats. They would be recruited from different social classes, especially from 
peasantry, following a “negative selection”, i.e. choosing people prone to corruption and 
with a liking for repression, who were cynical, against changes, anti-inteligencja, with a 
low educational and cultural level, etc. Their appointment did not undergo any 
democratic controls and, given such attributes, their policies were usually characterized 
by inefficiency and avoidable mistakes.  
These elitist state groups would have even coined a kind of jargon of their own, 
both out of a wish to distinguish themselves from the “rest” of their compatriots and to 
exert an influence on them (intellectuals compared it to Orwell’s Newspeak624) as well 
as out of sheer ignorance and to avoid calling a spade a spade. Stefan Kisielewski made 
a mock of this phenomenon by comparing it with Latin in the Middle Ages, a language 
only used by the powerful, full of complex, abstract terms that had nothing to do with 
the real problems of “plebeians”, whose vernacular language was Polish. For what did 
“reeducationallyoptimal” (reedukatywnooptymalny) or “revaluablerecreative” 
(rewaloryzacyjnorekreatywny) really mean to the latter?, he wondered, caricaturizing 
Communist authorities’ taste for half-invented, long and senseless expressions625.  
To establish a link between feudalist times and the present was no coincidence 
either. It was a way, as we will see further on, to use the Marxist interpretation of 
historical progress (in which feudalism was considered the lowest and most unfair 
socio-economic system) against those who promoted it, in order to make evident their 
hypocrisy. Just like in the medieval period,  
 
authorities scorned society and feared it at the same time. Most frequently rulers treated society as 
a flock of simpletons626. It was reciprocal, though. When the government said ‘we’ it pretended to 
speak in the name of everybody, but in reality it only spoke in its own name. The masses spoke 
about themselves as ‘us’, and on the top, moving further and further away, were ‘them’.627  
 
But to speak different tongues implied something more than a lack of 
communication and of common aspirations (like independence) between the State and 
society. If we assume that language is a basic part of national identity, and Communists’ 
“Newspeak” was seen as a rather ugly deformation of Polish, the subsequent deduction 
was that PRL apparatus would be, at best, only half-Polish… Therefore, the “linguistic 
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translation. 
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estrangement” was a very useful and convincing argument to support opposition’s 
theory about the foreignness of the State-Party628.  
But which elements in particular were “foreign” (that is, not “Polish”) within 
official institutions, and which weren’t? Or better still: which aspects of the PRL system 
were simply not European? In inteligencja’s discourses it all boiled down to three 
possible options, though it is not always easy to tell them apart: Communist ideology, 
Russia’s typical “vices” and forms of government and, thirdly, a combination of both, 
i.e. Soviet (or Bolshevik) theory and practice, understood as the Russian version of 
Communism.  
In this chapter we will go through the first and the third elements, leaving the 
second for the part devoted to Poland’s relations with Russia and the Western countries 
(Chapter 3).  
 
 
A.3) Communism and Soviet ideology  
 
It is logical to think that the main source of discomfort for oppositionists in PRL 
times should be Communism itself. And so it was in the great majority of cases, though 
with slight differences.  
For example, in the eyes of many left-wing intellectuals the Polish Communist 
system was not necessarily akin to Communist ideology. The historian Jerzy Holzer, for 
instance, considered that his country’s government was rather a criminal distortion of 
Communism as such (jego zbrodniczy wypaczenie)629, which reminds us immediately of 
Bronisław Geremek’s comment about an evil and corrupted order hiding behind the 
mask of socialist principles630. Because of its connection to the core issue of truth and 
falseness in opposition discourses, such distinction is the most widespread and 
important nuance on this topic. 
On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Polish Communist State was 
far from being a monolithic or unmovable phenomenon: within the PZPR and the 
government there was in practice a broad range of positions and points of view, 
including many that verged on dissidence some way or another631. And, as we have 
already pointed out, some of the most renowned oppositionists were actually in the 
ranks of the Party until very late. However, both lifelong oppositionists and dissidents 
were determined to establish a Manichaean separation between Polish society and 
anything that had to do with Communist State authorities (us vs. them)632 in order to 
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transmit a strong and clear message of nonconformity and resistance to their fellow 
countrymen.  
Two powerful reasons inteligenci brandished to consider Communism alien to 
Polish and European culture was that it tried to suppress Poland’s aspirations to 
independence and national differentiation. Andrzej Micewski, who published openly 
through Tygodnik Powszechny, hinted that regimes and states that were based on force 
and did not take on account the people over whom they ruled could not be considered 
truly European. Never mentioning PRL, he argued that nineteenth-century empires 
crumbled not only as a result of the First World War, but also because the national and 
social consciousness of Central and Eastern European peoples awakened and they 
refused to belong to a formation that was harmful to their interests. Fascist states 
personified strength, but their crimes, abuses and arbitrary acts against the population 
finally mobilized the civilized world against them. The same went for other cases 
beyond Europe, such as the colonies. The right to self-determination, Micewski 
deduced, was common to all humankind633. 
The highest posts in Polish Communist government and Party saw Poland as part 
of the Soviet Union and were ready to demand help from “Big Brother” if their 
governmental monopoly was endangered, in Łepkowski’s opinion. The PZPR was 
contradictory in essence, for it was formed by Poles but belonged to the world 
Communist movement controlled by Moscow, which was a key piece in the Cold War’s 
system of blocks. Within the Communist apparatus, the author admitted, there was a 
clash between “internationalists”, who wanted to copy the Soviet model, and more 
“liberal” and “national” factions, who wanted to attain as much autonomy from the 
Kremlin as possible. In his view, the majority of these struggles were won by 
“internationalists”. After the bitter acceptance of their delicate geopolitical reality and 
the Warsaw Pact, at least between 1956 and 1981 most Poles recognized the State and 
the Party as Polish institutions, though they considered that its members didn’t use up 
all the chances offered by the country’s “limited sovereignty”. In addition, authorities 
were far too partial to the Soviet Union to the detriment of Poland, not only in trade and 
economic exchanges, but also in their historical assessments, for, whereas the USSR’s 
victories were glorified, national traditions and avatars were regarded very critically634.   
Given this situation, many intellectuals feared an eventual “Sovietization” of 
Polish society in the name of “socialism”, a term that certain movements which 
threatened European civilization and the world order had appropriated along the 
twentieth century, according to Bronisław Geremek. Regarding the ongoing debates 
about the potential fairness of unfairness of the market, the medievalist referred during a 
speech to Braudel’s proposal to differentiate between the market, which was the soul of 
economic dynamics and a catalyst of human energies, and capitalism, which took to 
extremes the thirst for profits, tried to stand above the market’s laws and generated 
inequalities and exploitation. He then added, in a similar way to his Annales teacher:   
 
[It is necessary to recognize the market, C.A.] ... not only because present historical experience has 
taught us that it generates freedom. But perhaps also because to destroy the injustices of the market 
takes, like up until today, to the injustice of violence. And to substitute the market’s omnipotence 
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for state omnipotence takes to a worsening of economic effectiveness and of peoples’ fate, since it 
deprives somebody’s work of its sense and eliminates personal values.635 
 
In line with this idea, Geremek also supported John Paul II’s proposal to apply the 
philosophy of personalism to collective property and means of production. In the 
encyclical Laborem exercens, published on September 14th 1981, the Pope affirmed that 
socialization could only take place once agency (podmiotowość) was attained. In order 
to foster this process, it was very necessary to create intermediate organs independent 
from public powers and to link the property of capital to work636. 
But would all of this be feasible in face of a Sovietization that was spreading like 
a cancer? The publicist and founder of the underground publishing house CDN637, 
Czesław Bielecki, considered that the vices of the Soviet system had penetrated in 
Poland much more than what was acknowledged by its inhabitants. The increasing 
dependence on the government and public institutions, the ineffectiveness of 
bureaucratization and the fact that many persons wanted to direct, govern or represent, 
but hardly anyone was willing to simply act, were negative symptoms, as well as the 
bad habits at work: some workers and peasants receiving a fixed income, regardless of 
the quality of their labor, spent the money in drink instead of investing it in something 
that improved their lives and made them more autonomous from authorities. Polish 
society should wake up quickly from that nightmarish slumber before it was too late: 
 
Bolshevism was the offspring of the Russian nation’s impotence. For centuries, mediocrity and 
enslavement have attained ranks, privileges and power in Russia. Soviet ideology takes these 
weaknesses and spreads them around the world as Good News. This diabolic trick is precisely the 
key that explains all about the almighty system in Poland. We must decide ourselves. Either we are 
the heirs of Christian civilization and Western culture, or we are the loiterers of bolshevism, 
halfway between Asia and Europe. If we have untransferable human rights, we must take the 
duties too, or be quiet and submissively accept Communism’s ‘rules of the game’.638 
 
Not only Bielecki thought so: the rest of the members of Polskie Porozumienie 
Niepodległościowe expressed very similar views in an essay entitled “Polska i Europa”. 
In their opinion, no regime or economic system could be considered ideal, including 
democracy and free market. However, at least in the latter one could speak out freely 
about its flaws and problems. What should the Poles prefer: constant economic 
shortages, the lack of responsibility of governmental organisms, a Party-State imposing 
its will over national will, the unpunished destruction of the environment, to waste 
people’s potential, the absence of morality at work, alcoholism and the falsification of 
social life (the negative characteristics the authors attribute to Communist regimes), or 
governmental instability due to the clashes between different parties, unemployment 
─in places where the unemployed receive subventions that could be tantamount to a 
young doctor’s salary in the PRL, and the commercialization of culture (i.e. the defects 
of Western democracies)? They would prefer those disadvantages they can get to know 
and try to solve together, rather than harmful, insurmountable drawbacks that damaged 
society and reduced it to a dumb crowd without will. Since the eighteenth century, 
Poland could be European (by endorsing European imponderables, as we have seen 
above), or it could be Muscovite, there was no third option. “Though today we are 
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located in Moscow’s orbit”, PPN members said, “we have preserved to a certain extent 
our Europeanness ─but its loss threatens us if we do not oppose to it”639. Hence, Poles 
should not remain passive and allow this forty-year process to continue its relentless 
advance.   
Polish inhabitants could receive, nevertheless, a little help in this task from 
beyond their borders. Through his interviews and texts published in foreign media, 
Bronisław Geremek sounded a warning too in the late 1980s among Western European 
governments and public opinion, for they should also realize that a material, economic 
and civilizational abyss was rapidly cracking open between the Eastern Bloc and the 
rest of the continent, so that the Yalta military division was finally taking shape or 
consolidating in other, much deeper spheres of social life too. And that would surely 
have unexpected consequences for all:  
 
Je suis angoissé. Nous quittons l’Europe. Vous rendez vous compte? Nous quittons l’Europe. Nous 
avons la crise de l’économie, notre parc de machines se fait de plus en plus vieillot, l’écart 
technologique prend des proportions catastrophiques, l’état des infrastructures est désolant, le 
niveau de santé de la nation se dégrade, l’écologie est en perdition. C’est une ‘fosse de civilisation’ 
qui se creuse sous nos yeux. La principale menace aujourd’hui, c’est cela, au-delà des critères 
simplement politiques et idéologiques nous assistons à un Yalta de civilisation, la division de 
l’Europe en deux parties, l’une développée et l’autre en arrière. Les conséquences peuvent en être 
tragiques pour la Pologne, mais aussi pour l’Europe de l’ouest et il serait temps que les 
occidentaux en prennent conscience.640 
 
Thus, actually existing socialism had only brought about in the long run 
destruction, isolation, insufficiency, inefficiency, repression and backwardness in 
almost every field of Polish life and, by extension, of the rest of the Eastern Bloc. Jan 
Józef Lipski especially insisted on this last point because he was convinced that the first 
victim of Soviet ideology had been Russians themselves, who had seen how a good deal 
of their traditions and culture (eg. those related to the Orthodox Church) were destroyed 
or suppressed by the new Bolshevik State:   
 
We, Poles, when speaking about Russians, say that the USSR is the heir and the continuation of 
the Tsarist empire in terms of aspirations and even of style, and that Russian nationalism played a 
crucial role in the Soviet expansion ─but at the same time we do not like to remember that Soviet 
ideology, that attempted to destroy the national identity of Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, 
Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians etc., tried to destroy with even more determination Russian 
national identity, tradition and culture. Soviet ideology is equally threatening and lethal for Poles 
as for Russians.641  
 
Another outstanding feature of so-called Communist governments was already 
hinted in our analysis of the 1989-1990 election posters: their absolute reluctance to 
change the system from within or to negotiate with non-Communists some kind of 
limited reforms. Many believed that the last proof of this ossification, the establishment 
of the Martial Law in the night of December 12th-13th, 1981, was being planned almost 
before Solidarność officially registered in November 1980, that is, when authorities 
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perceived (only too late) that a major transformation was taking place and that it could 
jeopardize their power monopoly642. If at any point since the mid-1970s oppositionists 
had fantasized with the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Party-State out of 
the latter’s goodwill, the image of General Wojciech Jaruzelski on television that 
evening ruined whatever was left of it for good: 
 
The end of the Polish August [1980] means that the last chance for the system to evolve has 
exploded. It happened once again that Communism allows no reforms. Each thaw in satellite 
countries is regarded by Moscow as a mortal threat. For Communist authorities, anything that 
draws us closer to authentic democracy and authentic independence in the framework of a societal 
agreement, even by legal means, is a dangerous extremism. The only sensible tactics in this 
situation is, thus, the tactics used before by Communists themselves. To struggle within the system 
against the system, openly ─with legal methods, and clandestinely ─with illegal methods, but 
always ready for illegalization.643 
 
But rather than imitating Communists, even if it was only tactically, inteligencja 
usually betted on a reinterpretation or an overturn of Marxist principles to show the 
incongruities of “socialist” regimes beyond the Berlin wall and, of course, to complain 
about them, either because they did not fulfill the socialist ideals they pledged, or to 
prove that Communism was essentially harmful for Poland and the rest of the region. 
We advanced some of these ideas with Kisielewski’s comparison of the PRL elites with 
the most privileged layers of the medieval estates, but he was not the only one to draw 
such a parallel: Stefan Bratkowski also considered that, instead of providing justice and 
welfare to workers, as its ideology promised, the Polish government was treating them 
as feudal serfs. To “manumit” workers today would mean to allow them to participate in 
decisions and public life; that would be the basis, in his view, for a future industrial 
democracy644.  
On the other hand, Czesław Bielecki advocated the recovery of the medieval and 
modern ages’ spirit in the world of work and of opposition groups because he felt that 
the Soviet system was destroying the value of (and the pleasure in) basic work, which 
was so necessary, and the important contribution of middle posts in the transmission of 
knowledge, besides artificially separating decision making from practical work, which 
should be always combined: 
 
As a result of the hereditary burden of bolszewia645, structures to govern and represent, but not to 
act, were established in Solidarność’s lowest and middle ranks. That is why after the outbreak of 
the phoney Polish war646, and on our side, one can see almost nothing but generals, colonels, 
captains, but there are not corporals and sergeants. How many times have I heard from the 
members of the Solidarność Factory Commissions ‘I actually should not act because I am under 
surveillance’. We already know what the next step is: Communist search for ‘manpower’ begins. 
In the meantime, within each organizational work there is a part of decision making and a part of 
executive performance: driving for hours, checking, getting in touch, writing, buying, packing, 
numbering. In ALL ranks of an organization these two elements co-exist. Bolszewia means to 
make the members of every rank above the mere worker (who is always imagined as someone in 
an assembly line) want only to decide and co-ordinate. Specific work is always pushed to the 
bottom, specific decisions are always pushed to the top. This way, a pyramid of bureaucrats 
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incapable of reaching an agreement in the end entrust the load of work to a single worker. Such an 
organizational structure deprives each working phase of its craftsmanship and creative 
components. Between the worker and the director, the master or overseer is still necessary. His 
rank is crucial: he makes possible that a person who knows how to work well and in a timely way 
performs what another person thought up well and in a timely way. An underground without 
masters, without those who are capable of showing with their own hands how something can and 
should be done, will never work well. A conspiratorial organization formed by roboli647 and 
directors, by subordinates and managers will never defeat communists. We must reinstate the ethos 
of the master and the merchant648 within us against bolszewia. Because the essence of a 
‘sovietized’ organization is that, instead of working with people, it works by using people as 
tools.649 
 
The essences of the feudal world and early capitalism were, in Bielecki’s eyes, the 
right weapons to counteract an unsuccessful socialist model that was supposedly going 
to surpass both previous “stages” and put an end to exploitation. The ethos of the master 
and the merchant represented to him hard work, industriousness, organizational 
efficiency, practical guidance and the urge to improve, in contrast to the behaviors that 
Communism stimulated in practice among factory workers and peasants, which acted 
against their humaneness.    
Bratkowski, for his part, reminded his readers that Communism was neither the 
single nor the best remedy against injustice and workers’ problems, despite what official 
propaganda might say. In the first pages of his book Co zrobić, kiedy nic się nie da 
zrobić? [What to do when nothing can be done?], the author went through the highlights 
of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine, from Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo anno 
to John Paul II’s Laborem exercens (popularly known as “the workers’ gospel”), to 
show that religion was not das Opium des Volkes. The rest of the book is devoted to the 
results that different initiatives related to workers’ welfare and self-government 
rendered in other countries, especially France, Great Britain and the U.S.: Robert 
Owen’s utopian socialism, Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Pierre Leroux, how 1848 
revolutions fueled the formation of workers’ associations, Edme Jean Leclaire, Jean-
Baptiste André Godin’s Familistère, etc. The point was to encourage Poles to start up 
similar organizations and reduce their dependence on a system that had actually 
destroyed the heritage of authentic, democratic and progressive workers’ movements in 
the country… in the name of so-called “socialism”650. 
Another way to show the contradictions between Marxist ideas and actually 
existing socialism was by resorting to the “revolution argument”. Could a revolutionary 
socialist government have established Martial Law? Michnik’s opinion was clear in this 
respect: “The military coup of December did not attempt to realize the Communist 
utopia ─it was a classic anti-worker counterrevolution carried out to defend the 
conservative interests of the ancient régime”651. Therefore, such recoil was incompatible 
with Marx’s progressive view of history. Of course, things could and should improve, 
but that would only happen by means of what the KPN leader Romuald Szeremietiew 
defined as “the great national revolution” of Solidarność (Wielka Rewolucja 
Narodowa), that was changing political and social structures to build a free, democratic 
and rich Poland. On the other extreme, the PZPR would be a counterrevolutionary force 
representing all that was reactionary, retarded and unfair, and would still be in power 
only because of its use of violence and its control over repressive organs. In this sense, 
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Szeremietiew completely agreed with Marx’s saying “cruelty is issued by 
cowardice”652.  
Despite counteracting Polish Communist government in every possible way, 
opposition intellectuals’ belief in progress (which, of course, can be found in many 
doctrines beyond Marxism) did not waver. After all, they were struggling to make the 
country and their personal conditions better. However, it was crucial to be able to tell 
apart real progress from “so-called progress”. Either society advanced as a whole, or 
something was wrong in the system. 
According to the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, the main mistake of Marxist 
theory was its reductionism. Historical processes were far more complex and 
unpredictable than what Marxism-Leninism ever acknowledged so that, for instance, 
national feelings or religion could play a crucial role in a country, not against the 
workers, but in their benefit. On the contrary, patriotism was used by Lenin as a mere 
tool for the benefit of the Russian Communist regime and was in fact regarded as an 
obstacle for the internationalist union of the working class. But in no way everything 
could be explained through class struggle: Solidarność, a pro-independent and pro-
working class movement with Catholic roots that had stood up against actually existing 
socialism, proved PRL history textbooks wrong653.  
To some extent, these impressions resembled classic historicism due to the 
importance given to the nation building process and, within it, to the political sphere. 
However, in Poland’s case it was not the nation-state and its institutions what mattered, 
but the nation alone and society’s autonomous organizations, so that history should be 
written bottom to top, from grass-roots level (the represented) upwards (to the political 
representatives), not the other way round.  
 
 
B) Snapshots of Polish society throughout time 
 
That is precisely history’s lesson, that despite everything no 
martyrdom is worthless. Those who died for an idea always 
won beyond the grave. Their sacrifice cannot be indifferent 
to the next generations. Hence, tradition is an integral part 
of national consciousness and if a nation must exist, if it 
mustn’t die vilely, it must develop its traditions. 
 
Henryk Wereszycki: “Przedmowa” (my transl.) 
 
Only the past of those who fought for a noble cause and fell 
by the wayside is left. The chance of hope lies in the 
desperate. Within that despair there is hope albeit defeated, 
in a latent state, waiting to be awakened by contemporaries 
who are equally spurred by despair.  
 
Reyes Mate: Medianoche en la historia  (my transl.) 
 
According to Bronisław Geremek, the interest in the history of the Polish nation, 
plus its most recurrent topics and characteristic interpretations (optimism-pessimism, 
independence question), stem at the very latest from the nineteenth-century partition 
period and permeated Polish society’s ways of regarding history writing ever since:  
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… l’opinion polonaise reste toujours sensible au débat centenaire entre la vision pessimiste et 
optimiste de l’histoire polonaise ainsi qu’au problème complexe de l’indépendance nationale. On 
retrouve la même continuité dans la problématique des recherches où, malgré le changement du 
paradigme ou de l’appareil conceptuel, la prédilection pour tels thèmes ou telles façons de 
comprendre semble rattacher l’historiographie actuelle au travail du siècle précédent, et parfois 
plus loin encore.654 
 
He further admitted that, in his fatherland’s case, the need to look for 
responsibilities (memory) and the need to suggest some kind of future-oriented strategy 
(purpose) actually entwined, making history and politics go hand in hand in the search 
of the truth of the past: “La vérité sur le passé est toujours restée en Pologne 
enchevêtrée dans les enjeux politiques, et le vieux débat sur les causes de la perte de 
l’indépendance: faut-il conspirer contre l’occupant? Ou bien les Polonais ont-ils été 
victimes de leur penchant atavique à la conspiration (liberum conspiro)?”655. Historians, 
thus, responded to Polish society’s concern about the source of the nation’s unease, but 
also to its demand about what should be done next: “Le public attendait que l’historien 
lui livre un enseignement du passé clairement orienté vers l’action”656. This fulfills 
inteligencja’s classic duties of social representation and guidance and also matches its 
traditional determination to solve national problems ─or at least to consider them under 
a new, more comprehensible light.   
The fact that the birth of modern Polish historiography coincided with the 
disappearance of Poland as a state influenced history writing and the way historians 
conceived their task more than any methodological claims. As a result, Geremek 
complained, Polish readers were always most interested in contemporary history, 
something which, from his annaliste point of view, reinforced classic researches on 
political history, whereas analyses of core, long-term problems such as mentalities and 
political structures did not arouse much curiosity. In his opinion, the essential role that 
freedom and free will played in these customary narratives greatly contributed to the 
association of socio-economic approaches to deterministic postulates, which were 
virtually alien to Polish historical tradition:    
 
L’histoire politique accepte difficilement les éclairages de la sociologie et de l’économie, car elle 
semble angoissée par le spectre du déterminisme. L’histoire politique, écrivit Władysław 
Konopczyński (1880-1952)657, un disciple d’Askenazy658 à Cracovie, ‘semble répondre à tous les 
possibles et à l'appel de liberté... L’histoire ne prend de sens que comme histoire des 
responsabilités humaines’. Cette attitude recèle un certain conservatisme méthodologique, mais 
elle répond bien aux expériences et aux aspirations de la Pologne.659 
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In opposition intellectuals’ eyes, freedom (or, in its absence, the wish for 
freedom) was Polish nation’s hallmark since the late Middle Ages. In times when, as 
under Communism, that freedom was maimed or simply trampled, there was an 
growing need to insist in the two aforementioned aspects of the question of choice: 
firstly, in why had things occurred as they did (causes and responsibilities) and 
secondly, in the idea that change was not only possible, but within society’s reach. The 
former could be carried out with a view to explain, uncover, understand, condemn or 
justify but, in any case, it ultimately aimed to promote the latter, that is, to find in the 
past the courage and the lessons people required to avoid previous mistakes and 
transform things in the present. This way, historical reflection became a potential form 
of action. 
 
 
B.1) Modern times until the Postwar period 
 
In Tadeusz Łepkowski’s view, dependence or half-dependence had been Polish 
people’s most usual condition throughout time, but especially since the First Partition. 
Structurally, this meant a long feudalist period, followed by a dependent, weak and 
peripheral capitalism and, finally, a “dependent socialism” against the will of the 
majority of society660 ─a disappointing albeit more realistic version, by the way, of the 
theoretical stages to cover in order to achieve a fair, free and idealized Communist 
social organization. Nevertheless, Poland’s socio-political strength, medium-high 
development and its repeated struggles against this situation made it have a fair chance 
of finally overcoming it: 
 
When the socio-cultural level of a given country is low, to become dependent means to fall almost 
into despair. The Polish case is different not just because its “point of departure into dependence” 
was not the worst. Throughout most of these two hundred-odd years of dependence Poles have 
fought in various ways against it (however, let’s not deceive ourselves: not everybody and not 
everywhere) to destroy it or, in any case, to put a limit to it. One may gather a considerable dose of 
optimism from that fact.661 
 
Hence, pro-independence initiatives, revolts and uprisings amongst the Poles 
cannot be considered an exceptional or even a closed phase in history. Quite on the 
contrary, they have become a kind of constant in a long-term framework which is still 
ongoing662. This did not mean, of course, that every step taken towards such goal was a 
wise one: Jan Józef Lipski, for instance, considered the Messianism embraced by the 
best nineteenth-century poets and thinkers as a helping hand to endure defeats, but also 
as a likely cause of the following ones663. 
Whilst under the three empires’ control, the subject-agent of Polish history was 
not a state-nation in the making, as elsewhere in Western Europe, but a stateless nation 
aiming to attain a state of its own. It was then when a crucial process began to take 
place: national consciousness bloomed and spread from noble and educated strata to 
lower social classes, together with hatred for a foreign, oppressive and invasive state664. 
From the mid-nineteenth century until the interwar period, Polish peasantry experienced 
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the end of serfdom, the conferment of land ownership and educational progresses which 
gradually led to national awareness. There is no denying that this was a long, winding 
and painful road (bloodsheds in Galicja, participation in the January 1863 Uprising…) 
dotted with the peasants’ persistent animosity towards lords and a new mistrust of 
bourgeoisie but, according to Łepkowski, by the end of that time the sons of peasantry 
could be considered “full Poles”, which assured the nation high chances of survival and 
development665.  
This historian, as well as other intellectual oppositionists, liked to ascribe to each 
of the most prominent groups forming Polish society certain general features, 
idiosyncrasies, characteristic behaviors and ways of thinking, just like they did in their 
own case. Never departing from present-day concerns and realities, some inteligenci 
tended to believe that the best qualities of each class played a role in the opposition to 
PRL government and could be tracked down to some point of the past, ancient or more 
recent. 
The peasants, Poland’s main social basis until not very long ago, were given in 
these narratives an outstanding individualistic character. They represented resistance to 
change, whereas active or passive, together with defense of the ownership of the land:  
 
The Polish farmer understands the strength of solidary collectivity and knows how to associate, 
but he joins cooperatives, circles and organizations as an independent individual. Hence his firm 
anti-collectivism and anti-communitarianism. The idea that the multitude is above the individual is 
rejected by the Polish peasant. He loves what he owns, he is and wants to be the householder and 
the lord at home. He recognizes the army’s discipline, knows how to submit himself to the state 
(not to bureaucracy), but rejects the cruel collectivism that makes him play the role of a worker 
serving a foreign lord and, thus, be deprived of property. 
The Polish peasant has preserved till today a high sense of life concreteness and political 
realism. He doesn’t like nice, lengthy speeches. He is distrustful and hard to “move”, and at the 
same time consistent and obstinate when he is convinced about something. He regards national and 
state issues in a similar way as his economy. He values hard, patient and systematic work, ability 
and taking care of property, of the goods obtained from work. He can’t stand being indoctrinated 
or manipulated by power.666 
  
Being the social group that had least transformed in the last century, relatively 
speaking, such description of peasantry intended to highlight continuity between past 
(partition) and present (Communist) political systems in terms of unfairness, state 
control, lack of ownership and demagogy. However, what could have become the 
biggest social force in Poland if united, soon gave way to divisions, constant party 
foundation and dissolution, personal, regional and ideological disputes. Due to 
competing interests, by the 1930s Polish peasantry formed a very fragmented political 
landscape667. Nevertheless, its “spirit” as described by Łepkowski reappeared in PRL 
times and avoided land collectivization, a major achievement and contribution to the 
weakening of the Communist apparatus.    
This historian also suggested that, in a certain sense, Polish peasantry handed over 
the baton of political pre-eminence to the working class, especially after the First World 
War. Certainly, it was not an easy task for a multinational social stratum to get used to a 
new state-nation context and border reconfiguration, chiefly among the eldest, but 
thanks to younger generations and to Polish government’s will of accelerating 
industrialization and modernization, workers became more united and played a 
fundamental role in the democratic building of the reborn State. 
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In Łepkowski’s eyes, Polish workers are honest and able in their job. They feel 
linked to their factory, have a high sense of dignity both in their lives and working 
places and appreciate professional knowledge and qualification, for they have a will to 
improve. In contrast to Germans, Jews or Ukrainians, Polish workers usually place a 
greater emphasis in their religious beliefs (Catholicism); however, this doesn’t interfere 
with their support of different socialist movements. Like the peasants, they are 
individualistic and support pluralism so that, despite their sense of honor, class dignity 
and solidarity, they don’t have a “herd instinct”. Brave, obstinate, persevering and ready 
to make sacrifices, their claims and fighting spirit are decidedly revolutionary668.  
Through this description, even vaguer and more stereotyped than the peasant one, 
the author insisted on the same idea, that is, that the premises of actually existing 
socialist regimes were essentially incompatible with the Poles’ national ethos and 
different class identities ─something that was perhaps slightly less clear back in the late 
nineteenth century in the workers’ case, but that gained force along the Second Republic 
and the following historical periods: 
 
Generally speaking, it can be said that (…) in the Polish labor movement the socialist nuclei of 
different shades (PPS was never “monolithic”) had a decisive importance and, to a lesser extent, 
the Christian-democrats, that the Communist nucleus, especially after 1918, was marginal and 
usually regarded as a foreign agent and [that] the majority of the workers’ movement, both in 
political parties and trade unions, had anti-Communist and anti-Soviet positions.669 
 
After bearing witness to or actually getting involved in the workers’ protests and 
revolts during Communist times (1956, 1970, 1976), critical intellectuals understood 
that the Polish working class was and would be, more than ever, the engine of change, 
and their clashes with PRL authorities the best and most tragic example of the 
inconsistencies and injustices of a system that proudly defined itself as “dictatorship of 
the proletariat”670.  
Within oppositionists’ historical narratives, the two main social groups in Poland, 
besides inteligencja itself, converged in their evolution towards resistance against the 
Communist regime. However, Polish twentieth-century annals were far from being 
stainless. Just as it happened with previous epochs, it was Jan Józef Lipski who first put 
the finger on the wound when he spoke out about anti-Semitism in the interwar period. 
To approach such episodes was an important step towards a more balanced and 
self-critical view of history, not just due to their recent (and hence much more delicate) 
character, but because the events took place when Poland was an independent State, and 
therefore it was not possible to turn a blind eye and blame foreign powers and 
ideologies for those excesses and crimes, like during partitions or the following Nazi 
invasion.  
During the Second Republic, anti-Semitic feelings spread across Polish political 
spectrum, especially in the right and far right groups, like the National-Democratic 
Party (later renamed as National Party) and its eventually banned by-products: the 
Camp of Great Poland, the National Radical Camp and Falanga National Radical Camp. 
The latter, studied in detail by Lipski671, resembled other totalitarian fascist movements 
in Europe. Besides questioning Jewish minority’s citizen rights, promoting economic 
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boycott and pogroms in villages and high schools, its press even suggested the 
extermination of Jews in the country.  
But what was more worrying, in terms of figures and relevance, was the behavior 
of the rest of Polish society: opposition was feeble, there was no organization beyond 
individual acts of solidarity and bravery, and even the Church and many Catholic 
groups adopted an alarmingly indifferent attitude towards their Jewish compatriots’ 
fate672. “I must fairly say”, wrote Władysław Bartoszewski, “[that] if I had assimilated 
everything I heard about the Jews at school and in church ─I would have become anti-
Semite. Only inner resistance against nonsense and thought coercion enabled me to 
defend Jews in the War”673.  
As it turned out, finally “…somebody else built the wall around the ghetto, 
scalded with boiling water and destroyed. The prisons and concentration camps that the 
followers of Bolesław Piasecki674 wanted to fill with Jews and with the Poles who, in 
their opinion, served the Jews, were not directed” by them675. However, this only meant 
that ONR “Falanga” didn’t get the chance to do it, and that Polish society also had its 
share of responsibility in the subsequent European tragedy promoted by the Nazis. If it 
hadn’t been for that poisonous anti-Semitic substratum and its uncontrolled growth in 
the 1930s, Lipski reflected, who knows how many more Jews could have been saved in 
Polish lands afterwards…676. 
The ordeal of the Second World War, thus, entailed potentially controversial 
views and memories that, once again, challenged Polish nation’s status of “victim of 
history” in historical discourses. On the one hand, Poland was on the “right side” of the 
War and could, supposedly, feel guiltless as to the responsibility of its outburst, crimes 
and defeat. Furthermore, Polish Underground Government and the delegate of Warsaw 
Jews informed and warned Great Britain and the United States about extermination 
camps and Nazi mass crimes against the Jews, but encountered with disbelief and 
indifference677. On the other hand, the radicalization and totalitarian turn of Polish 
politics the decade before the War was undeniable, and the anti-Semitic atmosphere of 
fear and mistrust exclusively national. Through their acts or omissions, out of fear, 
selfishness or greed, and leaving aside open aggressions (attacks, denunciations, 
collaboration in persecution, bribery, frauds…), Lipski believed that Polish civilians 
didn’t do enough to help, protect and save as many Jewish fellow-citizens as possible in 
1939-1945. And that included himself as a Home Army member during Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising (April 19th - May 16th, 1943), in which he and the majority of his companions 
didn’t bother to take part: “This shame and remorse torments many of us. Back then, it 
was easier to think that we shouldn’t die by the walls of the fighting Ghetto”678.   
Interestingly, suffering and sacrifice also provided important points of 
convergence between the catastrophe of the Holocaust and the ethos of inteligencja, as 
seen by the latter. Władysław Bartoszewski is the best example of it. He participated in 
the defense of Warsaw in September 1939 and then worked for the Red Cross. In 
September 1940 he was arrested and sent to Auschwitz, where he spent eight months 
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before being freed. The camp, he recalled decades later, was firstly designed to get rid 
of Polish inteligencja (1940-1941) and it was only about a year or a year and a half later 
when it began to be used to massacre Jewish population in the gas chambers679. German 
invaders had the same plans for intellectuals and Jews alike, so they shared a victim 
status, a tragic fate. Besides this, the prevalence of physical strength supported by the 
Nazis was contrary to inteligencja’s ethos:  
 
It was abominable to the highest degree: this display of force, boots, propaganda ─brutal, physical 
violence. Many people in Poland, intellectual people, said to themselves back then: our strength 
can only emanate from our hearts and minds, it must come from the soul. 
We, Poles, dreaded the annihilation of the nation, of its language, of its culture, of its mere 
existence.680 
 
Within Bartoszewski’s first-hand experience, fear for national survival and the 
moral dilemma of having personally survived horror merged and gave birth to a strong 
sense of duty which was directly related to his self-identification as an intellectual and 
as a Catholic believer. The crimes committed beyond the conventions of war against 
Polish civilians, Jews and non-Jews alike, produced pain and grief that had to be eased 
through active knowledge and remembrance, both in the meantime but, especially, in 
the aftermath. The gift of life had to be somehow returned, the mission was “to act 
against hatred, against violence ─against all hatred and all violence”681. Hence, 
Bartoszewski found a meaning in the suffering of Polish people, but chiefly a meaning 
to carry on with life once the suffering was over: 
 
The families of prisoners who died in the [extermination] camp helped me [in my health recovery 
after Auschwitz, April 1941]. But there was a problem for me: I lived on, whereas they had died. 
Eventually a question took shape in my mind: I live ─but why? This is a duty for me. There are no 
coincidences in life. I am a believer. If I live, it means that I must help others.682 
 
Why precisely so? [to act against hatred and violence, C.A.] Because we, Poles, fell as victims 
of hatred and violence. The role of those who suffer is contained in our Messianism, so richly 
expressed in our literature as well. But those who suffer must carry the torch of good, not of evil. 
This is the secret of what the New Testament demands from us: conversion.  
We want to be those who understand, who know. (…) We believed in God’s justice. We 
remembered Warsaw inhabitants who died on the snow, during the first bombing of the city in 
September 1939. We remembered executions carried out without choice, when people were taken 
out of the shops ─ordinary people, not politicians, not soldiers. Also ordinary women and children. 
One knew how to differentiate between someone who fell in the battle front and a victim of 
murder. My fellow countrymen, who lost their fathers and sons in the battle front, somewhere in 
England or France, in the sea, in the air, for example during the battle of London ─they knew that 
they fell as soldiers. This notion does not produce a feeling of revenge. It is war. One does not hate 
personally the German soldiers who perpetrated that death. But when somebody fell as a victim of 
a murder, not in the battle front, a deep hatred surfaced among people. A soldier is a soldier ─we 
understood this, it was the way we had been trained before the War. A soldier who behaves 
decently can be respected. But not the murderer of innocent women and children who, to add 
insult to injury, claimed that he accomplished orders. What happened to Poles was beyond all code 
of conduct in wartime. Even more so what happened to the Jewish nation.683 
 
Survivor-victims had a moral duty towards perished victims. This is how two 
outstanding fights of the War, Warsaw Ghetto and Warsaw Uprisings, were understood 
                                                 
679
 Bartoszewski: Jesień nadziej..., 45. 
680
 Bartoszewski: Jesień nadziej..., 46, my transl. 
681
 Bartoszewski: Jesień nadziej..., 46, my transl. 
682
 Bartoszewski: Jesień nadziej..., 23, my transl. 
683
 Bartoszewski: Jesień nadziej..., 46-47, my transl. 
166 
 
by some too. An apparently “pointless” struggle or sacrifice is not so useless if 
remembered and honored. Spiritual strength, in contrast to physical, would be gathered 
precisely from past defeats.  
As to the Jews’ revolt, Lipski commented: 
 
This fight was not undertaken [by the rebellious] in defense of their lives, for they could have 
saved them by fleeing ─but in defense of human dignity. Therefore, it was mainly a symbolic act, 
with scarce practical influence, but with an immense moral meaning both for Jews and for the rest 
of humanity, especially for the Polish nation.  
It is our duty to reflect on the meaning of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising if we esteem that the values 
in whose name the insurgents fought are equally binding on us. It is therefore a duty not only 
towards the memory of the fallen, but also towards ourselves. In addition, many of us witnessed 
the tragedy of Jews in Poland, which is also binding ─even if just to bear testimony. If the Polish 
nation and Warsaw forgot about them, about its victims ─we would not deserve to put into 
practice the values in whose defense the Ghetto rebels died.684 
 
Stefan Kisielewski had a similar view of Warsaw Uprising (August 1st – October 
2nd, 1944), in which he took part. Despite his later criticism about its convenience, he 
also pointed out once that, even if many of its participants were fully conscious of its 
flaws and didn’t pin their hopes on actual victory (which was regarded as very 
improbable), they nevertheless fought as if they counted on it, until their last breath, for 
they were impelled by something beyond material hope, as if it was a moral testimony 
or a cry for help whose echoes would reach beyond that moment, or even beyond their 
lifetime685. Łepkowski pondered on this too in a more general fashion that linked Polish 
past and present-day situations:    
 
[In the twentieth century,] Evil attained technical abilities bordering on perfection. However, 
courage, braveness (for it’s not an empty, arrogant action) can vanquish modern dictatorships 
─though not without victims─ or, if not, can at least broaden successfully the margins of freedom 
in a captive country. Braveness plays a crucial role in this resistance (…), usually based on a deep 
faith in God; braveness in the Christian sense of the word, based on the deep conviction that ‘they’ 
cannot ultimately win, that in the most extreme cases ‘those who kill the body (…) after that can 
do nothing more’ (Luke, 12:4).686 
 
In sum, the experience of Polish society and its Jewish community during the 
Second World War acquired in a few intellectuals’ narratives a kind of cathartic or 
expiatory value687. However, it is a fact that the Jewish question in particular was rarely 
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studied by oppositionists (either of Jewish or non-Jewish origins) until the late 1980s 
and, when done so, it was usually as a separate topic, without a direct connection with 
inteligencja’s recurrent ideas about the Polish nation. Rather than being implicitly 
included in it, thus, the Jews were considered a distinct national group or merely 
“forgotten”. In addition, the question of guilt and the knowledge about tragic, shameful 
and controversial issues spread beyond War times and materialized in more recent and 
complex phenomena, like the persecutions and murders of the surviving Jewish 
population in the second half of the 1940s688 and the governmental anti-Semitic 
campaign in 1968689. It was indeed, as Lipski alone ceaselessly reminded, one of Polish 
society’s major contemporary failures.  
But, in the Postwar period, surviving Poles would have to endure yet another 
moral disaster to which intellectuals devoted much more time and many more pages: the 
submission to Communist power.  
 
 
B.2) The Postwar period: Communists’ takeover of power and the defeat of society 
 
Like Benjamin pictured, the historian Krystyna Kersten’s bet for the future, and 
therefore the political character underlying in her works, is clear: for her, real change is 
not tantamount to a “counter-attack” of non-Communist historians, that is, to a coarse 
return of the past issues and arguments that Communist power had disposed of in the 
rubbish dump of history. To replace certain theories, terms and interpretations by others 
would imply to pay somebody back in his own coin, a mere swap of impositions, thus 
not an advance at all. For what would be the use of former victims setting themselves up 
as victorious if they produced more victims by doing so? The process would lack the 
same morality they demanded from previous winners. The real, perhaps single way to 
go forward is by acquiring knowledge and by understanding in depth Polish postwar 
history through critical, independent thought690.   
Kersten stopped by that rubbish dump of history she mentioned in a different 
fashion: as a plain historian-ragman, and not as one who wished to become the next 
historian-winner. Within her texts, especially in Narodziny systemu władzy, she 
“recovered” nothing less than Polish society among the rubble by remembering how it 
was terrorized by the new political authorities and left aside of decision-making 
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processes in the mid-1940s. Communists who voluntarily submitted to Moscow’s will, 
in their turn, subdued Polish society through different means, hence depriving Poles of 
their historical and political agency (podmiotowość). Kersten’s “revenge” for that moral 
crime consisted of a “claim for justice”, plus an inclusive proposal: those who had 
suffered or were currently suffering would be rehabilitated both in the past and in the 
present through today’s remembrance, but not by betraying the truth and using history 
for one’s own benefit, or to please authorities, because a scenario with “new” defeated 
and “new” winners must be urgently avoided. In this sense, it is also significant that she 
quoted the following fragment of a song by the musician Jacek Kaczmarski right at the 
beginning of her work on Yalta agreements: “Only victims don’t make mistakes / And 
that’s how Yalta must be understood” (“Tylko ofiary się nie mylą / i tak rozumieć 
trzeba Jałtę”)691.  
Kersten’s comment in Narodziny systemu… can also be understood as a warning 
against attempts to re-build past political ideologies and ways in the present or, in other 
words, to try to restore the “past-that-did-take-place” (Polish Second Republic period) 
before the latest “defeat” (Second World War + Communist seizure of power) by 
putting into practice fifty- or sixty-year-old, even nineteenth-century socio-political 
thoughts.   
For her, the recovery of what was lost and repressed would be of a moral and 
intellectual nature, and should be used as a starting point to build a different reality in 
which everybody counts. This reality would be new because it bears in mind present 
circumstances, including all that occurred in the last forty years. Thus, it was not a 
question of stopping time to take it up again at a certain, more favorable point of the 
past, but of stopping it to change its course now and fill it with meaning. That is, to 
transform into real the latent ideals and values that had been cut short in Polish history, 
such as independence, freedom and democracy, so that a “regenerated” society, which 
has “recovered” historical knowledge, memory and podmiotowość, can take charge of 
its future once and for all. 
In order to contribute to this historical knowledge and rehabilitation of victims, 
Kersten approached the circumstances in which Poles arrived to the elections of January 
1947. She pointed out, for instance, that by Spring 1945, after more than five years 
standing War and systematic physical extermination in its own territory, Polish society 
was not only greatly damaged, but also exhausted, disoriented and disappointed both 
with its government-in-exile and with Western allies due, among other things, to the 
Yalta Agreements, which were interpreted by many as a betrayal and an abandonment. 
Some kind of order and re-organization of postwar life was badly needed and, for this 
reason, many waited impatiently for their towns and villages to be liberated by the Red 
Army, which was advancing westwards.   
On the other hand, in the meantime the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
(PKWN) managed to not be perceived as a mere occupation power. All social groups, 
including a considerable number of inteligenci, began to carry out different activities to 
rebuild the country, which were seen as a must in order to preserve its social and 
biological existence. This didn’t mean that the majority of Poland’s inhabitants 
supported actively PKWN and the idea of establishing a Communist government: the 
interaction between society and PKWN was limited and Communists met reluctance 
frequently. Polish society was somehow “forced” to a provisional commitment with the 
new authorities, but tried to move away as far as possible from capitulation. However, 
passiveness was beginning to spread, and fears to rise, the hopes for a real victory 
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mingling with the conviction of the need of going back to “normal life” regardless of 
what kind of government and system was established.    
After the 1946 referendum, which was carried out as a first rehearsal and in order 
to gain some time, Polish Communists tried to “persuade” the population through 
propaganda and other less subtle means about the convenience of supporting them in the 
forthcoming elections: by affirming, for instance, that a change of regime would entail 
the loss of the recently-incorporated Western territories, by resorting to patriotic and 
nationalist slogans and leaving aside the economic and class contents of their program, 
by attacking physically and verbally their political opponents and “partners” in the 
Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN), such as Mikołajczyk’s PSL, or by 
repressing anybody else who complained or opposed to the new powers692. This was the 
way they ended up destroying whatever remained of people’s resistance, by denying 
them any change expectations, making them give up and accept faits accomplis. To only 
force people to participate in the elections and vote for the Polish Workers’ Party 
(Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR) wasn’t so crucial or had such long-lasting effects, 
because, in any case,   
 
the results of the elections could always be falsified. It was above all a psychological operation: a 
tired society had to yield ultimately to force. Repressions, arrests, house searches, dismissals, 
blackmail, the compulsory signature of a collaboration agreement─ affected hundreds of 
thousands of people, but fear, together with hopelessness, made the remaining millions vote 
against their will and convictions, ruining permanently society’s ability of opposing the new 
system. To crush society morally created the necessary conditions to impose a world of 
appearances, characteristic of this system, where words, symbols and rituals lost their authentic 
content and meaning and became ornamental masks.693 
 
Tadeusz Łepkowski shared her views when he remarked that  
 
A citizen who is submitted by terror gradually (though relatively quickly) loses the honorable right 
to call himself a citizen and becomes the serf of the omnipresent and almighty (as he believes in 
his penetrating fear) power apparatus. (…) Uncontrolled fear rejects the opposition to evil that 
instills calm and (I would say) constructive courage, it degenerates humanity (…), produces 
passiveness and apathy, egoism and selfishness, a feeling of powerlessness and resignation, 
senselessness and the incapability of doing something sensible, it makes one agree with the 
unwanted (many times simply with evil), succumb to lies and co-participate in them (…), finally a 
complete social and moral accommodation [takes place].694 
  
In her Conclusions for Narodziny…, Kersten resorted to the words of the back 
then Czech dissident and writer Václav Havel to highlight the deep moral damage that 
yielding and the lack of resistance causes within a group, in this case within Czech 
society since the Munich Diktat of 1938695. In another later text, already as President of 
the Czech Republic, Havel asked himself: 
 
Didn’t the ‘less moral’ decisions have deeply adverse effects in the political sense as well? Didn’t 
the moral traumas resulting from these decisions have a profound and long-lasting political 
impact? We do not know what the consequences would have been of decisions to the contrary 
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─the more ‘moral’ ones. But we can well imagine that in the latter case the effects might not have 
been so deep, so long-lasting, or so fatal. There would most likely have been heavier immediate 
losses of both human life and property, and greater immediate physical suffering. But wouldn’t we 
have spared other losses, the less visible yet deeper and more permanent ones ─the losses caused 
by the damage done to the moral integrity of our national community?696 
 
According to Kersten’s works, in Poland’s case a reluctant society was eventually 
compelled to give up due to reasons one can deem understandable, but yielded in any 
event, and hence lost its dignity and podmiotowość. The 1947 elections became the first 
postwar example of en masse behavior against one’s own convictions and rights. 
Politics and elections acquired new, negative connotations and began to be perceived as 
a mere masquerade to legitimize de facto the law of the strongest. Dejection, apathy and 
fatalism spread among the Poles697. Far worse than material poverty, this defeat carried 
moral misery. Communist politicians managed to debase their own society and turn it 
into an ethical and spiritual Lumpenproletariat in the name of so-called proletarian 
revolution, so-called progress and Poland’s rebuilding after the War.  
Despite Bronisław Geremek’s work La potence ou la pitié (1987) focused mainly 
on the feelings and attitudes towards poverty in Europe during the late Middle and early 
Modern Ages, it is inevitable to wonder, as Michel Sot did698, whether the Polish 
historian wasn’t also making a critical reference to the present situation, perhaps to his 
country’s recent past, when he asked himself if the price to pay for capitalism/ 
economic progress had to be so high (increase of poverty, change of official policies 
towards it, including much more indifference and repression, less charity and 
compassion), or when he concluded that, when values and human virtues (re-)emerged, 
any outrage committed against them was condemnable, because “historical necessity” 
cannot be a valid argument when individuals and groups have been divested of their 
natural rights:   
 
La naissance de la société moderne s’accompagnait d’une brutale détérioration des relations 
humaines, qui constituait, selon les historiens en socio-économie, le prix social de l’essor du 
capitalisme. Fallait-il vraiment que ce prix fût si élevé? ─il serait vain, de nos jours, d’essayer de 
trouver la réponse, ou de se demander dans quelle mesure ce prix se justifiait par rapport aux 
règles de l’éthique. Il est à noter, en revanche, que la politique sociale mise en oeuvre grâce aux 
'moyens des riches', à l’aube de l’âge moderne, a été en général approuvée par les contemporains; 
peu de gens ont manifesté leur révolte face à une politique qui a préféré les potences et les prisons 
à la charité. Les sentiments et les valeurs les plus nobles, considérés comme les vertus suprêmes de 
l’humanité, apparaissent au grand jour et déterminent le comportement des collectivités seulement 
lorsque la réalité y consent. Et, à ce moment, sont aussi désavoués tous les actes qui ont porté 
atteinte à ces valeurs les plus précieuses, car même la nécessité historique ne saurait être une 
excuse là où les individus et les collectivités se trouvent dépouillés de leurs droits naturels.699 
 
In the speech he delivered in Warsaw’s French Institute to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the French Catholic journal Esprit (late 1986), Geremek inspired himself 
─not surprisingly, regarding the subject of his historical researches─ in a fragment of 
Benjamin Disraeli’s (1804-1881) political novel Sybil (1845). In the chosen passage, 
Egremont, one of the characters, speaks about two “nations” which live “together” but 
ignoring and disliking each other; they do not know anything about their respective 
habits, thoughts and feelings, and have different ways of life, formation and education, 
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as if they were inhabitants of different planets. Geremek suggested the use of the same 
metaphor for Poland’s present context; hence, the “two nations”, which originally 
referred to the great socio-economic gap there was between the few, privileged rich and 
the poor, would allude in the Polish case to a political division (though it also involved 
an economic factor): that between the rulers and the ruled, my and oni (us and them), as 
they usually said in the country back then. The two groups had different behaviors, 
supported by divergent systems of values, plus felt mutual distrust and estrangement. 
They even spoke different languages. The problem about this was that the vast majority 
of Polish nation felt humiliated and under compulsion, having lost its rights as a 
“subject-agent”. Since, according to Geremek, the “objectivization” of Polish society700 
had taken place in the public sphere, to overcome this unfair situation the person-
citizen, social groups and society in general must recover their political podmiotowość 
in the name of a sense of justice which is simply a moral imperative701.   
In the eyes of some critical inteligenci, in the 1970s and 1980s dignity and 
podmiotowość were beginning to be retrieved, especially since the formation of 
Solidarność. And, in the light of past experience, Poles should never allow those 
qualities to be taken away from them again. In this sense, Adam Michnik’s article “Why 
You Are Not Signing” acted as a double reminder because, besides reminding himself 
and his imprisoned opposition colleagues the reasons for not collaborating with 
Communist authorities or signing a declaration of loyalty to PRL government despite 
repression, he also reminded his readers not to forget the outstanding behavior of those 
Poles who refused to give up. The best and most effective way to pay tribute to them 
and, simultaneously, to change things nowadays, was by following their steps. This was 
what he called “the argument of memory”:     
 
The history of your nation is fixed in your memory. You know that in its history a loyalty 
declaration signed in jail has always been a disgrace, loyalty to oneself and to the national tradition 
a virtue. You can remember those who were tortured and jailed for long years but who signed no 
declarations. And you know that you, too, will not sign them, because you are unable and 
unwilling to renounce the memory of the others, especially since there are certain people who keep 
on popping up in your memories: those who lost the battle for dignity in prison.702 
 
For Michnik, to betray oneself in this way was not only tantamount to betraying 
or letting down fellow opposition colleagues: it also meant to betray and forget those 
who had sacrificed their lives before in the name of higher values and the freedom of 
future generations703. A “double crime” or, at least, something not to be proud of, that 
would draw those who yielded closer to the state of complete moral surrender the 
“winners” want the “defeated” to be in: “Every loyalty declaration is an evil; and a 
declaration that has been forced out of you is an evil which you were compelled to 
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commit, although it may, at times, be a lesser evil. So this act sometimes deserves 
understanding, always compassion, but never praise”704.  
Therefore, present-day resistance and opposition were perceived as two-way 
redeeming actions if connected to past “defeats”.  When danger and need were more 
severe, “a tiger’s leap into the past” is performed in search of something that could be 
brought back to the present. Present-day victims appropriated the claims for justice and 
other imponderables of former defeated, “skipping” the gap between life and death, but 
not just in the generation or affinity sense: “old” niepokorni705 can (so to speak) support 
mentally or technically “young” oppositionists because there is a stronger link of 
purpose and “destiny” between them, but they can also “redeem” all the people within 
society who had given up and had been forced to forget about their own rights, 
capacities and power, plus about past defeats and its victims. In other words, those who 
have been “defeated by life” in some way (yielded due to despair and fear, to spare their 
families’ lives or their own, deluded themselves or were already born and raised in that 
system and apathetic atmosphere) are given the opportunity to “inherit” the dignity, 
consistency and courage of the “defeated by death and subsequent oblivion”, that is, 
those whom only death managed to crush. The present-day redeemed, in turn, give 
meaning to the lives of past defeated and restore them to their deserved place in history, 
hence completing the double redemption process. 
Krystyna Kersten considered that, except for Polish Communist rulers, every 
single Pole was defeated in the mid-forties. Back then, she argued, society was divided 
basically into two groups, regardless of their social origins and political commitments: 
on the one hand, people who believed that an engagement with the Communist 
government was definitely out of the question; on the other hand, those who thought 
that the only way they could make a difference in Polish state’s and nation’s fate was to 
participate in what was taking place. In both sides there were people with different 
views about social and economic change, democrats and supporters of an authoritarian 
people’s or national regime, traditional right-winged and leftists (among the latter: 
socialists and PSL backers). Thus, the point was which attitude would make Poland be 
better off bearing in mind the Red Army’s occupation of its territory and the recently-
signed international treaties, how to protect Polish population, exhausted due to War 
and occupation, and at the same time ensure the conditions it needed to survive and to 
preserve its national cultural identity. 
Kersten thought that politicians and citizens who were against an agreement with 
the Soviet Union were realistic in some way: with the Red Army’s and Communists’ 
dominion of Polish lands and government, respectively, to sign a declaration about 
Poland’s sovereignty was just an attempt to conceal from Polish and international 
society the revolutionary coup d’état Communists were carrying out with Stalin’s aid. 
They also foresaw Mikołajczyk’s failure in trying to reach an agreement with them. 
However, she pointed out, these “realists” who refused to negotiate from the start were 
defeated as well, and so were the ones who thought that only by admitting the Soviet 
Union’s and PPR’s supremacy there would be chances of developing social life in a 
country within USSR’s influence area. Thus, nothing could be done from any position 
in the face of Moscow’s unconditional dominion. That defeat was a burden in Polish 
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political thought during the following thirty years, until a generation who hadn’t lived 
these events first-hand entered public life706. 
But Kersten also devoted some reflections to them (oni), the Polish Communists and 
“winners of history”. She did so in the two versions of her Preface to the journalist Teresa 
Torańska’s homonymous book (Oni), which consists of interviews to former senior 
officials of the Communist system who had fallen into disgrace, but still maintained their 
ideological convictions. Already in her first underground version under pseudonym, 
Kersten highlighted that these former leaders “divide schizophrenically the real world and 
the ideological world”707. This idea is the starting point of a comprehensive, albeit always 
critical approach to past Communist leaders on Kersten’s part. 
In her theoretical and methodological analysis of the interviews, she reflected on 
the nature of memory and knowledge, and on the blurry line dividing knowing and not 
knowing: self-deceit or self-justifying resources, suppression of memories, what 
somebody really knows about, but would rather not, what one doesn’t know he/she 
knows or what someone thinks he/she knows but in fact doesn’t… For a historian, who 
is aware of the reluctance of Communist ex-leaders when pressed and egged on by 
Torańska, the most important information that such privileged sources can give is 
provided in an unconscious, unintentional way.   
Kersten tried to understand Polish Communists’ way of thinking in the past and in 
the present by arguing they found themselves before two essentially different orders: the 
national one, which gave priority to Polish national interests, and the revolutionary 
supranational one, where national values were only taken on account if they fitted into 
the framework of the socialist advance that would lead to the liberation of humanity, 
and which was incarnated in the historical necessity of progress. In theory, the main 
goals for Polish Communists were the proletarian revolution and Socialism but, in 
practice, that boiled down to the Soviet Union’s policies. The clash between these 
opposite value systems can be spotted in the interviewees’ use of two linguistic 
registers, or even different languages: Polish and “Newspeak” (nowomowa), the latter 
being characteristic of all Sovietized Socialist regimes. It can be appreciated too through 
their contradictions and inconsistencies, such as the way they justified the establishment 
of PRL system back then (fulfillment of revolutionary ideals) and how they explain it 
now (out of need, as the lesser evil, had to take on account Soviet pressures…). To put 
it briefly, a Polish Communist patriot would be simultaneously, through a para-logical 
reasoning process, a Soviet patriot and, in consequence, he or she would treat the 
USSR’s interests as a priority instead of Poland’s708.  
Polish Communists very rarely recognized that, to a great extent, and willingly or 
not, they were “the tools and executors of the Kremlin’s political plans”. Nevertheless, 
Kersten perceived an authentic feeling of impotence and obligation within their 
statements and explanations, besides concealed fear709. So, in her effort to go deeply 
into the views and reasons of the “winners” (already “former winners” by the time the 
second Preface appeared), and thus understand better the mental and ideological training 
of a period which belonged to the past, she posed an empathetic question: “who were 
them for them?”. That is: if Polish society feared and simultaneously despised 
Communist aparatchiks and collaborators, who did they, in turn, fear and despise?  
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According to her, Polish Communists were twofold “accused” (oskarżoni): on the 
one hand, by all the people who opposed Communist system; on the other hand, by their 
own fellow-comrades once they fell into disgrace. Therefore, they lived under a double 
threat and pressure, because they secretly feared their own society and political 
opponents (Mikołajczyk, Polish government-in-exile…), but they probably feared even 
more the USSR and what Stalin or his successors could do to them710.  
Hence, Krystyna Kersten’s brief essays on Polish “winners of history” turn out to 
be, in a sense, an approach to a peculiar kind of “victims”, in the light of their morbid, 
schizophrenic behavior. Poland’s Communists were, above all, victims of their own 
delusion, ambition and lack of principles, which led them to be manipulated and 
exploited by foreign interests in Polish society’s detriment. But empathy has moral 
limits, and the author in no way tries to justify their wrongdoings, only to show the 
unhealthy results such behaviors brought about. Therefore, criminals and repressors 
should in any case answer for what they did and for what they supported, for all the 
victims they produced besides themselves.  
Consequently, Kersten thought that the interviews in Oni are at bottom a moral 
trial: younger generations of Poles, such as Torańska’s, pick up the baton of the 
“defeated of history” and demand explanations about the possible pasts that miscarried: 
 
The encounters of Teresa Torańska, a journalist who was born and raised in Poland under 
Communist power, with Communists belonging to the generation of her parents, and perhaps of 
her grand-parents, were not an ordinary contact between the Young and the Old, between the 
representatives of the incoming generations and people of the outgoing generations. There is in 
this encounter a considerable amount of tragedy, because the young woman who poses questions 
and demands the truth simultaneously accuses and calls to account. She calls her interviewees to 
account and demands them to testify, driven not only by her thirst of knowledge and truth, but also 
─maybe above all─ by moral reasons. She personifies defeat, though she is the living proof that 
Polish society resisted, couldn’t be “rebuilt anew”, preserved its identity, with its great defects and 
wonderful virtues. And after forty years a considerable part [of Polish society] speaks critically 
about the role played by Communists, especially by those who were in power before 1956.711 
 
Kersten’s previous words contain two other basic ideas present in her earlier 
historical reflections: firstly, the ultimate victory of the previously “defeated” Polish 
society; secondly, its diversity, which can never be given up, thus reinforcing her 
inclusive socio-political proposal for the future. That’s the reason why she argued in 
Narodziny systemu władzy that everybody lost in 1943-1948 but that, in the end, 
everybody won: 
 
The second part of the sentence with which I began these last remarks is well-founded if we 
take a look at that new generation change ─at Solidarność’s generation─: everyone won the 
struggle to preserve and develop Polish society in every field of its existence. Irrespective of the 
more or less favorable international conditions and the evolution of the Soviet system since 1956, 
different traditions, different patriotic models, antagonistic and at the same time complementary 
ideological and political frameworks must have been kept alive so that Poles could fully preserve 
their cultural identity. The problem of realism, as well as the reflection about imponderables, 
appear nowadays otherwise than in 1944 or 1945, the forms of commitment are different, as well 
as the controversies about the ways to fight. Everything takes place within a living community, 
rooted in history, in various social and idiosyncratic nuclei. However, the Poles of 1944 had to 
play, without being aware of it, different roles so that what happened [later] could take place. 
Almost every single one of these roles was indispensable for Poland to continue being Poland.712 
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Once again, we perceive in these comments the wish to overcome what are seen 
as obsolete divisions among the Poles and to work towards understanding and 
inclusiveness, because to accept and value diversity, to assume what happened in the 
past, especially at the beginning of the Communist period, and allow that wound to heal, 
is the basis of the democratic, balanced and conciliating system Poland should aspire to. 
This time, the collective defeats of the past should be transformed in an equally 
collective victory.  
Similarly, we also spot the same idea regarding the inevitability of certain events 
from the Polish point of view. According to this, Poland’s inhabitants were swept up by 
the current of history in the forties despite their multiple and varied attempts to avoid it 
(to fight, not to yield, to negotiate, to yield to diminish losses…). The moral that can be 
learnt seems to be that, sometimes, a people must endure defeat in the short term in 
order to have the chance of succeeding in the long run. As long as memory and the 
claims for justice are not completely lost, as long as some people put up a fight, a 
society can rise from its own ashes. The new attempt of younger generations gives a 
meaning to the defeats of the older. 
 
 
B.3) PRL times and the prelude to massive social awakening 
 
According to Tadeusz Łepkowski, all social classes in Poland collaborated to a 
certain degree with Communist authorities and institutions, and not just reluctantly, for 
the sake of survival or as the result of an inevitable daily co-existence and interaction. 
While Kersten rather focused on the moral defeat that such submission had entailed and 
presumed bona fide or, ultimately, fear and exhaustion in people’s decisions, the former 
also considered other motivations in a more explicit manner, whether related to 
idealistic premises, selfish collective interests or individual profit. Blinded by these, 
many Poles ignored ethics and let themselves be persuaded by the rising powers, so that 
social debasement went even further. 
On the one hand, peasants hoped to obtain lands, so part of them supported the 
government in spite of their fear of Bolshevism and the sovkhoz-kolkhoz organization of 
property that was predictably going to take place. Contrary to expectations, Łepkowski 
assured next that only a small percentage of the workers actually sided with the 
Communist regime, so its major backing came mostly from intellectuals, due to 
romantic leftist, positivistic, patriotic or self-seeking reasons. On the other hand, age 
played an important role in people’s positions too, since the socialist revolution was 
carried out or aided by a quite significant part of the young, who wished career 
opportunities and adventure. They were soon organized in a national association and, 
full of faith and fanaticism, devoted all their efforts and sacrifices to the transformation 
of the country and the building of the new State. By the mid-1950s, however, some of 
them began to back off from official stances and attempted to change the regime from 
within (1956), while the rest remained as part of the apparatus and carried on with their 
careers. Thanks to all that constant or occasional assistance from Polish inhabitants, 
PRL’s endeavors to “sovietize” society were more successful and efficient.  
Starting from a state of complete material and social fabric destruction, to rebuild, 
restore, modernize, or universalize public services could only bring about considerable 
improvements in people’s lives; however, all this went hand in hand with a drastic 
reduction of freedom, for authorities were aware that they didn’t count with society’s 
mandate. The government’s central planning of economy aimed to organize and 
thoroughly control society, regarding it as a mere working force, while in factories 
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workers lacked motivations and limited themselves to fulfill the assigned task. Besides 
this, the Poles were constantly bombarded with Communist propaganda anywhere they 
went (streets, schools, army, trade unions, associations…) and through mass media, and 
the newly instated security services, together with their anonymous collaborators, made 
the development of pluralistic political life or the display of any kind of dissent a very 
risky job, especially in Stalinist times (1944-1956)713.  
Everyday life, thus, became in many aspects the prolongation of the moral 
surrender undergone in 1944-1947. Out of fear and compulsion, “the majority of society 
started to live a double life by clearly separating what it thought in private from what 
was said publicly”714. In Bielecki’s eyes, the Poles’ “second life” was both a kind of 
social boycott against the government and, especially in economic matters (black 
market), a corrupted system where each person pursued his or her own interests, in 
many occasions out of need715.      
In any case, critical intellectuals soon looked out in the recent past for the features 
that, in their opinion, had made People’s Republic of Poland differentiate itself from 
other surrounding socialist regimes along the decades. First, the country’s pluralistic 
society had constantly opposed post-revolutionary and arbitrary governments, so that, 
slightly contradicting the previous idea of an absolute moral defeat, Łepkowski and 
others believed that some social resistance had actually remained behind or quickly 
appeared once more in the face of new events. Secondly, as a result of this, social 
revolts or crises broke out periodically, sometimes with a political content and with a 
view to alter the bases of Poland’s systemic dependence on the USSR (1956, 1968), 
other times against socio-economic policies that worsened life standards (1970, 1976). 
Third, thanks to the strength and the moral and political prestige of the Catholic Church, 
Communist authorities had been compelled to make some concessions. Fourth, 
agriculture had avoided collectivization to a considerable extent and there also existed 
some space for the private sector in cities. Finally, due to social pressure as well, 
authorities had been forced to allow some political and cultural pluralism, though 
closely supervised (eg. through censorship) and with hardly any effective influence in 
decision making. Therefore, for inteligencja those distinctive features had more to do 
with social attitudes, positions and reactions than with voluntary governmental 
initiatives716. 
Nevertheless, beyond an action-opposition chain, PRL government’s 
arrangements had also contributed to an increasingly adverse state of affairs for 
Communist rule because they created the conditions that restored part of its strength to 
society. The reconstruction of the country, the occupation of the new western territories 
or the 1950s intensive industrialization and urbanization favored national integration 
and solidarity links, so that Poles developed a community of destiny. Universal 
education, scientific development and a wide access to culture managed to change and 
broaden millions of people’s views, though certainly steered, bureaucratized and 
restricted from above. In addition, the “national-Communist” creed related to national 
consciousness and society’s faith in its own power which was taught at schools actually 
backfired on authorities more than once and became, as we will see, one of the main 
dialectic weapons of oppositionists from the mid-1970s, but especially since the 
irruption of Solidarność in the public sphere. That is, instead of uniting the majority of 
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society in favor of the Communist system, authorities eventually managed to unite it 
against themselves717.   
According to opposition narratives, as years went by, an avant garde of all social 
groups (but mainly intellectuals, students and workers) began to define themselves as an 
opposite or alternative pole to Communist authorities and were each time less and less 
willing to reach an agreement with them or yield to their pretensions. These initially 
modest proposals gathered momentum along the decades, its promoters reconsidered 
their goals and strategies, pooled them or went over their mistakes and misperceptions. 
For example, for Aleksander Smolar, the working class had been acquiring more and 
more consciousness of its own strength and the State’s limits since December 1970 
protests, which opened new spaces of freedom. Some years before, once Stalinism was 
over, part of the inteligencja, either individually or collectively, started to regain its 
intellectual, moral and even political role718. Jan Józef Lipski saw the return of former 
Communists to critical stances in Christian ethical terms. As a founding member of 
KOR, he witnessed how many of them redeemed and “rejoined the flock”, and did so 
with understanding: “… there was probably some shared memory of the joy of finding 
one’s lost sheep; or that Peter denied Christ three times out of fear; or that Saul, the 
oppressor of Christians, was rightly forgiven when he came to join them; or that only 
those who are themselves without sin have the right to cast the first stone”719.  
However, Smolar esteemed that, if analyzed soberly, the socio-political initiatives 
created as a consequence of the 56, 68, 70 and 76 crises were isolated or few cases, for, 
in general, at least up until 1978 Polish society had had only a “negative” participation 
in public life, that is, it had only prevented or made more difficult the enforcement of 
laws or other measures, rather than taking an openly active role720. Nevertheless, 
already back then other more aware and committed attitudes were being encouraged in 
books and articles, as well as through activism. 
The same year Smolar made the aforementioned appraisal, for instance, Czesław 
Bielecki noted that the idea or feeling that the Polish government no longer depended 
exclusively on the Communist Party, but also on the international context and the 
situation at home in the light of recent events (Helsinki Conference both in Finland’s 
capital and Belgrade, Carter’s policies, the appearance of opposition groups forcing an 
amnesty in 1977 and putting an end to the monopoly over information and culture) was 
rapidly spreading. There was an increasing consciousness about society being able to 
make a change. PRL apparatus had weakened because it could no longer carry out mass 
terror policies like in the first decade of its existence, so society had to try to profit from 
this and from its periodical crises. In his view, henceforward bloody revolts should be 
avoided; instead, the Poles needed to develop internal, organic work based on 
organized, constant pressure demanding reforms and pushing towards the fall of the 
regime. The Polish people had to be prepared to take up more responsibilities in 
decision making and force the government to really represent the nation and pursue 
society’s goals and interests instead of the USSR’s or its own721. 
In the second half of the 1970s, among former Communists, revisionists, 
neopositivists722, left-winged or right-winged intellectuals, students, Catholic circles or 
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workers, there appeared a series of groups with different socio-political programs and 
proposals. Their features varied in many senses: a great number of its participants had 
been already involved in previous critical initiatives (eg. October 1956, March 1968 at 
Warsaw University, protest letters, 1970 protests and riots…), while for others it was 
virtually the first time; some collectives were clearly opposition-like from the beginning 
or soon after (i.e. the government perceived them as a threat and persecuted them), 
others had existed for decades but approached opposition stances more decidedly since 
1976, others differed from official views but were half-tolerated and yet others aimed to 
act as intermediaries between oppositionists and officialdom.   
All of them were regarded by Jerzy Holzer as part of the mosaic that created a 
favorable social breeding ground for the formation of Solidarity, in a kind of snowball 
effect: the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR/ KSS “KOR”), the Student Committee 
of Solidarity (SKS), the Committee of Free Trade Unions of Upper Silesia or the Free 
Trade Unions of the Coast in Gdańsk (WZZ), the Robotnik magazine, Polskie 
Porozumienie Niepodległościowe (PPN), the Flying University and the Society for 
Academic Courses (TKN), the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civic Rights 
(ROPCiO), the Young Poland Movement (RMP), the Confederation for an Independent 
Poland (KPN), the Movement of Free Democrats (RWD), the collaborating Znak (out 
of the Sejm since 1976) and Catholic Inteligencja Clubs (KIK), the Konwersatorium 
“Experience and Future” (DiP)…, though, in his opinion, some had had much more 
direct influence in the events that followed than others723.  
In any case, they all had several important aspects in common: first, they believed 
that, in order to make changes in the system, social pressure had to be necessarily put on 
the government; in other words, Polish society had to regain its place and prominence in 
the public sphere and get involved as much as possible in the demands and the process 
of transformation. Secondly, in order for these ideas to reach as many people as 
possible, critical groups spread them through some kind of press organ, besides leaflets, 
mostly in drugi obieg724.  
The foundation of the Workers’ Defense Committee in 1976 was an important 
milestone in this sense because it implied either a change in or a deepening of 
inteligencja’s perception of the rest of society, both in theory and, most importantly, in 
practice. With their rapprochement to workers as a consequence of the repressive wave 
ensuing from June protests, KOR intellectuals started up a bottom-to-top initiative: they 
decided to focus primarily on the grassroots level (help people with money, legal or 
medical advice, finding them a job or moral support) and, only later on, aim for higher 
targets. Jan Józef Lipski explained it this way: 
 
First, we fought simply so that the workers who were beaten, imprisoned, and dismissed from their 
jobs would not be abandoned and alone, and so that they and their families would be able to live a 
little more easily through the period of fury directed against them by the apparatus of violence. 
Later, we broadened our goals, singling out two at the very end of the road: democracy and 
independence.725  
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KOR began, thus, by aiding the victims of Communism in their daily needs and 
defense of rights. An apparently humble task if compared to the ultimate wish of 
transforming PRL system. However, they helped to turn words into deeds and to 
“reconcile” two social strata that had acted separately and without the other’s support 
for decades. In addition, through the argument that every individual mattered, they 
contributed to restore the repressed workers’ dignity and to prevent their tragic 
experience from falling into oblivion: 
 
This was a struggle with totalitarianism in its Bolshevik version, for which any individual life 
counted for nothing and could be sacrificed at any time to the Moloch726 of a so-called socialism, 
to the interests of the ruling class, party, or clique. KOR had no choice but to be different; here one 
could offer a sacrifice for oneself, when one believed that it was necessary and right, but never of 
anyone else, although this was never discussed in KOR and any discussion would have been 
considered inappropriate.727  
 
The Workers’ Defense Committee was one of the first associations to spur Poles 
to organize themselves autonomously and from the basis, so that its creation was later 
seen (especially by its upholders) as a crucial step in Polish society’s process of 
empowerment and recovery of podmiotowość, which reached its zenith in 1980-1981. 
There were, as well, other ways to promote this in a complementary fashion 
during the mid-1970s. For example, two well-known figures in the journalistic media 
with different ideological backgrounds, Stefan Bratkowski and Stefan Kisielewski, 
decided to put ordinary people at the center stage by telling their (hi)story or inciting 
them to know more about it. In Bratkowski’s opinion, empowerment had to take place 
too through the retrieval of people’s personal past, which he encouraged all his readers 
to discover and explore:   
 
We have grown up believing that the right to a past is unevenly distributed in our society. That 
some families must have such past ─those belonging to the upper strata of the old Poland─, and 
the rest have nothing to appeal to because their past is anonymous, fluid, it doesn’t belong to 
anybody, there is none. However, that belief stems from absurdly false premises; we have 
democratized present time (despite the efforts of some of our petty tyrants, we consider even them 
equal to the other citizens), but we have not carried out a social revolution towards the past.728   
 
If after returning from that dive into the past such advice was also followed to the 
letter in the (supposedly democratized) present, it might very well suggest that each 
person, no matter who he or she is, can contribute to improve and change the course of 
events, that what he or she does is important and, therefore, worthy to preserve.  
Hence, for Kisielewski, it was not just a question of recovering the past, full stop. 
The next step was to look out for and protect today’s stories, for they could become 
history in the future (see Chapter 4). In a context of economic crisis, great price 
increases and complete governmental indebtedness, Tygodnik Powszechny’s columnist 
actually agreed with Karl Marx’s idea of history: it didn’t have to describe the 
adventures of kings and grandees, but of ordinary people, their situations and material 
circumstances, to appreciate their class struggles. The history of society, he proceeded, 
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was above all the history of economic relations and fluctuations, and of how the latter 
were reflected in behaviors, culture and mentalities (i.e. in the “superstructure”). Was 
such thesis only valid when it favored Communist rulers and not when, as in 1976, it 
turned against them by showing their blunders, failures and inconsistencies? Feeling 
like a chronicler or, as he said, like a “modern Kadłubek”729, Kisielewski believed that 
the hardships, disappointment and anger the Poles were experiencing needed to be told 
instead of being ignored and forgotten for the sake of Communist authorities’ 
convenience. In spite of censorship, he was trying to register and comment on what was 
really happening out on the streets, for he was persuaded that a country’s population 
was both the subject and the object of history730.  
With that same conviction, Polish intellectuals approached next to what they 
perceived as Polish society’s “rebirth” en masse: the formation and development of 
Solidarity.  
 
 
B.4) Polish society’s massive rebirth (1980-1989) 
 
In Bronisław Geremek’s eyes, the general crisis experienced by Communist 
systems in the Eastern Bloc and the “awakening” of society to an active public life 
(“l’éveil de la population à une vie publique active”) converged in 1989 and are 
essential to understand the end of these regimes in Europe. He believed, thus, that the 
Round Table’s success was achieved to a great extent thanks to the involvement of 
society in the process and its support of a democratic change, though it demanded that 
the latter be bigger and quicker:   
 
Le succès de la table ronde, tout comme la surprise tant de la direction soviétique que de la 
direction polonaise, ont été provoqués par la prise de parole des citoyens. Tandis que nous 
menions ces négociations, nous sentions que nous avions le plein appui de l’ensemble de la société 
polonaise, même lorsque celle-ci se plaignait que les choses traînaient, même lorsqu’elle était 
gagnée par le sentiment grandissant que nous pouvions obtenir plus et régler plus de choses 
encore.731 
 
Nonetheless, for the majority of intellectuals (including Geremek himself), this 
large-scale social awareness and prise de parole had taken place almost a decade before. 
Solidarność could be considered either its cause… or its consequence. 
  
 
B.4.1) Solidarność’s legal period (August 1980-December 1981) and inteligencja’s 
proposals for Polish society  
 
Opposition intellectuals’ interpretations as to what Solidarność was and how it 
came about were coincident or complementary in many ways. 
For Holzer, its foundation had nothing to do with an anti-governmental 
conspiracy. It was simply a response to an exogenous pressure ─that of PRL powers in 
the previous decade: “The history of the 70s made the society of Gdańsk’s Coast take a 
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strong dislike to the prevailing system and have a particular fighting spirit and 
radicalism, it shaped shipyard workers and their leaders”732. 
Lublin strikes733, which occurred hardly a month before August 1980’s Gdańsk 
events, laid down an important direct precedent in Geremek’s view. This was due to the 
fact that their form, level of organization and some of their programs and mottos 
transcended the usual material demands concerning bread and prices. A new quality had 
been forged: it was society’s “first act of awareness” and, thus, the igniting spark of a 
different kind of opposition on an unparalleled scale734.  
Along that Summer, the initially economic character of strikes and workers’ 
demands went beyond and soon acquired a political and more global meaning, to the 
point that, in the talks that followed the occupation strike of Gdańsk Shipyards (starting 
in August 14th), the government decided to attend political claims first rather than salary 
or family subsidy increases, which would do nothing but worsen an already catastrophic 
economic situation. The former included the reinstatement of fired companions like 
Lech Wałęsa or Anna Walentynowicz, the building of a monument in memory of the 
victims of governmental repression in December 1970 and a security guarantee for 
striking workers. However, according to Holzer, just a few days later governmental 
representatives rejected any political postulate, including the creation of independent 
trade unions, but were willing to negotiate even the most demanding economic 
conditions735. From the author’s narration, it can be deduced that Communist authorities 
realized only a little too late that these strikes had gone further than any other and that 
the political tune they had heard before almost exclusively in critical intellectual circles 
was now being played in factories too.  
Louder and louder, that music spread around the country, was performed in 
different ways and yielded better or worse results, but it was yet again in Gdańsk where 
most was achieved and where Solidarity was founded. How was the latter perceived and 
described back in the 1980s? 
Politically speaking, Solidarność was more than a workers’ independent trade 
union for intellectuals. Tadeusz Łepkowski highlighted, in the first place, the few but 
significant anarcho-syndicalist snippets present in its ideas, form and strategies, 
especially at the beginning. For instance, strikes were considered an omnipotent force, 
had a political, anti-governmental nature and addressed not only workers, but society in 
general, using the opposition “State-society” typical of anarcho-syndicalism736. The 
self-governing character and territorial structure of the Union (divided in regions), plus 
its recurrent appeals to solidarity (hence its name), were indebted to this ideology too. 
However, due to the Church’s influence and to the risk of being accused by PRL 
authorities of forming an anarchic, destructive movement that endangered the country’s 
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stability (which would justify its persecution and repression)737, Solidarność soon 
reduced its anarcho-syndicalist claims almost exclusively to the symbolic sphere738. 
In the second place, Solidarity contained a great deal of pro-democratic and pro-
autonomous elements. It carried out its activities openly, both in workplaces and the 
political arena, organized itself by means of free, democratic elections and many of its 
decisions were taken by a majority. The Union rejected violence, betted for 
understanding (“its words were extreme”, Łepkowski reckoned, “but its deeds and plans 
weren’t”) and wanted its negotiations with the government to be equally open. It 
represented moral and national renaissance, was idealistic (even partly utopic) and 
contained religious and humanistic-socialist components based on the concepts of truth, 
brotherhood and, yet again, solidarity. “It is clear to everyone”, this historian assured, 
“that the movement that began in Summer 1980 became a patriotic, national, democratic 
and pro-independence revolution fighting for the agency and independence of society-
nation-State”739.   
In the third place, both connoisseurs of Polish history and Polish opposition 
members alike dealt with the question about the revolutionary or non-revolutionary 
character of Solidarność. To Łepkowski’s mind, who agreed in defining it as such, a 
revolution was “an accelerated qualitative change in mentalities and the socio-political 
field (sometimes, though not necessarily, sudden and violent) carried out by a human 
group, and which, simultaneously, dragged the latter in a direction that was not always 
predicted or desired”. The indispensable ingredients for a revolution to break out were 
“a deep belief that a given situation is unbearable, that it’s unfair and hence morally 
intolerable. A spiritual, moral revolt against lack of freedom, against lies and hypocrisy, 
against the division into rulers and subjects, against abnormal normality, produces 
revolutionary stances. There cannot be a revolution without them”740.  
Besides the most widespread idea of “self-limiting revolution”, Jacek Kuroń also 
described Solidarity as an “evolutionary revolution”. This view was shared by Timothy 
Garton Ash, who added some other concepts and adjectives, like refolution (reform + 
revolution) or “revolution of the soul” (rewolucja duchowa). In his work The Polish 
Revolution (1983), the British historian explained:  
 
Solidarity was an attempt to make an evolutionary revolution. The specific question it 
posed was: can a self-organized society transform the political system of a state within the Soviet 
empire, by pressure from below, without violence?741 
One year after General Jaruzelski’s violent counter-revolution [December 13th, 1981] the short 
answer to this question appeared to be ‘no’. But the immediate aftermath is not the best vantage-
point: the English Revolution ended with the Restoration, the French with Napoleon: only from a 
longer distance of time could the revolutionary scale of those events be measured. We do not yet 
have the necessary distance.742  
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Up until August 1980, national revolution or renaissance had been a shared 
emotion (which, according to Törnquist Plewa, is the truth within the myth) that was 
expressed only through visual and verbal representations. It was understood as a 
past/frustrated past and a wish rather than as a present-time fact, or even something 
feasible. However, thanks to the achievements of striking workers and the ensuing 
foundation of Solidarity, this collective emotion was actually experienced by the 
majority of Polish society both first-hand and for the first time743. The way of 
expressing the myth had changed from a more passive, indirect and rationalized form to 
an active one, and, in a sense, so had many Poles’ way of facing the Communist regime. 
What had so far just been seen, heard, read or thought about suddenly seemed to spring 
to life, boosting morale plus the general degree of awareness and involvement. People 
had the chance of playing the starring role now.    
Still, it was not simply a one-way flow from the rational to the irrational: myths 
are in a state of constant flux. The emotional impact of having lived and witnessed 
Solidarność’s legal period could not linger in the air alone for too long, it had to be put 
into words and images almost at once, which meant a partial rationalization of that 
new/not so new sentiment that, unlike before, had now been felt directly. This was done 
by two means: through the political actions of Solidarity itself (which required rational 
and realistic planning) and through the interpretation of events provided by intellectuals. 
Despite its irrational nature, collective emotion was being steered in a wise and 
constructive way by Gdańsk strikers and, later, by the new independent trade union, 
according to Adam Michnik. It was possible to act critically and adapt to circumstances 
at the same time, so to live the myth and to behave realistically were not necessarily 
opposites. A “rational irrationality” implied the transformation of sheer emotions into 
realistic demands and political actions: 
  
I think that [the wisdom and maturity of striking workers consists] of a skillful translation of 
everyday anguish into the language of socio-political postulates, and into a precise and realistic 
consideration of real possibilities. The list of demands of Gdańsk’s Inter-Enterprise Strike 
Committee puts forward a fundamental change in the exercise of power, but all postulates 
remained behind the border delimited by the Soviet Union’s political and military presence in this 
part of Europe.   
Workers fought for the rights and interests of society as a whole. They fought for social rights 
and the rise of living standards, they fought for citizen rights and freedom of speech, for the right 
to agency and independent trade unions, for moral rights and the release of political prisoners.744 
 
In Michnik’s view, “each attempt to rule against society must lead to catastrophe” 
and, similarly, “each attempt to bring down Communist power in Poland means to 
attack Soviet interests. That’s reality. One may not like it, but it needs to be taken on 
account”745. Poles couldn’t aim for political transformation right away due to their 
country’s geopolitical situation, but they could nevertheless walk towards independence 
and democracy by building a freer, fairer, stronger and better organized society. It was 
possible to demand pluralism and truthfulness in media and public life, the end of 
preventive censorship and police violence, a rational economic reform and fair social 
policies, freedom in scientific and academic areas, social control of prices, the creation 
of movements defending consumers’ rights and independent justice courts. All of this 
should lead to a hybrid system combining a totalitarian State structure with democratic 
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social institutions, even if it was provisional. Hard, patient negotiation and dialogue 
between the government and society was the only means to attain it746.  
With the Gdańsk Agreements and the formation of Solidarity, it looked as if the 
message intellectuals had preached during years was finally reaching far beyond their 
scope and turning into broad-scale deeds747. 
As to the social composition of August 1980 phenomenon, inteligencja had two 
ways of tackling it: in different strata (as when dealing with previous historical periods 
and decades) or altogether, like a unity (people, the Poles, society…).  
In the first place, Tadeusz Łepkowski described Solidarność as a “young 
revolution”, both because it was being carried out by young people and because the 
freshness, impertinence, openness and sincerity of the latter had ended up “infecting” 
part of the older generations, rejuvenating them. This spoke against the traditional 
unfavorable image of youth as consumerist, easy-going and lacking ideas748.  
In the second place, the movement’s existence was indebted to a groundwork 
dating back decades ago, i.e. to the sum of efforts and struggles of almost all social 
strata in Poland. With the difference that what had been mainly separate endeavors 
before, in 1976-1981 seemed to have joined or drawn closer together. As Michnik put 
it:  
 
The Church’s opposition to atheistic policies, the villages’ resistance to collectivization, the 
intelligentsia’s defiance of censorship ─all made up the ‘Polish syndrome’ that bore fruit in the 
form of the August strikes and Solidarity. The actions of the intellectual groups that organized aid 
to the participants of the June 1976 strikes played a special role. It was then that a common 
denominator for the activities of different social groups, especially the intelligentsia and the 
workers, was successfully created.749 
 
In the third place, Solidarity was especially strong in industrial centers and big 
cities. Among the workers, the first to get involved were heavy industry’s. Among 
inteligencja, those devoted to creative activities. It then spread to workshop workers, 
and other inteligenci, then to peasants. Its impact was much more indirect in smaller 
towns750.  
For Łepkowski, there actually existed two working classes: firstly, a modern, 
progressive, westernized and independent one, which had started and headed 
Solidarność’s revolution (highly qualified workers like those in shipyards, metallurgic 
factories, precision components and electronic industries); and secondly, a traditional, 
subordinated, “easternized” one, with a low level of awareness and knowledge, who 
spoke ill about Solidarity or eventually joined it full of reticence and fear (workers 
belonging to the textile, construction food and agrarian industries). The first needed free 
trade unions, while the second would content itself with slightly improving the existent, 
State-controlled ones.  
As to intellectuals, the most committed were writers, artists (mainly from theater 
and cinema), scientists, workers of publishing houses, museums and libraries, some 
journalists and publicyści (though sometimes in an inconstant way, due to their status in 
the regime) and the most valuable teachers (unfortunately a minority). There were 
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Catholics and non-Catholics alike; some had already backed different opposition groups 
since the second half of the 1970s, but between August and October 1980 many more 
joined in751.  
In Łepkowski’s and Holzer’s view, the basis of Solidarity had been the alliance 
between workers and intellectuals. This was, in many of the latters’ eyes, a “traditional” 
link (1956) that had broken in some of the previous protests (1968, 1970) with a 
dramatic outcome. In 1976-1980, when inteligencja and workers’ independent groups 
had acted separately (KOR helped repressed workers rather than collaborating with their 
own organizations), the influence of the former in the course of events had been 
indirect. And then, in the Coast of Gdańsk, there converged the ideal conditions for the 
union to take place again: a very vivid memory of the massacres perpetrated during 
1970 strikes’ (some of whose most popular leaders were still active); dynamic 
intellectual and student opposition groups, especially connected to KOR or the Young 
Poland Movement, and a relatively strong workers’ opposition circle, organized as Free 
Trade Unions. Once the strikes were in full swing in August 1980, a few intellectuals 
made the first move and offered their help to workers in spite of governmental 
repression and attempts to avoid an inter-class understanding. Finally, a Commission of 
Experts was created to assist the Gdańsk’s Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee. That is, 
intellectuals put their economic, sociological and political knowledge at the service of 
strikers, and inspired many important reforms and projects752. The conclusion that could 
be drawn from such texts is that the collaboration between workers and intellectuals was 
an indispensable ingredient to change things due, in general, to the former’s number and 
strength and to the latter’s broader experience and know-how in negotiations and 
strategy design; that intellectuals seemed to be more eager and willing to approach 
workers than the other way round and that their wish was to provide guidance and 
counselling. In other words, it is inteligencja’s myth revisited.  
However, the Catholic Church’s social role in 1980-1981 events and before was 
not diminished either, even by non-believers. Actually, a left-winged intellectual like 
Michnik sought for inspiration in the Church as an independent institution co-existing 
with Communist authorities, in terms of negotiation of fields of action. At the same 
time, he acknowledged that it didn’t only represent its own interests, but was “the 
spokesperson of the wishes of society as a whole”753. Since the beginning, Solidarity 
defined itself as moral and Christian due to the faith and hope it exuded, its spirit and 
philosophy, its rejection of violence and goal of social understanding. Conversely, the 
relations of independent trade unions with the Church regarding ideological and 
political-organizational matters were far more complex and there was mutual reticence 
at some points. While the Church was centuries-old, full of experience and independent 
from any other initiative, Solidarność was a young and inexperienced movement that 
could only do without the Church’s support at a very heavy price. Therefore, there was 
certain dependence in that sense. In general, and especially before December 1981, the 
clergy was more radical and supported the Union more openly, while bishops and other 
Church hierarchy members behaved much more moderately, to the point that by the end 
of 1982 their stance regarding opposition movements was put into question by some, 
though this didn’t entail a deep crisis754.   
Finally, as to the peasants, on the whole they got involved in Solidarity’s activities 
only later (demanding, for instance, independent agricultural cooperatives or democratic 
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local council elections), and with considerable regional differences. Like in the working 
class, the most modern, richest and developed part of the countryside was usually the 
most engaged in independent initiatives. It was important to note, Łepkowski reminded, 
that a significant part of the middle and lower ranks in the Communist apparatus had 
peasant origins. In his opinion, a mass peasant movement against totalitarianism was 
impossible in present time but, given their mistrust of government, their contempt 
towards bureaucrats and their attachment to land, they also helped in the struggle 
against PRL755.  
If the Poles supporting Solidarity were regarded as a whole, the first aspect that 
drew intellectuals’ attention was its number. According to Łepkowski, while nineteenth-
century uprisings were organized and carried out by scarcely 2-3 % of the population, 
now there was one million of active and conscious people belonging to or directly 
committed with the movement, then a couple of millions forming the circle of 
convinced supporters, though linked to it in a less direct way, and, lastly, around 8-9 
million who backed Solidarność semi-actively, from time to time. In a country of about 
35.5 million people, this would overall mean about one third of the population. So, he 
remarked, unlike in the previous century, 1980-1981 strikes and protests were a 
celebration that addressed and awoke a significant part of the nation756.  
For Michnik, less visible contributions to oppose PRL system (whether by act or 
omission) should not be despised either, because the addition of small, daily deeds 
probably helped to change mentalities more effectively than anything else and created 
the necessary background for most ambitious initiatives to succeed: 
 
This pressure [of people] has manifested itself (…) more frequently through silent, dogged, daily 
resistance. This resistance is exemplified, for instance, in the refusal to make a denunciation. It 
permeates the mental atmosphere of a good part of our intellectual life (...). All this is usually the 
work of people who do not sign protest letters or make spectacular gestures of opposition. But it is 
also thanks to them that we in Poland have been breathing a different spiritual air. This spiritual air 
─this tissue of culture and national consciousness that is growing daily, invisibly─ is not simply 
the result of reading Zapis or Biuletyn Informacyjny or publishing in the Independent Publishing 
House (NOWa) but is the outcome of the totality of Polish accomplishments.757 
  
Czesław Bielecki also believed that, besides its members and collaborators, 
opposition movements were based fundamentally on a much broader social conspiracy 
(zmowa społeczna). In his view, that element made a theory become actual massive 
practice and, in the Polish case, it “referred to the world of ideals enrooted in the 
nation’s history and the experience of families”758. Nevertheless, since inteligenci 
traditionally assigned themselves the task of defining values and the writing of national 
history, it looked as if everything departed from them after all…  
Nowadays, Bielecki wrote, social conspiracy must adjust to circumstances and 
add more reflection and political theory to its formula in order to counterbalance 
traditional rash actions ─something which reminds us of the arguments brandished by 
critical intellectuals in the idealism vs. realism debate (Chapter 1): “In Poland, courage, 
street protests, the ability to resist, is not the problem ─we may add, it has not been a 
problem for two centuries─, even if they only were caresses against tanks. The problem 
is the nation’s degree of political consciousness and its transmission channels”759.  
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Society needed to build its own democratic structures and moral sphere, taking 
advantage of the “dual life” situation it was forced to live in and exercising other less-
practiced qualities, like “consistency, realism and patience”760. This way, when the 
international context changed and the right opportunity came round, the Poles’ parallel, 
“authentic” life would overcome the “false” one and an already free and democratized 
society would finally be able to build an equally democratic and independent State761.  
Similarly, education was regarded by many as fundamental for creating such 
public awareness. In particular, historical knowledge was, according to Kersten, the 
source of attachments and affections, but also of reason and wisdom, hence the 
insistence on the topic. Agency could be restored through the recovery of history762.  
In sum, now more than ever intellectuals’ target was to create and promote the 
idea of a united nation against the Communist regime (following the “us vs. them” or 
“society vs. State” logic), where everybody and every effort, no matter how humble, 
involuntary or even purposeless, counted, and where every governmental attempt to 
create discord among the Poles should fail. They believed that Solidarity had managed 
to join the majority of the population’s hopes, goals and endeavors and provided new 
opportunities for social collaboration that had to be steered towards more democracy, 
independence and education beyond governmental control. It expressed the rebirth of 
civil society and, therefore, the recovery of its lost podmiotowość763. 
In spite of this, as time went by some left-winged opposition intellectuals 
apparently began to have second thoughts about society making its own decisions. 
According to David Ost, as people played an increasingly important role, Polish 
inteligenci started to notice the flaws of a completely democratic functioning in 
practice, in which populism, nationalism or too radical, hasty and unwise resolutions 
could ultimately frustrate Poland’s aspirations (i.e. opposition inteligencja’s) to a 
democratic liberal system. Thus, instead of imagining a community fighting altogether 
for freedom and democracy, along the 1980s this proposal changed and the community 
appeared as definitely guided by intellectuals. In other words, power should be handled 
carefully and responsibly by experienced people in order to avoid miscarriage764.   
In our opinion, this tendency most probably increased since 1981, as Ost said, but 
could already be spotted before. At bottom, and whether leftists or rightists, intellectuals 
never ceased to see themselves at the lead or behind ongoing social changes.  
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B.4.2) December 1981: another defeat? 
 
 
The frustrated projects of those who were crushed by history 
are alive in their failure as a possibility or a demand of justice. 
(…) Mere possibility brings to life a past that seemed 
concluded because its “absence” calls into question the 
legitimacy of what’s factual and simultaneously allows past 
injustice to be present as a demand of justice. Because the past 
could have been otherwise, what exists now must not be seen 
as fatality beyond repair. And if present time contains a latent 
possibility coming from a past that could not be, we can then 
imagine a future for the possible rather than for the given 
present.  
 
Reyes Mate: Medianoche en la historia 
 
 
“I hereby announce that today the Military Council of National Salvation765 was 
established (…) and it declared, today at midnight, martial law over the entire country”, 
rang the voice of Prime Minister and PZPR’s First Secretary, General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, out of television sets at 6 a.m. on December 13th, 1981. Thus began the 
Martial Law period in Poland (December 13th, 1981-July 22nd, 1983), which entailed 
closed borders, the disconnection and ensuing tapping of telephone communications, 
the militarization of most prominent industries, curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., 
curtailment of freedoms (inviolability of private homes and correspondence), the 
closing of some schools of various types and levels, a tighter censorship, the internment 
of thousands of oppositionists and dozens of killings. 
From then on, a maimed and dwindled Solidarność would have to try to carry on 
in the underground. 
What had taken to that situation? Was Solidarity’s “Carnival” definitely over?  
Opposition inteligencja perceived two problematic sources prior to December 13th 
events: one coming from PRL authorities, the other from Solidarity members and 
upholders themselves.  
On the one hand, Holzer pointed out that from the beginning of August 1980 
strikes the government had strived to play them down and then carried out campaigns to 
discredit the whole initiative, something that didn’t come to halt with the Gdańsk 
Agreements and the formation of Solidarity. Hence, the fact that Communist power was 
ill-disposed to negotiate and yield at some points was sufficiently clear, even more so 
when its pro-reform nucleus lost the internal battle against the pro-Soviet one, by 
Summer 1981. On the other hand, in the year and three months previous to the coup 
Solidarność developed and experienced a radicalization, especially among grassroots 
activists. The Union’s power became overrated (even more so if bearing in mind their 
relatively low international impact) while Communist apparatus’ was underestimated, 
so that Solidarity’s representatives and National Commission were accused of being far 
too moderate in their aims and were egged on to put more pressure on the 
government766. Some intellectuals, like Geremek, already sensed back then that 
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authorities actually wished that the movement got carried away by extreme, demagogic, 
nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies, because that would provide them with an 
excellent pretext to ban it. According to Łepkowski, the government was planning from 
the start to dissolve the Union sooner or later and intensified the preparations since 
February 1981. Time was on its side: Solidarity was beginning to lose some support 
from ordinary people, the clashes between its leaders increased, as well as governmental 
provocations, and Polish society grew tired of daily economic difficulties767.   
In the Conclusion to his 1984 work Solidarność 1980-1981. Geneza i historia, 
Jerzy Holzer ventured an early interpretation and assessment both of PRL government’s 
and Solidarity’s positions before the coup. In a sense, the nature of such analysis was 
“para-historical” because the author allowed himself to wonder whether there had been 
any alternatives for oppositionists or anything both sides could have done to avoid that 
tragic ending768. 
In the first place, the Polish Communist regime was at a low ebb in 1980-1981. 
Unlike with previous protests and crises, on this occasion it hardly tried to interfere in 
the course of events. The Party had weakened and its cadres were discouraged; this was 
partly the indirect consequence of it losing a good deal of people’s trust and of its 
growing reticence to carry out even minimal reforms.  
In the second place, Polish society had never been so prepared to take part in the 
events ensuing from the workers’ strikes; opposition groups existing since a few years 
ago played a fundamental role in this context. The new organized movement decided to 
demand and foster reforms without resorting to violence. In addition, given Poland’s 
delicate dependent situation and bearing in mind the results of former national and 
international change attempts within the Communist Bloc, the promoters of Gdańsk 
shipyards’ strike and Solidarity chose to self-limit their goals and forms of activity.  
Once an agreement was reached, all sides of the conflict described it as an 
“engagement” (Solidarność, the Church, the government, the Communist Party…). For 
a considerable part of Polish society and its novel representatives, that engagement 
implied socio-economic and political transformations that would end up with 
Communists’ monopoly in public life. However, governmental and Party authorities 
regarded it as something they had been forced to accept provisionally, until the right 
time came to return to the previous situation by regaining total dominion. 
Could have Solidarity increased its chances of success, Holzer asked himself, by 
adopting a more moderate position when defining the permissible limits of the 
engagement or, on the contrary, by taking its adversary by surprise with a more radical 
behavior, and forcing it to make deeper transformations in the system? In his opinion, 
more moderation could have led to Solidarność’s self-destruction without attaining any 
of its ultimate objectives. Besides, everything that had been achieved at first was soon 
hampered by authorities and thus looked temporary and endangered. As a result, the less 
willing the government showed itself to carry out a minimum of reforms (delays and 
problems in registering Solidarity, police repression in Bydgoszcz, attacks against the 
Union…), the more radical and demanding Solidarity became (changes in justice courts, 
public prosecutors and the Milicja769, its own space in the media…). On the one hand, 
the Party and the government didn’t want changes to be permanent; on the other, people 
supporting Solidarity mistrusted verbal promises and felt they had to ensure those 
changes by weakening its adversary and challenging it in all fields. For Holzer, along 
PRL times there had always existed the same action-reaction scheme: society responded 
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to governmental pressure. The road of moderation was blocked, so the only possible 
way was to go radical.   
Radicalization, however, was not a wise option either, because in order to make 
changes irreversible it was necessary to weaken the inner forces that sustained 
Communist power (i.e. the army and the police). In doing so, Solidarity would have 
risked turning a bloodless revolution in a violent, armed war. Both the majority of 
society and the Church were against that so, in spite of increasingly radical activities, it 
was decided not to resort to physical confrontation. This was, to Holzer’s mind, the 
result of society’s ingrained aversion to a fratricidal war and of the fear both of 
provoking a clash between a disarmed crowd and the army/Milicja and of the 
internationalization of the conflict through the Soviet Union’s intervention. 
Therefore, oppositionists’ and society’s room for maneuver was minimal. It was 
true they had made many mistakes, but most divisions and conflicts had been due to 
personal and group rivalries rather than to clashing perspectives about the present and 
the future and, even regarded altogether, they only had a secondary influence in the 
course of events. Thus, besides specific variants, the general outline of Solidarity’s 
revolution was defined by the international context, and in the face of such reality there 
were only two alternatives: capitulation or defeat.  
Nevertheless, there never existed a real dilemma: a revolutionary process such as 
1980’s precisely involved the will of not surrendering in a voluntary way, even if it had 
entailed an apparently better state of things in the short term than a situation finally 
imposed by force. Solidarność’s leaders and advisers ─and, in fact, Polish society─ no 
longer believed that something could be achieved that way, as 1956 and 1970 
experiences had taught them. To yield would only mean a significant loss of support 
and power for the movement, its contribution to the worsening of the crisis, its 
manipulation by Communist powers and the calling into question of the idea of 
independent trade unions.  
Taking all this into consideration, Holzer reckoned that the lack of freedom 
caused by physical imprisonment was preferable to capitulation, because the latter was 
tantamount to a “spiritual suicide”. It would be as if somebody fastened a slipknot round 
his neck hoping it not to tighten itself. Most probably, it would alternatively strangle 
and slacken, as it had done in former presidents’ Gomułka and Gierek times, turning 
finally into a kind of collar, the symbol of a humiliating submission. Society could only 
do well shortly, in the long term the system would break its will and ability to resist. It 
would debase Poland’s national consciousness.  
Despite approaching different historical periods, there are some clear parallels 
between Holzer’s reflection and Krystyna Kersten’s arguments. Firstly, within 
intellectual narratives in which the idea of losing weighs heavily (their works are 
ultimately a kind of chronicle and analysis of the Poles’ loss of freedom and 
independence in recent times), they both tackle the difference between defeat and 
surrender, which they consider morally and spiritually vital for the nation/society770. 
Secondly, they tried to determine whether things could have turned out otherwise either 
in postwar771 or in 1980-1981. The difference between their considerations lies precisely 
in the chosen context: in their view, whereas in the times of the Yalta Conference the 
turn to make a decision was overwhelmingly in Stalin’s hands and the country was 
materially and mentally devastated, in the 1980s Polish society and oppositionists had a 
slightly broader field of action and hence decided to take the less harmful path to ensure 
a long-term survival. At the same time, these authors pointed out that many aspects and 
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resolutions were beyond non-Communist Poles’ control since 1944, to the point that the 
unwillingness of the USSR and PZPR to negotiate became in both cases an 
insurmountable obstacle. Everything had been decided beforehand, and there was little 
to do. However, how it was done was simply crucial.  
Therefore, Holzer apparently reached a deterministic conclusion: given the 
immovable stand of Communist power and opposition’s reluctance to surrender, Polish 
society could only chose the “lesser evil” and Martial Law was implemented. This way, 
Solidarity’s sixteen months of existence out in the open would turn into a lasting legacy, 
remaining in people’s memory until they became a legend and instilled the necessary 
courage to carry on. With his work on the Union, this historian was certainly making his 
own contribution to the building of that heritage.  
Many external and internal factors, Holzer acknowledged, would define Polish 
nation’s fate, but sooner or later the awareness of society would be decisive and, in that 
sense, the Poles’ destiny still depended, like in August 1980-December 1981, on 
themselves. 
In the eyes of opposition intellectuals, the defeat caused by General Jaruzelski’s 
coup was unlike others in recent national history: it might even not be considered as 
such. They argued that not only a quantitative, but especially a qualitative change had 
taken place in Polish society, and that it was irreversible. It was as if the lights had been 
turned on and, despite plunging back again into darkness, what was “seen” (and felt) for 
a more than a year could not be forgotten. What had only reached an embryonic state 
before (and was aborted many times) had finally become a “national rebirth”. 
Karol Modzelewski described Solidarność’s sixteen-month experience, plus the 
following two and a half years of Martial Law, as “surely the most important times”772, 
and explained why:    
 
The Union, like no other in history, was set up by a great mass of people with their own hands. It 
was fought out and won through strike, but even in those plants where there was no strike, people 
who joined the Union built its links and felt, perhaps for the first time, as the authors of something 
new in social life and they were never going to allow that authorship to be taken from them. Not 
just the first step, but the next ─right until the end.773  
 
The movement had made a crucial difference in the nation’s degree of 
consciousness and involvement in public life. Before 1980, Michnik argued, the vast 
majority of Polish society was immerse in a “psychology of captivity”: hatred and 
desperation were its main gears when demanding change and that just yielded poor, 
short-lived results and the use of blind violence. With the appearance of Solidarność, 
however, the Poles “again felt themselves to be a civic and national community”, “they 
forged their solidarity and discovered their strength”774. The flavor of freedom would 
certainly be hard to forget, as well as the feeling that the course of history was no longer 
exclusively in PRL government’s hands, as Władysław Bartoszewski believed:  
 
Within the limits of what was possible, we wanted to co-run our working places by ourselves. Our 
youth experienced for the first time what freedom could be like, they tasted the Polish Summer. In 
spite of the brutal violence, that taste remained in the memory of students and workers alike. All 
social groups felt solidary towards each other for the first time. This is the novelty that became 
engraved in social memory and will multiply in the future. For, in the long run, neither 
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[Communist] Party workers nor generals can push a nation of 36 million people into internal 
emigration or resignation. The limits of what is possible must be permanently discerned anew, but 
no one can define them now ─they are changing. History cannot be predicted ─I know this as a 
historian. I had time to think about it. And dreaming is still allowed, isn’t it? Even in a country 
deprived of freedom.775   
 
Martial Law times were, nevertheless, times of uncertainty, and that lack of 
definition could eventually cause social paralysis, as Jan Józef Lipski pictured: 
 
… no one today can come up with a distinct perspective and a program of action. The state of 
suspension between ‘yesterday’ and ‘tomorrow’ continues. ‘Today’ is still an elusive state of 
affairs, sometimes felt to be more than temporary, a kind of pseudo-existence. 
In the long term this is a dangerous state of affairs, felt less by those who continue to be active 
through underground struggle than by the rest of society.776 
 
Some of his colleagues, however, were again ready to provide some guidelines 
about what should be done to avoid this. For Michnik, what was needed was to carry on 
with the self-determination process (not give up an independent civil life), politics of 
activism (requiring determination and patience), the Catholic Church’s contribution to 
teach moral values, human and national dignity, but without interfering in politics or 
discriminating; national solidarity (respect pluralism and other nations), socialism 
(representing traditional values of social freedom and justice) and freedom (assuming its 
risks in a responsible and mature way)777.  
Sometimes they also resorted to historical examples. Drawing parallels between 
the Martial Law period and the Second World War was especially popular: 
 
[If you sign the declaration of loyalty to PRL government] The steel gates of Białołęka [prison] 
will open up before you, and instead of the prison yards you will see the streets of your hometown, 
filled with strolling army patrols and rolling tanks. You will see people being asked for 
identification cards, cars being stopped to have their trunks inspected, the security agent, with his 
keen eye, fishing out of the crowds individuals suspected of ‘violating the state of war legislation’. 
You will hear World War II terms that until now you knew only from history books: ‘roundup’, 
‘Volksliste’ ─ words cleansed of the dignifying patina of time and pulsing with new menace. You 
will hear about new arrests, about people sought by the police or in hiding, about Draconian 
sentences.778 
  
December 1981 military coup was seen as a war declaration against the Polish 
people. The ways to defend against that attack had to do with the deepening of self-
governing activities (as recommended by Stefan Bratkowski, who provided different 
past foreign instances) and the building of political maturity through careful planning, 
efficient organization and distribution of tasks involving as many people as possible, 
and everyday work instead of living off abstract ideals. In sum, rather than following 
World War II’s model of an underground, militarized State, it was necessary to develop 
an “underground society”, in Czesław Bielecki’s words. Oppositionists gone into hiding 
after PRL’s round-ups should rely on more horizontal networks of “collaborators” 
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(ordinary people) not just to do better, but in order not to eventually lose the Poles’ 
support and commitment779. 
All efforts would be worthwhile if it all boiled down, as Michnik, Bielecki and 
others maintained, to a struggle between authenticity and falseness in Polish life. If 
Communist authorities had perceived the Union as such a threat to them, then its 
members and supporters must have done something right:    
 
You ask me whether I believe that it is sensible to maintain a political underground. Before I 
answer this question, let me ask you a question: Do you believe that Solidarity was an event of 
historic significance, or merely an unimportant episode in Poland’s history? Was it a coincidence 
of events, a unique deformation of the historic process, or the natural, institutionally permanent 
embodiment of the aspirations of the Polish people? If it was a mere episode, then we can expect 
the ruling communists to wipe out its traces ─and not only of the walls of the cities. But if it was 
an authentic movement of national rebirth, then no one will manage to replace it with artificial 
creations, such as the Committees of National Rebirth, that are being founded throughout the 
country on the orders of the army commissars. If it was authentic, then the communists’ scheme is 
pathetically unrealistic, and even the most energetic activity on the part of WRONa’s people 
─those armed with guns as well as those armed with bugging devices─ will fail to exterminate 
Solidarity.780 
 
Was December 13th the consequence of extreme aspirations or of the system’s own nature? I think 
that the inevitable cause of the conflict between Communist powers and Solidarność was the 
authenticity of the movement. In a society that, besides the Church, was built upon appearances, 
there suddenly appeared something that showed the grim truth of our social life, and thus had to be 
destroyed or exchanged for something resembling it only nominally.781 
 
The revolutionary process headed by Solidarity had been violently interrupted. It 
had lost but it had not been vanquished because, in the meantime, Polish society had 
recovered its agency, rising from its postwar ashes. And, as Giełżyński reminded, this 
kind of lost revolutions brought about the most favorable and lasting effects782. Such 
ideas were also expressed by opposition circles through different images, like the 
following783. 
Despite Solidarność was “cut down” by PRL government, as the next poster 
shows (Figure 6), repression didn’t manage to kill its spirit; only that, after December 
13th 1981, it was forced to grow underground, in secrecy. However, it pushed its way 
into the open again with new shoots. It seemed that, out of a single, powerful tree, many 
more buds could sprout to resume the pending issues concerning Polish society’s rights 
and freedoms. 
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Figure 6 
 
The use of the tree as a metaphor is significant in several ways: firstly, it links to 
nature’s cycle, to the idea of renovation and Springtime (“Springtime is ours, Winter is 
yours”, their motto went: Wiosna nasza, zima wasza)784. Secondly, it alludes implicitly 
to the origins of the Solidarność-tree: the seed, loaded with frustrated pasts, that had to 
wait for the right moment to sprout and that, before its early “death”, had left behind 
other seeds and strong roots that also waited their turn to grow. Bartoszewski also 
perceived it this way and actually made use of the same metaphor: 
 
When we went to Mass or prayed together in the [internment] camp785, when we prayed alone, we 
thought not only of our friends, wives and families. We thought about our humiliated society, 
about our Polish nation. And about the Pope, who was always close to us. We never lost our 
courage. We fought for a just cause. We knew that young people would resume this fight. If not 
today’s youth, the next generation will. The soil is prepared. The seed that has been sown by 
millions of people is going to grow and provide a rich crop.786  
 
Thirdly, roots refer to origins and identity too, and, at the same time, to all that 
goes on “below the earth”, that is, underground (w podziemiu), without being noticed. 
After repression and illegalization, “authentic” social life was displaced almost 
exclusively to the clandestine sphere, but never ceased to flourish, as Jan Józef Lipski 
pointed out:  
 
The state of war crushed the numerically impressive but still rather loosely organized open 
structures of Solidarity. It paralyzed all free social life in the country. The authors of the December 
coup were unable, however, to destroy the underground. Hundreds of printed underground 
periodicals, many editions of books, and often effective economic strikes, and so on ─all constitute 
a spectacular indication of the strength and the extent of resistance. The new government trade 
unions still represent a minority, and even they are not loyal beyond question. But the period of 
demonstrations and massive strikes is over. New demonstrations still occur often, but they are not 
as large and impressive as before. The masses, loyal to Solidarity in the majority, are not ready 
today for great actions, and do not believe in their effectiveness. For them, it is a time of waiting, 
and a time of persistent underground work for particularly determined groups. One might say that 
as things stand now it looks as if KOR ─and the democratic opposition in general─ had multiplied 
thousandfold.787 
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Figure 7 
 
The poster shown in Figure 7 also insisted on the multiplying effect of critical 
movements and attitudes the Martial Law had caused. Not only did it not kill 
Solidarność, but, as the saying goes, it made it stronger:  
 
Just as the ideas of Solidarity are still alive in Poland, so also the real effects of the impulse that 
gave birth to KOR eight years ago are luckily still with us, and they have been strengthened 
despite the December catastrophe. Those who were fully active in the movement in defense of 
human and civil rights and in the fight for free trade unions numbered only a few hundred people, 
yet today there are tens of thousands, and behind these, millions more. This can be a source of 
cautious optimism.788 
 
Inteligencja had to keep hopes alive. It was one of its fundamental duties in 
moments of hardship. 
 
 
B.4.3) Epilogue: the triumph of 1989 
 
As the 1980s dragged on, the international changes that intellectuals expected 
finally arrived (US’ and UK’s pressure, Gorbachev’s measures…), and it looked as if, 
despite the Martial Law setback, most of Polish society was willing to profit from the 
opportunity and push things further. In Summer 1986, PRL government announced an 
amnesty and shortly afterwards Lech Wałęsa established Solidarność’s Provisional 
Council out in the open. In 1987, John Paul II visited the country for the third time and 
the wave of protests and strikes in Spring-Summer 1988 forced Communist authorities 
to propose a meeting with the opposition. More than five months and many 
preliminaries later, that suggestion gave way to the Round Table talks (February-April 
1989), where government representatives officially recognized Solidarność and agreed 
to its participation in the following half-free elections in June.  
The posters designed to promote Solidarity’s candidatures in the election 
campaign insisted on, and hence summarized, the images that intellectuals had 
developed in their writings about Polish society’s collective rebirth, Springtime 
renovation and the “return” of past defeated789.  
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Figure 8 
 
Figure 8, for instance, depicted in a very particular way a typical landscape of 
Polish Mazovia region formed by a special kind of knobby willow trees (wierzba). In 
principle, this could convey fertility, renewal or nature’s cycle, like the posters of 
Figures 9 and 10 do. But not only: these “trees” are actually hands and arms bursting 
through the earth, which may evoke the return from death. The branches sprouting from 
the trunk remind of thin jets of blood gushing forth, or veins and arteries turning into 
branches, giving new life beyond the body. Their red color connects with Solidarity’s 
logo, as if echoing the gift of a new life provided by a previous sacrifice. The dead and 
defeated of the national community come forth and nourish present-day aspirations790. 
We do not know the exact date when the poster was designed, but it also suggests a vote 
by a show of hands: the roots of Polishness supporting an opposition movement that is 
acting once again out in the open.  
 
              
 
                            Figure 9                                                                      Figure 10  
 
    
In June 1989, Solidarity won ninety-nine of the hundred seats in the Senate and 
35% of the seats in the Sejm, the maximum it could aim for. Change was unstoppable 
now. 
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 An anonymous poem titled “Droga krzyżowa” fused the Catholic notion of resurrection with Springtime 
renovation. It was published in the drugi obieg magazine Solidarność Narodu, 1, 22/II/1982, 1-2. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The meaning of Poland’s existence between Russia and the West. The re-
edition of old debates and the question of (co-)responsibility  
 
 
The collective identity of a given group is formed by two different and closely-
related aspects influencing each other: the group’s idiosyncrasy (i.e. what its members 
consider their own) and its relation with different groups, that is, with what its members 
consider alien. As Lipski put it, “a fatherland can only exist when foreign lands also 
exist; there is no ‘our own’ if there is no ‘foreign’. The shape of patriotism”, the author 
believed, “depends more on the relation with what is ‘foreign’ than with what is ‘our 
own’”791.  
The relations of Poland with neighboring or close-by countries have had many 
peaks and valleys along history, especially in the last three centuries. Opposition 
intellectual circles within our time scope usually tried to diminish the feelings of 
resentment and mistrust towards other nations while promoting friendship and 
understanding.  
For instance, in the mid-1970s two outstanding émigré oppositionists, Jerzy 
Giedroyć and Juliusz Mieroszewski, supported in the journal Kultura that Poland’s 
independence from the Soviet Union would be favored if Ukraine, Lithuania and 
Belarus (ULB), back then republics of the USSR, also recovered their sovereignty792. 
The most recent grudges against these three countries had to do with the shift of borders 
after the Second World War, which moved westwards, so that Poland lost a broad strip 
of lands in the east, but gained others on the western side in detriment of Germany. 
Among the eastern territories, the Poles especially lamented the loss of two cities which 
had been considered a fundamental part of Poland and Polishness: Lwów (Ukraine’s 
Lviv) and Wilno (Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania). Regarding this point, and in close 
connection to their reluctance to recover past political ideologies (Chapter 1), most 
intellectuals insisted in wiping the slate clean and not questioning the new territorial 
reconfiguration.  
Besides Jan Józef Lipski’s general review of the relations with each neighboring 
country and beyond in Dwie ojczyzny… (Germany, Russia, ULB, Czechoslovakia, 
Western nations), other Polish underground publishing initiatives stimulated dialogue 
and the exchange of views between oppositionists from different Eastern Bloc 
countries, including Hungary, Romania or Yugoslavia. For example, since its first 
appearance in 1978, some articles or sections of Krytyka (which had Hungarian and 
Czech members in its editorial board) were almost always devoted to the thought and 
works of foreign dissidents, like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Václav Havel or György 
Konrád, and, by the 1980s, more specialized periodicals such as ABC. Adriatyk, Bałtyk, 
Morze Czarne, Nowa Koalicja, Obóz, Biuletyn Informacyjny Solidarności Polsko-
Czechosłowackiej or Zona were issued793. A few books and monographic numbers on 
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Polish-ULB and Polish-German relations were also published along those years794. 
Apart from this, many other intellectuals dealt with or referred to such relations more or 
less directly, frequently or in depth in their essays and speeches.  
Leaving Germany aside, the two countries that contributed most to shape the ways 
of being and the attitudes of the Poles and their inteligencja were Russia-the USSR and 
the West ─which, of course, is not a single state or nation, but is very frequently 
regarded as an abstract whole in Polish discourses, covering at least Western European 
countries and, sometimes, also the U.S. or North America. The “East” and the “West” 
according to the Poles, thus, will be the topic of the present chapter. 
 
 
A) Russia and the Soviet Union 
 
It is undeniable that Poland’s relations with its Russian neighbor have been 
turbulent for centuries, though this does not mean that Russian influence was always 
rejected on principle, and even less rejected by everybody or by a majority.  
The dictatorial form of the Polish state between 1947-1989 was harmful, irksome 
and worrying enough alone, especially for those who relied on freedom of speech to 
earn their livelihood, but the fact that it was fostered by and dependent on the Soviet 
Union lent completely different connotations to the situation, given Poland’s partitioned 
past, the Polish-Soviet War795 and the Katyń massacre796, just to mention the most 
outstanding and traumatic landmarks engraved in the country’s collective memory.  
For the Poles, who, unlike Czechs or Bulgarians, did not cherish pan-Slavic 
feelings, the origins of the PRL system were as clear as day: the penetration in Polish 
territory in the 1940s of the Soviet army, which had never left since then; or, in other 
words, the aggression of a foreign power, so that, from then on, Poland was forced to 
respect the USSR’s interests in spite of its own 797. Making use of the Second World 
War and Nazi occupation experiences, Polish official media insisted in pointing out 
Western Germany as the country’s main threat, whereas the Soviet Union’s friendship 
and protection would provide security against it: “it’s about proving, through the 
manipulation of history, that the Russian problem had ceased to exist (the USSR 
guarantees the lasting independence of Poland), while the menace on Germany’s side is 
still actual”. However, Łepkowski assured, “in reality the Russian (USSR) issue stood 
in the foreground. Already in the nineteenth century it was evident that the main front 
for the uprising struggle was the Russian front. The second half of the nineteenth 
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century fully confirmed this. Each ‘slackening’ in the Soviet bloc diminishes our 
dependence”798.  
Therefore, the “curse” of half-sovereign states and protectorates did not only 
belong to Polish past, it was part of the present too. So it was suggested by Czesław 
Bielecki when he drew a parallel between the Grand Duke of Russia Constantine 
Pavlovich (1779-1831), commander-in-chief of the forces of Congress Poland, and 
general Wojciech Jaruzelski (1923-2014), the PRL prime minister responsible for the 
establishment of the Martial Law: “and so HOW to fight against Russia and its Grand 
Duke Jaruzelski?”, he asked his readers799. Both he and Łepkowski considered that 
Poland’s “protector” had always feared the country’s independent spirit and its 
democratic traditions and aspirations: 
 
… the most important reason why the Russians have refrained from an invasion is their historical 
knowledge about our attachment to imponderables, their certainty about our resistance (…). 
Hence, besides the economic consequences of an invasion, of taking charge of the maintenance of 
a nation of 35 million, it is mainly us what discourages them, not Carter, Reagan or the conference 
of Madrid 1980.  
The Polish complex of Russians is not only based on their memory of uprisings, but also on the 
lesson of Afghanistan, and thus on the conviction that a Soviet soldier will surely enter Poland, but 
it is not certain whether he will get out alive. The fear towards Poland has an ambivalent character. 
By tolerating the ‘Polish syndrome’ there is the risk of tainting with freedom the Ukraine, 
Lithuania, Belarus and the Baltic republics. By ‘normalizing’ Poland Russia becomes tainted with 
the help of its own pacification forces. The masters of the Soviet empire realize that ‘panska 
Polstsa’ can be the beginning of the end of their colonial expansion. Already today nothing 
portends peace in Vietnam, Angola and Afghanistan, so it will be worse for Russians if there 
arrives one more, this time white, mutinous colony.800 
 
Besides the fact that colonial theories concerning Russian dominion over Poland 
popped up from time to time in some oppositionists’ narratives801, the main point of 
Bielecki’s argument was that, far from being helped from abroad, the Poles were 
somehow being aided from the past. According to CDN’s chief editor, the Black 
Legend of fearlessness and ethical rebelliousness that their ancestors managed to knit up 
over decades, suffering bloodshed after bloodshed, had “clotted into” a kind of magical, 
invisible, protective psychological “barrier” around Poland, so that invaders would 
think twice before making a too risky and irreversible move. This was, at least, what 
many critical and unsatisfied Poles were prone to believe as part of their process of 
empowerment, especially before December 1981. And, indirectly, inteligenci told their 
readers what Poland was like in contrast to their Russian neighbor (freedom-
submission) or, more precisely, how Polish inhabitants would like to be… and be 
perceived. 
But the principle of national self-definition could awaken less positive nationalist 
feelings within the countries revolving against the Soviet Union, Leszek Kołakowski 
warned. Anti-Communism or anti-Bolshevism could be ousted fairly easily by anti-
Russian notions in oppressed societies802. But where did Communism-Bolshevism or 
the previous tsarist regime end and where did Russianness begin? For some left-winged 
intellectuals, this turned out to be a crucial, albeit complicated distinction in their 
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dissertations. If the Russian nation and the Russian regime were not the same thing, 
were they simply divergent? Or were they different, but inseparable?   
Other oppositionists, on the contrary, did not bother so much in spotting the 
differences between them because they deemed them a consequent whole. Bielecki’s 
comment about Bolshevism being the offspring of centuries of corruption and 
enslavement, or, in other words, of the weaknesses of the Russian nation, is very 
significant in this respect803. Impotence, primitivism, chaos and irresponsibility were 
typical Russian features, according to him, whilst in KPN’s magazine Gazeta polska 
hopelessness, passivity, loss of individuality and of one’s truth, existential 
disintegration, constriction of the soul and, in sum, the defeat of man by force were 
added804.   
These characteristics were the result of Russia’s position between Europe and 
Asia805. “For some centuries”, Jerzy Holzer wrote, “Rus’ was submitted to Asia, and 
when it got rid of its dependence, it turned towards Asia of its own accord. Its Eurasian 
character made it grow completely away from its neighboring European countries in the 
shape of Moscow, later Russia”. And, later still, the Soviet Union, which was the heir of 
Eastern Christian-Byzantine traditions, but also of “an Orient which is further away 
from Europe in geographic and civilization terms”806. Wojciech Skrodzki was even 
more explicit in Gazeta polska when he connected Russian forms of government to the 
Chinese Empire and the Mongol Khanates, which, in his view, were based on the 
maintenance of the system by force807. 
Jan Józef Lipski, on his part, tracked down the origins of these “oriental” 
interpretations back to Romantic times and strived to remind the Poles about the 
excellence and Europeanness of Russian culture and principles: 
 
Since very long ago, since Romanticism, there are conceptions in Polish ideology according to 
which Russian culture was twofold ─and negatively─ conditioned by the crossing of Byzantine 
and Mongol-Tartar (Turanian) influences. Lately one can spot in the press and other uncensored 
publications a very rapid success of Feliks Koneczny’s conceptions in this respect808. To put it 
briefly, the result of this Byzantine-Turanian crossing is a culture in which there is an evident 
submission of the individual to a hierarchic power, collectivism dominates over the person, and the 
                                                 
803
 Bielecki: “Program...”, 69; full quote in Chapter 2. 
804
 Bielecki: “Program...”, 70-71; Or. [unknown pseud.]: “Kiedy Polak przegrywa duszę?” Gazeta Polska. 
Pismo Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej, 3(34), 18-II-1988, 3. 
805
 An image developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, sometimes dealing only 
with Russia, as in Poland’s case, sometimes covering all Eastern Europe, which was pictured as the 
homeland of backwardness and barbarianism, a “compare and contrast” resort to highlight Western 
Europe’s importance and advances. WOLNIEWICZ, Marcin: “‘Russian Barbarism’ in the Propaganda of 
the Polish January Uprising (1863-1864)”, Acta Poloniae Historica, 107, 2013, 129-164; WOLFF, Larry: 
Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1994. 
806
 HOLZER, Jerzy: “Europa Środkowa. Przeszłość- Teraźniejszość -Przyszłość”, in Holzer et al.: Myśli o 
naszej…, 5 and 7 respectively, my transl.; also Holzer: Solidarność…, 26; KISIELEWSKI, Stefan: “Głos 
z drugiej Europy”, in KISIELEWSKI, Stefan: Bez cenzury, Warszawa, CDN, 1983, 135. On Russian 
artists’ and intellectuals’ interest in the Asian facet of Russian identity since the late 19th century, and the 
Russian democrats’ own explanation of tsarist despotism and the Soviet Union in terms of Asian 
character, see chapter 6 of Figes: El baile…, 435-517.  
807
 SKRODZKI, Wojciech: “O Rosji metafizyczne, nie geopolitycznie”, Gazeta Polska. Pismo 
Konfederacji Polski Niepodleglej, 1(49), 14-I-1989, 2. 
808
 Feliks Koneczny (1862-1949) was a Polish historian and journalist specialized in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Between 1919 and 1929 he taught at Stefan Batory University in Vilnius. In his theory of 
civilizations, he classified the actually existing civilizations in seven types, according to their attitudes to 
law and ethics. The four dating back to ancient times were “Brahmin”, “Jewish”, “Chinese” and 
“Turanian”; the remaining three were medieval: Latin, Byzantine and Arab.  
201 
 
ethics of the horde over individual ethics. As it usually happens with such generalizations, there is 
some truth in it and at the same time too much does not correspond to the truth. The traditions of 
Moscovian despotism surely have something genetic coming from the model of Chinese power, 
and the position and role of the Tsar and his court certainly followed the Byzantine model in a 
conscious way.   
But against these traditions there is another tradition in Russia, the tradition of spiritual 
independence, starting from knyaz Kurbski809 or earlier: a tradition of dissent and of search of 
ideological bases in the West. The Russia of Decembrists, Herzen810, Bezkiszin811 and other 
participants of the January Uprising, of Zemlia i Volia812, of the narodniks813 ─that is not 
Byzantine-Turanian Russia. In our times, the Russians coined not long ago the word samizdat, 
which we frequently use today; they were the first, they showed us the way at a very high cost, and 
the committee of the great Sakharov814 is an inspiration and an example for us. In Russia it is 
additionally difficult, and more courage is needed.815  
 
Therefore, without denying the existence of a two-faced reality in Russia, Lipski 
encouraged his compatriots to make a difference between the country’s Western 
European values or democratic traditions, like Orthodox Christianity and the 
Decembrists’, and those which had nothing to do with it, that is, tsarist and Bolshevik 
regimes816. 
In Adam Michnik’s opinion, the hybrid nature of Russia whipped up an equally 
schizophrenic feeling in Polish thought since the late eighteenth century. The long-
lasting quandary “to befriend, or to mistrust?” had been clearly stated, according to him, 
in the works of the poet Adam Mickiewicz:  
 
Partitions and uprisings, repression and conspiracies ─here are the sources of Polish reflections 
on Russia. The community deprived of its own state and civil freedoms, the submitted and 
‘russified’ nation defended its identity by building a cultural barrier and creating a civil catechism 
that rendered useless Russian attempts to transform Poland into the ‘Privislinksy krai’817. This 
catechism had to solve as well a fundamental dilemma: what was the character of the conflict 
between the Poles and Russia? Was it part of the conflict between two nations, of which one was 
the bulwark of Western civilization, and the other the incarnation of Asian barbarianism, or was it 
also part of the universal struggle for freedom against despotism? If it was a civilizational dispute, 
then the enemy of Poland would be the whole of the Russian nation, for each Russian, regardless 
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of his or her personal choices, is condemned to participate in the steppe-Byzantine civilization and 
the barbarian conquest. If it was, on the other hand, a conflict between the spirit of freedom and 
despotism, then the natural ally in the Polish war against tsarist Empire would be the Russian 
democratic movement. 
Adam Mickiewicz ─all of us following his lead─ provided an ambiguous answer. Or rather a 
double one. The first answer was the message “Do przyjaciół Moskali” [“To the Muscovite 
friends”, C.A.], the second ─the image of the Russian state, both in the pages of Dziady 
[Forefathers’ Eve, C.A.]. As if in the pages of his work Rylejew fought with Nowosilcow, and 
Pushkin with himself. Nowosilcow won Rylejew, and Pushkin-the author of the verses 
Oszczercom Rosji [To the slanderers of Russia, C.A.] won Pushkin-the friend of Decembrists. 
Also in people’s general awareness Mickiewicz-the friend of Muscovites was defeated by 
Mickiewicz-the relentless writer who unmasked Russian despotism and Russian submission to 
autocracy.818 
 
Thus, in Michnik’s view, the national issue had prevailed over the idea of a 
common struggle for freedom and rights:  
 
The Poles ─following Mickiewicz─ ceased to believe in a Russian democracy after the defeat 
of the Decembrists. They based their reasoning on the conviction that Russia was somehow 
condemned ─by its tradition─ to perpetual slavery; so it was thought by Słowacki and 
Krasiński819, Mochnacki and Klaczko820. Of course, specific individuals were respected; the 
Decembrists and Lermontov821, Herzen and Granovsky822. However, they were seen as voices in 
the night, flowers growing in a rocky ground, noble flowers among the dark night of Russian 
autocracy. These formulae degenerated into resentment and complexes, fitting characteristics for a 
submitted community resisting a policy of denationalization. The pressure of Tsar Nicholas’ 
tsinovniks823 produced an utter resistance: the national catechism demanded the next generation of 
Poles to fight unconditionally against the Russian element. Also in the cultural sphere.824 
 
However, following in Mickiewicz’s footsteps, the mission of Polish intellectuals 
in PRL times was to remind about the ancient struggle for freedom taking place in 
Russia825. Reviewing Wiktor Woroszylski’s826 biography of Alexandr Pushkin827, 
Michnik considered there were few Polish writers who, like the former, were capable of 
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writing about Russia without falling into servility or, on the other extreme, into hatred. 
Despite this, Russia is one of the key Polish topics, and the ignorance about it only 
made Poles defenseless and unwise. As Lipski frequently reminded, critical writers and 
intellectuals must understand and make others understand that their Russian equivalents 
lived in even worse conditions than they did, both in the tsarist Empire and in the Soviet 
Union. In sum, the Russians were the intellectually and spiritually captive people par 
excellence, and some of them challenged the moral nastiness of their own system:  
  
Russia’s literary life is the continuous conflict of the verse against denunciation and of the poet 
against the informer. The history of the great Russian literature is the history of confiscated works 
and of writings deformed by the censor’s pencil, it’s the history of tortured and morally broken 
writers, imprisoned and put into lunatic asylums, murdered and committing suicide. The spiritual 
history of Russia is the history of a people in a cage. I do not know any book in which there is 
such a descriptive tale about this cage than Wiktor Woroszylski’s. The denunciation is one of the 
most popular literary genres of the cage. (…) By quoting denunciations and police reports, 
Woroszylski takes us into a world which is closed to simple mortals: the reader follows his guide 
with an increasing blush, similar to that which must appear in a monk’s face visiting a brothel. It is 
nevertheless a highly instructive trip: it allows one to understand the nature of the conflict of the 
tsinovniks with literature, of the spirit of the lackeys with the spirit of freedom.828  
 
Michnik, as Woroszylski, wished to pay tribute to the unsubmissive intellectual 
Russia from Pushkin’s times onwards; to Dostoyevsky and Gogol, to Mikhail 
Lermontov, Aleksandr Poleżajew829 and Lev Tolstoy, to Vladimir Mayakovski, Osip 
Mandelstam, Anna Akhmatova, Boris Pasternak, Andrei Sakharov and Alexsandr 
Solzhenitsyn, among many others with whom he wanted to form a brotherhood against 
the “other Russia”830. To put it another way, the image of the nation-victim, the ethos of 
the “defeated” and the repressed, with which the Poles felt so identified, could actually 
pave the road towards mutual understanding with the Russians.  
While those devoted to politics or political negotiations, like Solidarność’s leader 
Lech Wałęsa, should certainly follow the premises of Realpolitik, move around with 
cautiousness and always take into consideration who controlled de facto the Soviet 
Union, the task assigned to opposition inteligencja was of a different kind. Its members 
should raise their voices against the injustices and crimes taking place beyond their 
eastern borders; they should fight against negative nationalist stereotypes in a 
humanistic and conciliatory way. Politicians had to solve specific problems in specific 
circumstances, intellectuals took care of much broader, timeless questions: 
 
Just like Wałęsa’s silence is understandable, my silence concerning the persecution of 
Sakharov would imply betraying what I consider the sense of my life. This sense consists of an 
unconditional faithfulness to Mickiewicz’s tradition, which demands to link the love towards 
national freedom to a fraternal gesture directed to the Muscovite friends; which demands to remain 
faithful to Russian friends not when they walk in the glory of victory ─for what’s the merit of 
being on the side of the victorious?─ but when, especially when, they are imprisoned and 
persecuted, thrown out of their own fatherland and pushed into inexistence by the reality of great 
politics, which reduce human rights, our civil sacrament, to ‘humanitarian questions’. To remain 
                                                 
828
 MICHNIK, Adam: “Puszkin i Rosjanie”. Krytyka. Kwartalnik Polityczny, 16, 1983, 239. Very similar 
comments in a Letter to Russian intellectuals in opposition written by Michnik and the film director 
Andrzej Wajda: “Szczerość za szczerość. List otwarty do Dymitra Lichaczowa i Nikalaja Samweliana i 
innych rosyjskich ludzi kultury”, Tygodnik Powszechny, 26-III-1989, 5. A different view on the bad 
influence for the Poles of Russian intelligentsia’s internal conflicts and their subsequent attitudes: Or.: 
“Kiedy Polak…?”, 3.  
829
 Russian romantic poet (1804-1838) in the line of Decembrist poets. Due to the writing of a satirical 
poem he was forced to join the army and was sent to the Caucasus. 
830
 Michnik: “Puszkin…”, 242; very similar in Michnik: “Powstanie listopadowe...”, 86-87. 
204 
 
faithful against history and sociology, when Katkov831 wins Herzen, when black-hundredist 
ideas832 try to be inoculated to Poles and Russians, when nothing forebodes changes, when even 
the West has forgotten about Herzen because it seems a waste of time to get to know a defeated 
emigrant. Have we remained faithful to that message? (…)  
… the intellectual must defend the values that have been trampled on just for the sake of those 
values. He must know that these values rarely enjoy victorious times, but above all he must know 
that no victory is definitive. In this sense, he must be an eternal Don Quixote, the knight of the 
causes which are being continuously defeated, but which are nevertheless worth defending. It is 
absolutely possible ─the idea of Polish-Russian reconciliation, of free people with free people, of 
equal people with equal people, is one of the hallucinations of Polish naïve idealism. However, the 
intellectual must defend this hallucination ─also against reality, also if its costs isolation and loss 
of popularity. Also if it costs him persecutions. But not at the cost of truth.  
The intellectual must understand reality. He must understand its inner tensions. He must 
comprehend that latent values usually have a controversial character: defending one, we reject 
another. That’s why the duty of intellectuals is not to repeat a homily of reconciliation, but to 
penetrate into reality and discover its snares. He must then reject the interpretation of Polish-
Russian relations in terms of ‘Slavic dispute’ and Christian bulwark. He must track down 
mystifications and obstinately go back to difficult issues, propose a language free of lies and a 
reflection free of phobias, hence a talk without diplomacy and stereotypical banalities.833 
 
Therefore, in Michnik’s eyes, the mission entrusted to inteligenci consisted in 
going beyond stereotypes and in challenging harmful, nationalist fallacies ─while 
fueling their own, positive intellectual myth. 
In this spirit, Michnik was perfectly aware too that Russians logically pursued 
their own national interests and welfare, not the Poles’. So he made the effort of being 
in their shoes, though without justifying what he considered unprincipled actions. 
Taking Alexandr Pushkin as an example, the author argued: 
 
He could loathe despotism, censorship, secret agents and betrayers, he could support the pro-
freedom Decembrist movement heartily, he could write that he had had enough of the ‘Saintly 
Rus’’, he could dream for years about travelling abroad and make all kind of efforts to do so, but 
he couldn’t wish the fall of the Russian empire. 
This position was (and probably is) usual among Russians, such a crack is nothing strange. 
How many Poles during the II Republic supported the creation of a Ukrainian state? Just a few 
individuals. And Poland was not a despotically ruled country… (…) To wish the defeat and the 
lessening of one’s own state is very difficult indeed, even when one is aware of the fact that it is 
not the ideal state. Such a position requires a great civil courage and a great spiritual strength that 
only a few possess.834 
 
To approach the Russian question with a more understanding and empathetic will 
involved soul-searching on the Polish side too. Tadeusz Łepkowski and Jan Józef Lipski 
observed that while the hatred, mistrust and fear felt by the Poles towards their powerful 
eastern and western neighbors mingled, in the German case, with a complex of 
inferiority, in the Russian case feelings of superiority and disdain took the lead. It was 
as if Poland assigned itself “the mission of conveying the heritage of the developed 
West to the backward East. Probably even more”, Łepkowski hinted, “if we sense, sotto 
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voce, that our ‘Westerness’ is by no means complete”835. To doubt about the value of 
Russian culture and attempt to pour scorn on it was both offensive and senseless for 
Lipski:   
 
To feel culturally superior in the face of a nation that has given birth to Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, 
not to mention dozens of writers who could proudly represent all of European literature; in the face 
of the nation of [the medieval painter Andrei] Rublev and Mendeleyev and Stravinsky ─is most 
surely a complete misunderstanding. It is the nation that created byliny836 and great Orthodox 
paintings when we still had a very poor national literature and our own painting had hardly begun.  
No Polish writer has had so much influence in Western literature, that West which we want to 
belong to, as Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Chekhov. Nothing proves either that the spiritual 
culture of Polish peasantry was richer than the Russian. They are simply different. There is 
something grotesque and regrettable in the megalomaniac feeling of superiority of some Poles over 
the Russians.837      
 
According to Polish oppositionists, hostility should be thoroughly avoided not 
only in the name of transcendental ethical reasons, but also due to present-day practical 
motivations. By the mid- and late 1980s it became increasingly clear that the 
transformations taking place in the Soviet Union, stimulated either by official spheres 
with the arrival of Gorbachev, by society or by unofficial critical circles, could bring 
about very important changes for the rest of the countries of the Eastern Bloc. To look 
for answers together and co-operate with each other was the single way out: 
 
Each Pole must understand today that our traditional phobias and megalomania towards 
surrounding nations are suicidal for two reasons: moral and political. (...) ... the political reason 
tells us that either we manage to free ourselves from the threat of death and disintegration all 
together, the nations of the USSR and the nations dependent on the USSR ─or none will.838 
 
Therefore, the Poles should keep an equilibrium based on taking a stand against 
submission to the Soviet Union (their own and others’) and, at the same time, not falling 
into hatred. Such a balanced position would enable Poland to become a kind of 
intermediary or “bridge” between Eastern and Western Europe839.   
The images of Russia were certainly complex and manifold in Polish intellectuals’ 
thought. Up to now we have seen how some of them focused on the country’s hybrid 
Eurasian nature or on the perverse reciprocity of Bolshevism and Russianness; others 
were determined to set Russian cultural heritage apart from the pulse of violence and 
despotism of its rulers. Some preferred to talk about Russian complexes; others tried to 
understand the attachment to one’s fatherland and discovered through an introspective 
analysis that, actually, Russians and Poles shared similar defects and tendencies 
(nationalism, democratic movements against despotism, inferiority complexes…). Some 
tried to avoid simplifications while claiming the ethical superiority of universal issues 
over national(ist) quests in spite of Realpolitik; many were seeking international 
rapprochements and collaboration to overcome the forty year-old division of Europe.   
But we have seen none of them demanding accountability… until now.  
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This did not mean that Polish intellectuals held the Russian people responsible for 
the crimes and injustices committed against their nation. From the classic standpoint of 
history of international relations, the spotlight was put on Soviet decision-makers. 
Bearing in mind Poland’s situation, anything that suggested that the USSR authorities 
were guilty of endless outrages was an official taboo, besides a risky business. 
Nevertheless, this was precisely the path that cautiously, but rigorously and firmly, 
Krystyna Kersten chose to follow in her works. 
 
 
A.1) Case study: Could it have been otherwise? Krystyna Kersten’s “rightful 
temptation” and the Soviet Union. Between powerlessness and the responsibility of 
power 
 
When describing Krystyna Kersten’s career and merits as a historian, some 
authors tend to highlight (as in fact she herself did) her commitment with impartiality 
and rationality, besides her search of truth ─despite how painful, uncomfortable, many-
sided or disappointing it may be. Her detailed analyses of Poland’s international and 
socio-political situation in the mid- and late 1940’s, of the perceptions, ideological 
divisions and intertwinement of different interests, set an outstanding precedent for 
following researches concerning that period and are unanimously praised840. However, 
in the main works Kersten developed during 1976-1989 we can spot a feature that has 
little to do with sticking to hard facts, and that we have already approached in Chapter 2 
in connection with Jerzy Holzer’s reflection on the establishment of Martial Law. In our 
student times, we used to call this tendency “historia-ficción” (history-fiction), but 
English readers are probably more familiar with what ifs.  
In the preface to her Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1943-1948, written in 
1984, Kersten said that the aim of her research was to show the reasons and conditions 
in which decision-making processes took place, both little and big, in a large, national 
scale or an individual one. And pointed out: “I show their consequences; however, I 
don’t assess these choices and decisions”841. Nevertheless, she then added: 
 
To do so would require the formulation of alternatives, for example: if [Stanisław] Mikołajczyk 
had reached an agreement earlier, the establishment of a Communist power could have been 
avoided, or the other way round: if Mikołajczyk hadn't reached an agreement, Communists 
wouldn't have managed to stabilize their government. Such examples can be endlessly multiplied: 
if the Political Bureau KC PPR had supported Gomułka in 1948, then..., if society's resistance had 
been greater..., if it had been less... I leave these up to the critical reflections of the readers.842 
 
Thus, Kersten was perfectly aware of the doubts and what if questions many Poles 
had in mind, including herself. We appreciate this even better in her following works, 
where she explained herself more explicitly. For instance, in Jałta w polskiej 
perspektywie she argued that, despite historians tried to avoid speculations, these can 
actually be found within any historical narrative, as long as the latter is not a mere 
descriptive chronicle. Any assessment of the activities of historical subjects, any 
application of epithets or consideration of past words and deeds in the light of the 
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results they yielded include what ifs implicitly843. To ignore them won’t make them 
disappear: the “pasts-that-didn’t-take-place” underlie in the historical narrative of a 
failure or a defeat. It is actually an understandable, even legitimate “temptation”, and 
the fact that Kersten admitted that she couldn’t help asking herself similar questions 
speaks not only of her integrity and personal commitment to remain as truthful as 
possible, but also about her tragic, intimate background: her father, Gniezno’s regional 
public prosecutor Edmund Goławski, had been murdered in Katyń. Thus, this need to 
reflect about what went wrong, to find out who had the power to change things and 
carry out feasible and fairer alternatives, draws Kersten closer to Benjamin’s 
hermeneutic proposals, at least much more than what we could have expected a priori 
due to the acknowledged preference she gave to facts and information over 
interpretation in history writing. But, as Reyes Mate and Michael Löwy remarked, the 
orthodoxy of historians-victims cannot be the same as the “orthodoxy” of the historians-
winners: 
 
The ragman’s regard, the experience of living on the other side of history, is not taught in any 
conventional handbook. What that [historical] rubbish says is what guides the researcher in his/her 
path. That path is made of protests against its state of injustice and of inquiries about justice.844  
 
In Benjamin’s interpretation of historical materialism not only are the present and the future open, 
but also the past, which means, firstly, that the variant that succeeded wasn’t the only possible one. 
Against the winners’ history, the celebration of accomplished facts, the one-way historical paths, 
the inevitability of the victory of those who won, it is necessary to go back to the following 
essential observation: each present is open to multiple possible futures. In each historical moment 
there were alternatives which were not doomed to fail a priori: the exclusion of women from 
citizenship during the French Revolution was not unavoidable; Stalin’s or Hitler’s rise to power 
wasn’t inescapable, like that of Brecht’s Arturo Ui; the decision of dropping the atomic bomb over 
Hiroshima was far from inevitable. (…) 
To open up the past means that the so-called ‘trials of history’ are by no means definitive or 
immutable. The future can re-open ‘closed’ historical records, ‘restore’ slandered victims, update 
defeated hopes and aspirations, rediscover forgotten fights or those considered ‘utopic’, 
‘anachronistic’ and ‘counter to progress’. In this case, to open up the past and to open up the future 
are closely linked.845  
  
In her researches about the Yalta Conference (February 1945) and the 
establishment of Communist power in Poland in the midst of the 1940’s, as well as in 
the first preface she wrote under a pseudonym for the journalist Teresa Torańska’s Oni 
(1985)846, Krystyna Kersten wondered, for instance, whether it would have been 
possible to prevent Stalin from reaching his goals in Poland during the last phase of the 
Second World War. Could that have been achieved by the United States? Perhaps with 
different policies of Polish political leaders? Would have wiser representatives, the lack 
of a Polish Communist group willing to follow Moscow’s plans and a stronger 
resistance of Polish society made a difference? And in such a case, were the alternatives 
“better” for Poland in terms of independence: to become an ally of the USSR but 
simultaneously a sovereign, democratic state able to develop economically and 
culturally (in other words, closer to Finland’s situation); or were they “worse”, that is, to 
become the seventeenth republic of the USSR? Kersten could go as far as posing her 
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doubts, but could not provide solid answers, nor a 100% reliable “prediction” (or rather 
post-diction?) of the “past-that-didn’t-take-place”847, though she made a clear bet in 
Benjamin’s line, as we will see.  
In her aim to refute the widespread Polish perception of the Yalta Conference (i.e. 
that Poland was then betrayed and “sold” by the West to the Soviet Union), Krystyna 
Kersten asked herself yet another (as she called it) provoking question: “was Poland lost 
in Yalta?” In order to try to answer it, she would like to provide a general overview of 
the course of events and circumstances basing herself on the available sources of that 
time but without the “chains” of Polish stereotypes, despite assuming a Polish 
perspective848. This would apparently suit a classic self-perception of a 
“demythologizing-historian” in pursuit of truth, which is considered to fulfill a 
liberation task. To put it in psychoanalytic terms, Kersten would like to sit Polish 
society on a couch (a king-size one!), track down the roots of its trauma and unease, talk 
it out of its biased interpretations and make it approach the past otherwise in order to 
break those chains and enable it to advance.  
However, the truth can be never complete, and is not always comforting. What’s 
more alarming still: it could get dangerously close, in the eyes of a “demythologizing-
historian”, to other myths which were also intended to be dismantled. Kersten came up 
with the following inferences about her own inquiries:   
To start with, Stalin followed a policy of faits accomplis. Within their early 
expansionist plans, the Soviet Union’s leaders already viewed the Second World War as 
an imperialist struggle; hence, their mission was to acquire influence in different 
countries during and after their liberation from Nazi troops (eg. foundation of military 
and political organizations) in order to rise to power at the right time and transform the 
imperialist World War into civil wars against national exploiters. Communists had 
become a political force to be taken on account in almost every liberated country by the 
end of the War. The result of the clashes between Communists and non-Communists in 
the late 1944 and early 1945 was not determined by internal factors, but by support 
coming from abroad: finally, Communists didn’t form a government or build a new 
political regime beyond Soviet military sphere, where they were politically stronger 
(Italy, France, Greece), but where they were weaker: in Poland, the Achilles’ heel of the 
area occupied by Soviet Union’s troops during the War849. 
But even if Stalin hadn’t found in Poland a Communist group ready to make 
Moscow’s guidelines its own, or hadn’t been able to transform the USSR-sponsored 
Polish Committee of National Liberation850, which controlled de facto the liberated 
parts of the country since July 1944, into the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Poland851 right before the Yalta Conference (January 1945), geopolitics would have 
probably had the last word anyway, Kersten argued852. Due to the priority given to 
military goals above political and economic ones during the War, and to the decision of 
Western allies to delimit their military operations’ sphere up to Western Germany 
(except for Berlin) in 1943, the Soviet dominion area in Central-Eastern Europe was to 
a good extent decided beforehand853. It was the incipient clash of two mentalities: not 
only was Stalin a hard negotiator, but also the representative of a system that didn’t 
                                                 
847
 Kersten: “W oczach...”, 21-22; Kersten: Jałta..., 242. 
848
 Kersten: Jałta..., 7-9, 15-16. 
849
 Kersten: Jałta..., 23-31. 
850
 Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN. 
851
 Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, RTRP. 
852
 Kersten: “W oczach...”, 21. 
853
 Kersten: Jałta..., 17-26. 
209 
 
respect any rules or human rights, either within its borders or abroad. Unlike the U.S.’ 
and Great Britain’s leaders, he didn’t have to take any public opinion or future elections 
on account. He took the occupation carried out by the Red Army as the effective and 
permanent establishment of his dominion over the region, and the Yalta Conference as 
its acknowledgment. Democracy was an empty word for him, but he was ready to make 
promises and pretend it mattered in front of his allies as a way of achieving his targets. 
Regarding Poland, Kersten believed Stalin’s plans of establishing a Communist 
government in the country had taken full shape by 1944. The only aspects that were still 
undecided were how and when, that is, the way to act and the tempo of the process 
leading to the “construction of socialism” ─in other words, of a country economically, 
ideologically, militarily and politically dependent on the USSR854.  
However, in Kersten’s Jałta w polskiej perspektywie we can also find the opposite 
impression: apparently contradicting herself, the author considered that not everything 
was settled before Yalta, and that the Conference was a crossroads rather than a 
sentence for Poland855. The Agreement was actually quite open in order for it to be 
accepted and signed by the three powers. If it had been literally interpreted and honestly 
put into practice, it would have meant Polish Communists’ defeat, since they wouldn’t 
have stood a chance of being in power after free, democratic elections. Nevertheless, 
Stalin managed to make his Western partners not include in the Agreement a clause 
guaranteeing the allies’ supervision of those future elections and ensured to achieve by 
all means what he had in mind regardless what the Pact said856. 
Instead of focusing on the role played by Western allies before and after Yalta, 
especially the U.S., Kersten wondered whether a wiser policy of Polish political leaders 
could have changed something, or if, at least, all resorts were used up in order to 
preserve Polish state’s sovereignty and its nation’s existence. Usually, she said, the 
Poles have a poor and very critical opinion of all political actors of the time: they 
reproach the Polish government-in-exile for its lack of realism, the Communists for 
their identification of the reasons of Polish state with Soviet interests, and Stanisław 
Mikołajczyk for his excessively conciliatory position. However, given the situation of 
the country and its inhabitants, she considered there couldn’t have been a single policy: 
on one extreme, the government-in-exile lacked effective power inside Poland and was 
ignored by the allies in international meetings and compromises from 1944; its 
representatives demanded complete sovereignty and independence for Poland and, since 
its legitimacy was based precisely on the defense of these and other moral values and 
rights, to give up that claim would have been shameful and undignified, and hence 
unthinkable. On the other extreme, Polish Communists had effective power in the 
country thanks to Stalin, and that enabled them to organize Polish postwar life within 
the USSR’s sphere, but in 1944-1945 the majority of the population regarded them as 
representatives of foreign interests supported by the Red Army and the USSR’s 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKWD). They were Stalin’s politicians, but 
in that context any government that wasn’t under the USSR’s control in Poland was 
non-viable, regardless whether Polish Communists considered Soviet patronage as a 
need or as the natural expression of ideological bonds between Moscow and Warsaw. 
These extremes, due precisely to their irreconcilable aims, were incapable of 
negotiating. Taking on account present-day knowledge on the topic, Kersten considered 
that Polish non-Communist politicians wouldn’t have been able to prevent the inclusion 
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of Poland in the USSR’s area nor the Communists’ rise to power; they could have only 
increased or diminished the costs and damages of the process.   
But that wasn’t so clear even by mid-1945, for there were still open variables. 
Bolesław Bierut’s857 suggestion to Mikołajczyk of resigning as Prime Minister of the 
“reactionary” government-in-exile and joining the “democratic” (PKWN’s) side in 
October 1944 was a betrayal proposal rather than a commitment. However, there was 
yet a meagre, narrow margin left for authentic politics, and it was based precisely on the 
Yalta Agreements. Thus, Mikołajczyk returned to Poland in December 1944 and tried to 
make the most of this small, single chance in a last attempt to avoid a Communist 
political monopoly in Poland, hoping to have Western allies’ support and secure some 
concessions from Polish Communists when they finally realized they simply couldn’t 
rule the country on their own due to the lack of internal support. But things turned out 
otherwise. Therefore, Kersten concluded, it wasn’t the lack of political balance or 
realism, but the way the international situation developed what determined beforehand 
the defeat of all those who tried to preserve Polish nation’s and state’s existence without 
turning away from reality but, simultaneously, never supporting policies based on force 
or on the law of the strongest858. And she finished off: 
 
Not every defeat proves that the defeated were wrong or that they didn’t fulfill the requirements of 
political realism. Contrary to what is generally thought, back then the Soviet Union didn’t have 
just a refusal on principle [Polish government-in-exile’s position, C. A.] or an unconditional 
submission [complete Communist monopoly in Poland, C. A.] on the table, but also a readiness to 
acquire a reasonable commitment, as long as it was authentic, not a concealed capitulation, and in 
humiliating conditions.859 
 
Regarding her discourse and evidences, could we assert that, for Kersten, 
everything was settled by the second half of World War II? Could have something else 
been decided afterwards? And in such case, by whom?  
In my opinion, the author’s work is not so much a general attempt to dismantle 
recent historical myths as a personal statement, a struggle and, finally, an accusation, 
besides a reminder for Polish society. While refuting the so-called “myth of Yalta” with 
the help of her sources, Kersten was, ironically, very close to acknowledging fatalism in 
the form of geopolitical determinism; she even described present-day geopolitics as a 
curse in the first preface she wrote for Torańska’s Oni860. Apart from being definitely 
unfortunate, to be located between Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union and 
becoming their shared war booty certainly contributed to perpetuate the classic Polish 
view regarding their nation’s previous situation between former Prussia-Germany and 
Russia. In the light of this unescapable condition, Kersten ended up recognizing the 
powerlessness both of Polish political actors, in spite of their multiple positions and 
attempts, and of Western allies861, which she nevertheless questioned from the start and 
approached thoroughly along this and other essays in order to understand them.   
But the author’s main concern lies elsewhere. Unlike the supporters of the “myth 
of Yalta”, who were too busy blaming the West categorically for Poland’s setbacks, an 
apparently obvious question throbs in Kersten’s arguments: what about the USSR? It is 
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at this point where hesitation and a personal struggle can be appreciated: on the one 
hand, the documents proved, and she actually believed, that in the midst of the War the 
Soviet Union had already decided that Poland’s future would be Communist or simply 
wouldn’t be. On the other, however, the documents also showed, and her democratic 
moral imperative told her, that Stalin had many chances to reconsider his decision and 
think about, for instance, “finlandization”, the last one probably being the application of 
the Yalta Agreement (hence the fact she described it as a “crossroads”), but he didn’t. 
And she wanted to make that point especially clear862.  
But what for? Did it really matter whether it was a question of fate or of free will? 
If it had been known or assumed back then that it was the latter, would it have made any 
difference in practice? Possibly not. However, it can make a crucial difference today, 
because it involves a change of perception both of the past and of present time. By 
reminding or showing Polish society the repressed source of its trauma, namely, that it 
was Stalin who first and foremost had the leading voice in negotiations since 1943, and 
thus had a choice, Kersten dismantled an unstated, far more threatening determinism 
underlying in the “myth of Yalta”: the perception of the Soviet Union as an implacable, 
pre-programmed automaton or, in other words, as an irrational animal that cannot take 
responsibility for its instinctive, albeit brutal, actions. Nothing could be further from the 
truth: Soviet leaders, together with Polish Communists, were conscious of the harm they 
would cause in the name of so-called “progress”, “democracy” or “greater good”, that 
is, in the name of their (only half-concealed) thirst of power and greed, but didn’t care, 
or even relished it. In this case, the truth is tough enough to face, but to de-humanize 
Soviet decision-makers and their Polish long arm meant doing them a favor, precisely 
because it exempted them from any responsibility towards the defeated, the fallen and, 
ultimately, towards Polish society as a whole.   
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It is not surprising, then, that a stereotype that diverted people’s attention from the 
core, most conflictive issue of Polish recent past and sought scapegoats or culprits 
elsewhere should be very convenient for Communist authorities, and thus fueled during 
forty years by politicians, propagandists, pro-governmental historians and publicyści, 
besides also being supported by many oppositionists.   
A widespread “myth” such as Yalta’s was simultaneously dangerous and 
harmless: dangerous, because it actively contributed to the establishment of a bitter, 
disappointed, conformist or resigned view of the country’s history and, by extension, of 
present time; harmless, precisely because it rendered present time sterile, in the sense it 
wouldn’t help oppositionists nor Polish society to challenge Communist rule and 
improve things. In other words, the present can’t fully become Jetztzeit because it’s 
prisoner of a paralyzing, incapacitating view of the past. Kersten was conscious of this 
dependence when she remarked earlier, in Narodziny systemu władzy, that  
 
In writing this book about the past, I think about the future. We need history not only as an 
element of national survival but also as a component of political thought, which is experiencing 
rebirth. Our ‘today’ is so deeply rooted in our ‘yesterday’ that we won’t be able to plan future 
actions rationally without a deep comprehension863 of that ‘yesterday’.864  
 
Similarly, she dedicated Jałta w polskiej perspektywie “to all those who seek 
knowledge about the past in order to think about the future”, and considered that the 
problems she posed should be seen as “a lesson in politics”865. Politics regarded in this 
case as “the art of the possible”, as a democratic will to negotiate that takes 
circumstances on account, a midway path between unrealistic, far-out demands and a 
surrender equivalent to giving up imponderabilia, set up against immoral “anti-politics” 
founded in totalitarian intransigence.  
It’s about not taking for granted that things had to turn out as they finally did. It’s 
about identifying those ultimately responsible for frustrated chances, unfulfilled 
commitments and past crimes with a view, in the first place, to exercising the moral 
right to claim justice, and, in the second place, to demanding a better future where there 
will be no room left for such outrages. Finally, it’s about not allowing the “winner” to 
get his way and to eventually succeed in his hermeneutic goal for, if he achieved it, the 
real, serious wounds of Polish society would never be healed. That is, to put it in Václav 
Havel’s words, the power of the powerless. 
In sum, Kersten’s approach is a warning about the peril of accepting deceit 
(whether out of pain and resentment or out of indoctrination) and yielding subsequently 
to oblivion.  Rather than final, soothing rest, to promote such a reinterpretation of 
history can make a society experience a productive combination of unrest and relief 
based on action and on remembrance, not only of the defeated, but also of what the 
opponent-“winner” can be capable of if given the chance. The inevitability of certain 
“given” facts, such as a geographic location, must be assumed, but not of those 
dependent on human will. No-one should be exempted from that moral imperative. 
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B) Western countries  
 
“Your father’s gone,” my bald headmaster said. (...) 
 
I was a month past ten when I learnt this: 
I still remember how the noise was stilled 
In school-assembly when my grief came in. 
Some goldfish in a bowl quietly sculled 
Around their shining prison on its shelf. 
They were indifferent. All the other eyes  
Were turned towards me. Somewhere in myself 
Pride, like a goldfish, flashed a sudden fin. 
 
Edward Lucie-Smith: The Lesson  
 
Despite many oppositionists regarded Western (European) countries as the 
antithesis of what the Soviet Union or Communism represented to them in terms of 
values and principles (Chapter 2), Polish views about the West were not always as 
positive as one might have expected866.  
Basically, this phenomenon had to do with two related aspects: firstly, with the 
differences between Polish and Western European modern historical experiences 
concerning freedom and suffering; and, secondly, with unfulfilled expectations.  
To start with, some intellectuals were concerned about Western Europe’s 
increasing monopoly over the concept of “Europe”, especially since the integration 
process of the European Economic Community began to take off. Not only did they fear 
being left behind in terms of development, but simply being left out of the West’s 
agendas and minds, becoming a kind of foreign and second-rate “Eurasian” partner867. 
However, the fact that Western Europeans questioned or did not acknowledge the 
“Europeanness” of Eastern Bloc inhabitants did not make the former perfect, nor 
superior in relation to the latter. The European ideals which should, in Polish eyes, be 
the guidelines of social life and the code of ethical conduct in the continent, clashed 
with the real behaviors and practical situations that many Polish travelers and emigrants 
had witnessed in the West. These impressions about the “good” and the “bad” side of 
Western European countries were ingrained in Polish cultural spheres since uprising 
times and the ensuing emigration waves to France, England, etc.:   
 
The following question of those years [first half of the nineteenth century, C.A.] dealt with the 
relations of the Poles, of a torn nation, with the world. It was suitably and fully formulated 
precisely by émigrés: the question about the meaning of Poland’s existence between Russia and 
the West. Back then, the West was for the Poles the symbol of civilization and democracy, but also 
of mercantilism and petit bourgeois spirit868, as Zygmunt Krasiński said. The country idealized the 
West, the émigrés unmasked it. Thus, the relation of the Poles with the West was ambivalent, just 
like the range of experiences of a French writer and a Polish writer were different; the experiences, 
let’s say, of Balzac and Mickiewicz.869 
 
Such an assessment stressed that Poland remained faithful to European ideals and 
kept a more essentialist position in the continent due to the undergone hardships and 
national catastrophes, whereas Western European countries living in more favorable 
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circumstances slid into materialism and excessive pragmatism, which eventually led to 
a crisis of values.  
The political myth about a European or Western European moral plight is neither 
new nor exclusive of Polish or Eastern European authors: Tony Judt’s Postwar, for 
instance, contains pretty much the same theses870. In Poland’s specific case, this is 
closely related to the idealist-realist dilemma we have gone through before (Chapter 1).  
The founder of the endecja party, Roman Dmowski, once said that great men 
were dreamers and that, on the contrary, an excellent good sense only produced average 
people ─who were typical of the West. Inspiring himself in these words, Andrzej 
Micewski believed that dreamers could still be found among old and young Polish 
generations, and that it was precisely an excess of sensibleness in Western governments 
what had boosted Adolf Hitler’s territorial ambitions during the interwar period. Since 
the signature of the Yalta agreements, Czesław Bielecki stated, Western European 
countries had ceased to fight for a free world; and, after the Second World War, they 
were blinded by economic miracles and enrichment aspirations, only to find themselves 
at a loss before civilizational threats and the phantom of economic recession shortly 
afterwards. In the opinion of Polish intellectuals, as well as of other Central and Eastern 
European oppositionists like Václav Havel, it was as if the West had taken for granted 
the principles that formed the basis of their identity and had become far too smug, too 
indifferent, pliable and easy-going regarding their defense. Immerse in moral 
decadence, Western Europeans did not realize that those values required a 
nonconformist attitude and many sacrifices in order to be preserved; sacrifices which, 
ironically, only Central and Eastern Europeans had been ready to make, given their 
continual exposure to existential danger871.   
Stefan Kisielewski, who sometimes shared with his readers his impressions of his 
journeys to Western Europe, once explained in Tygodnik Powszechny that the 
differences between Eastern and Western Europeans, despite existing, were not 
insurmountable if relativistic and euphemistic attitudes were left aside and a real 
dialogue was established. The setting of his anecdote was the conference “Education in 
Europe: culture and specialization”, held in Hamburg in January 1976872. Many Western 
European intellectuals attended the meeting, while just a few Polish and Romanian 
experts managed to come from the Eastern Bloc. When they had the floor, Western 
European specialists delivered very technical and pragmatic speeches focused on the 
development of high-level educational policies; however, according to Kisielewski, 
their words lacked real ideas, something that stimulated discussions and authentic 
“brain life”. He also realized that they were not taking on account Eastern European 
reality so, when it was his turn to speak, the author complained about this. He said that 
lecturers were not bearing in mind that there were two Europes, with two very different 
education systems. And he went on to explain what the Eastern European system was 
like, while perceiving how his audience became increasingly uncomfortable. After him, 
a Romanian colleague explained the matter in an even harder way, and only then the 
curse broke.  
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All of a sudden, people began to speak their minds freely about these East-West 
differences, as if before they had been refraining themselves out of cautiousness, 
consideration, mistrust or, perhaps, ignorance or indifference. But now the silence was 
broken: the audience was exchanging opinions, taking up controversial issues, doubting, 
questioning, laughing, scoffing, accusing, so that the previous inactive brains engaged 
in revising terms and sanctified ideas or pseudo-ideas. It was certainly a memorable 
moment: “We, who have eaten from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, 
suddenly run after experts873 in this cautious, material world. Idealistic ‘aesthetes’874, 
discussions and disputes without object enjoyed some good days then! It’s a shame that 
so seldom”875. Faced by Eastern European intelligentsia, Western European experts 
stepped out of their specialization comfort zone and re-discovered their original, 
intellectual nature, taking up substantive broad debates again without turning their 
backs on the real, fundamental problems of the “other” Europeans, and their own876.  
The image of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, which appeared from 
time to time in Kisielewski’s texts877, suggested the loss of innocence of the Eastern 
Bloc countries due to their geopolitical conditions and, at the same time, the moral 
capability of its inhabitants of telling good and evil apart, of calling a spade a spade and 
pinning down the essentials instead of being in a tangle with details and technicalities. 
Their burdensome past and present, full of victims, appointed them bearers of a 
universal warning message:  
 
This[, the Lumpen who suffers, gets indignant and protests, C.A.] is the subject-agent who can 
know what the rest (who oppress, rule or pass by without stopping) can’t know. Their cognitive 
bonus consists of a regard loaded with experience and focused on the reality which we all inhabit. 
In a social State governed by the rule of law, this regard can tell that those who are oppressed live 
in a permanent state of emergency, or that what is considered as progress by the majority is at 
bottom a process of ruins and corpses, as the angel of history of [Walter Benjamin’s, C.A.] ninth 
thesis says. (…) To know is to possess a visual acuity that sees the unwonted in the objects, 
situations or events we all look at. It is a regard that shakes the established securities which 
constitute the basis of our social life, even in democracy.878 
 
In this case, such regard came from beyond democratic countries, not from within, 
but it nevertheless questioned the foundations of Western European postwar systems, 
for the alleged progress the latter experienced since the mid-1940s had been, in a way, 
built upon the loss of independence and freedom of the other half of Europe. Stefan 
Kisielewski and his Romanian colleagues in Hamburg were the reminder of an 
inconvenient, neighboring reality that proved that progress very rarely meant progress 
for all, and that their nations were the victims of those improvements and, in sum, of 
“peace”. The first step to overcome that situation was to admit its existence and, 
secondly, to promote a free dialogue without prejudices between both parts.  
Moral far-sightedness was the legacy that the (former) Eastern Bloc countries 
could offer the West. Václav Havel insisted on this further ahead in time, in his 
presidential speeches: 
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The communist type of totalitarian system has left both our nations, Czechs and Slovaks ─as it 
has all the nations of the Soviet Union, and the other countries the Soviet Union subjugated in its 
time─ a legacy of countless dead, an infinite spectrum of human suffering, profound economic 
decline, and above all enormous human humiliation. It has brought us horrors that, fortunately, 
you [the U.S. people, C.A.] have never known.  
At the same time ─unintentionally, of course─ it has given us something positive: a special 
capacity to look, from time to time, somewhat further than those who have not undergone this 
bitter experience. Someone who cannot move and live a normal life because he is pinned under a 
boulder has more time to think about his hopes than someone who is not trapped in this way. 
What I am trying to say is this: we must all learn many things from you [the U.S., C.A.], from 
how to educate our offspring and how to elect our representatives, to how to organize our 
economic life so that it will lead to prosperity and not poverty. But this doesn’t have to be merely 
assistance from the well-educated, the powerful, and the wealthy to those who have nothing to 
offer in return. 
We, too, can offer something to you: our experience and the knowledge that has come from 
it.879 
 
In the end, those who expected the worst from the Soviet Union in the closing 
stages of the World War had the right perception after all. It seems, however, that 
American decision-makers did not have such a clear view from the start.  
Krystyna Kersten pointed out in her monographs that Polish diplomats and 
politicians were convinced that the USSR wanted to profit from its military victories 
and carry out its expansionist plans before the War ended. A Soviet policy based on 
faits accomplis was extremely dangerous for Central and Eastern European nations in 
such circumstances, and so they let their Western allies know. Nevertheless, back then 
the U.S. leaders did not want to side with small countries or be forced into a military 
intervention against the Soviet Union. They thought that only great powers should reach 
an agreement about territorial matters, and believed in Stalin’s bona fide and promises 
about the celebration of free elections in Poland after the War.  
By autumn 1945, when the Communists’ grip on Poland was consolidating, the 
United States’ policy towards the Soviet Union began to change in a gradual but firm 
way. The doctrine of containment, based on a counteroffensive to restrain the Soviet 
advance in other parts of the world, especially Europe and Asia, started to take shape. 
But it was already too late for the countries in the eastern bank of the Elbe.  
Certain American researchers of the postwar period considered that the adverse 
outcome of the Polish case actually played an important role in the transformation of the 
United States’ perception of world politics. In 1944 and the beginning of 1945, Poland 
was basically seen as an important piece in the collaboration game between the allies. 
Further on, Stalin’s increasingly brutal and intransigent position regarding the advances 
of Communists in the country was one of the first signs that sapped the hopes for a 
peaceful international cooperation. The ripening process of the new Western strategy 
concluded with the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) and the ensuing meetings 
of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and Moscow (September and December 
1945), where the fate of the III Reich’s former satellites was discussed. At that point, 
little could be done for the nations occupied by the Red Army880.   
Polish modern historical experience couldn’t have been more different from that 
of the Western countries. While each of the latter made their way towards national 
sovereignty and gradually developed democratic systems, public opinion and 
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citizenship, Poland was deprived of the right to do so for more than a century881. But 
despite it had survived Tsars and Kaisers, two World Wars, Hitler and Stalin; despite it 
had tasted, in sum, the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil over and 
over again since the partitions’ period, the warnings of the Nation That Knew Too 
Much were repeatedly disregarded by the West. And so it was necessary for the 
desperate Polish Cassandra to endure another defeat and become once more the “Christ 
of nations” to make the U.S. leaders understand the real intentions of the Soviet Union. 
Apparently, Kisielewski said, Western intellectuals and politicians had been unable to 
foresee something that any Eastern European common citizen, actually any child, saw 
quite clearly882.  
Though they referred to shameful and terrible events, it is easy to catch a glimpse 
of pride’s “sudden fin” in opposition inteligencja’s words: the feeling that Poland’s fate 
since the Nazi invasion had somehow changed world history, besides reinforcing the 
Poles’ moral superiority over the West, could be strangely comforting. But nobody 
should be deceived: history was an untamable runaway horse; only that the “chosen 
nations” knew much better than others what its face was really like:  
 
In general, having frequent dealings with Western culture, I have come to the conclusion that we, 
here, in the East, possess a knowledge about the mechanism of history and what goes on behind 
the scenes that they [Western Europeans, C.A.] just cannot imagine, despite they regard us so 
proudly as a province. A province of the world fully loaded with useless historical wisdom 
─useless, since it does not provide any happiness.883   
 
But even if Poland’s cry was ignored in the short term, the seeds of the forbidden 
fruit had been sowed. Something good could now sprout from them if the Poles shared 
their recent traumatic experiences and Western countries were willing to listen.  
The lessons that the West could learn from Central European inhabitants were 
varied. To start with, they understood how Bolshevik totalitarianism worked from the 
inside. Great Polish literature about Soviet gulags had escaped Western readers’ notice, 
and that had delayed for about a decade the knowledge about the Soviet imperium’s 
repressive nature. It was time to recover these and other texts, and make an effort to get 
to know Central and Eastern Europe’s multiple traditions and specificities, instead of 
superficially regarding the region as a whole due to its geopolitical conditions884.  
Secondly, Poland could provide Western Europe with moral guidance, pull it out 
of the materialistic spiral it was swirling in and encourage it to retrieve the principles 
that it was about to lose:  
 
In the face of such a widespread hangover885, wouldn’t a tiny bit of romanticism and, as they call 
it there, political idealism, be very necessary for the West? It even looks as if such awareness is 
ripening there and begins to bear fruit. Moreover, this is nothing other than simply returning to the 
sources and values of Western culture, of Greco-Roman European culture.886  
 
According to Bronisław Geremek, there was also “in Polish fate a certain lesson 
of sense of community”. The protest and opposition experiences of the last years, said 
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the historian in 1986, were based on high social aspirations, like the diminishment of 
collective and individual damages within Communist regime, the encouragement of 
pluralism in representation systems, the sponsorship of real participation of people in 
public life and the search of different ways of building a direct democracy. “Because the 
sense of solidarity towards others demanded to act for others”, the first protests of the 
Gdańsk shipyards in defense of Anna Walentynowicz887, of whom her companions 
highlighted her moral qualities and sense of justice, did not end when the workers’ 
salaries were increased. That communal spirit was not just a response to the lack of 
democracy and of free will in Poland, but a suggestion to build a fairer, more equal and 
fraternal European polis in order to overcome the crisis of democracy in the continent, 
“a proposal that cannot go unnoticed in Europe, for it reminds it about the values it has, 
but can lose, as well as about the values it doesn’t have, but can attain”888.  
Lastly, inteligencja insisted once again in the importance of Poland as a cultural 
or civilizational bridge, this time between Western European countries and Communist 
satellite nations, in order to draw them closer together and set an example for others to 
follow behind the Iron Curtain: 
 
The Poles must remember that the role of bridge, intermediary and promoter is one of the 
fundamental components of Polish historical tradition, it’s what determines its indispensability in 
the community of European cultures. 
Our efforts to preserve our own national identity and at the same time the continuity of our 
historical traditions and links with European countries means much to other nations, also 
dominated by the USSR, especially Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These countries are also equally 
linked to Western Europe concerning their past and their cultural contents.889  
 
The second point of friction discussed in opposition intellectuals’ texts had to do 
with Poland’s disenchantment and unfulfilled expectations regarding the West. In 
Tadeusz Łepkowski’s opinion, the hope of being unselfishly aided by Western countries 
when their nation was in peril dated back to Napoleonic times and had become a heavy 
burden in Polish minds and perceptions: 
 
During this period [eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, C.A.] there was a single and shortly 
successful attempt of regenerating Poland with the support of the West, that is, of the Napoleonic 
Empire. It is difficult to overestimate the importance that the Duchy of Warsaw had in the 
preservation of Polishness and of the faith in a future independent Polish state. However, this 
success of pro-independence initiatives under the protection of a united West (for as such must be 
understood Napoleonic France) is at the same time our damnation. Since Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
times up until today, and precisely because the West once helped us in an effective way, we drag a 
chain of politically deceptive conceptions that boil down to the following: it will happen again, it 
must happen again, it is necessary to rely on the West, regardless whether its name is Napoleon III, 
Chamberlain, Churchill, Roosevelt or Reagan, for only the West can help us to regain complete 
independence. What is the reason for this past and present illusion? The reason is that, despite 
having sensible and brilliant studies about the Napoleonic question, we always make the same 
mistake. We believe (deep in our hearts, obviously) that the Emperor of the French aided us out of 
mere liking and sympathy, us and only us (‘God is with Napoleon, Napoleon with us’). However, 
if our thoughts were more in line with the truth, that is, with the fact that the Polish issue was just 
part of a new global organization of Europe, the conclusions would be certainly different. If a 
complete change in the European system depended on the West (understood as a specific and 
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variable dominant center in the West), maybe Poland would be economically and politically 
necessary as an integral part of it. Nevertheless, if the established or planned system can do 
without an independent Poland, then no altruistic help will be ever provided to the unfortunate 
country of the Vistula. One cannot expect this. Especially when in the twentieth century the role 
and strength of Germany and Russia is what really counts, and thus not Poland.890 
  
For Western great powers, as for any other country, national interests are the 
major priority, if not the single. Therefore, Poland would be just one more token in the 
international board, and political actors only helped each other when it was convenient 
for them and expected to receive something in exchange. Regardless whether he 
deemed it unfair or not, Łepkowski considered that the Poles should assume the real 
rules of the game in order not to experience further disappointments.  
In relation to this, it was important for them to understand as well that much of the 
harm which they blamed the West for was simply the result of decisions based on 
different perceptions of the international context and its limitations, not a consequence 
of “personal” dislike or indifference towards Poland and a subsequent betrayal.  
Stalin acted in an opportunistic and realistic way, sounding out how far the USSR 
could go in its expansionist scheme before the Western allies tried to stop it. Many in 
Washington still believed in his words in 1944-1945 and were unaware of his intention 
of building a broad influence area in Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans controlled 
de facto by Moscow.  
Despite not wanting a Communist Poland, Central-Eastern Europe was a 
secondary region in Washington’s foreign policy. The main goal for the U.S. was to 
reorganize the world through the UN with the USSR’s cooperation, so it left some 
controversial issues open to argument, including the Polish, in order to negotiate with 
Russia and secure its collaboration in the global project. The United States’ president 
and some of his diplomats thought mistakenly that the main problem for the Soviet 
Union had to do with future borders instead of with political systems. The lukewarm 
reaction of Great Britain and the U.S. when the USSR broke its relations with the Polish 
government-in-exile persuaded Stalin to go ahead with his plans.  
Home affairs also influenced the development of the negotiations: according to 
Krystyna Kersten, Franklin D. Roosevelt eluded duties and postponed decisions about 
postwar order until the November 1944 presidential elections were over, so time was 
definitely on Stalin’s side.  
The future of Central and Eastern Europe was therefore shaped under an 
enormous Soviet pressure that was only feebly opposed by Western leaders, who were 
convinced about their own impotence concerning the territories already occupied by the 
Red Army. The formation of the USSR-promoted Provisional Government of National 
Unity891 at the end of spring 1945 was regarded by Western governments as the partial 
fulfilment of the Yalta treaty, so they withdrew from the Polish affair and allowed the 
celebration of unsupervised elections, trying at all costs to avoid the outbreak of another 
war that would confront the former allies892.    
Despite the attempts to understand the complexity of the situation in an impartial 
way, there was nevertheless an inescapable tinge of disappointment and indignation in 
opposition historical discourses for, at bottom, many intellectuals felt that Western 
countries could have behaved less pliably and more firmly, but turned a blind eye and 
shielded themselves behind the theory of the Yalta agreements instead of mobilizing 
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against what was going on in practice. And things hadn’t changed much in the next 
decades: when present-day military and economic interests prevailed over cultural and 
spiritual values, Central-Eastern Europe ceased to exist in the West’s international 
considerations893. 
In any case, since seeking for foreign aid had always rendered such poor results, 
Poland’s survival strategy should definitely change, inteligenci said. The Poles should 
begin to help themselves before asking others to help them out.  
Adam Michnik did not see anything new in this idea: it was simply one of the 
nineteenth-century “Polish questions”… 
  
Already back then the following question was posed: whom can the Poles count on? The 
governments or the people? ─asked Maurycy Mochnacki. And the Poles answered (though they 
never expressed it directly) that they could neither count on the governments, nor on the people of 
Western Europe. They could only count on themselves. Naturally, the international context could 
help them. (Naturally, the voice of public opinion could support them). But beyond these changing 
circumstances we must be capable of attaining independence and freedom. We must build 
independence and freedom within ourselves, from the inside.894 
 
In one of his better-known essays, Czesław Bielecki compared Poland’s situation 
at the end of the 1970s with that of a very peculiar internment camp. Its guards and 
watchmen (Communist authorities) had lost their confidence, while the prisoners, i.e. 
the rest of the Poles, were not afraid of them anymore. But no-one thought that things 
could be changed; prisoners comforted themselves instead by wishing that somebody 
else would come to rescue them someday. Until it gradually dawned on them that they 
had to free the camp for and by themselves895. It was no use turning to the countries 
officially representing European principles in search of salvation, for “the only 
Democratic International that can help us is the one that we set up. After all the western 
defeats in the fight against Communism from the outside, it is clear that the Empire-
camp can only be blown up from the inside. And we must expect nothing more than 
sympathy and understanding in this”896.  
To rely on the “powerful” was a mistake, inteligencja thought, for who could be 
more powerful in the defense of Polish independence, rights and freedoms than the 
Poles themselves? That is what the poster in Figure 1897 tried to transmit to society in 
the words of one of its national heroes, the leader of the 1794 Uprising Tadeusz 
Kościuszko: “Poles! You have everything you need for success ─just dare to succeed”. 
To wait for Godot, who would certainly not come by, made people fall into despair, as 
Havel cleverly remarked. So why not try to be patient and cherish hopes in one’s own 
power instead, why not try to work and resist despite not seeing the light at the end of 
the tunnel in the short term?898 
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Figure 1 
 
This did not mean they were completely alone in their struggle. Just like 
Kisielewski and the Romanian guests of the Hamburg conference had to speak up first 
about their difficult situation in order to break the ice of the Cold War and encourage 
their Western partners to make a move, Polish opposition in Poland and abroad should 
“make some noise” about it too, “cause a stir, prove our liveliness and determination to 
live”, challenging the indifference (fortunately, most times only initial) of democratic 
European countries899.  
Thus, opposition intellectuals’ formula to make the Poles overcome their 
emotional and psychological dependence on the West split into two counterbalanced 
measures: on the one hand, they played down the importance of Poland in the 
international arena (i.e. Poland is definitely not the center of the world and of others’ 
concerns, there are no Don Quixotes in foreign affairs ministries); on the other hand, 
they boosted the morale and self-assurance of their fellow countrymen and made them 
focus on what they could be capable of if they only tried. In other words, they 
readjusted the object of Polish pride, hopes and strength. 
To sum up, Polish inteligenci sought moral acknowledgement from Western 
countries for being up to the task of preserving European principles in very adverse 
circumstances. They wanted to share their defeats in order to give them a redemptive 
meaning, but also their latest successes, and feel part of a “trans-Berlin-Wall” European 
community. At the same time, they wanted to avoid old pitfalls concerning Poland’s 
reliance on foreign aid. By speaking about and overcoming the barriers present in the 
Poles’ perceptions, inteligenci made their compatriots gain confidence in their own 
capacities and encouraged them to find solutions to their socio-political situation for 
themselves, helping them to gain back their podmiotowość.   
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Chapter 4 
 
A Question of Time 
 
 
What do Poles talk about in jail? About the same things they always 
have, the same things as their fathers, grandfathers and great-
grandfathers did when they were jailed in the pavilions of the Citadel 
[in Warsaw]. Today, the Citadel no longer exists. The jail has been 
replaced by a museum of the revolutionary movement. But the myth 
of the Citadel remains, as does the symbol of the Citadel. Now we 
have Białołęka. Will a commemorative plaque be placed here one 
day? 
 
Adam Michnik: “Conversation in the Citadel” 
 
 
Das Bewußtsein, das Kontinuum der Geschichte aufzusprengen, ist 
den revolutionären Klassen im Augenblick ihrer Aktion eigentümlich. 
Die Große Revolution führte einen neuen Kalender ein.  
 
Walter Benjamin: “Über den Begriff der Geschichte, These XV” 
 
 
L’année 1989 transgresse la logique des calendriers. Elle est 
importante en tant qu’expérience de libération d’un système 
autoritaire car d’autres encore emprunteront cette voie. Elle est 
importante parce que, d’une certaine manière, elle n’est pas terminée, 
ses conséquences ne sont pas toutes connues. Cette formidable 
révolution pacifique ne peut pas être éclipsée par l’ombre des périls en 
gestation; ceux-ci passeront. 
 
Bronisław Geremek: La rupture 
 
 
 
Polish inhabitants’ liking for historical knowledge in its historicist form and the 
trouble it could eventually cause was already a subject of concern for researchers like 
the Polish émigré Adam Bromke back in the 1960s, when he pointed out that 
 
There exists strong historicism among the Poles. Especially in times of crisis, they almost 
instinctively turn to history to look for answers to the problems with which they are faced. This, 
however, carries with it the danger that, in drawing historical parallels, comparison [sic.] n’est pas 
raison, the Poles might be overimpressed with the past and ignore the new elements of the 
situation.900 
 
Fortunately for opposition circles, Bromke’s apprehension did not become a 
large-scale reality during the next decades. Many critical intellectuals, regardless of 
their specific profession, were certainly deeply allured by history, but that did not 
overshadow their present-day political commitment. Quite on the contrary, they 
reinforced both aspects of their identity through their combination, for opposition 
inteligencja proposed to build present time with the materials of the past. By paying 
attention to Poland’s frustrated pasts, inteligenci brought the authority and legitimacy of 
the factual into question, and thus carried out a political and epistemological 
subversion901.   
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 In previous chapters, especially the first and the second, we have seen how 
oppositionists established a continuity in spirit with their defeated predecessors ─though 
not always in method and hardly ever in political specificities or programs─; how they 
interpreted, valued and inspired in their thought and lives in present time; the recovery 
of what was lost or taken away, like society’s podmiotowość; the dread of making the 
same mistakes or living through the same things again; the fondness for the old, but also 
for the new and the unprecedented in the building of an aware citizenry. All of this 
engendered a specific perception of time within intellectuals’ narratives that was stated 
through the blend of cyclic and lineal images of the past and a keen interest in the 
pioneering aspects of Polish protests and opposition movements. Both ingredients, 
repetition and novelty, stimulated historical awareness and the historicization of present 
time, which entailed the belief in the capability (or incapability) to change the course of 
events and break with the winners’ time continuum, the notions of power and 
responsibility, the question of posterity and the search for truth, as well as the massive 
gathering, writing and publication of documents related to opposition activities. We will 
deal with all these topics here, in the fourth and last chapter of the work, where hopes 
and fears swirl together from the beginning right until the very end.    
  
 
A) “The return of the new”*. Cyclic and lineal perceptions of time and the pioneer 
question 
                                                                                                    
... Every one a revengeful burst 
Of resurrection, a grasped fistful  
Of splintered weapons and Icelandic frost thrust up 
 
From the underground stain of a decayed Viking. 
 
(...) Then they grow grey, like men. 
Mown down, it is a feud. Their sons appear, 
Stiff with weapons, fighting back over the same ground. 
 
Ted Hughes: Thistles 
 
The idea of a cyclic evolution of history began to settle in Polish consciousness 
after the Commonwealth lost its independence and statehood at the end of the 
eighteenth century, spreading and fortifying with each repressed revolt against 
partitioning powers. From then on, the third and definite division of Poland was 
regarded by many as a brutal interruption of the country’s historical development and 
continuity902.  
For Ewa Domańska, such a perception contains both mythical and religious 
elements, specifically “pagan notions of the tragic” and “Christian notions of 
redemption” that transform the Poles’ frustrated struggles and sacrifices in a source of 
strength, besides of pride and glory:  
 
This means that defeat and death for a noble cause are in themselves redemptive, having ritual 
values of ontological transformation, and are not merely the means of attaining life after death. 
Poles have had many tragic reversals in the past, but the sufferings caused by those events did not 
humiliate so much as inspire them. In this sense, suffering has had a cathartic value. (...) ... I would 
claim that when the myth of sacrifice is analysed on the basis of Polish consciousness, it becomes 
a place where Christianity and paganism, and religion and myth come together. On one hand, 
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suffering feeds history903, but on the other, it allows history to deviate from linearity, causality and 
change.904 
 
Despite looking back for patterns, inteligenci’s mission had a powerful creative 
component as well, focused on the building of a better and freer future. This explains 
the amalgam of two complementary views of the cycle in their discourses: on the one 
hand, the vicious circle inspired by repeated repression and the ensuing sense of loss 
and frustration for not being able to achieve the expected goals; on the other hand, the 
circle that ensures another opportunity to resume the battle against the winners. Thus, 
while in the first case the cycle is perceived as a curse that should be broken sooner or 
later, in the second it is the fountainhead of hope and of the conviction that the Poles’ 
aspirations for independence and freedom will never be utterly defeated, that such 
mission will be taken up again because the democratic and pluralistic essentials of 
Polishness will be passed on generation after generation905.  
Within a broader cyclic framework, we may sometimes spot glimmers of linearity 
and pioneering issues in oppositionists’ narratives. For instance, speaking about late 
eighteenth-century Polish educators, Stefan Bratkowski argued that, despite the 
Commission of National Education was far from being the first ministry of its kind in 
Europe, it was nevertheless unique in terms of effort in adverse circumstances, for it 
achieved an outstanding regeneration of Polish cultural sphere in a decomposing State. 
He even termed these reformers “constructivists”, more than a century before Jean 
Piaget and other scholars developed constructivism as an educational philosophy: 
 
... for the first time in two centuries Poland took up the challenge of time in the sphere of positive 
facts; and not only did it catch up with Europe, but it surpassed it─ with the best thought-out 
action, that had no parallel among its “parallels”. It [the Commission, C.A.] excelled them 
intellectually and in organization, and contained yet another aspect: the Commission’s activity was 
an argument in favor of our national raison d’être, Poland did not die, it did not fall completely 
into stagnation and decay, but was capable to undertake the organization of activities abreast of the 
times. Let’s not say that this was “without precedent” in Europe: it was without precedent that a 
state, the living corpse that Poland was in the mid-eighteenth century, suddenly proved such an 
aptitude for regeneration! I deeply recommend finding out more about our “dark centuries” too 
(…) so that we learn to value the efforts and achievements of the people who, in truth, prepared 
the nation intellectually and morally to survive the later long night of partitions. If it hadn’t been 
for these eighteenth-century Polish constructivists, who brought up the generation of Kościuszko, 
Staszic, Kołłątaj, Śniadecki, we would probably be just a geographical reminiscence.906 
 
Bratkowski displayed before his readers a peculiar picture: enlightened Polish 
educators, to whom the Poles owed so much, were the pioneers of renovation; that is, 
they were the first to start over again after a period of degeneration, and in especially 
difficult circumstances, due to the corruption of nobility and the increasing patronage of 
the Russian empire over the country. 
In his ninth thesis on the concept of history, Walter Benjamin perceived so-called 
“progress” as a kind of violent storm or hurricane with a lineal trajectory that thrust the 
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angel of history forward while keeping its head turned back, watching helplessly how 
victims and ruins piled up without end in a sort of catastrophic whole:  
 
Es gibt ein Bild von Klee, das Angelus Novus heißt. Ein Engel ist darauf dargestellt, der aussieht, 
als wäre er im Begriff, sich von etwas zu entfernen, worauf er starrt. Seine Augen sind aufgerissen, 
sein Mund steht offen und seine Flügel sind ausgespannt. Der Engel der Geschichte muß so 
aussehen. Er hat das Antlitz der Vergangenheit zugewendet. Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten vor 
uns erscheint, da sieht er eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig Trümmer auf Trümmer häuft 
und sie ihm vor die Füße schleudert. Er möchte wohl verweilen, die Toten wecken und das 
Zerschlagene zusammenfügen. Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradiese her, der sich in seinen Flügeln 
verfangen hat und so stark ist, daß der Engel sie nicht mehr schließen kann. Dieser Sturm treibt ihn 
unaufhaltsam in die Zukunft, der er den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen vor ihm zum 
Himmel wächst. Das, was wir den Fortschritt nennen, ist dieser Sturm.907 
 
Contrary to this lineal image, many Polish oppositionists perceived their own 
“wind from Paradise”, i.e. Communist ideology of “progress”, as a vicious circle. Since 
they valued and expected changes and improvements, a lineal view of history did not 
have such negative connotations for them: it meant a breakthrough, a rupture with the 
official order of the PRL regime, to overcome present-day situation, and therefore a 
success. The discourses on progress and linearity elaborated by Polish authorities were 
seen as the expression of the opposite, that is, of repeated mistakes and repression, of 
the ossification of a failed system, as a new defeat, but also the same defeat. Therefore, 
in the representation of People’s Poland everyday reality, opposition set up the circle of 
catastrophe against the line of “progress” provided by officialdom. Just like there was a 
struggle in the sphere of memory, symbols and commemorations908, Polish 
oppositionists fought with Communists as well over the real meaning of progress and 
hence the way to state it: the image of the line.   
We can appreciate the official lineal view very well in the propaganda posters 
both of People’s Republic of Poland and of the Soviet space race (Figures 1 to 5)909, 
where it is very usual to see straight paths or lines, the poster characters gaze towards 
the horizon and technological progress or industrial development is suggested910. While 
Figure 1 expressed the international alliance of the PRL with the Soviet Union in its 
determination to take the unobstructed highway to socialism (“A common path, a 
common target”), Figure 2 focused on a national alliance between Polish peasants and 
Polish workers (“The worker-peasant alliance is the source of the strength of People’s 
Poland. With the work produced by our hands the fatherland will grow and become 
stronger”). Figure 3, a Soviet poster featuring the classic socialist realist proletarian, 
suggested that, in terms of progress, the sky was the limit for Moscow (“Towards the 
Sun! Towards the stars!”). More recent in time, Figures 4 and 5 reinforced the idea of 
linearity when they warned that “There is no backing down in the road to socialist 
renewal!” (1981), or reminded that “breaking the rules, you delay our march towards 
socialism and you damage yourself and society”. 
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On the other hand, we find among Polish opposition posters a very different way 
of understanding the evolution of Communism and the repressive nature of the Soviet 
Union and the governments under its control in the Eastern Bloc. In Figure 6 the 
hammer and sickle, symbols of Soviet ideology, turn into a Nazi swastika, evoking the 
totalitarian basis of Communist regimes911. On the other hand, in Figure 7, labelled 
“evolution”, a flag transforms into an axe, probably suggesting that the use of 
nationalism by Polish Communists’ did not manage to hide their criminal acts912. 
                                                 
911
 The Spanish Communist dissident par excellence, Jorge Semprún (1923-2011), who in addition was a 
survivor of a Nazi concentration camp, shared this opinion about the similarities between one kind of 
regime and the other, and went into much more detail in his reflections. He even considered the Soviet 
system worse because, at least, the terrible goal of Nazism was totally explicit, its followers put in 
practice what they preached ─extermination, whereas in the Soviet case authorities promised something, 
seemingly very positive, and then did the opposite. This generated a very dangerous illusion that 
destroyed the market, one of the bases of society. As a result, it was much more difficult to recover and 
democratize former socialist societies than those dominated by Nazism. Semprún, Jorge: Pensar en 
Europa, Barcelona, Tusquets, 2006. 
912
 Both courtesy of Karta Archiwum. 
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                   Figure 6                                                                     Figure 7 
 
Going back to the combined images of the cyclic and the linear in Bratkowski’s 
essay, “Walka na tysiąc rund” [“Fight for a thousand rounds”], the author couldn’t help 
perceiving a continuity in Polish history since the mid-eighteenth century onwards. In 
spite of the obstacles put up by the partition system, enlightened Polish educators set up 
the basis of modern Polishness with their renovations and innovations. Perhaps partly 
due to his Marxist upbringing and convictions, as it happened with many other 
dissidents, Bratkowski did not lose his faith in progress: “The lack of statehood 
hindered and delayed the fulfillment of this task [the building of a modern Polish 
society, C.A.], (…) it suffered setbacks many times; however, despite the lack of 
freedom, it was never interrupted. And it progressed forward, which allows us to speak 
about continuity, about a historical process”913. 
These educators did not manage to see with their own eyes the good results they 
expected, but their existence was full of meaning because they believed that their legacy 
would outlive them and be profited later on, according to Bratkowski. Was he 
suggesting his opposition peers to adopt the same attitude today? 
 
We have reasons to treat them like tragic heroes, because history paid them for their enormous 
lengthy effort only one hundred and fifty years later. But they probably weren’t tragic heroes: a 
constructivist must believe that others will come after him, he is satisfied thinking that his work 
will not be wasted, that it will bear fruit. Constructivists can be beaten, but they cannot be 
defeated.914  
 
It was basically a question of perseverance and resistance, like a boxer in the ring, 
hence his allusions to Joe Jeanette and to boxing rounds (rundy)915. Other inteligenci, 
like Jerzy Stępień916, shared a similar view and referred explicitly to recent events: 
                                                 
913
 Bratkowski: “Walka…” , 22, my transl. 
914
 Bratkowski: “Walka…” , 24, my transl. 
915
 Bratkowski: “Walka…” , 27-28. 
916
 Jerzy Stępień (n. 1946) participated in the March 1968 protests at Warsaw University. He studied Law 
and was legal adviser during the 1980s of several organs in Kielce (a factory, health services and the 
diocesan curia, the latter when he was fired after his return from prison). As member and regional leader 
of Solidarność he was incarcerated in December 13th 1981 and spent several years in jail. There, he co-
organized cultural life and founded two underground magazines for the internees. After his release, he 
collaborated with several underground periodicals and in 1985 he co-founded Samorządna 
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June and October ’56, March ’68, December ’70, June ’76 ─these already are symbolic dates 
in the postwar history of Poland. 
For one person they might mark the turning point of successive cycles in the process of 
alienation from the authorities. For another they might be the most intense examples of protest 
caused by life under intolerable conditions or protest attesting to the inauthenticity of authority. 
And that lily-livered authority found only one answer ─coercion... 
But it is possible to look at these dates in a different fashion ... as movements of experience, 
which in aggregate comprised the collective consciousness of Poles in 1980... 
They created an image of struggle, the most beautiful of all ─for Freedom... 
Then the value of the suffering of all those wronged, of each lonely and individual sufferer, 
became clear.917 
 
Yet others did not think that historical development headed for a particular goal or 
followed a specific direction. Nevertheless, the resultant “shape” of time in their 
discourses resembled Bratkowski’s and Stępień’s in most cases. After 1989, for 
instance, Bronisław Geremek was inclined to see history as a spiral because, in his 
opinion, both the eternal cycle (related to conservative positions) and the accumulative 
linearity (linked to progressive views) were far too simple to explain reality by 
themselves:  
 
... cette formule [‘l’histoire est un perpétuel recommencement’, C.A.] peut apparaître comme 
une manifestation de conservatisme, mais je ne crois pas qu’il soit bon d’opposer à cette 
approche-là une foi inébranlable dans le progrès de l’histoire. Une autre approche estime que 
l’histoire est une accumulation progressive, qu’elle a un sens, une direction, qu’elle est un 
escalier et qu’on le monte. Cela n’est pas vrai non plus. 
[Philippe Sainteny] – C’est une spirale? 
BG: Peut-être. Ç’a été d’ailleurs, dans l’histoire de l’histoire, une métaphore utilisée. Et je crois 
que c’est une bonne métaphore.918  
 
In any case, the commitment with the defeated should be the cornerstone of an 
engaged oppositionist, historian and historical actor, if positioned in Benjamin’s line. 
To stop the destructive line or the vicious circle of “progress”, the present must head 
elsewhere. The past could certainly act as a muse, but not as an oracle in this permanent 
struggle with the winners: 
 
Either dealing with the past or with the future, in Walter Benjamin the opening of history is 
indissolubly linked with an ethical, social and political option in favor of the victims of oppression 
and of those who fight against it. The fate of that uncertain combat and the form it will take will be 
surely inspired or conditioned by the attempts of the past: but that will not make them less novel, 
and perfectly unpredictable.919 
 
Starting with the image of the vicious circle in opposition narratives, Tadeusz 
Łepkowski was probably one of the authors who most frequently referred to it. In his 
opinion, “Poland has been in a state of cyclic, permanent revolution for two hundred 
years. It is condemned to this in order to live”920.  
The back then émigré oppositionist and co-founder of the quarterly journal Aneks, 
Aleksander Smolar, went into further detail when he described the three phases of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Rzeczpospolita. He held several posts within Solidarność and participated in the Round Table 
conversations. He was elected senator in the elections of June 4th, 1989. Opozycja w PRL..., vol. 1. 
917
 STĘPIEN, Jerzy: Introduction to Radomski Czerwiec ’76, Radom, MKZ NSZZ “Solidarność” Ziemia 
Radomska, 1981, 1, quoted and translated by Bernhard: The Origins of Democratization…, 46. 
918
 Duby and Geremek: Passions…, 147. 
919
 Löwy: Walter Benjamin: aviso…, 185, my transl. 
920
 Łepkowski: Myśli o historii…, 68, my transl. 
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political cycle in Eastern European Communist regimes: In the first one, named 
“accumulation of society’s acquiescence”, the power, aware of its weaknesses, wanted 
to be in favor with the people and ensure their passivity. Authorities tried to conceal 
their violence behind liberal gestures, promises of renovation and democratization and 
quick material development. Once they gradually achieved society’s consent and 
became stronger, the previous balance of forces broke in people’s detriment and the 
phase of full domination began. Communist governments attempted then to substitute 
traditional spontaneous social networks for hierarchical links connecting each individual 
with the center of decision-making. Violence in all its forms increased; the acts, words 
and even thoughts of citizens were kept under surveillance. In response to this terror, 
most of society fell first into a kind of defensive lethargy; later, different forms of active 
and passive resistance emerged and some persons started to revolve against the rulers. 
Within power there also appeared different factions, and the main group of the 
apparatus felt its position and interests were endangered. The cycle concluded with a 
more or less long and harsh phase of crisis, repression and with subsequent promises of 
“renovation”.  
However, Smolar admitted that the single country in the Eastern Bloc where that 
cycle was completely evident was Poland. The revolts of 1956, 1970 and 1976 were the 
result of the structural impossibility to balance for good two clashing realities: that of 
Communist authorities and that of society. The State fled from reality and dodged 
responsibilities, but at the same time aimed to monopolize power, which ironically 
made it responsible for almost everything921. 
With a much more pessimistic and ironic tinge, and in a fatalistic mood akin to 
Łepkowski’s, Stefan Kisielewski argued that exceptionality was already normality in 
Poland.  He grasped this some time ago, that is why he did not worry too much lately or 
take national problems too seriously, he explained to his inquiring readers. For he 
worried in the Second World War, during Warsaw Uprising, with the mishaps of 
October 1956, with Gierek and with the Martial Law, and “at last I understood”, he said, 
“that the goblet of my worries was already full, that there was no room for more. And 
that nothing new takes place because all has taken place before, the repertoire has run 
out and what happens next will be the same that has happened since the 1950s, and so it 
is already normal”922. The author, clearly frustrated, felt that since the rise to power of 
communists the Polish nation was being forced back into a cycle of “abnormal 
normality” time after time, and so many defeats were damaging and embittering the 
already overused pluck of senior generations.      
Michnik, younger and more optimistic, was persuaded that opposition initiatives 
and social networks of dissent constituted “the conscious attempt to overcome Poland’s 
vicious circle, the cycle ‘from one ‘renewal’ to the next’, from an explosion to an 
uprising”923, and thus could do something very positive in this respect yet. The author 
expressed similar views in his famous article “The New Evolutionism” back in 1976924. 
The fact that he resorted to a term such as “evolutionism” is very telling, for it 
suggested the possibility of change and progress through the adaptation to the 
environment; in this case, the necessary adaptation of PRL powers to social changes and 
demands, or else, if referring to social dissent, the adaptation of the methods and tactics 
employed in its activism (rejection of violence, creation of independent organizations, 
                                                 
921
 Smolar: “Prosta i koło”, 94-109, esp. 94-97. 
922
 KISIELEWSKI, Stefan [pseud. Kisiel]: “Czemu się nie martwię? (felieton egocentryczny)”, in 
Kisielewski: Lata pozłacane..., 679, my transl., also 678. 
923
 Michnik: “Conversation in the Citadel”, 327. 
924
 Michnik: “The New Evolutionism”. 
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combine open and underground work, etc.). In either case, the transformations should 
take place from the bottom to the top; that is, instead of trying to convince Communist 
authorities to change, Polish society had to evolve on its own first to be able to exert the 
necessary pressure on the government and hence compel it to change too. Jumping 
ahead to the late 1980s, Bronisław Geremek believed that the formation of Solidarność 
contributed in a decisive way to the Poles’ definite prise de conscience of the socio-
political vicious circle they were immersed in, as well as to its collapse:   
 
Il ne faut pas juger de la situation polonaise dans l’optique du passé, de l’enchaînement hausse des 
prix-grèves-révolte populaire. Les Polonais savent désormais que ce type d’enchaînement ne 
provoque qu’un changement superficiel, le remplacement d’une équipe au pouvoir et quelques 
promesses de réformes. L’acte de naissance de Solidarité, la grève de 1980, était précisément une 
rupture de cette logique puisque, pour la première fois, on a pu obtenir un espace 
d’indépendance.925  
  
But this process was on the move years before Solidarność. In Jonathan Schell’s 
view, the Workers’ Defense Committee already challenged the historical timings of the 
winners by behaving differently to what authorities expected. Instead of attempting to 
seize State power first and then carry out the measures they supported, KOR members 
decided to start directly with the latter, creating their own source of power beyond 
official organs and behaving very much as if they lived in a free country. By quoting the 
words of the worldwide renowned Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński, the 
collaborator of The New Yorker proved that the rules of the winners’ time continuum in 
the PRL were not only evident for “outsiders” like him: 
 
In A Warsaw Diary, Ryszard Kapuscinski writes, ‘Here everything is based on a certain principle 
of asymmetrical verification: the system promises to prove itself later (announcing a general 
happiness that exists only in the future), but it demands that you prove yourself now, today, by 
demonstrating your loyalty, consent and diligence. You commit yourself to everything; the system 
to nothing’. The opposition worked exactly in the opposite way. It proved itself today, and let later 
take care of itself. In so doing, it offered a new approach to one of the most intractable problems of 
all political life: the endemic discrepancy between evil means and good ends in politics ─between 
the brutal and mendacious methods commonly accepted as a necessity of politics and the noble 
visionary ends toward which these means are directed. In the direct action in society practiced by 
the opposition movement in Poland, means and ends were rolled into one. Every means was an 
end, and vice versa.926 
 
The question of violence followed the same path: in Schell’s opinion, the repeated 
and fruitless recourse to violence along Polish history had finally led present-day 
oppositionists to employ peaceful means first, and leave armed defense as a last 
resort927. This could be considered as “a revolution in revolution”928… and a revolution 
in the perception of time. 
Another aspect of this “time revolution” implied reconsidering what was 
provisional in Polish life and what wasn’t. According to Czesław Bielecki, the 
Communist system had managed to turn theoretically temporary situations in permanent 
ones (najtrwalsza jest prowizorka, “the provisional is what lasts longer”, the saying 
                                                 
925
 Interview to GEREMEK, Bronisław: “The Solidarity chapter is not closed”, Le Monde, 1987. Also 
GEREMEK: “Total system failure”, The Guardian, December 28th, 1990. Both in HU OSA 300-50-15 
(Biographical Files of RFE Polish Unit), box 9. 
926
 Schell: “Introduction”, in Michnik: Letters from Prison…, XXXII-XXXIII, italics in the original. 
927
 Schell: “Introduction”, XXXVI-XXXVII; also Michnik: “Letter from the Gdańsk…”, 86-89. 
928
 Schell: “Introduction”, XVIII. See Chapter 2 for more on Solidarity’s revolutionary character in 
particular.  
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went); the indefinite provisional character of values, means and goals had fueled social 
demoralization and, as a result, corruption, alcoholism, lack of discipline and apathy. 
Moreover, if opposition movements believed they were also provisional, i.e. that they 
were bound to disappear after governmental repression, they tended to carry out just 
short-term initiatives with a striking effect rather than taking a step further by 
developing long-term strategies. Instead, Bielecki betted for regarding as provisional 
what their great-great grandparents already deemed as such: the lack of complete 
national sovereignty. 
 
The awareness of our provisional state inscribes our political activity in the pro-independence 
nineteenth-century tradition. It consisted in reminding constantly the next generations that, despite 
Poland is not sovereign, it was in the past and will be in the future. The provisional thus 
understood was based on the transcendence of political goals: in partition times each young 
generation was raised for a future free Poland regardless of the actual reality of this ultimate 
goal.929 
 
Such suggestion epitomizes opposition’s belief in some kind of progression in 
Polish history, which was nevertheless periodically disrupted by exogenous (some 
would also add endogenous) causes and spun for decades or even centuries like a 
whipping top. Bielecki saw time revolving over and over again, for instance, as a result 
of the struggles against the Soviet Union. In his opinion, with the workers’ protests and 
the ensuing foundation of NSZZ “Solidarność”, the Poles were about to confront the 
Red Army for the fourth time, after the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, the Soviet invasion 
of 1939 based on the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the USSR’s repression or 
passivity towards the Home Army’s fight against the Nazis in 1944930. 
In spite of this, Solidarność somehow broke the mold as well. For Leszek 
Moczulski, it was simultaneously a social, political, democratic and national pro-
independence revolution. It had great dimensions, not known hitherto, and proved itself 
more powerful than those of 1794, 1830 or 1905. In his last words during the trial 
against KPN, he compared the passage of time and recent opposition events to a wind. 
Such metaphor is almost the same that Benjamin used for his ninth Thesis; however, as 
explained further above, it had the opposite meaning: instead of being the storm of so-
called “progress” powered by the “winners”, it was tantamount to restoring the memory 
of the defeated and leaving Communism behind: 
 
Is it strengthening? Is it slackening? It strengthens ─and it is far from its zenith. One may think 
carefully about how many times in history immense forces make use of all their energy only to 
show in the end their immense weakness! Great powers, fabulous governments, brave generals 
─powerful beyond imagination─ everything tumbles down like a house of cards when the wind of 
history blows…  
I watch how this wind grows stronger.931 
 
The next poster, designed by Czesław Bielecki (Figure 8)932, aimed to represent 
how repetition could eventually breed something new, original and unique like 
Solidarność. We are looking at the vital signs of Poland along the second half of the 
twentieth century, as understood by a member of democratic opposition. The peaks of 
the graphic, i.e. the moments when awareness was stronger, and hence the nation was 
more “alive”, are labeled with the years 1944, 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976, when 
                                                 
929
 Bielecki: “Prowizorium”, 4-5, my transl. 
930
 Bielecki: “Umowa …”, 40. 
931
 Moczulski in Ostatnie słowa..., 32, my transl. 
932
 Courtesy of Karta Archiwum. 
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uprisings, revolts and protests took place in the country. According to this design, in 
1980 national consciousness experienced its highest peak since the foundation of the 
PRL, and the lifeline ceases to be a monotonous line from there on by transforming into 
the logo of Solidarność, as if an accumulative process had finally been completed 
despite previous setbacks and defeats. Or, as Adam Michnik put it, “the origins of these 
events [the foundation of Solidarność] were obvious: they lay in society’s long 
resistance, that was marked by the tragic dates of spurts of national revolt. These dates 
─1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, which today are being engraved on monuments of national 
memory, are the dates of the stations of the Polish Via Dolorosa”933. 
  
 
 
Figure 8 
 
“…In the last ten years”, Michnik assured back in 1985, “everything in Poland 
has been without precedent”934. Jan Józef Lipski and Jerzy Holzer thought likewise, and 
devoted a few pages too to reflect on the novelty of opposition maxims and methods 
since the appearance of KOR, and especially of Solidarność, in comparison with the 
revolts of other Eastern Bloc countries and former Polish protests or reform attempts. 
For instance, while in Hungary 1956 people took control of the revolution in the streets 
and Communist power disintegrated, in Czechoslovakia 1968 the reforms came directly 
from the Party apparatus and looked for people’s support. In Poland, on the contrary, 
dissent movements tried to reprogram and organize social life so that Poles could put 
pressure effectively on the Communist government and achieve their demands. Thus, it 
was not just a question of increasing political autonomy or pluralism, but of finding new 
ways to attain such goals, like non-violence and the promotion of uncensored spaces for 
social action and intellectual debate, independent of any official organ. Unlike PSL in 
1945-1947, Solidarność did not expect Western powers to provide help and press 
Moscow to respect the law and international treaties, nor did it hope to convince Soviet 
leaders about its socialist orthodoxy either, as the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) tried. It 
did not promote an internal regeneration of Communist structures, like revisionists 
wanted back in 1956, and mistrusted democratizing intentions of official trade unions 
and referenda for the workers similar to those promised in 1970935. The key element 
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 Michnik: “A Year Has Passed”, 125, also “Maggots and Angels”, 188. 
934
 He referred to the creation and preservation of independent social spheres and organizations, but also 
to PRL forces’ multiple attempts to bring the latter down and the way that their violent pressure methods 
became more evident after December 1981 (eg. harsher attacks against the Church), as in the Toruń trial, 
in which four policemen were convicted for the murder of Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko, supporter of Solidarity 
(1984). Michnik: “Letter from the Gdańsk…”, 81.  
935
 Holzer: Solidarność…, 26-51, 350-351; Michnik: “Polska Wojna”, 4-5; Michnik: “A Year Has 
Passed”, 125-126; Lipski: KOR..., 3 and 5. 
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now was social emancipation, that is, the awareness that Polish society had to change to 
change the country instead of counting on the alleged bona fide, conciliatory aims or 
improvement wishes of other subject-agents that had very different, if not clashing, 
priorities.      
Foreign media reporting on what was going on in Poland in the 1980s greatly 
contributed to reinforce and internationalize the feeling of uniqueness many Poles 
shared concerning August 1980 events. When pinning down what made the Polish 
opposition movement par excellence so especial, most journalists and political analysts 
provided the following definitions and features: a dissent blooming from within (not 
started up or led by émigré circles or foreign powers936), a self-limiting and worker-
centered revolution (i.e. with a massive support but not aiming to overthrow Communist 
government), the alliance of lay dissidents with the Catholic Church, the search for 
internal freedom and democracy in opposition groups and, last but certainly not least, 
the general rejection of violence937. After 1989, the image of Polish opposition’s 
uniqueness and pioneering character in the downfall of Eastern European Communist 
regimes acquired an official rank, as academic works938 and recent international 
commemorations have shown939.  
Much earlier, in 1981, Piotr Gumper, the designer of the placard celebrating the 
first anniversary of Solidarność (Figure 9) already made it clear that it was the 
beginning of the end of the “red empire”940. Polishness, represented with the white and 
red colors of the national flag over the map of the country, was being recovered. 
 
                                                 
936
 But of course encouraged and supported by both in many ways: Sowiński: Zakazana książka...; 
ALBERSKA, Małgorzata: Ośrodki emigracji polskiej wobec kryzysów politycznych w kraju (1956–1981), 
Wrocław, Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum, 2000; PIENKOS, Donald E.: For Your Freedom Through 
Ours: Polish American Effort On Poland’s Behalf, 1863-1991, New York, East European Monographs, 
Boulder, 1991, esp. 152 and ff. 
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 Zuzowski: Political Dissent…, 8, 10, chapter 9; Ekiert and Kubik: Rebellious Civil Society…, 6; Falk: 
The Dilemmas..., 14. 
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 For the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a gigantic row of dominoes was arranged in the 
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rest of the row tumble down was Lech Wałęsa, as if to symbolize that Solidarność’s political and trade 
union struggle was the coup de grâce for Central and Eastern European socialist dictatorships. An 
anecdote recounted by FARALDO, José M.: “Lech Walesa. La deconstrucción del mito”, in MEES, 
Ludger and NUŃEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M. (coords.): Nacidos para mandar. Liderazgo, política y poder. 
Perspectivas comparadas. Madrid, Tecnos, 2012, 291. 
It is very interesting to check how Poland’s pioneering role and the chain reaction in the fall of 
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autobiographical comic about her childhood in Communist Poland, Marzena Sowa represented the same 
idea through the image of a tree in Autumn. Its first leaf (PRL) fell… followed by all the rest. Sowa 
explained: “In our country it was a natural process. We were the first leaf”. SAVOIA, Sylvain and 
SOWA, Marzena: Marzi. Nie ma wolności bez solidarności, Warszawa, Egmont, 2011 (2009).  
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Figure 9 
 
Paradoxically, the freshness of Polish August 1980 was described by Michnik as a 
“miracle on the Vistula” (cud nad Wisłą), an old expression originally referring to the 
Polish army’s unexpected and decisive victory against the Red Army in the battle of 
Warsaw (August 12th-25th, 1920) during the Polish-Soviet War (February 1919-March 
1921). The connection between these two Augusts was stated graphically by 
Solidarność’s supporters (Figure 10)941; however, the battle waged by oppositionists 
was a peaceful, long-distance endurance race that had resisted every governmental 
attack, including the Martial Law, which made it ever more original and miraculous942. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
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 Courtesy of Karta Archiwum. 
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 Michnik: “Letter from the Gdańsk…”, 77-79, 86. About the parallel unprecedented character and 
danger of the Martial Law: Michnik: “On Resistance…”, 43; Michnik: “Polska Wojna”, 11; Pomian: 
“Robotnicy i secretarze”, 93.  
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However, back in the night when the Martial Law was established, the attitude 
and perspectives among oppositionists were certainly not so confident or hopeful. 
Waldemar Kuczyński (n. 1939)943 remembered later on that, in the moment he was 
being arrested, he perceived that the course of time was being altered once again and 
that they were being forced back into a vicious circle, the long-lasting triumph of a 
legalized Solidarność becoming quite unexpectedly a new “past-that-didn’t-take-place”: 
 
When the Milicja seized me by the arms, I felt with painful clearness that time split in two, that 
right before what was the present and could apparently be the future only a second ago, not only 
mine, but of the whole country, a grille slammed shut without return, and the new reality opening 
before us consisted of high walls, barbed wire, handcuffs, guards, ubowcy944… I felt then the 
continuity of the struggle and the continuity of the repression… The continuity of the struggle and 
the repression, and perhaps stagnation, the ossification of this system that cannot do without terror, 
and the permanent ineffectiveness of the fight to make more human and freer everything in which 
we live in.945  
 
The endless effort, Sisyphus rolling down the hill and pushing the rock back up all 
over again… The Poles had not managed to escape the cyclic disaster of the myth 
enclosed in their historical consciousness since partition times. Rather than resorting to 
the motifs of Homer’s Greece, the author of the next placards (Figures 11 and 12)946 
drew inspiration from the art of the Pre-Columbian era to recreate the flavor of an 
ancient mythical tale, apparently taking us back to a “time without time” (in Eliade’s 
line) but, simultaneously, recording the struggle of dissent movements and life in the 
PRL system as a graphic opposition chronicle of the present, with a view to its 
preservation. This time, Gutenberg prevented Polish oppositionists from having to 
engrave their story in stone. In the first picture, a miner (given that opposition was 
working in the underground since the Martial Law) hits with his pick the neck of a kind 
of snake-god that surrounds him, conveying a circle that someone attempts to break. 
The second poster, also with a circular shape, depicts the beast of Communist 
dictatorship sat on a tank (the tanks that occupied the streets the night of December 12th-
13th, 1981) being dragged around by a row of slaves, but arriving nowhere. 
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the common name for the security services of the State in the Stalinist period. Later on, it was also used 
as the equivalent of the Służba Bezpieczeństwa (SB), i.e. the Security Service of the Ministry of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which replaced the UB since 1956. Its workers were called esbeccy. 
945
 Quoted in Holzer: Solidarność…, 348, my transl. 
946
 Courtesy of Karta Archiwum. 
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In Leszek Moczulski’s eyes, the PRL had meant stepping back into the past for 
the Poles, the return to a half-sovereign or protectorate situation under the auspices of 
Russia, like the reign of King Stanisław August, Napoleon’s Duchy of Warsaw or 
Congress Poland947. In the same fashion, Michnik compared general Jaruzelski’s “self-
invasion” of Poland (with the USSR’s collusion) to the Targowica Confederation, an 
episode which is tantamount to high treason in Polish historical tradition. But both 
Jaruzelski and the Soviet Union were wrong, according to him, because they 
presupposed an ultimate violent outcome of opposition and social protests. By 
misjudging and mistrusting their own society, the army and the Party had actually 
betrayed the nation:  
 
The Martial Law decree should remind society about Targowica, the secular symbol of national 
infamy. The ghost of a Russian invasion, in case Jaruzelski had failed, prejudged Polish society’s 
position. I risk this hypothesis because I am persuaded that there is still an argument in favor of the 
fact that there are many rational and sensible thinkers in this romantic nation, an argument in favor 
of the fact that Poles do not only know how to fight, but how to think too.948 
 
Despite Polish society had rejected violence and was organizing itself peacefully, 
Communist powers wanted to preserve their position and perceived any autonomous 
alternative as a potential threat to their monopoly. Thus, their reaction was a 
consequence of past political mentalities and behaviors, based on the belief that “it takes 
one to know one”; that is, on the idea that, just like Communist rulers themselves were 
not trustworthy, critical Poles were not to be trusted either. Though oppositionists had 
also made pretty much the same mistakes as before (eg. becoming too self-confident 
and daring, going to extremes, not foreseeing upcoming repression), inteligenci wanted 
to instil in people the notion that, in general, after the Solidarność experience Polish 
citizens had evolved and left Communist rulers behind, revolving alone in their 
completely outdated time continuum.  
“We were turning around in a circle of fossilized stereotypes”, of romantic versus 
positivistic nineteenth-century attitudes fueled by official media, Kersten thought949. 
But times had changed ─the “defeated” had changed, and it was senseless to oppose 
oversimplified traditions that only put together in all their complexity and variety could 
provide a realistic picture of Polish modern political thought, where there was still much 
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 Moczulski in Ostatnie słowa..., 30. In the same line, we have already mentioned in Chapter 3 how 
Czesław Bielecki compared Jaruzelski with the Grand Duke of Russia Constantine Pavlovich. 
948
 Michnik: “Polska Wojna”, 9, my transl. 
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 Kersten: Narodziny..., 358, my transl. 
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room left for innovation and real progress. Democratic opposition had taught people 
how to live in freedom and Solidarność provided them experience in political struggle, 
and that would not be easily forgotten. Forty months after the Martial Law, Michnik 
assured, the foundations of an independent civil society were still standing and moving 
forward: “Under the conditions of the Leading System, this is an unprecedented 
phenomenon. Instead of resembling a communist system after victorious pacification, 
this situation resembles a democracy after a military coup d’état. The Poles have 
traveled a great distance on their journey from totalitarianism to democracy”950.  
Given this, old 1944 tactics of the Communist government to divide and terrorize 
Polish society would not be effective anymore, in Bielecki’s opinion. Many Poles had 
lost fear and gained a high level of social consciousness, so that they were not readily 
manipulated. The plot of dissent that had taken shape in the 1970s and bloomed in the 
1980s escaped official control “because it was living history, not the accomplishment of 
political programs following a plan designed from above”951.  
 The winners’ time continuum, its sterility and resistance to change, had been 
defeated by the drive of history itself, a fertile history made up of the seeds of past and 
present generations fighting for freedom. Because “even in the Soviet Bloc countries 
history does not stand still”, Krzysztof Pomian pointed out952; something which was 
also borne in mind by arrested oppositionists like Tadeusz Stański, who defied the 
Court judging him by asserting that “we [the nation, C.A.] are already in another epoch. 
A historical process has already begun, history cannot be stopped with bars, prison 
sentences or with our death”953. Or like Władysław Bartoszewski, incarcerated in the 
first and darkest days of the Martial Law period: “Among lakes and forests, in a relative 
comfort, we were locked up954 with our hopes and dreams. But we knew one thing: 
history goes forward. It does not remain motionless despite the evident blow. Our 
country had undergone in its history much more hopeless situations”955.  
In harmony with Stański’s and Bartoszewski’s words, the following placard 
described 1982 precisely as a “year of hopes” (rok nadziei) (Figure 13)956. Its most 
outstanding detail is the broken line of the numeral “8”, which resembles a couple of 
broken chain links, in clear allusion to freedom. On the other hand, if such figure is seen 
horizontally, it also reminds of the mathematic symbol representing infinity (∞). 
Therefore, the picture may be additionally interpreted in terms of time perception: 
an infinite periodical pattern had been broken in Polish history. Despite the apparent 
defeat of opposition due to the Martial Law and the army’s takeover of the government, 
this was not just another failure. The formation and development of Solidarność had 
stirred something deep down in Polish society that permitted to alter the course of a 
history which, up until then, seemed doomed to repeat over and over again. Hopes were 
no longer the exclusive property of those who had been defeated in previous occasions, 
waiting to be vindicated and recovered from oblivion through remembrance. Now they 
also belonged to those who had not been completely crushed, who had opened new 
ways that, sooner or later, they intended to resume personally, though with more 
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 Michnik: “Letter from the Gdańsk…”, 81, also 85-86; Król: “Realistyczna...”, 1-2; Schell: 
“Introduction”, XVIII. 
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striving and barriers than they had thought in the first place. It is the hope in a future 
which is no longer perceived as written beforehand. The vicious circle was blown to 
pieces: thanks to the effort of all, what seemed endless had been put to an end.  
 
 
 
Figure 13 
 
Interestingly, many oppositionists highlighted that such a crucial (and lineal) 
breakthrough took place thanks to previous renewals and the periodic transmission of 
knowledge. In this sense, Wojciech Giełżyński expressed his liking for a cyclic or 
spiral-like view of time in response to an article written by Damian Kalbarczyk on the 
irreconcilable aims of Catholicism and left-winged trends, such as Edward 
Abramowski’s957: 
 
Kalbarczyk writes, in an authoritarian way, that Abramowski’s political conceptions belong to the 
past and that it doesn’t make sense to turn to them, because it is not worth to build a legend. In this 
aspect I am more inclined towards the Hindu perception of time as a circle, and not as an endless 
straight line; it has occurred more than once that different trends of human thought return after 
centuries in a new, more mature form ─and have been politically very prolific.958 
 
 The journalist was surprised that a Catholic author like Kalbarczyk did not 
understand the role played by legends and utopias in the national psyche (like to stand 
misfortune, for example)959, and was convinced that Abramowski’s political 
conceptions belonged to the present and the future rather than to the past960. Such a 
comment ratifies one of the ideas previously suggested in our research: that at least part 
of opposition inteligenci were aware of the importance that myths and legends had for 
Polish society and were willing to imbibe them (besides placing themselves within 
them) and simultaneously push them in a new direction, intertwining tradition and 
innovation or, put in another way, revisiting tradition in an innovative fashion. That was 
exactly Michnik’s proposal regarding earlier clandestine resistance:  
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 Published in Znak, no. 359, October 1984. 
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 Giełżyński: Edward Abramowski…, 154, my transl. 
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 Similar ideas for the Hungarian case can be found in MOLNÁR, Miklos: “Obecność historii”, in 1956. 
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 Giełżyński: Edward Abramowski…, 155. 
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Solidarity was the first mass movement in our history that lasted for many months, that struck 
deep roots in Polish hearts and minds, in work places and private homes. This permits one to 
believe that the movement of resistance against WRONa has a real base, that the underground has 
a chance of surviving future police actions. This chance stems from the Solidarity tradition and 
from the gains won by the pre-August democratic opposition. In addition, the entire body of 
experience of the nineteenth and twentieth-century underground activities serves today as a book 
of knowledge about the values and methods of illegal resistance. This book must be reread, so that 
we can adapt old examples to new situations. 
Many different accusations have been made against the Poles over their stormy history, but no one 
could ever say that they know nothing about conspiracy.961 
 
In the Czechoslovakian context, Václav Havel valued as much as Polish 
oppositionists the mysterious and almost instinctive mechanism that enabled 
forthcoming generations to unbury their ancestors’ “arms” (their principles, their 
experience) and bring a long-forgotten (and most times lost) struggle back to life 
through reinterpretation, sprouting always at the suitable moment (kairos), like the 
thistles envisaged by Ted Hughes: “... the humanistic and democratic traditions, about 
which there had been so much idle talk, did indeed slumber in the unconsciousness of 
our nations and ethnic minorities, and were inconspicuously passed from one generation 
to another so that each of us could discover them at the right time and transform them 
into deeds”962.  
But maybe such mechanism was not so mysterious or mechanical after all: rather, 
it all had to do with intellectuals’ will and self-perception. By appropriating the custody 
and evaluation of national (and especially immaterial) heritage, opposition inteligencja 
consciously performed a “tiger’s leap into the past” in order to become the tacitly 
authorized interpreter of former knowledge and, at the same time, its transmission belt. 
Focusing specifically on recent events, and expressing himself in similar terms to 
Bielecki, Jan Józef Lipski believed that KOR’s contribution to Polish society had been 
passed on to Solidarność, and still throbbed within it:  
 
When this chapter of the history of KOR comes to an end963, a great chapter in the biographies of 
each of us will also come to a close. KOR is already history, although it is living history, which 
contributes to the formation of the present and the future. But Solidarity, for which we began 
working in the corridors of the courtroom during the first Ursus trial on July 17, 1976, is not just 
the past, not just history. I believe that Solidarity is not only a present reality but also a future fact. 
Perhaps this will not be exactly the future for which we worked in KOR, not independence and 
democracy right away, but in any case, some new piece of the road leading towards these final 
goals.964 
 
The key in Polish intellectuals’ mission was to conceive history not as something 
dead and buried, but as something actual, alive, and, most importantly, as an inherent 
quality or right of each individual, therefore shared within society (historicity). By 
erasing the fictitious and misleading barriers separating past, present and future, 
oppositionists tried to demonstrate that history was being written and rewritten 
ceaselessly, and that the Polish nation should have the leading voice (or voices) in its 
modification and plotting from then on. While living in a dictatorial system, it was 
fundamental to restore in people the senses of hope and responsibility to change things, 
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but the task was not over once democracy was achieved; principles had to be 
continuously remembered, defended and improved afresh precisely to keep them alive, 
as Michnik warned: “Each act of resistance saves a portion of liberty and preserves the 
values without which a nation cannot survive. Each act of resistance is a step towards 
democratic socialism which should be more than just an institutional and legal structure: 
it should be a community of free men, a real community, which is re-created anew each 
day”965. “The road that I choose and seek to follow”, he would insist not very long after, 
“while fearing the police, malicious gossip, and my own conscience, is a road on which, 
my teacher Słonimski966 taught me, ‘there are no final victories, yet also no final 
defeats’”967. 
The cycle also conveys the expectation of an eventual success in face of a present 
defeat like the Martial Law one. The fact that in the next picture (Figure 14)968 Lech 
Wałęsa was portrayed as Władysław Anders969 suggests that an actual opposition leader 
is taking the place of a past defeated and exiled one and, simultaneously, that the exodus 
of “defeated” are “returning” and being avenged through him. So, in Polish opposition’s 
view, it is not just Wałęsa or Solidarność, but the “army” of past national victims of 
Communism who back them what makes the actual representative of the “winners”, 
general Jaruzelski, hide under the sheets and tremble with fear, with his characteristic 
dark glasses lying on the bedside table. The difference is that, probably unlike Anders, 
Wałęsa does not clutch an arm; instead, he is holding up his hand making the victory 
sign970. Today’s fight, possibly the ultimate and definitely victorious in such an adverse 
context, with such an uneven balance of power (for, as Michnik reminded, the battle for 
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democracy actually never ends), is taking place without violence, and not in a military 
but in a civilian context.  
 
 
 
Figure 14 
 
The attempts to overcome had been many, and so had repression waves. However, 
after each defeat the total toll swelled, as well as the processes of remembrance, so that 
it was increasingly harder for the “winners” to stifle or damage Polish humanistic and 
democratic values (if they ever had, more than one oppositionist would say), until there 
came a time when the tables would be turned. Intellectual opposition networks of the 
mid-1970s felt they had taken up the secular fight of the fallen for freedom, national 
independence and democracy. Thinking about the forthcoming lawsuit against the 
members of the Workers’ Defense Committee, in 1982 Lipski considered that  
 
This will be a battle for truth, for the memory of KOR. I do not believe that this memory can be 
hurt by a trial ordered by the heirs of those who once murdered without trials, or handed down 
draconian verdicts against the soldiers of the Home Army and the Peasant Battalions, and against 
the civilian authorities of the Underground Polish State of World War II, the heroes of the struggle 
of the Polish nation for independence on all fronts and in all areas of life. Later, during a long 
series of political trials, those who had fought for the same thing as their predecessors, though no 
longer in an atmosphere of mortal terror, were judged and made to pay a not insignificant price for 
the service they rendered to Poland and to its culture.971 
 
By regarding their case and failures in a broader time perspective, and thus in 
accordance with the cycles of Polish history, oppositionists were persuaded that their 
defeats would never be complete, just lost frays in an ongoing long-term campaign 
which they expected to finally win. Czesław Bielecki and Tadeusz Stański expressed 
this idea in similar terms:  
 
The supporters of the first answer [i.e. those who believed that Solidarność was a trade union in a 
narrow sense, C.A.] think that December 13th was the ultimate frustration of our hopes, the 
supporters of the second [answer, believing that Solidarność was an authentic democratic and pro-
independence movement, C.A.] that the 16 months of our ‘prisoner camp freedom’ should be 
regarded as a big step towards independence. For those who thought that the fight began in 1980, 
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December 13th is a lost war. However, for those who thought that the war against the nation began 
in 1944, it is just a lost battle within the next campaign.972  
 
The nation, members of the High Court, does not surrender. The nation loses battles, but not 
wars. We have lost during two hundred years. After some time rebuilding our biological and 
intellectual potential, we jump back to action. (…) Ultimately, if it is not us, if it’s not today’s 
generation, the next one will achieve our common goal: the Recovery of Independence and the 
building of a Free Poland. 
Members of the High Court: the nation can never lose. During almost two hundred years we 
have been jailed, sentenced to hard labor, confined in Nazi concentration camps, in Stalinist 
camps, in the Security Office’s prisons ─and, after some time, we stand back up again. And so it 
will be till victory. Such is the nation’s need, such is our obligation, such is our duty. The nation 
will never surrender.973 
 
While Lipski (born in 1926) actually lived through the experiences he recounted, 
in the words of Stański (born in 1948) we spot a strong ─and convenient─ feeling of 
empathy towards past victims, as his use of “we” shows. For just like the return of 
commander Wałęsa-Anders’ “remembrance army” frightened Jaruzelski in the cartoon 
of Figure 14, opposition inteligencja strengthened its moral position and became an 
active part of Poland’s (ongoing) history if “backed” by former national suffering.  
On the other hand, the unshakeable faith in a final or at least long-lasting rebirth, 
and the wish to personally witness that moment, prevailed in many opposition 
discourses. Together with the previous examples, Tadeusz Łepkowski was probably one 
of the inteligenci who best expressed this trust in the triumph of another kind of 
progress: 
 
For almost two hundred years we have suffered enormous losses. The threat of total 
extermination hung above us. The proof of Polish society’s great maturity and ability to read its 
own history is the fact that, without giving up the fight for its rights, it did everything in its power 
to make the 1980 revolution a bloodless one. Blood was nevertheless shed after December 13, 
1980, when the government, wishing to suffocate the pro-freedom uprising of the Poles, began ─as 
in 1956 and 1970─ shooting workers. 
The Poles are a revolutionary nation, but revolution must not be tantamount to victims and 
holocaust. Bravery should be coupled with cautiousness. The fight for an Independent and Fair 
[Poland] is ongoing. It is difficult to tell what the future will bring. Hard times might await us. 
However, we must walk towards a real utopia, march and fall, stand up and walk towards the light 
again. No night, even the darkest, nor the one lit by moonlight, lasts forever.974 
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B) Historical awareness and historicization of present time (I)  
 
B.1) Jetztzeit, hope and helplessness 
 
History, history, 
Art thou a landlady, 
That for you die, 
That for you die 
Beautiful young peasants. 
 
Suites, courtiers, 
noise peacock feathers! 
Suites, courtiers, noise! 
 
History, history 
Dark discothèque, 
You don’t allow people or centuries 
To catch up their breath. (…) 
 
History, history 
You, our stepmother,  
How little you give us  
Except for the Lord’s Prayer. (…) 
 
History, history 
Art thou a snare,  
We make our way to the stage, 
But it is still the cloakroom. (…) 
 
History, history 
So many dreams within you,  
You use to be written 
By liars and whippersnappers. 
 
History, history 
You, voracious myth, 
What does it mean to you 
One single human life? 
 
Suites, courtiers, noise! 
 
Agnieszka Osiecka: Orszaki, dworaki 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overnight, very 
Whitely, discreetly, 
Very quietly 
 
Our toes, our noses 
Take hold on the loam, 
Acquire the air. 
 
Nobody sees us, 
Stops us, betrays us; 
The small grains make room. 
 
Soft fists insist on 
Heaving the needles, 
The leafy bedding, 
 
Even the paving. 
Our hammers, our rams, 
Earless and eyeless, 
 
Perfectly voiceless, 
Widen the crannies, 
Shoulder through holes. We 
 
Diet on water, 
On crumbs of shadow, 
Bland-mannered, asking 
 
Little or nothing. 
So many of us! 
So many of us! 
 
We are shelves, we are  
Tables, we are meek, 
We are edible, 
 
Nudgers and shovers 
In spite of ourselves. 
Our kind multiplies: 
 
We shall by morning  
Inherit the earth. 
Our foot’s in the door. 
  
Sylvia Plath: Mushrooms
 
 
With the above-mentioned qualification concerning the “shape” of time975, the 
“revolution” that Polish opposition intellectuals meant to carry out resembled 
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considerably to Walter Benjamin’s notion of the term, at least as understood by the 
sociologist and philosopher Michael Löwy: “Unlike common evolutionist Marxism 
─that may as well include certain writings of Marx and Engels themselves─, Benjamin 
does not conceive revolution as the ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ result of economic and 
technical progress (…) but as the interruption of a historical evolution leading to 
catastrophe”976. In order to pull the emergency brake, a conscious victim of history and 
potential subject-agent should “not consider time as a mere passage but as something 
balanced and in suspense. (…) The equilibrium Benjamin refers to is that between the 
memory of the defeated and the actual need of liberation, between the demands of the 
past and the needs of the present”, whereas “in suspense” involves the possibility of 
stopping unlimited progress (i.e. unlimited war and barbarity)977 by shaking off 
conformism and the idea of inevitability.  
Therefore, the fate of a given group ─the Polish nation as a whole, or pro-
democratic opposition movements and supporters in this case, is undecided, unwritten. 
Such conviction generated contradictory feelings. In inteligenci’s texts, the hope of 
being able to change socio-political life for themselves mingled with the fear produced 
by the well-founded sense of risk and peril that changing those things could imply in a 
system like the PRL. It was precisely during Jetztzeit, when everything was up in the 
air, when the most transcendental questions about the meaning of Polishness were 
posed: 
 
This period [the nineteenth century and Warsaw Uprising, C.A.] bequeaths to us probably the most 
difficult of queries. The query about the sense of being a Pole. I acknowledge that I have 
frequently thought about this. Always with fear. (…) This question always returns 
─understandably─ in times of national tensions, in moments when the atmosphere in Poland is 
charged with danger, but also with expectation. Today is one of those moments. Our future is full 
of question marks, but also of signs of hope. We look at the future with fear, but nevertheless with 
faith, hope and love as well. (…) 
(…) In my view, the message of romantics was a reminder about the impossibility of conceiving 
and understanding the sense of being a Pole without understanding the sense of the Cross. (…) 
Without the Cross, which is the symbol of suffering, but also the symbol of Good News.978 
 
When standing at the crossroads of history, the dread of making a wrong turn or 
the belief that, whichever path was chosen, one would end up in the same place as 
before is unsurprising. It was less frequent for democratic oppositionists, however, to 
perceive their situation in a predominantly pessimistic or even impotent mood, or to 
display their frailness and vulnerability in an open way. But it did occasionally happen.  
A recurrent topic in modern Russian literature, the insignificance of the ordinary 
individual in the face of inhumanly supreme natural and historical forces was masterly 
depicted by Alexandr Pushkin in his poem The Bronze Horseman: A Petersburg Tale 
(1833), when, a year after the apocalyptic deluge that destroyed his life, poor suffering 
and maddened Evgenii sees how Falconet’s equestrian statue of Peter the Great is 
brought to life and pursues him until his death979. In our case, such sense of utter 
powerlessness and lack of control may be considered the other face of Polish critical 
intellectuals’ reflections on time, and we will explore it primarily through some of 
Stefan Kisielewski’s felietony. 
                                                                                                                                               
tyle w tobie marzeń,/ często ciebie piszą,/ kłamcy i gówniarze.//  (...) Historio, historio, ty żarloczny 
micie, co dla ciebie znaczy jedno ludzkie zycie?// Orszaki, dworaki, szum! 
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Considered one of the most renowned Polish publicists of his time, the sweet pen 
name of Kisielewski was ironically misleading, judging by the bitter twist of his 
reflections980. Critical and pessimistic, former neopositivist and member of the Sejm in the 
branch of Znak (1957-1965), deeply individualistic and very concerned about economic 
issues (given his support of a liberal, capitalist market economy), the author’s personality 
and viewpoint was probably one of the most exceptional within opposition circles981. A 
senior and well-established author in our time scope, he assumed his perpetual personal 
debacle and intoned the “blues of defeatism” in his fixed column of Tygodnik Powszechny 
ever more loudly when any of his friends tried to talk him out of it.  
For instance, he confided to his readers that the writer and historian Adam 
Mauersberger believed that, because they had lived through so many socio-political 
changes and difficult experiences, people of their generation (born before 1914) 
possessed a greater and better understanding of the world, and therefore had more 
chances of influencing on future events. Kisiel, however, considered that hope 
obstructed the objective assessment of present circumstances982, “that the past does not 
count, and that never up until then the key to master the future has been found in that 
past, even if researched most accurately”. Each period, he insistently asserted, had its 
own particular mystery, its riddle, and once it was solved it gave way to a new one983. In 
his view, politics was a mixture of bewilderment, disinformation, accidents, 
circumstances and improvisation. But politicians had the power to do something, at 
least apparently, whereas intellectuals, despite all their knowledge (or perhaps because 
of it), did not:  
 
… I do not regard too highly the brains of Napoleon or Mao Zedong; however, it is impossible not 
to admit that they have done more than wise Mauersberger or me. But did they necessarily have to 
do it, or would have things been done without them equally, or maybe even better? (…) I am 
skeptical about knowledge and wisdom: specialists and experts have never ruled the world, and to 
bear in mind all the data and elements does not lead to great decisions, but rather to indolence.984 
 
In the case of Pushkin’s poem, the catastrophes experienced by Evgenii were 
beyond his understanding and control. For Polish intellectuals, however, the main 
problem would be an excess of understanding of situations beyond their control. 
Nevertheless, in Kisiel’s opinion such knowledge was actually the modern version of 
the Socratic paradox, so that instead of providing security or determination, it finally 
made inteligencja understand how little there was to be understood (especially after a 
lifetime), producing a discouraging and paralyzing effect. But politicians or great 
military leaders, who thought less and did more, were probably also dispensable, the 
course of history hardly being disturbed had they not existed. Very intellectual-wise, 
Kisiel thus reflected on the issue of posterity, uncertainty and the ultimate futility of 
human actions. Sometimes, possibly with the scheme of Greek tragedy in mind, he 
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suggested the existence of historical forces that acted of their own volition and played 
with human beings as they pleased:  
 
To live in history ─how annoying! Now then, contrary to what many scholarly men think, history 
is an extremely flippant lady and breaks herself (or rather breaks us) into different pieces, she 
mocks her clientele considerably by resorting to a whole series of accidents that may look 
tremendously comical to a collateral observer, but that are not funny at all for those involved in 
them (…). 
... I question the graveness of the activities of Mrs. History, she makes jokes, though we rarely 
appreciate them, treating them with deadly seriousness.985 
 
At other moments, however, Kisielewski deemed this lady completely humorless: 
“History places us like porcelain figurines, we try to move a little, smile, put a brave 
face on things, but in fact all this goes nowhere, for history does not let go, nor does it 
joke”. Talking of porcelain figurines, the author remembered how he had felt as helpless 
as a puppet on September 1st, 1939, when his world was ruined and he was pushed into 
history (“wkroczyłem w historię”) without being asked986.  
But Kisiel was not the only one to think that fate was not on the Poles’ side since 
the 1930s. In his determination to make some sense of the ordeal that their 
grandparents, parents and they themselves had undergone, and somehow similarly to 
Jerzy Holzer and Krystyna Kersten (Chapters 2 and 3), Adam Michnik came to the 
conclusion that his fellow countrymen did everything they could to avoid the blow (in 
different ways and with different ideologies), and yet did not succeed: 
 
I have tried many times to locate in recent history the exact point at which an error or a wrong 
choice in Polish policy foredoomed the nation to its subsequent misery. And I cannot find it. As 
I’ve examined the wartime and postwar history of the Polish cause, I’ve had the feeling that Clio, 
the muse of history, must have turned her back on Poland, as if she didn’t even give it the slightest 
chance of interrupting the stream of misery or of finding ways to emerge from its national 
oppression. All the different trends in Polish politics lost.987 
 
Nevertheless, it was impossible for human beings to travel otherwise, Kisiel 
admitted: “history is such a vicious horse ─but one must ride it, because there is no 
other”988.  
It was fatalism, yet an unpredictable one. Like a perverse, implacable but 
capricious clockwork machinery, history did not follow any given path, much to the 
chagrin of believers in continuous progress and simple totalizing explanations, 
officialdom and oppositionists alike: “I definitely do not believe in automatic progress, 
especially psychic, spiritual. In certain periods the world can go forward, in others 
backwards, life has many surprises in store and gladly upsets all schemes, especially 
those which were already widely known and accepted”989.  
Curiously, from time to time Kisielewski worked his way towards a personal form 
of hope, for, despite his insistence on the powerlessness of individuals and perceiving 
himself as frail as a porcelain figurine, in his view individuals were also the only 
possible source of moral actions, hence the single ones who could improve things and 
prevent further catastrophes. Since he was a confessed pessimist, the fact that he saw a 
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chance for success, no matter how small and imperfect, is perhaps more significant than 
in many other cases analyzed in this research. 
The way Kisiel tried to emancipate, that is, to get rid of the feeling he was a mere 
puppet at history’s mercy, was through his articles in Tygodnik Powszechny. He was not 
very confident, though, about the usefulness of his texts, or about the effective power of 
his readers, who might be just as overwhelmed and defenseless as he was: “for who 
reads it [Tygodnik Powszechny] today? Only pious men─ and other figurines”, he 
complained in 1979. Nevertheless, Kisiel felt it was his duty to remain critical with 
what surrounded him, to approach key controversial topics (unlike the journalists of 
official magazines) and to express himself as freely as he could in order to maintain the 
spiritual health of his country, just like very prominent nineteenth-century writers and 
artists had done before him (Hugo, Dickens, Wyspiański, Żeromski)990. Thus, he made 
an appeal from hopelessness in a similar fashion as Michnik pictured the hopeless 
defense of values that inteligencja should carry out in spite of everything else (Chapter 
3). The name of his fixed column between 1976 and 1981, “Wołanie na puszczy” (“A 
cry in the wilderness”), was certainly not accidental; “a fight without faith in victory” he 
confessed later on, “is very close to my heart”991. 
But Kisielewski’s accepted impotence was not at odds with his strong 
individualistic will and his determination to preserve his independence as much as he 
could. By assuming his own human fragility, he also showed the vulnerability of those 
who believed themselves invulnerable under the aegis of Communist power. In this 
sense, they were all on an equal footing, “defeated” and “winners” alike. “Winners” 
might have re-written history and imposed their time continuum (for the moment), but 
they were not history itself. Kisiel reminded them they were puppets too, and that under 
no circumstances would he become a puppet’s puppet. Despite not treating Poland very 
well lately, history was simply beyond all monopoly: 
 
I don’t want to dance the gavotte992 with them [with publicysci who avoided positioning 
themselves in controversial issues, C.A.], poor things, I prefer to be a separate figurine, with a 
seeming dancing grace of its own. ─A cabaret? ─yes. But my own, with my own, deliberate clay 
for porcelain. 
Above all, a porcelain figurine defends itself so that other figurines do not wish to manipulate 
it.993   
 
Given the fatalistic turn of Kisielewski’s thought, it is logical to wonder which 
was his standpoint regarding the question of responsibility. Always avoiding too easy or 
simple answers (besides too explicit, due to censorship), through the felieton “Konflikt z 
samym sobą” (“A conflict with oneself”) he provided some illuminating clues in this 
respect.  
The trigger for his reflection was the recently-published autobiographical work of 
the former Nazi leader and, since 1942, Minister for Weapons, Munitions and 
Armaments Albert Speer994. Kisiel was surprised by the degree of Speer’s honesty when 
he pondered up to what extent did he know about Nazi Germany’s crimes back then, to 
what extent did he try to persuade himself about his ignorance or, consciously or half-
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consciously, self-justified his actions in the name of higher, fundamental national goals, 
giving full priority to the end in detriment of the means. He even supposed that, if he 
were young again, he would follow Hitler once more. Going from the particular to the 
general, and therefore alluding to Communism in a veiled way, Kisielewski 
summarized: “It is a disturbing study, due to its absolute and thus disconcerting 
sincerity, about the ambivalence of human activities and about the inevitable conflict 
between people’s intentions and the means to carry them out, when old truths in new 
circumstances become lies, and old imponderables─ crimes”995. Apparently still talking 
only about Nazism, the author went further ahead in his reflection on collective 
behavior and the way in which totalitarianism distorted moral values and destroyed or 
hushed up any kind of ethical doubts, objections and (self-)criticism, finally leading to 
disaster:   
 
The president of the GFR Walter Scheel once said that in 1939 and 1940 Germany went to the 
war without inhibition or complexes, without remorse, feeling it had right fully on its side, for ‘its 
psyche was falsified’ artificially. It is very interesting, a group’s psyche also suffers sclerosis when 
it shuts itself away from self-critical gusts, when the awareness of inevitable internal conflicts and 
of the threatening ambivalence of actions is replaced by the cult to a monolithic system or to 
absolute megalomania. Many questions arise at this point: can a nation make mistakes? Is the 
mistake of a group automatically the mistake of an individual? To back down and admit one’s 
mistake is something honorable, or shameful? And for whom: for the individual, for the group? 
And can history make mistakes? And what is history: a fetish, an idol, a demon, a mechanism, or 
simply a collection of coincidences, integrated post factum by the human brain, which inveterately 
searches for generalizations and explanations?    
I will not give an unequivocal answer, the awareness of the existence of a secular conflict and a 
secular ambivalence prevents me to do so. I think that the complications of the world are encoded 
artfully and equivocally (with a double or repeated code, a palimpsest996), hence the futility of 
human efforts to explain everything with single-minded, single-discipline theories.997     
 
With such reflections, Kisielewski publicly claimed the right to doubt and dissent 
(essential for any independent intellectual, or actually any person), and insisted on the 
complexity of history as a response to those who tried to impose a single way of 
thinking or ignored the dark sides of the human soul. The uncertainty or absurdity of 
human behavior and how it is registered (i.e. the nature of history, the senselessness of 
events unless people make some sense out of them), the frequent incompatibility 
between good theories or utopias and good practices or the alarming easiness with 
which perceptions radically changed along with circumstances were fundamental topics 
that, according to him, were stated more truthfully in Speer’s uncomfortable memoires 
than in many detached treaties on Nazism.  
Perhaps Kisiel was not completely sure about who had the ultimate responsibility 
of past and present catastrophes and destruction, including Polish, but he was sure that 
any chance of improvement could only sprout from within the individual, as a personal, 
private and moral decision: 
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... because the earthly adventure of man is his spiritual test, which he takes individually, not 
collectively. The topics of the examination, thus, are just a pretext, what is important is the effort 
put in their solving; it’s the intellectual and moral effort what counts regardless whether one 
succeeds or fails. (…) Above the successes and failures in life, the religious man is aware that he 
has a duty towards another superior system of values and appraisals in which an apparent paradox 
comes true, that the first will be last and the last will be first. A frustrated life is usually more 
valuable than a successful life, hence pessimism might be spiritually more important than 
optimism.998 
  
With his particular view of Catholicism, completely against Communist 
collectivism and its (in his opinion) fallacious rhetoric of equality, Kisiel insisted on the 
importance of struggling for one’s supreme beliefs, no matter what the final results 
were. If, as he believed, the single relevant progress was moral progress, the history of 
the twentieth century gave no reason to be optimistic, because technical, scientific and 
medical advances had been used, among other things, to create gas chambers and the 
atomic bomb, to cause genocides on a scale never imagined before: “What progress are 
we speaking about, especially when millions of innocent souls have been lost before 
they even had the opportunity to take the earthly moral test? Isn’t this Satan’s triumph, 
when earthly, massive cataclysms turn people aside from their individual spiritual 
fate?”999.  
In line with his pessimistic stance, Kisielewski did not hope for an ultimate 
victory of good during earthly life, but rather envisaged the existence of some kind of 
balance between good and evil in the spiritual sphere, so that basic moral problems had 
remained the same throughout space and time. In his opinion, a religious man (though 
we might add too: an intellectual) should look for those permanent ethical dilemmas 
among the incessant changes taking place in the world1000.  
And once such continuities were spotted, who might find the key to them, at least 
temporarily? Who would be able to solve the sphinx’s new riddle, to decipher history’s 
palimpsest, rewritten over and over again by the “winners” of the moment, but never 
quite concealing the multiple underlying texts that people still remembered or even 
knew by heart? Who were the last who would become the first, who would catch a 
glimpse of the permanently forthcoming peril, of the continuously ongoing battle, like 
Benjamin’s victims-agents? 
 
Maybe a very naïve person, not involved in anything nor in charge of anything, hence free from 
systemic and professional sclerosis, not any theoretician, nor specialist, nor expert, nor prophet, 
but an everyday witness who has maintained simple axioms and imponderables, looking around 
him in a fresh and unselfish way, but without closing his eyes to ‘atypical’ conflicts and 
‘irrelevant’ difficulties characteristic of all things, including the human soul. Atypical and 
irrelevant, but in fact decisive, just like the air’s invisible resistance decides that a fired carbine 
bullet will not fly endlessly. ‘After the noise, the roar, the toil,/ Meek, simple, little people will 
take charge of the legacy’. Meek, because they will be free from the pretensions of conceptual 
sclerosis. Simple, because they will be faithful to plain everyday truths and observations. Little, 
because they will not need the destructive narcotics of greatness. An apparent one [greatness] at 
that. Because only individual moral greatness still means something and contributes to 
something.1001  
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The verses that Kisielewski quoted in his work belong to a poem written by Adam 
Mickiewicz; the full stanza could be roughly translated as follows: 
 
… The hands fighting for the people will be cut off by the people,  
The names dear to the people will be forgotten by the people... 
Everything will pass. After the noise, the roar, the toil, 
Meek, simple, little people will take charge of the legacy.1002 
 
Mickiewicz’s words (hence also Kisiel’s) contain a clear reference to the 
Beatitudes delivered by Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, specifically to the 
second one: “Blessed are the meek: for they will inherit the earth” (Matthew 5: 4)1003. 
Since Kisielewski was generally quite critical with romanticism and the Messianic ideas 
concerning Poland’s uniqueness1004, it is pretty interesting to note how Messianism 
found its way back into the author’s thought through his beliefs and expectancies, the 
latter perhaps only half-acknowledged. Therefore, despite his usually negative 
assessments of history and people’s (wrong)doings, deeming them a mystery almost 
impossible to unravel, Kisielewski introduced a tinge of hope through morality. Would 
the meek someday, somehow, inherit the earth, as the Beatitudes said?  
Władysław Bartoszewski, also Catholic and a good friend of Kisiel1005, pointed 
out through a practical example something quite similar to the latter’s meditations on 
the moral behavior of ordinary people: Once, during the Second World War, a 
gamekeeper witnessed near his home one of the nightly mass executions and burials of 
Polish citizens that were being carried out by the Nazis in the outskirts of Warsaw. 
From that day on, he risked his life by following German firing-squads in the woods at 
night and managed to mark the places where the victims had been buried. After the 
War, the corpses of many disappeared and murdered people were found and identified 
thanks to his dangerous, solitary, quiet work1006. Bartoszewski was convinced that   
 
In the twenty-first century or even later one will be able to read that there were completely 
ordinary people ─nuns, peasants, simple people without much education, who did what was fair. 
The societies of both our countries [Germany and Poland, C.A.] are built upon these people. The 
Jews say that each day must have its own righteous person for the world to keep on turning. But 
there is not just one: there are whole crowds that do instinctively what they think it’s fair. That is 
precisely to work for peace.1007 
 
Very much in this vein, Kisielewski’s “Conflict with oneself” ends up with a 
tribute to ordinary, powerless (especially “thirst of power”-less) but watchful persons, 
who individually start up a silent opposition based on principles, moral doubts and 
dilemmas that, put together, act as “the air’s invisible resistance”. According to the 
author, only they might be able to pull the emergency brake of the train of so-called 
“progress”, the utopic progress that, in the name of moral and legitimate goals, had 
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taken to moral ambivalence, self-deceit and later on to the perpetration of the most 
immoral crimes. By remaining vigilant and critical, i.e. by listening to the warning signs 
of their own private conscience, these people would not get carried away by an 
escalation of collective totalitarian madness, which prevented others from seeing that 
there were more options, that today’s leaders did not own the truth and that their 
proposals were definitely not the single, nor the fairest answer to social problems. With 
a disagreement, by speaking out about one’s uncertainties and, of course, by following 
one’s own conscience, the imposed and artificial uniformity would begin to crack. The 
means are far more important than any goal: such was the maxim of the moral, 
individualistic revolution that Kisiel supported.  
Moving on now to more optimistic assessments, Adam Michnik believed that, in 
spite of the Martial Law, the course of history was at a turning point in the PRL: 
 
We live in truly interesting times. We witness the barren twilight of the old world of 
totalitarian dictatorship. (...) 
We live in a strange state of suspension. Nothing has been sealed yet. The grand fate of the 
nation and the small fates of the people still hang in the balance. We are trapped by the humiliating 
feeling of helplessness and impotence. Is this right? 
In 1942 Czesław Miłosz wrote: ‘In an historical moment when nothing depends on man, 
everything depends on him ─this paradoxical truth is revealed today with particular force’. 
And also today...1008 
  
In order to profit from that new “now-time”, Polish society had to recover its lost 
confidence and complete as much as possible its process of empowerment ─with 
democratic oppositionists’ help. It certainly all started with a personal decision, a 
humble individual contribution, but the coordinated sum of such efforts could finally 
bring about much desired changes in the Communist system. To not lose hope and trust 
that others were still pushing in the same direction, despite not being able to see them, 
had been essential for Michnik himself, especially in the hardest moments: 
 
You know how profound the feeling of loneliness can be. You think that you are powerless 
against the police-army machine that was mobilized on that December night. You still don’t know 
what will happen. You still don’t know that people will begin to recover from the shock, that 
underground papers will appear, that Zbyszek B. [Zbigniew Bujak] will lead his Solidarity region 
from the underground, that in Wroclaw they will fail to capture Władek F. [Władysław Frasyniuk]; 
that Gdańsk, Świdnik, and Poznań will again shake up all Poland; that illegal union structures will 
be formed. You still don’t know that the generals’ vehicle is sinking in sand, its wheels spinning in 
place, that the avalanche of repression and calumnies is missing its aim. 
But you do know, as you stand alone, handcuffed, with your eyes filled with tear gas, in front 
of policemen who are shaking their guns at you ─you can see it clearly in the dark and starless 
night, thanks to your favorite poet [Czesław Miłosz]─ that the course of the avalanche depends on 
the stones over which it rolls.  
And you want to be that stone that will reverse the course of events.1009 
 
It would not be the first time they achieved it, anyway: according to Jan Józef 
Lipski, former members of KOR had already managed to “reprogram social life” and 
alter considerably history’s progression back in the mid-1970s. In its determination to 
help and ally with the workers who were victims of repression in June 1976, this 
reduced group of inteligenci challenged the rules and timings of the “winners” and tried 
to take advantage of the system’s cracks within its capabilities. Oppositionists needed to 
make the most of the margin left to transform things, conformism was not an option:  
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My understanding of social life is neither deterministic not voluntaristic. I believe simply that 
human will and the intellect directing it (or the emotions, but not ─God forbid─ the emotions 
alone) are also a part of reality and cannot be disregarded. As a result, all mechanisms that are 
basically determined are subject to conscious modifications of structure and program, and this 
means that the future can only rarely be seen as a unique and unavoidable consequence of the 
present. In other words, there exist both a theoretical and a practical possibility of social 
engineering and of politics. 
In my opinion, it was precisely the Workers’ Defense Committee that functioned as such a 
voluntaristic factor and that ─thanks in part to the intelligence, inventiveness, stubbornness, 
determination and hard work of its leaders and participants, and in part to circumstances─ was 
able to modify considerably the course of events that could have been anticipated from the 
perspective of mid-1975 (the issue of the Constitution1010). KOR modified the course of events 
considerably, but only within the bounds of its own possibilities, which were limited not simply by 
the numerical strength of the movement but also by the tremendous inertia of the system. Even so, 
this was possible only because the government limited its response to the activities of KOR to 
restraints and repressions that represented a negation of the need for reforms.1011 
 
Lipski’s perception of present time had much to do with the idea of “open history” 
suggested by Michael Löwy in his analysis of Benjamin’s Theses. Politically speaking, 
it meant to bear in mind “the possibility (not the inevitability) of catastrophes, on the 
one hand, and of great emancipatory movements, on the other”, and to realize that some 
of those chances of failure or success actually depended on present-day “defeated” and 
oppressed1012.  
In Polish oppositionists’ case, both failure and success were closely connected to 
the decisions taken in Moscow. The major national catastrophe was envisaged as a 
military invasion of the country by the Soviet Union; in this sense, the precedents of 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia played a fundamental role in the Poles’ consciousness 
─dissidence, officialdom and men in the street alike. As to emancipation, oppositionists 
wished to diminish the USSR and Communist Party control as much as possible, 
heading either towards internal pluralism and sovereignty in a kind of Finlandization 
process, or, Realpolitik permitting, towards complete independence in the future.   
Once the awareness of agency was recovered, two new elements came into play: 
power and responsibility1013. The famous opposition poster designed by Tomasz 
Samecki for June 1989 elections (Figure 15)1014, depicting Will Kane (Gary Cooper) in 
the film High Noon (1952), became a symbol of these feelings, as well as of the crucial 
historical relevance of the forthcoming polls. It announced that the definite duel had 
finally arrived: the lonely and apparently powerless Solidarność marshal (but 
nevertheless morally powerful, because he was not willing to submit or to flee from his 
duty) had to face the gang of wrongdoers (Communist system) once and for all, in a 
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 Since Autumn 1975 Edward Gierek’s government had been trying to introduce some amendments in 
the PRL Constitution, such as to establish the leading position of the PZPR, confirm the unbreakable 
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and the final modifications were passed on February 10th, 1976. 
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Western film-like clear-cut division between good and evil1015. It was the Poles’ turn 
and responsibility to speak up peacefully through their votes: in this occasion, Gary 
Cooper had left his revolver at home.   
 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
Going now back to almost a decade before the fall of Polish Communist 
government, one of the contexts in which the clash between the sense of power and the 
sense of responsibility became more evident was in the sessions of Solidarność’s 
National Commission at the beginning of the 1980s, as we will see next. 
 
 
B.2) Case study: Power and Responsibility in Solidaność’s National Commission  
 
On September 17th, 1980, more than thirty representatives of the Founding 
Committees of different striking Polish factories (Międzyzakładowe Komitety 
Założycielskie, MKZ) agreed to unify their statutes and officially register as a single 
national federal trade union, giving birth to NSZZ “Solidarność”. That same day, they 
also decided that a National Coordinating Commission (KKP), later re-named National 
Commission (KK)1016, would head the union and be its supreme executive organ at 
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 In June 2004, when paying tribute to the recently deceased Ronald Reagan, Lech Wałęsa wrote about 
this placard: “I have often been asked in the United States to sign the poster that many Americans 
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national level. Made up of one representative of each regional MKZ, and admitting new 
memberships after its formal registration1017, the KKP represented the trade union to the 
PRL government, coordinated the activities of its regional organizations, controlled its 
budget, established the principles to create new professional or industrial sections, was 
in charge of signing collective agreements and elected the members of the Presidium 
(devoted to bureau and legal issues), as well as the chairman of the Commission itself. 
Lech Wałęsa was appointed for this last post, and his deputies were Andrzej Gwiazda 
and Ryszard Kalinowski. 
The participants in the plenary sessions (posiedzenia) of the Commission were 
numerous and varied: the political advisers to the KKP1018, more than one regional 
representative of factories and working branches (chairmen and delegates), spokesmen 
of the peasant section and other institutions, the representatives of the eleven cities 
where the movement was stronger (usually known as “the eleven”), people working for 
the KKP or Gdańsk’s MKZ…, to the point that up until today it is impossible to provide 
a full list of those who attended them each time1019. During the meetings, which usually 
took place twice a month, and monthly since May 1981, the discussion topics ranged 
from the outline of general nation-wide actions to technical specificities and regional or 
inter-factory problems. The majority of them were tape-recorded1020 and, after the 
establishment of Martial Law (which illegalized Solidarność), they were transcribed and 
published by the main underground publishing house Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 
within the collection Archiwum ‘Solidarności’ (The Archive of Solidarność). The 
English summary included in each of these books provided the following arguments 
supporting the past, present and future relevance of such assemblies: 
 
… the Commission played a key role not only because its decisions were binding for members 
of the Union and its local branches, but also because it was the arena for most important public 
polemics and discussions concerning both the internal problems of the union itself and general 
political problems of a national impact. (…) 
… the unrestrained nature of the sessions (as a rule the speakers presented their texts “off the 
cuff”), the representative character of the Commission and the role played by the participants in 
the life of the Union and in the political struggle current at the time ─all this means that the 
records of the debates held by the KKP (KK) are an exceptionally valuable source for the history 
of Poland and of the independent social movements in the September 1980-December 1981 
period.1021 
  
Given the atmosphere of debate of the KKP sessions, from time to time some of 
its participants brandished in their argumentations general questions concerning 
responsibility and power. In addition, the tension and emotions present in some 
especially crucial moments of the decision making process took at least once to a 
dramatic resort to history and personal traumatic experiences (plus the ensuing 
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 Rising from 40 in October 1980 to 53 by February 1981. 
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 Political advisers and experts were opposition inteligenci who had collaborated with repressed and 
striking workers since 1976 or during the Gdańsk Shipyards’ strike of August 1980. They could attend 
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discussion), showing the extent to which historical awareness had permeated in 
opposition ranks ─as well as the range of standpoints among its members concerning 
the approach to national past and its relation (or lack of relation) with present time. 
 At the beginning of November 1980, the barely two month-old Independent Self-
governing Trade Union Solidarność was still immerse in its registration process. Firstly, 
it had tried to register in Warsaw Voivodeship Court, but given the latter’s resistance 
(which led to the first nation-wide hour-long strike organized by Solidarność) and the 
attempt to modify some of the clauses of the movement’s statute without Solidarity 
members’ knowledge and consent as a condition for its approval, Solidarność leaders 
decided to take their demand to the Polish High Court instead. Communist authorities’ 
attempts to hamper or even halt the legalization of the first nation-wide independent 
trade union in the Eastern Bloc, or of any other independent association following its 
lead, was the main concern of the moment, and an especially delicate situation 
considering the possibility of an armed intervention from Moscow.   
In the KKP, which gathered on November 9th to deal with this issue, two lines of 
action could be already spotted among its participants: a more moderate one that wanted 
to exhaust all negotiation paths with the Polish government before effectively 
embarking upon further forms of pressure, and the hard line, which mistrusted parleying 
with PRL representatives and betted instead on early strikes in order to achieve the trade 
union’s targets. During this meeting, one of Wałęsa’s deputies in the Commission, 
Andrzej Gwiazda, declared himself against a compromise with the government1022. 
Other representatives and advisers, however, felt that the moment was critical and that 
the chances of a Soviet invasion or a declaration of Martial Law were high, so the 
majority finally chose to negotiate a compromise solution with Communist authorities. 
During the discussion prior to this decision, Karol Modzelewski’s eloquent and 
dramatic speech, as Jerzy Holzer described it, warned about the risks of pressing on too 
far and increasing the tension between the parts:   
    
Let’s not forget that the fate of Poland, and perhaps not just of Poland, is in our hands. Maybe this 
is the single case in postwar history where the statute of a trade union can be the cause of events 
on a European scale. I believe that the majority of you voted for the day of strike readiness, that is, 
for the strike (in the case that the outcome at the [high] court didn’t turn out as expected) with a 
heavy heart. Regarding this strike as a last resort, this strike was not called last Tuesday in the 
Gdańsk Shipyards, for if we didn’t choose the option of the use of force then, it means we took the 
road that leads, either illogically: back to the Shipyards, to the same place where we are now, or 
logically: to a compromise settlement acceptable to both sides.1023 
 
Less than twenty-four hours later, on November 10th 1980, the High Court 
registered Solidarność with the statute clauses and annexes firstly agreed by the KKP. 
The independent trade union judged the decision as a victory and that same day the 
National Coordinating Commission called on Solidarity members to respect the statute, 
to go to strike only as a last resort and hence to finally call off the one planned for 
November 12th1024. In this particular crossroads, the young opposition movement chose 
the moderation path.  
And it would not be the single time that temperance won the hand. Another 
especially tense situation for the national executive organ of Solidarność came about 
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 Only a few months later, Gwiazda (n. 1935) became one of the most critical voices within 
Solidarność, especially concerning Wałęsa’s leadership, which he deemed undemocratic and far too 
inclined to compromise with Communist authorities. He protested, together with other Solidarity 
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only four months later, as a result of the “Bydgoszcz events”, the worst political crisis 
experienced by Solidarity in its sixteen months of legal existence.  
On March 19th, 1981, the delegates of Solidarność attending a session of the 
Voivodeship National Council of the city of Bydgoszcz (Wojewódzka Rada Narodowa) 
were beaten up by the Militia after protesting for not being finally allowed to express 
their views (especially concerning Solidarity’s farmer division, still pending to be 
registered) during the meeting. Three of them were injured and taken to hospital, among 
them the Union leader of the Bydgoszcz region branch, Jan Rulewski (n. 1944).  
The majority of Union members and activists considered this new repressive 
action as a direct attack against Solidarność and a provocation, given the biased 
information provided by official television about the incident and the military 
manoeuvers of the Warsaw Pact currently taking place in Polish territory under the 
supervision of a Soviet marshal and the recently appointed Polish Prime Minister 
general Jaruzelski. Even many sections of the Communist Party expressed their anger 
about the aggression. From the next day, thousands of factories issued resolutions 
demanding justice and the establishment of political liability: punishments for the guilty 
policemen and for those who did not prevent the incident, governmental dismissals, etc. 
Regional leaders of Solidarity held meetings and voted for the decision to call a general 
strike. Following instructions of the National Commission, they declared to be ready for 
a strike, though without specifying a date, and moved their seats to big factories, while 
the KK itself moved to the Gdańsk Shipyards. On March 22nd, Union representatives led 
by Wałęsa met government representatives headed by the vice-Prime Minister 
Rakowski in Warsaw, but their talks did not render any positive result. In view of this 
situation, the Commission decided to celebrate an extraordinary open session on March 
23rd, which continued on the 24th, to clarify what had exactly happened in Bydgoszcz 
(including the responsibility of authorities and oppositionists alike in the incident) and 
discuss what to do next. Journalists of the Union, as well as of official and foreign 
media, were present in the assembly1025.   
Two main options were put forward then: the declaration of a general strike of 
indefinite duration (except for vital services) starting on March 27th (Friday), which was 
initially supported by a majority; or the declaration of a four-hour strike for that same 
day as a warning to force the Communist government back to negotiations and, only if 
that strategy did not render the expected results, the declaration of a general occupation 
strike for the 31st. The inteligenci acting as political advisers to the Commission, as well 
as Lech Wałęsa himself, were in favor of the second alternative, arguing that rash 
actions increased the probabilities of the government declaring a state of emergency or 
of a Soviet armed reaction. Timings were essential, according to the lawyer Władysław 
Siła-Nowicki (1913-1994)1026, just as they proved to be when the Polish civilian and 
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military leaders of the resistance movement against the Nazis, in which he actively 
participated, decided to start what was later known as the Warsaw Uprising (August 1st-
October 2nd, 1944), perhaps an unnecessary risk with an overwhelmingly tragic result:  
 
Ladies and gentlemen, this trade union is the hope of the nation, it’s the hope of the country, it 
was born with the biggest of efforts, with the biggest of sacrifices, it exists thanks to the people, 
thanks to all of you as well. In the course of seven months it has carried out enormous changes and 
it is the hope of the nation. And now let us consider whether we should take the risk of losing what 
has become the hope of the nation, its strength! I don’t know… We should not behave like 
children. I’m united to each person and I know that we’ll defend each person but, ladies and 
gentlemen, I’m used to the fact that I’ve risked people’s lives, and that those people died for 
relatively trivial issues, such as serving one or two sentences, [I’m used to] to the fact that corpses 
fell there, to the fact that people died in the uprising. Because when our colleague [Jan] Olszewski 
was a child1027, I was commanding the diversion squad Warsaw-Downtown, and this burden of 
responsibility weighed heavily on me. I understood what it meant then, I understand it   terribly 
well up until today. And it was carried out, and so many victims were sacrificed, and the single 
explanation I came up with was that I am risking my life in the same way, and therefore I can send 
people to death. And now we, due to… no one has even died, thank heaven, and we have to put at 
risk everything, the existence of the whole Union without considering whether it’s necessary? 
Because the Union defends these three [Union activists beaten up by the Militia in Bydgoszcz], but 
the Union also defends thousands, tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands. And it must 
defend them. It must defend them not only today, but throughout time. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we need to consider whether a sensible and responsible person would 
take an extreme decision without absolute need. Would any of us, as parents, put our children, our 
wife, our home at risk, as the only, single solution?! Please, ladies and gentlemen, do not risk it. 
And now let’s consider if we, as we have heard here today, were not to talk, only call a general 
strike, stop any labor, any work, any conversation ─aren’t we in the place of a person who’s 
risking something even more beloved than the lives of our children, wives, families, something 
that has an enormous value for the whole country? Without turning back. And without profiting 
from other opportunities. (...) For if we do as some said here, if we call a general strike without 
hardly negotiating with the government, ladies and gentlemen, we’ll put the government in a 
situation that it’ll deem unacceptable. We’ll be finishing, we’ll be then putting an end to a certain 
era of Polish life that began in August, which was based on seeking political solutions.1028  
 
Believing that a general, one-sided and open-ended strike would be tantamount to 
large-scale repression and the possibility of violence also within opposition ranks, Siła-
Nowicki perceived it too as a break with the new-born tradition established by 
Solidarność, that is, the non-violent and moderate resort to political means to solve 
conflicts and achieve the workers’ and Polish society’s demands: “It is a worldwide, 
unprecedented phenomenon that, during its seven months of existence, a group made up 
of many millions of people, in the very controversial Polish circumstances, never 
scratched a single policeman nor broke any shop window in the country! For we sought 
and seek political solutions, not the use of force”1029.  
During his long speech, the adviser to the National Commission insisted on the 
responsibility question: “Because the possibility of a complete disorganization of Polish 
life is in Solidarity’s hands. And economic [disorganization], if we go towards 
confrontation. It is. But would the possibility of ordering Poland also be [in Solidarity’s 
                                                                                                                                               
participant. There, he demanded universal suffrage in presidential elections and represented the interests 
of the opposition groups lacking their own representatives in the conversations. In 1990-1992 he co-
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hands] if the government fought against us using violence?”. In Siła-Nowicki’s eyes, if 
the rash path was chosen, the chances of emancipation diminished to the benefit of the 
odds of a new catastrophe, and oppositionists’ liability for what happened would stretch 
beyond their life span: “We, ladies and gentlemen, hold accountable for Poland! And 
not only for our generation (applause)”1030. 
Like in Warsaw Uprising, a wrong or untimely decision could easily lead to 
disaster on a massive scale1031. Personal memories of senior members of Solidarność 
did not weigh solely on them as individuals: they also awakened historical 
consciousness and a sense of historicity in younger Polish oppositionists. The present 
moment was potentially full of possibilities, but if one did not act cautiously or take on 
account the power of the “winners”, once the choice was made there was no way back 
to the starting point. A “defeated” could be certainly accountable for engendering more 
“defeated” through his or her resolutions, Modzelewski (in November 1980) and Siła-
Nowicki argued, especially considering they were leading a new independent national 
force. The repetition of such mistakes was simply inadmissible to the latter. There were 
still other alternatives, and the “right time” (kairos) should be found for each action 
leading towards emancipation. 
Nevertheless, in March 1981 Karol Modzelewski nuanced considerably his 
previous view about strike calling. First of all, he criticized Siła-Nowicki’s use of 
history, for he considered that to compare their present situation with that of the leaders 
of AK when they decided to carry out Warsaw Uprising certainly caused a dramatic 
effect, but was deceiving. A social movement supported by ten million people, despite 
being very disciplined, had nothing to do with the Home Army’s military command; the 
decision to start the Uprising was based mainly on political reasons, while their decision 
about the strike had to do as well with the indignation and emotions that the “Bydgoszcz 
events” had caused among Polish society and Solidarity members. In addition, 
Modzelewski considered that, on this particular occasion, whichever decision was made 
would contain a risk that should be assumed, always bearing in mind that they were no 
army and hence lacked weapons and were not prepared for a combat situation ─that it 
was civilians’ lives what could be at stake from the beginning. Decision makers had to 
live with uncertainty, for a priori there were no ultimately right or wrong answers, nor 
easy and obvious paths to follow ─he, personally, was in favor of carrying out a general 
strike after the warning one:    
 
And it’s not true that those commanders [AK’s] weren’t questioned, that there were no doubts or 
reproaches addressed to them. However, that decision concerned an army, an underground one, but 
nevertheless an army, that had 20,000 disciplined soldiers in Warsaw. That’s why I allow myself 
to say that responsibility in these same categories, that is, in categories of national tragedy, 
bloodshed, threat to the Polish state and nation, is taken whether the decision to go on a general 
strike is made or whether it’s not made! For both decisions can lead to bloodshed, to the threat of 
national and state existence. And we must realize this, pondering on this responsibility. So it’s not 
so simple: to remind about the threat to elemental national values doesn’t clarify which decision 
should be made.1032 
 
Nothing was written beforehand: the same decision, summed up to many others 
within or beyond oppositionists’ control, could eventually take to emancipation or to 
catastrophe. By adding complexity to the perception of time in his speech, Modzelewski 
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was probably also questioning the straightforward model of progress and historical 
phases characteristic of Marxism, like many other oppositionists had done before 
him1033. In their view, historical materialism surely wasn’t the best theory to explain the 
recent history of dissident movements or workers’ protests in Poland. Besides, to trust 
in the infallibility of a given resolution in such an atmosphere of uncertainty could be 
the quickest and easiest way back into a circle (the circle, another circle?) of repression. 
Whichever path was chosen, including the moderate and apparently less harmful one for 
some of his colleagues, it should be treaded on cautiously and bearing in mind many 
possible outcomes. That is why, although he declared himself a supporter of the general 
strike as a way to force the government into further agreements, Modzelewski deemed 
wiser to organize a shorter warning strike before launching out into something bigger: 
 
There are two ways out of the indefinite general strike: either the government starts to shoot us and 
then entrusts the machineguns to someone else because it can’t manage the situation on its own, or 
the government capitulates. The alternative is terribly burdened with the responsibility for the fate 
of the country. That’s why I think that it would be an exceptionally risky decision [to carry out] 
before Friday [March 27th]. Being in favor of a general strike, and of setting its date now, I opt for 
Monday rather than Friday [to carry it out], and for it to be preceded by a strike… a general 
warning strike. Because (…) that doesn’t weaken the action, but strengthens it.1034   
 
During the minutes of discussion following Władysław Siła-Nowicki’s 
contribution, other oppositionists backed the idea of calling a general strike directly, 
without any preceding warning strike. For instance, the Union leader of the region of 
Łódź, Andrzej Słowik1035, answered Solidarity’s adviser:  
 
I don’t know who has taken most personally the reproach about us acting in the heat of the 
moment, about not perceiving this responsibility. I think that, despite our youth, a lot of us have 
spent more than one night pondering on what awaits us and on the consequences of signing the 
Statute of our Union (…). I think that a lot of us have thought about this. (…) … we all have just 
one life and what we do in the future will depend on how we act now. (…) … each submission on 
our part is going to be brutally profited against us. And more and more each time, it will escalate. 
It started with ripped out posters, with summons for interrogation, it took to beatings, after a while 
it’ll take to something more. Only what’ll we do then? We’ll have a divided society, (…) … we’ll 
have to worry about how to gather around us the whole society. In this moment we are in a 
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profitable situation such as no other trade union in the world is. In each country, except in ours, 
there exist a few unions that must reach an agreement among them in the most varied situations. 
We have the whole society, the whole working society is with us, in a single union. And we must 
profit from this. Let’s not perceive ourselves like a trade union, like a group of people out of touch 
with reality and with little sense1036. Quite on the contrary. The goals before us are big because 
people’s expectations are big, that’s why decisions must also have certain strength. And let’s not 
be aghast at the fact that it’s a historical decision, for it really is.1037 
 
The historicity of Solidarność’s situation was, thus, perceived and shared by many 
oppositionists, but it took to clashing conclusions: while the importance of present 
circumstances made some act (and react) more cautiously, it stimulated others to act 
boldly and as soon as possible in order to seize the moment.  
And there was yet one more reference to the past along the discussion. Adam 
Niezgoda1038, another member of the Commission, responded Siła-Nowicki:  
 
Today not only the fate of the Union is being decided, but also of the country. (…) Mecenas1039 
Mr. Siła-Nowicki spoke about the Uprising, but Mecenas Mr. Siła-Nowicki must also remember 
how the PSL was eliminated. Our Union could be equally eliminated. (...) … murderous murders 
in many regions of the country ─that’s how the PSL was eliminated. And today we have the duty 
to defend our Union. The situation is clear, but both us in this room and the journalists who are 
now listening to us must go out of here convinced about the fairness of the decision we make. And 
it must be understandable to society.1040 
 
Being the single political group clearly opposing the new order after the end of the 
Second World War, the Polish People’s Party became the main target for Communist 
attacks during the campaigns of the 1946 referendum and the elections of 1947. As a 
consequence, it split; thousands of its activists were arrested and around two hundred 
were killed by the Security Services1041. Thus, the phantom of Stalinist repression had 
been invoked in the meeting of Solidarność’s National Commission. For wasn’t now the 
trade union the main obstacle for PRL authorities’ preservation of the monopoly of 
power? Contrary to Siła-Nowicki, who feared that an untimely decision on their side 
could lead to catastrophe again, Niezgoda believed that this catastrophe might take 
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place in the shape of a new political purge and could perhaps be avoided by a timely 
defense. In any case, both of them longed for the tragic past not to repeat itself.   
As a result of the KK session following the Bydgoszcz events, it was decided that 
a delegation of Solidarność would meet with government representatives on March 25th 
and that a four-hour warning strike (one of the most successful of the Union, according 
to Holzer) would take place on March 27th to press Communist authorities. If those 
measures did not work, the KK agreed that a general occupation strike should be carried 
out on March 31st. The day before this happened, on March 30th, Solidarność and the 
PRL government reached an agreement that put an official end to the Bydgoszcz crisis; 
the government admitted that the law had not been respected and compromised to 
punish the guilty, while Wałęsa, without previous agreement of Solidarity’s National 
Commission, called off the general strike planned for the next day. Some Solidarity 
members regarded this as a too lukewarm position of the Union, especially concerning 
the support to the victims of the aggression and to the Farmer’s union, and criticized the 
undemocratic behavior of Wałęsa. The injured Bydgoszcz leaders Rulewski and 
Łabentowicz wrote to the Commission: “It is a disgrace for the Union, which not only 
did not defend the political dignity of its people, but also sold the hopes of other social 
groups”1042. The mounting criticism and mistrust towards Wałęsa and the intellectual 
political advisers to the Commission (who were regarded as manipulators), plus the 
radicalization of some Union members from then on, proved that the Bydgoszcz conflict 
had opened an important breach in Solidarność1043.    
To sum up, when an important danger was perceived, both historical arguments 
and the question of the unprecedented nature of Solidarity movement were used among 
oppositionists in order to support their diverging views about responsibility and the 
exercise of power. Some believed it was the right time (kairos) for an energetic action, 
others that it was too soon and risky; some opted clearly for caution, others for 
boldness, depending on what they perceived as the biggest peril for the Union (chances 
of catastrophe), its major duty or opportunities (chances of emancipation); yet others, 
like Modzelewski, nuanced their standpoint and assumed there would be dangers to face 
regardless of which decision was finally made. Hence, directly or indirectly, and even in 
such an unusual context as a meeting of Solidarność’s executive organ (which was 
certainly not the ideal setting to employ historical discourses), the past became a 
reference point and an emotional and rhetorical resource that helped oppositionists to 
highlight the relevance of their deeds and find their own place within a “history in 
progress”.  
 
 
B.3) Ongoing history and its future trial: the question of posterity and other examples 
of opposition intellectuals’ historicization of present time 
 
When dealing with helplessness, hope and the issue of responsibility and power, 
other ensuing aspects of historicization of present time already surfaced at some points 
of the analysis of Polish inteligencja’s texts.  
To start with, the question of transcendence was a persistent concern. Had 
intellectuals managed, together with other social groups, to change something in 
Poland? Would they be remembered later on, as years went by, for what they achieved? 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Stefan Kisielewski, always in a more negative mood than 
other oppositionists, hoped, on the one hand, to have effectively contributed to improve 
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the country’s situation but, on the other hand, was conscious of the insignificance of 
individual deeds and feared that his writings would be forgotten now that the 
Communist epoch was over: 
 
I’m afraid of having wasted my life. On the one hand, my political activities rendered some 
results, on the other ─everything would have happened likewise without me. In my books I 
described mainly Communists and Marxists ─it was, in my view, the most interesting oddity of 
our times. However what does it matter now, in this moment it doesn’t interest anybody anymore, 
it has been forgotten (…). 
I fear, thus, that my works about those odd times and the people they concerned also fall into 
the dark pit of oblivion.1044 
 
Once their lifelong enemy vanished, intellectuals could not avoid feeling some 
kind of emptiness and lack of purpose: “The fact is”, Kisiel acknowledged in another of 
his conversations with Piotr Gabryel, “that I prepared myself mentally to play until 
death the role of the ill-regarded, of the quarrelsome, the disputatious, of one who 
observed all the absurdities of the world. My job was to criticize Communism, I made a 
living from this. Now, when reality has changed, I must look for another thing to 
do”1045.  
The future that many thought about but were not confident in witnessing had 
actually arrived and, according to the poet Adam Zagajewski, it altered Eastern 
European intellectuals’ self-perception, especially if they had decided, like Kisielewski 
or himself, not to involve directly in politics:  
 
Now it’s all over. Now it’s all about money and nationalism. Writers, who once represented 
mythical entities, now represent just themselves. I welcome this development enthusiastically; it 
suits me well. What’s mythical and visionary hasn’t ceased to exist; it has returned to where it 
belongs: to poetry, instead of nourishing political illusions. (...) 
Who are we writers, those of us who have not entered the administration of new, transitional 
democracies? Now we represent just ourselves, our books, our past and future, our mistakes, and 
bons mots. And ─as far as political struggle against bad, oppressive systems is concerned─ we 
have turned into historians who can dwell on their remembrances for decades. I don’t want to 
be misunderstood; I am not sneering at the historical function of literature, quite the contrary. But 
we are no longer oracles. We are writers, lonely and slightly comical figures, fighting with white 
sheet of paper, exactly like our colleagues from Australia and Italy, San Marino and Andorra.1046 
 
While they felt they were making history, opposition inteligenci struggled to 
imagine what would be the result of their actions and how they would be morally 
assessed in the future. At the same time (as we will see further along), they tried to 
weave the basis of that future narrative by providing first-hand the information about 
the present that they deemed important and wanted to preserve. Once the historicized 
present actually became history ─in many cases the predominant master narratives of 
the post-Communist period and beyond─, what was there for a former opposition 
intellectual to do? The answer, of course, varied from one inteligent to another, but it 
basically depended on what they had perceived as their major enemy or threat in the 
past. In other words, whether they were against an authoritarian, unfair and repressive 
regime that had collapsed, or rather against authoritarianism, unfairness and repression 
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in general. For those who believed that a democratic and liberal system also required 
critical voices and a constant moral supervision, besides the formation and maintenance 
of an active citizenry, inteligencja’s mission would be always prevailing, though it 
would have to adapt to new political and socio-economic circumstances1047.  
Back in the 1980s, Władysław Bartoszewski expressed himself about history and 
posterity in a much more optimistic way than his friend Kisielewski. To him, suffering 
or sacrifice was not an individual and senseless experience, but a seed out of which a 
crop would grow; a crop that, sooner or later, would be harvested by those coming after 
their generation. Bartoszewski trusted that the persons who, in spite of their moral and 
intellectual relevance, had been somehow “erased” by the “winners” of history or gone 
unnoticed in a given epoch, would be “re-discovered” and “(re-)introduced” in people’s 
collective memory ─producing an ultimate hermeneutical success:     
 
Certain German diplomat asked me years ago in Warsaw, before we said farewell: ‘Mr. 
Bartoszewski, we’ve known each other for some years. Tell me, do you only live for history?’ He 
was not a silly man, and I answered him: not only for history. I do not know which part of me will 
remain. I cannot judge this for myself. God will decide what must remain. It has usually happened 
in Poland, and elsewhere, that a second or third generation values writers, philosophers or 
historians who had been forgotten for decades. One suddenly realizes that precisely these people 
built bridges towards the new generations, that they said something very important. And when one 
reprints what they wrote back then, it remains alive. We have in Poland dozens of examples. Let’s 
think of our nineteenth-century literature. Until 1918 many Polish writers were foreign citizens 
who usually lived in Sweden, France or England. The greatest went abroad. Only a small 
percentage of Poles knew back then about their works and praised their surnames. For the majority 
they simply didn’t exist. But in the generation of their grandsons this was regarded otherwise. 
Now they are considered some of the most prominent Poles. Each ordinary person knows today 
something about these people, about whom their ancestors and contemporaries didn’t know a 
word. 
So what’s important for history, and what’s unimportant? I must admit that it would be 
something great for me if in a hundred years’ time I had a two-line entry in a Polish encyclopedia. 
I do not know if that will happen. But I hope so. 
Does suffering have any sense? (…) Suffering should be fruitful for others. This means that 
one must decide consciously about one’s own life.1048 
 
As yet another result of historicizing present time, some critical inteligenci took 
for granted the inclusion of recent Polish opposition experience, and especially of 
Solidarność and its precedents, in future history books and textbooks.  “Works about the 
seventies and about KOR are needed for many reasons”, Jan Józef Lipski pointed out in 
1982, “and one can reasonably hope that they will one day be written”1049. Such 
conviction was sometimes hinted through the comparison and connection with other 
past events which could be safely labeled as “historical”: “The reader will probably 
note”, Lipski said, “that I do not equally like all the [opposition] groups and all the 
activists. Probably it should not be this way; but even if this were a book about the turn 
of the century, or about the January 1863 uprising, I would have been unable to 
summon as much sympathy (or indifference) for Stefan Bobrowski as for Gustaw 
Awejde” 1050. Similarly, Jerzy Holzer believed that 
 
Historians will discuss about the chances of success of the bloodless Polish revolution of 1980-
1981 just like they discuss up until today about the chances of success of the Polish November 
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1830 Uprising, or of the Russian Revolution of 1905. This kind of discussions will remain 
unsolved, because there will always be arguments in favor of even totally opposing answers. 
Along the next decades, these discussions will be steeped in strong emotions because they will be 
analyzing the merits and mistakes of people who are alive and even active in Polish national life. 
Let’s try to clear the threshold of future discussions.1051 
 
The author’s last sentence summarizes very well Polish intellectuals’ aim to set up 
a starting-point for future historical knowledge. It is no coincidence that both Lipski’s 
and Holzer’s opinions were actually expressed within their first attempt to approach 
KOR’s and Solidarność’s immediate history; even if they considered themselves rather 
chroniclers than historians in this case, and hence that the phenomenon they were 
writing about and experiencing first-hand was something yet too recent to be fully 
assessed, they believed it deserved a place in the country’s annals1052.  
It happened so in a more general level too, as the following Solidarity poster 
shows (Figure 16)1053. At the top, beside the national coat of arms (the white eagle) and 
in red letters, it says: “Let’s not waste this Polish chance” ─which reminds us of some 
of the standpoints of the members of the National Commission analyzed before. At the 
bottom, in bigger white letters and on a black background, the authors of the placard 
encouraged Poles “… to live without lies and fear, with honor…”. The words “lies” and 
“fear” are aligned to the right, while “to live” and “with honor” are aligned to the left; a 
Manichaean semantic association is thus suggested through the spatial arrangement of 
the concepts: a real, authentic life cannot do without honor, while a life full of fear and 
lies is not worth living. Between these two sentences, in smaller red letters and on the 
left-hand side of Solidarność’s logo, an interesting historical comparison is drawn: “as 
important as Grunwald” (ważne jak Grunwald). That is to say, Solidarność is waging a 
“battle” which is implicitly described not only as national1054 and decisive, but also 
ultimately as victorious.     
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 
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But what to do until that ultimate victory arrived? How to face forthcoming 
defeats, like the implementation of Martial Law, and be able to overcome in the end? 
During the trial against KPN leaders, Romuald Szeremietiew pointed out that the 
recordings of political prosecutions would eventually become a weapon for the victims 
of repression and enable remembrance. Thus, the repressed should manage to leave 
similar traces, some kind of evidence in order for others (or themselves later on) to 
claim justice and demand accountability, so that at least the effective “winners” didn’t 
become “hermeneutical winners” too:  
 
We will still say what we say now, it’s registered in the recording tape. We will resort to these 
tapes in the future, perhaps before too long. But even in the long run, in nine or ten years’ time, 
there cannot be the slightest doubt as to “who’s who” in this prosecution. We must flourish all the 
arguments that prove our innocence. I must do so, so that in the future no participant in the 
prosecution may have the right to say “I didn’t know”. Just like the judges and prosecutors who 
took part in the shameful trials of Stalinist times frequently said after 1956. In this prosecution 
there cannot be situations allowing future subterfuges.1055 
  
When certain events were regarded as historical by Polish oppositionists, either in 
an emancipatory or a catastrophic sense, the first impulse was to give an account of 
them. Within our time scope, both the formation of Solidarity and the establishment of 
Martial Law marked a turning point as to the quantity of such records and the urgency 
of their registration and/or preservation.  
Once forced back into the winners’ time continuum, so to speak, historicization also 
became gloomier. Szeremietiew alluded above to Stalinism, whereas Michnik wrote in jail:  
 
For what else happened on the night of December 12/13? “Factories were taken by force. 
Workers’ organizations were dissolved and decimated with the help of the police. The working 
class was transformed into an amorphous, apathetic mass devoid of political consciousness. From 
then on, the government had to deal with individuals and not with organizations. Napoleon was 
right: it suffices to be stronger at one particular moment.” This is not my assessment of the 
political situation that followed December 13. These are the words used by Bertold Brecht to 
describe Hitler’s takeover of Germany. And if WRONa achieves its goals, this is how future 
historians will write about Poland in the period after December 13, 1981.1056 
 
Still, this was only a possibility. Michnik left the door open to changes in the 
belief that the Poles had not been yet deprived of their recently-recovered 
podmiotowość, and hence of their power to prevent further catastrophes, though it 
would have to be channeled otherwise given the increasing repression (see Chapter 2). 
Democratic opposition’s field of action had been dramatically restricted in the official 
and open spheres ─but underground publishing houses flourished. 
“How will history judge this sentence [against KPN]”, Szeremietiew wondered 
out loud when finishing his speech before the Warsaw Voivodeship Court1057. 
Especially after December 1981, many understood that the result of “history’s trial” 
would depend entirely on who managed to recount that currently ongoing history in the 
long run. As one of the favorite novelists of critical Poles said, “who controls the past 
controls the future: who controls the present controls the past”1058. Oppositionists had to 
produce, safeguard and spread historical narratives about themselves to counteract 
Communist authorities’ attempt to return to a monochromatic version of reality.  
Paradoxically, history had to be written and settled even before it became history. 
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C) Historical awareness and historicization of present time (II) 
 
 
Die Gefahr droht sowohl dem Bestand der Tradition wie ihren 
Empfängern. Für beide ist sie ein und dieselbe: sich zum 
Werkzeug der herrschenden Klasse herzugeben. In jeder 
Epoche muss versucht werden, die Überlieferung von neuem 
dem Konformismus abzugewinnen, der im Begriff steht, sie zu 
überwältigen. Der Messias kommt ja nicht nur als der Erlöser; 
er kommt als der Überwinder des Antichrist. Nur dem 
Geschichtsschreiber wohnt die Gabe bei, im Vergangenen den 
Funken der Hoffnung anzufachen, der davon durchdrungen ist: 
auch die Toten werden vor dem Feind, wenn er siegt, nicht 
sicher sein. Und dieser Feind hat zu siegen nicht aufgehört. 
 
Walter Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte, These VI” 
 
Poland’s destiny is the destiny of each one of us. It is our 
human destiny. We must defend it like our grandparents and 
parents did. At any cost. All the mighty of the world: 
remember this.  
 
Adam Michnik: “Powstanie listopadowe ─‘polskie pytania’” 
 
 
C.1) History of the present, oppositionists’ view of the document and the search for 
truth and authenticity  
 
Despite memory and history writing have gone hand in hand in Western cultures  
since Ancient Greek times, it was especially after the experience of the Holocaust when 
this relation was brought back into the spotlight of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
undergoing considerable epistemological re-elaborations. By the late 1970s, a new 
historiographical trend emerged, albeit with different connotations and methodologies 
according to each country or school: in France, it was labelled Histoire du Temps 
Présent; in Germany, Zeitgeschichte; in English-speaking countries, Current History 
(though it lacks the sociocultural overtones of the two former), whereas in Spain it is 
usually named Historia del presente or Historia “vivida”. A third element, identity, was 
then explicitly incorporated to the history/memory tandem in the collective plane.  
Interestingly, something very similar was going on in Poland around the same 
period of time, though on a different echelon and with diverging implications. In the 
beginning, Polish oppositionists’ “history of the present” was not primarily a 
historiographical or academic trend, but rather a multi-layered hermeneutical operation 
or reaction against a threatening enemy; in other words, something that inteligenci 
deemed vital in order to “save” themselves and the critical initiatives they supported.  
If we compare it specifically with the French case, we may spot a few 
resemblances beyond the most evident professional and regime differences (academic-
amateur, democracy-dictatorship). For instance, both initiatives were based on a 
renovated notion of “collective memory”, that is, on “the recollection or set of 
recollections ─either conscious or not─ of an experience which was lived and/or 
mythologized by a living community”, as long as the feeling of the past is an integral 
part of the latter’s identity1059. The goal of such approaches is to depict the history of 
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living people in its full complexity; this history would be narrated by its main characters 
with the historian/history writer’s assistance, who would act as a witness and perhaps 
also as a judge. In addition, in Polish opposition’s case the figure of the main character 
and of the historian would frequently coincide, hence blurring even more the borderline 
between subject (historian) and “object” (the historical subject-agent), between 
autobiography and biography.  
Strongly empathetic, though conceptually and theoretically vague, this kind of 
history writing is also specifically linked to the idea of national identity, understood as a 
binding element which needed to be reinforced. In France, historians of the present 
contemplated a nation-state betting for rationalism, centralization, laicism and equality, 
whereas in Polish opposition circles it was the nation claiming for its independence, 
freedom and rights what prevailed… in spite of a hostile and illegitimate state. National 
feelings, Bronisław Geremek explained, became then the easiest way for people to 
defend themselves against the imposition of an ideological scheme which was alien to 
their historical heritage, as well as to organize and communicate among themselves 
given the abnormal functioning of public opinion in Eastern Bloc countries:  
 
Rappeler sa propre histoire équivalait à rappeler l’appartenance à une communauté nationale et à 
s’opposer à la dépendance de l’empire soviétique. Qui plus est, dans le modèle politique imposé 
aux pays de l’Europe centrale, aucune place n’était faite au fonctionnement normal de l’opinion 
publique, à la communication entre les gens; la référence au sentiment national devenait alors la 
forme la plus simple et la plus aisée pour communiquer et s’organiser, et c’est ainsi qu’est apparue 
le plus aisément la communauté des résistants au système imposé. Violée par ses liens de 
dépendance à l’égard de l’empire, la souveraineté des nations revendique ses droits. Et ce n’est que 
normal.1060 
     
Lastly, both Polish and French historians and/or oppositionists contributed 
actively and openly to political praxis through the dissemination of their analyses of the 
present, converging or clashing in their aims with governmental policies and/or the 
media. Thus, when intellectuals fixed or stabilized a certain view of the immediate past 
in their narratives, they were always bearing the future in mind1061.  
Experience and expectations have become widely accepted as part of the process 
of history writing1062. As Eric Hobsbawm pointed out at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
past, the present and the future are always flowing and hence cannot be drastically told 
apart:  
 
… all prediction about the real world rests to a great extent on some sort of inferences about the 
future from what has happened in the past, that is to say from history. The historian ought 
therefore to have something relevant to say about the subject. Conversely, history cannot get away 
from the future, if only because there is no line which divides the two. What I have just said now 
belongs to the past. What I am about to say belongs to the future. Somewhere between the two 
there is a notional but constantly moving point which, if you like, you can call the “present”. (…) 
We cannot ask the past for direct answers to any questions which have not already been put to it, 
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though we can use our ingenuity as historians to read indirect answers into what it has left behind. 
Conversely, (…) we can ask the present any answerable question, though by the time it is 
answered and recorded it will also, strictly speaking, belong to the past, albeit the recent past. 
Nevertheless past, present and future form a continuum.1063  
 
The subject-agent who is conscious of a mortal peril “is, at the same time, the 
most threatened one and the single one who can save. The most threatened because he is 
in on the secret of the power of those who rule, and the one who can save because he 
has found the right strategy, the hermeneutical battle”1064. Not surprisingly, humanists 
and historians living within a dictatorship match Reyes Mate’s description particularly 
well: a better knowledge of the past and some of its secrets or distortions somehow 
make them superior to the powerful; they can tell who is lying and enjoy a clearer 
perspective of the all-pervasive oppressive system they are immerse in, which explains 
in our case why there was quite a large number of opposition activists in academic 
organs such as Warsaw University’s Historical Institute1065. As it happened with the 
people and events they recalled, researched about and vindicated, these subject-agents 
were aware of the danger of being erased from history; therefore, they tried to safeguard 
their own ideas and actions so that future historians-ragmen didn’t have to look out for 
the fragments of their defeated experience in the rubbish dump of history.    
Before proceeding with Polish opposition’s specific concern about the history-
memory-identity triad, documentation and the feeling of catastrophe, it is worth to go a 
little further back in time to draw attention to two remarkable prior cases. Just like 
Walter Benjamin “foresaw” and warned about the abyss towards which Nazi Germany 
was heading full-speed, as well as about the horror of totalitarianisms in general, during 
the Second World War some groups of outstanding citizens decided to implement a 
hermeneutical battle in an invaded and devastated Poland: they took up the task of 
researching, collecting and registering any kind of document concerning the victims or 
potential victims of Nazism (objects, diaries, personal data and documents, writings, 
good-bye letters, photographs…) both in order to preserve their memory (and hence 
their individual and collective identity) and in the hope of being able to tell their story in 
the future and do justice.     
Emanuel Ringelblum (1900-1944), an expert in the history of Polish Jews since 
the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century, together with many other Polish-Jewish 
scientists, writers and ordinary people, carried out a secret operation named Oyneg 
Shabbos to gather all the information available about the lives and tragic fate of the rest 
of their compatriots in the Warsaw Ghetto, including descriptions of the Chełmno and 
Treblinka extermination camps. Unfortunately, Ringelblum was not able to complete 
his mission: he was executed with his family while fleeing from the Ghetto, together 
with the people who concealed them. After the War, a part of the documents collected 
by Oyneg Shabbos was discovered hidden away in milk cans and metal boxes in 
different cellars of the city’s buildings and among the ruins, which enabled this 
initiative to be known worldwide and become one of the symbols of the salvage of 
Jewish people’s memory during the Holocaust1066.     
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If Ringelblum’s example is an important theoretical (albeit indirect) precedent for 
our research topic because it draws Polish recent past, the idea of history and memory 
cultivated in Jewish tradition and Benjamin’s Theses together, the second salvation 
project developed in occupied Poland connects in practice a past and a present mission 
through the figure of Władysław Bartoszewski, an important member, as we already 
know, both of Polish resistance against Nazism and of opposition circles during the 
PRL regime.   
In the War, Bartoszewski contributed to register Nazi crimes against Polish 
population, Jews and non-Jews alike, and gathered as much information as possible 
about the victims, so that they didn’t fall into oblivion. His notes, accounts and reports 
about the executions in Warsaw were used as proofs in the Nuremberg trials (1945-
1946) and in the complex process against Ludwig Hahn1067, which took place almost 
three decades later in the German Federal Republic. With his work Warsaw Death Ring, 
1939-1944 (1967)1068, Bartoszewski attempted “to build a monument to many known 
and unknown victims of the occupation, to show their faces, to remind about the values 
for which they gave their lives”, and explained that “that book was not for me an act of 
revenge, but a witness of history, a warning for both our nations [Poland and 
Germany]”1069.   
The archive is a key element for any society that wants to keep its memory, 
traditions and knowledge safe. However, as Olga Zaslavskaya points out, an archive “is 
not just the bearer of documentation but also a reflection of the needs of its creators, and 
the purposes behind its creation should be taken in a broader sociopolitical and cultural 
context”1070. Archives, in sum, do not deal solely, or even mainly, with the past: they 
are  
 
… a question of future, the question of future itself, (…) of a response, of a promise and a 
responsibility for tomorrow. If we want to know what the archive wanted to say, we will only 
know in the time to come. Perhaps. Not tomorrow but in the time to come, soon or perhaps never. 
A ghostly messianicity1071 works on the concept of archive and links it, like religion, like history, 
like science itself, to a very exceptional experience of promise.1072 
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Already in the midst of the Cold War, cultural and political circles of Western 
countries were discussing how to deal with all the alternative and opposition materials 
produced in Central-Eastern Europe that were reaching the West. In April 1971, 
academics and journalists celebrated a conference in London precisely to discuss about 
the future of the samizdat phenomenon (“Future of Samizdat: Its Significance and 
Prospects”). It was proposed then that Radio Liberty, which already had an ample and 
organized samizdat collection, could take charge of such documents systematically and 
set up a centralized archive accessible to researchers. It was also decided that some of 
those texts should be read and broadcasted in order for them to “return” to the East and 
reach local audiences. All these records, together with those of Radio Free Europe, 
became the germ of today’s Open Society Archives (OSA)1073.   
But how to take care of those same materials, as well as of many others, in the 
countries of origin, in a moment when a change of geopolitical conditions was regarded 
as very unlikely in the short and medium term?1074 
Urged on by the fear of destruction, oblivion or manipulation, Polish critical 
inteligencja also understood that documents had to be elaborated, collected and 
preserved to safeguard and (pre-)fix their collective memory and identity, especially in 
the atmosphere of deep uncertainty that spread after December 13th, 1981. Given what 
had remained of PRL’s printing and publishing facilities during the 1970s in 
comparison with other Communist countries (machinery, techniques, donations of 
money and equipment from abroad…), the best and most efficient way to look after 
what oppositionists deemed important was by recording it, transcribing or writing about 
it and, most importantly, by publicizing it, for knowledge had to be disseminated as 
soon as possible.  
In addition, the production and distribution of copies of oppositionists’ document-
testimonies by the underground press multiplied exponentially their chances of survival. 
It would be fairly easy for the “winners” to do away with a centralized archive full of 
original files, but how to get completely rid of thousands or tens of thousands of small, 
private collections dealing with the most varied experiences and opinions of the 
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“defeated” since the 1940s, hidden or passed on in the most unusual places and through 
the most ingenious means?     
Beyond this, the written form involves leaving a mark on the world. According to 
some authors, such materialization of the human struggle against the course of time 
builds stronger and more emotive bonds with tradition than the oral form. Writing 
compels us to reflect on what is worth preserving of tradition and what isn’t, and on 
how to harmonize tradition with contemporary procedures1075. It is a way of defeating 
death, of defeating defeat, and hence the favorite means of intellectuals to attain 
posterity. We come full circle in this sense with Bartoszewski’s reference to the 
importance of writing and books in Jewish culture, in connection with his concerns 
about transcendence: “Perhaps not much will be left after I die. Surely I have achieved 
too little. But I value very much printed word. In this respect I think similarly to Jews, 
who believe in books, in what wisdom and reason have transferred to paper. My 
experience and the experience of my nation tell me that much of that will remain”1076.  
The appeal of twentieth-century national history in Poland, the most hushed up 
and distorted by authorities, led to an increasing interest in documents of the past within 
underground and émigré publications. Besides bearing the problem of documental 
preservation in mind, independent publishing houses believed that a good way to 
increase their fame and reach larger audiences would be to offer readers alluring, little-
known documents or archival material hitherto unheard of. Such strategy tried to satisfy 
simultaneously popular demands, the wishes of readers with more specific interests and 
the ambitions of intellectual and scientific authors. Collected documentations about a 
given event, process, historical figure or period were published as monographs, while in 
some journals like Parisian Kultura’s Zeszyty Historyczne there were fixed sections 
devoted to reprinting and popularizing past sources. The majority of these dealt with 
pieces of knowledge that had been condemned in or excluded from official channels: 
public life in the Second Republic, foreign affairs (especially Polish-Soviet relations), 
pre-war politics and the structure of Polish governments during World War II, programs 
and activities of political parties or of anti-Communist groups belonging either to the 
military and political underground or to legal Postwar opposition, information about 
Polish Communist Party in its different phases or about its leaders, the establishment of 
Communist system in the first Postwar years and, last but not least, the vicissitudes of 
dissident and opposition initiatives up until the illegalization of Solidarność1077.  
Memories and diaries written by former “defeated” and victims of repression also 
became an important and popular part of “source publications”: the Poles living in the 
USSR after September 1939, people engaged in conspiracy and resistance during and 
after the Second World War, famous military commanders, members of the still legal 
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postwar parties, the repressed in the USSR or by Polish Security Services, made 
themselves “heard” in black and white decades after their tragic experience1078. 
Such way of providing historical knowledge or documents, with as few personal 
or academic comments as possible on the part of the compiler or publisher, is described 
by Magdalena Mikołajczyk as “propaganda of facts” (propaganda faktów)1079. That is, 
far from perceiving documents as monuments and approaching to them critically, like 
Jacques Le Goff suggested in one of his essays1080, opposition media frequently used 
them and conceived them as proofs in themselves that needed no further explanations or 
additions1081. They shared, in sum, a positivistic view of the source: 
 
The document that, for the positivistic historical school of the end of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth, was the foundation of the historical fact, seems to be presented 
as historical evidence though it is the result of a choice, of a decision made by the historian. It 
seems to possess an objectivity that sets up against the intentionality of the monument. Besides 
this, it essentially takes the form of a written testimony. (…) 
The intervention of the historian who chooses the document, pulling it out from the pile of data 
of the past, preferring it to others, attributing to it the value of a testimony that depends at least 
partially on one’s position in the society of the time and on its mental arrangement, is grafted on to 
an initial condition which is even less “neutral” than his intervention. The document is not 
innocuous. Above all, it is the result of a conscious or unconscious assembly of history, of the 
period and the society that produced it, but also of the following periods during which it has 
continued living, forgotten perhaps, during which it has continued being manipulated despite the 
silence. (…) The document is monument. It is the result of the strain fulfilled by historical 
societies to impose on the future ─intentionally or not─ the self-image they provide of themselves. 
There is no document-truth. Each document is a lie. It is the historian’s task not to feign 
ingenuity.1082     
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Rather than a question of pretended naïveté, in the Polish case such an idea of 
what documents could offer was connected to previous Communist malpractices 
concerning history and historical knowledge, witnessed or experienced first-hand by 
many students and academics who later became members of intellectual opposition.  
After the enormous losses and devastation produced by the Second World War in 
the educational field (annihilation of inteligencja, destruction of buildings, cultural and 
documentary heritage…), the first Postwar years were devoted to reconstruction and to 
the creation of new institutions with the support of the Communist-controlled 
provisional State (1944-1948). Marxism was not yet predominant in intellectual and 
cultural life, but an increase in the number of works dealing with social and economic 
history in detriment of political history could already be spotted, as well as of researches 
on Polish-German relations with a strong anti-German tone.  
During the full-fledged Stalinist era that came next, Communist authorities 
pursued the transformation of Polish historical studies following the Soviet model 
(1949-1956). It was the summit of historical materialism and of a deterministic 
approach based in theory (and quite paradoxically) on objectivity and factual materials 
(faktografia). Along those years, historiography became increasingly teleological and 
ideologized, and academics began to be pressed or attacked to make them be loyal to the 
Party. Some committed with the Communist cause, either truly convinced or out of 
opportunism (to be eligible for promotions, etc.), while others tried to adapt minimally 
to what was perceived as a hopeless situation after the elimination of political 
opposition and the fake elections of 1947. On the other hand, those who spoke out their 
disagreement and wished to keep their independence were excluded.  
However, the harshest remodeling attempts only lasted seven years, and the 
changes achieved at university level were neither complete nor broad or profound, 
unlike in other Eastern Bloc countries like Czechoslovakia. Despite pressures or the 
isolated position that some academics were forced into, it is important to note that a 
good deal of pre-war professors who survived the 1939-1945 period were not purged, 
but remained in their old posts. This implied that a certain tradition combining 
intellectual and professional ethos together with resistance and national consciousness 
also prevailed in higher education, which favored the creation of spheres of dissent and 
social pressure from the mid-1950s onwards1083.    
Aimed at justifying, legitimizing and giving a positive meaning to Poland’s 
sociopolitical turn after 1944-1948, the “history-propaganda” lessons delivered in 
Polish classrooms and lecture rooms along PRL times consisted of three basic, recurrent 
elements with variable degrees of application, according to Bronisław Baczko. Firstly, 
the Communist present had to be seen as an economic, political and social 
improvement; furthermore: as the culmination of a long-pursued goal, and hence a clear 
rupture with a poorly considered recent past. New symbols and rituals needed to be 
established in order distinguish the new system from previous stages and regimes of 
Polish history.  
Nevertheless, not everything could be based on novelty: some historical 
continuity had to be provided too, in the second place. The roots of today’s Poland ─a 
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country with new borders, less territories and a much more nationally homogeneous 
population─ were tracked down in the Polish Medieval kingdom ruled by the Piast 
dynasty1084, in detriment of the early modern, multinational and expansive state of the 
Jagiellonian dynasty. Legitimacy was sought too through the reinterpretation of some 
historical processes and events, especially those that hadn’t aroused much curiosity 
before in Polish academia: in modern times, of course, the labor and Communist 
movements, and in earlier times ancient peasant revolts, anti-Catholic and lay traditions, 
with a view to finding national precedents of the former. Given the will of promoting a 
progressive view of history, social and national reformers of the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment periods were regarded with interest as well. However, Polish nobility’s 
dominion and the Catholic Church’s influence were heavily criticized, and each past 
defeat or decadence period was ascribed to the selfishness and class ambitions of the 
aristocrats and rich owners. On the other hand, nineteenth-century national uprisings 
were either condemned in the name of a “sensible” political conservatism (incarnated, 
for instance, by Aleksander Wielopolski) or reinterpreted as attempts of progressive 
social revolutions against the formation of a bourgeois capitalist society.  
Lastly, the third element of Communist historical indoctrination was based on the 
legitimization of present-day PRL relations with the Soviet Union, touted as an alliance 
and friendship between equals, plus the only guarantee for Polish independence, instead 
of a relationship emanating from Poland’s political, military and economic dependence 
on Moscow. Past conflicts between Poles and Russians were explained otherwise or 
simply omitted, while the common struggle of the labor movement was highlighted. 
Geopolitically speaking, Germany was seen as Poland’s past and present major enemy 
and a strong anti-German feeling was encouraged. 
In order to understand national history as a continuum logically leading to 
socialist Poland, many periods and events had to be rejected, “forgotten” or “erased” in 
official annals. Thus, part of the past, Baczko explained, had to be “confiscated” in the 
hope that, in time, it became “non-existent”. This was especially evident with Polish 
history since Partition times: it was not an easy task, for instance, to ignore the fact that 
a considerable part of Poland’s culture and national identity had been built upon 
Catholicism and, most importantly, in opposition to Russian dominion ─though it was 
argued that Bolshevism had, after all, caused the downfall of the tsarist imperialist 
regime. A pro-Soviet perspective was also implemented in the interpretation of other 
topics, such as the October 1917 revolution or the Polish-Soviet War (1920). However, 
it was far more complicated to provide alternative explanations to the annexation of 
Eastern Polish territories due to the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the murders of 
Polish communists in Soviet prisons or gulags, the Katyń woods massacre, the Stalinist 
terror era or the repeated workers’ revolts and crises since 1956; among other reasons, 
because the Poles who had lived through those experiences or witnessed them were still 
alive. Therefore, many twentieth-century events, including the much despised Second 
Republic epoch, became taboo issues in official historiography and, as a result, the past, 
memory and identity of several generations was either distorted or cut out during 
decades from public historical narratives, producing so-called “blank spots” (białe 
plamy)1085.   
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Already during the harshest period of Communist historical policies, some history 
students and future dissidents ran up against the wall that PRL regime had built around 
contemporary Polish history. The multiple difficulties and discouragements encountered 
on their way made many change their minds and choose a different epoch or country to 
research about. Jerzy Holzer, who continued researching about modern times, explained 
later that he didn’t want to write his master thesis about the labor movement because its 
history “was especially distorted”. Therefore, out of self-preservation instinct (instynkt 
zachowawczy), he decided instead to study the political activity of one of the most 
important interwar organizations representing the Polish industry, the Central Union of 
Polish Industry, Mining, Trade and Finances (a.k.a. “Lewiatan”). However, after 
finishing his Ph.D. thesis on the Polish Socialist Party ─a topic of which his supervisor, 
Żanna Kormanowa1086, did not want to take charge─, he switched to universal history 
because there wasn’t so much ideological pressure as in national history, and focused on 
German parties and masses before Hitler’s arrival to power1087.  
Holzer’s opposition colleague, Bronisław Geremek, experienced a similar 
disappointment with contemporary history since his first university year. He was 
resolved to specialize in this field until he clashed with the Stalinist ideology of his 
contemporary history professor. As his first task in the subject, he had to work on the 
Communist Manifesto; but after commenting in class that Marx had been too influenced 
by Proudhon’s anarchist thought, and therefore acknowledging he had a weakness, there 
followed two hours of criticism and incomprehension against him. Overwhelmed by 
such an unfriendly and quite “un-academic” reaction, Geremek realized that 
contemporary history was completely politicized at university, so he decided to flee to 
an area in which he could think at ease, for he believed that historical materialism 
(which he actually applied along his professional career) should be a freely-chosen 
methodological approach, never an imposition: 
 
À l’époque du stalinisme, l’histoire a été le refuge de mon existence. Lorsque j’ai entrepris des études 
d’histoire, je pensais m’occuper du XXe siècle. Mais lorsque, à la fin de la première année, je me suis 
inscrit au séminaire d’histoire contemporaine, je suis tombé sur un enseignant qui représentait le type de 
pensée stalinienne le plus classique. Après quelques séances, j’ai compris que j’étouffais. J’ai fui au 
plus loin, là où il n’y avait pas de références politiques simples et de consignes impératives, là où l’on 
pouvait réfléchir à peu près librement.1088 
 
[Dans le séminaire d’histoire contemporaine, C.A.] ... le professeur m’a donné comme sujet de mon 
premier travail le Manifeste du Parti communiste. J’étudie donc comment s’est formé le document; 
j’étudie les débats idéologiques de de l’époque et je fais mon ‘topo’, j’ai fait mon exposé au séminaire, 
et j’ai dit entre autres: ‘Marx a eu la faiblesse d’aller trop vers l’anarchie, sous l’influence de Proudhon’. 
Quoi! Comment! Marx a eu une faiblesse? Nous étions en 1950. Je me rappelle le séminaire, les deux 
heures d’incompréhension; ensuite, j’ai compris que j’allais étouffer si je continuais. Ç’a continué tout 
de même quelques mois, et j’ai vu qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une façon de comprendre, d’une approche 
intellectuelle, mais qu’il s’agissait d’un emprisonnement idéologique et politique. J’ai fait mon choix et 
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j’ai fait le meilleur choix possible, à l’époque, parce que le Moyen Age me donnait d’abord la garantie 
de la liberté; si je ne touchais pas aux rapports polono-russes au Moyen Age, je pouvais tout lire, tout 
écrire; et la censure n’avait rien à faire là-dedans.1089 
 
J’étais alors marxiste, en ce sens que je voyais dans le marxisme l’inspiration des recherches 
historiques. Je continue à penser que, pour l’histoire comme pour la pensée historique, cette inspiration 
était importante. Les opinions imposées étaient un poison pour la science, mais l’école de pensée sur 
l’histoire s’est avérée particulièrement fructueuse, et, pour ce qui est de l’époque médiévale, 
l’indépendance de l’historien restait très grande. C’était mon aire de liberté.1090 
 
Thus, either all of a sudden or little by little, the scales fell from some young 
intellectuals’ eyes since the 1950s. Holzer, for instance, had found Marxism initially 
appealing because of its seemingly universal character ─it looked like a method that 
could be implemented in almost any sphere of human life. Due to his interest in political 
history, he attended Żanna Kormanowa’s seminar, and there he realized that the theory 
didn’t quite fit the practice: “[Kormanowa] taught us really well how to analyze 
sources”, he remembered, “but afterwards, after such a thorough analysis, she tried to 
build totally fantastic ideological interpretations ─beyond source material. We already 
perceived back then the absurdity of such behavior, besides our complete 
engagement”1091.   
Among Communist history professors like Kormanowa, Celina Bobińska, Adam 
Schaff, Marian Serejski or Witold Łukaszewicz, the search for the “objective truth” and 
the subordination of history to Communist ideology and Party were not regarded as 
contradictory actions1092. However, for students like Holzer, to stick to the facts 
provided by historical sources only to move on to distortion or invention minutes later 
raised worrying professional and ethical doubts.  
Travelling abroad thanks to scholarships, especially to Western countries, became 
another means of personally discovering PRL’s manipulations and use of stereotypes. In 
Holzer’s case, his stay in Western Germany while writing his Ph.D. dissertation made 
the difference: “… that year in the GFR had an enormous influence on my relation with 
Germany ─I became convinced that all our propaganda against the Federal Republic is 
false”1093. 
An outstanding specialist in intellectual history involved in opposition 
movements, Jerzy Jedlicki, admitted in an interview with Magdalena Bajer that, 
although he disliked from the beginning the intrusion of the Communist Party in 
people’s private life and behavior, in his youth he succumbed to the idea that his 
conscience and rightful doubts were simply a weakness, a product of Polish 
inteligencja’s immaturity and a bourgeois burden, a belief that made him stifle his 
critical thoughts for some time. However, not long afterwards he checked for himself 
the contradictions and dishonesty of PRL regime through history writing, and that 
became the straw that broke the camel’s back in his estrangement from Communist 
ideology.  
While writing reviews of historical books for Trybuna Ludu, Jedlicki had the 
chance to compare the compilation of documents about the history of the Polish 
socialist movement, edited and published by the Central Committee of the PZPR and 
accessible to everybody, with the first-published sources, which were not so easy to get 
hold of. Thus, he confirmed the rumors about the former volumes not being trustworthy 
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at all: “… I became convinced that they were full to the brim with falsehoods. They [the 
Department of History of the Party within PZPR’s Central Committee] erased, added, 
modified, so that it [the original document] matched present-day doctrine. I still didn’t 
know Orwell’s 1984, but I was already a bit of a historian and my hair stood on 
end”1094. He tried then to tell about his findings and to criticize this policy from within 
the PZPR, in the self-criticism fashion they had been taught as Party members. But his 
article, entitled “Truth and falseness in historical science” (“Prawda i fałsz w nauce 
historycznej”), was never published in Trybuna Ludu, nor in Po Prostu, the most critical 
journal published openly, where the text was subject to censorship. Such reaction “… 
discouraged me”, Jedlicki reflected many decades later, “especially as a historian, for 
whom the document is something sacred. One may write what one likes in the end, in 
articles or monographs, though there are limits too, but to falsify documents? A party 
that alters its own past! And the duplicity of these people, who don’t want to admit what 
they did under no circumstances”1095.   
These reminiscences of dissidents follow a similar narrative pattern which is 
linked to a shared perception of what an inteligent should be like: a personal encounter 
with the truth, i.e. with Communist regime’s dark side and manipulation attempts, made 
them feel bewildered or at a loss, so that they eventually broke away with their previous 
political beliefs and trust in the Polish Workers’ Party and the PRL system, but not with 
their ethical convictions. Rather than considering themselves fully conscious actors 
while remaining faithful to Communism, inteligenci saw themselves as victims of 
deception or of their own ingenuity, though, as we have previously seen with 
Geremek’s case, this didn’t mean they didn’t feel a certain degree of guilt for having 
supported the dictatorship. The process of credulity and deceit > realization through 
personal experience > disorientation > rupture was regarded by those who experienced 
it, or who adjusted their own richer and divergent experience to this standardized 
pattern, as an important landmark or even a turning point in their biographies. In spite of 
the fact that, in their view, their “essence” or innermost collective and individual 
identity ─connected to values and attitudes─ had remained practically intact, now their 
previously sterile efforts were being channeled in a new direction and towards a new 
project. In sum, through the decision of forming or becoming part of an opposition 
movement, Poland’s problems and possible solutions were seen from a different angle, 
and intellectuals’ lives acquired a new sense (or recovered its old “betrayed” sense) full 
of different hopes and fears.  
Thus, not only PRL’s repression against the workers in the mid-1970s was 
regarded by inteligencja as a “moral outrage” that compelled them to act1096. To check 
that official historical narratives failed to tell the truth and that historiographical practice 
was used as a political tool caused a similar reaction and changed the way that 
intellectuals approached not just to history and its sources, but to public life in general. 
Hence their insistence in demanding the truth from authorities while trying to spread the 
truth themselves and tell what hadn’t been told before (the białe plamy), both through 
their researches and writings and from an oppositional point of view. There were 
basically three different means of doing this: by elaborating a counter-history that did 
not aim to be impartial and tended to oversimplifications, by betting on impartiality and 
a “scientific method” as much as possible, like Krystyna Kersten, Maria Turlejska or 
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Jerzy Holzer did, for instance, or by analyzing a topic from different angles in essays or 
op-ed articles1097.     
It is very likely that this kind of early experiences of discovery of truth and 
falseness in academia fueled dissidents’ fear of manipulation and made them take a firm 
stand against historical misrepresentations, or interpretations in general. Therefore, 
many rejected Communists’ historical practice, but not the nineteenth-century 
historiographical theory it was based on ─which was, of course, neither a Marxist 
invention nor such an “objective” way to study sources as it was initially believed. In 
any case, positivistic faktografia (that is, the description of facts or exhibition of sources 
without further analyses, elucidations or generalizations) became a very popular 
approach to both past and present in opposition circles and media.  
Intellectuals’ reaction against an unsatisfying and tainted version of reality made 
them try to “dig up” part of the truth that had been buried in the rubbish dump of 
history. “I decided to write my doctoral thesis about the PPS”, Holzer explained, “and 
that was already a totally conscious desire to make PPS return to Polish history, to 
reveal the truth about this party, to clear its memory from various falsities”1098. In order 
to do this, one had to leave interpretations aside and go back to the essentials, to 
sources: “It was a return to a kind of, I would say, basic research, to analyses based on 
an honest gathering of material…”1099. Some inteligenci (as we will see next) expected 
that elaborations on those gathered documents would come later, especially concerning 
recent or still ongoing opposition initiatives, and limited themselves to do the 
groundwork which forthcoming generations would profit from in more favorable 
circumstances. Fact literature or the “propaganda of facts” was associated to greater 
“purity”, to a “cleaner” or non-manipulated testimony of the past ─at least not 
manipulated in present time.  
In Poland, the truth turned into a political value the moment that an opposition 
group accused authorities (the State, the Communist Party…) of lying and deceiving, so 
that professional and collective intellectual ethics was transferred to a broader field of 
political struggle and commitment. From intellectual oppositionists’ and dissidents’ 
point of view, their “side” strived to look for the truth while the “other side”, holding 
power unlawfully, attempted to conceal it or use to its own advantage. This took to a 
paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the theoretical rejection of politics as a corrupted 
practice helped inteligenci to redefine their identity in opposition to what the 
Communist government represented to them (discouragement, disappointment, distrust, 
fear); on the other hand, the search for truth in the recent past involved taking a stand 
against governmental historical policies, and thus a way of making politics, whether 
they acknowledged it or not1100. Bo Strǻth explains this connection between history and 
politics as follows: 
 
History has a criticising, deconstructing function as well as one of legitimation and construction, 
and any denial that this is the case, by arguing that history is independent of politics, is itself a 
political gesture. The legitimating function, in turn, requires that history is conferred the status of a 
science. The solution to this problem is not to deny the political dimension, which would be a form 
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of crypto-politics, but to recognise it and try to find its specific role in a general division of labour, 
a role which could preliminarily be called proto-politics.1101 
 
In relation with the search of truth and being consistent with such pursuit, 
authenticity became an important feature within intellectuals’ public identity in contrast 
to Communist authorities’ negative and vilified image. Jerzy Holzer, who did not leave 
the PZPR until 1979 in spite of the fact that his dilemmas went back to 1968, told 
Magdalena Bajer that when he decided to return his Party card he was “engaged, since 
not very long ago, in several illegal activities”, but that he “didn’t want to go on living 
in a false double situation”1102. A professional and ethical value coming from 
humanistic studies, to remain as faithful as possible to the truth, became a fundamental 
element in critical movement’s politics and made oppositionists look trustworthy to a 
considerable part of Polish population, as Geremek remembered:     
 
... il ne suffit pas de mépriser les falsificateurs, il faut parler contre eux. Il faut dire la vérité. Et en 
Europe centrale, les historiens se sont trouvés dans une situation très spéciale. L’histoire était à la 
fois refuge de la vérité et discours sur la vérité. On compte beaucoup d’historiens dans la vie 
publique en Europe postcommuniste; quelle peut être la cause? La cause n’est pas seulement qu’ils 
comprennent peut-être un peu mieux l’événement et les choses, elle est surtout que dans les 
sociétés totalitaires la vérité est le message politique par excellence. Et les historiens se trouvaient 
engagés dans la résistance au régime, non seulement par devoir civique, mais aussi par 
attachement au code déontologique de leur profession. S’ils disaient la vérité, ils disposaient d’une 
certaine confiance.1103 
 
Authenticity had two different meanings or levels in this context: firstly, the 
positivistic/faktograficzny acceptance of a source or document as authentic, i.e. as non-
manipulated or falsified, and hence as a proof of good faith1104; and secondly, but 
certainly more important, the right to live an authentic life, to be truthful to oneself and 
to one’s idiosyncrasy despite the obstacles that had to be overcome (political 
constraints, lack of freedom of expression, etc.)1105.  
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In sum, Polish opposition’s elaboration of a history of the present, plus the 
ensuing production and collection of sources, was a sociopolitical and hermeneutical 
counteraction based on or inspired in positivistic premises which, in the dissidents’ 
case, stemmed from a shared experience of discovery of truth ─that is to say, of the 
repressive and deceitful character of the PRL regime they had previously supported. 
Such intellectual realization transcended inteligencja’s professional or academic spheres 
and led to (or justified) a firmer political stance and oppositional activity, in order to 
prevent a similar distortion of present time ─and therefore of the development of 
opposition movements and their own biographies─ by Communist authorities in the 
future. 
 
 
C.2) Making past and present retrievable. The elaboration and preservation of Polish 
opposition’s recent history and the value of present-day documents and testimonies  
 
As many others before them, Polish critical inteligenci believed that the 
elaboration and preservation of memory could be achieved through the elaboration and 
preservation of written documents; especially, as in their case, when they perceived that 
their way of life, their victories and the changes they promoted were in jeopardy. Even 
if defeat was once again around the corner and couldn’t be prevented, oppositionists felt 
it was their duty to leave traces so that others could find about their particular collective 
history in the future, reading between the lines of the palimpsest ─which should be, first 
of all, acknowledged as such. Just like the spirit of the “defeated by death” survived and 
was breathed into the living “defeated” (those who threw in the towel, accepted the new 
regime or were persuaded by it, plus the generations born during and after the War), the 
experience of Solidarność and previous opposition initiatives should be fixed not just in 
the memory of people, so that it could be eventually “rediscovered” and remembered, 
but also engraved in their expectations, so that their ideas and struggle for freedom 
could be taken up and reinterpreted once more after performing a tiger’s leap into the 
past within the process of recovery of the Poles’ dignity and podmiotowość1106. 
“Contrary to the usual ideas about the impossibility of writing ongoing history due 
to the inaccessibility to many sources and the lack of so-called distance”, Tadeusz 
Łepkowski argued that “the history of the revolution of 1980, and hence of what 
happened in Poland in 1980-1982, can be written, and not just following the 
conventions of chronicles”1107.  
He himself did not take charge of such a task systematically, but nevertheless led 
his readers to the doors of August 1980 after a walk through Polish modern history in 
his essay Myśli o historii Polski i Polaków, where the highlighted components of 
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contemporary Polishness (long-lasting dependence, the position between East and West, 
Russia and Germany, different characters and idiosyncrasies of social groups) seemed to 
converge or reach their zenith in Solidarity times.  
It was easier to write the history of Polish opposition movements if the author had 
some previous knowledge about the aforementioned groups and enjoyed a privileged 
access to certain sources and pieces of information; that is, if he or she actually 
belonged to opposition. The majority of intellectual oppositionists approached in this 
research were, at the same time, historians or humanists (either salaried or amateur), so 
that both their sociopolitical and professional commitment made some of them put their 
expertise at the service of what they understood as a truthful and just cause and directly 
recount the events they had witnessed1108 or taken part in; or, furthermore, write a more 
elaborate and detailed essay about them. Such were the cases of Jan Józef Lipski and his 
works on KOR, Andrzej Micewski’s comparison of the Catholic groups Pax (closely 
connected to officialdom) and Znak (the Catholic legal opposition) or what Łepkowski 
himself and especially Holzer did with Solidarność1109. Before them, former members 
of the Resistance against Nazi and Soviet invaders in World War II like the Home Army 
had also shared their oppositionist experience and recounted many episodes of the 
1940s through tolerated or clandestine books and radio broadcasts. Besides 
Bartoszewski, Tadeusz Żenczykowski (1907-1997)1110 was one of the most prolific 
examples in this field.   
The urgency in the recollection, gathering of material and writing of this kind of 
history increased considerably after the establishment of Martial Law. The military 
display of force (tanks and other kinds armored of vehicles frequently patrolled the 
streets since then), arrests without charge, house searches, restriction of 
communications, postal censorship, the establishment of a curfew, the confiscation and 
destruction of anything slightly suspicious of being pro-Solidarity and, above all, the 
illegalization of the Union and other opposition movements made inteligenci realize that 
December 13th, 1981 would mark the abrupt and largely unpredicted close of an era. 
Not strangely, the picture taken by Chris Niedenthal in those days showing a wheeled 
armored personnel carrier standing before the Moscow Cinema in Warsaw, where the 
film Apocalypse Now [Czas Apokalipsy] was running (Figure 17) 1111, became an icon of 
the Martial Law period and the visual expression of many Poles’ state of mind when 
they heard general Jaruzelski’s communiqué on TV.   
 
                                                 
1108
 They wanted “to bear witness to the truth”, in Lipski’s words. Lipski: KOR..., 457. 
1109
 Lipski: KOR...; MICEWSKI, Andrzej: Współrządzić czy nie kłamać? PAX i ZNAK w Polsce, 1945-
1976, Paris/Kraków, Libella/Oficyna NZS UJ “Jagiellonia”, 1981; Łepkowski: Myśli o historii…, 54-69; 
Holzer: Solidarność… 
1110
 Publicist and former AK member who defended Warsaw in 1939 and took part in the Uprising of 
1944. He occupied different underground executive posts along the War. After the Communist effective 
takeover of the Polish government, Żenczykowski left the country and worked in Radio Free Europe 
between 1954 and 1975. He was the author of many historical essays, like Dramatyczny rok 1945, 
London, Polonia, 1982; Dwa komitety, 1920, 1944. Polska w planach Lenina i Stalina: szkic historyczny, 
Paris, Spotkania, 1983; Generał Grot. U kresu walki, London, Polonia, 1983, or Polska Lubelska 1944, 
Warszawa, Spotkania, 1990. 
1111
 Source: http://www.swiatobrazu.pl/100-najwazniejszych-zdjec-swiata-chris-niedenthal-czas-
apokalipsy-21049.html (accessed on August 8th, 2014). 
282 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
It was the tragic end of their world as they knew it, Stański reflected in the last 
phase of his trial, because from then on, instead of opposing openly like KPN or 
Solidarity had done up until then1112, critical thinkers would be forced into the 
underground, in the belief that “acting secretly and in conspiracy there (…) [would] be 
fewer chances of getting caught and imprisoned”1113.  
Decades later, Jerzy Holzer told Magdalena Bajer that the pessimistic feeling he 
had about Solidarność’s dénouement since its formation (for it was too good to remain 
united and demanded too much to last within a Communist monopoly of power) led him 
to worry very soon about the preservation of the sources it produced, in anticipation of 
an imminent attempt of damnatio memoriae on the government’s side:  
 
Almost since the beginning I knew that it would end up badly and… I adopted a practical attitude, 
namely I gathered up materials. A great amount of printed documents and other kind of materials 
were at home and, luckily, in December, when they [the milicja] arrived, they did not search the 
house, they only took me to Rakowiecka1114 ─my wife tucked everything away in the [Warsaw] 
University archive. When I was released, on April 30th, 1982, I immediately sat down and began 
writing the history of Solidarność. Its genesis was pessimism, a pessimism that told me that this 
period was at its close, sooner than expected, and that it was necessary to write about it.1115 
 
                                                 
1112
 KPN members had actually been imprisoned more than a year before Martial Law, in September 
1980, because their radical pro-independent program was considered especially threatening for Polish 
Communist circles and the Soviet Union. Their trial lasted 17 months (June 1981-October 1982) and 
became the longest political process in PRL’s justice courts. Stański said his last words in September-
October 1982.  
1113
 Stański in Ostatnie słowa..., 10, my transl., also 20. 
1114
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Warsaw Uprising and the crimes committed by the Nazis in the area, after World War II the place became 
sadly known for other reasons too: in number 37 there was (and still is) the Mokotów Prison, where 
Communists jailed and tortured political prisoners and underground fighters in the Stalinist period. In 
addition, the headquarters of PRL’s Ministry of Home Affairs (including the Security and Police 
Services) were at number 2A; people held in detention were sometimes taken there from the Mokotów 
Prison to be interrogated, like in December 12-13th 1981. 
1115
 “Nie przeżyłem...”, in Bajer: Blizny..., 67, my transl. 
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Another conviction underlay in some of Polish intellectuals’ narratives about their 
own opposition movements, namely that they were better authorized to tell such story 
because they had experienced it first-hand. A belief that, in a much smaller scale,  
mirrored Holocaust survivors’ position about who had the right to tell what they had 
gone through in extermination camps1116. For them, that action combined the personal 
and the social/ national, memory and history in the making. “… As a participant in the 
creation of this fragment of history”, Jan Józef Lipski wrote in the introduction to his 
work KOR. A History of the Workers’ Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981, “I felt 
it necessary and was competent to present the events described in this book; with 
similar justification, an author of memoirs can publish his work and by the same token 
render a service to historians and to all other readers interested in the subject”1117. As 
members of inteligencja, these oppositionists understood that it was their duty “… to 
give an account of events which are now part of history, of an immediate and living 
history, such that without knowledge of these events it is difficult to understand Poland 
today”1118. Similarly, at the end of his book The Church and the Left [Kościół, lewica, 
dialog] (1979), Adam Michnik quoted a poem by Zbigniew Herbert where one can 
read: “go upright among those who are on their knees/ among those with their backs 
turned and those toppled in the dust// you were saved not in order to live/ you have little 
time you must give testimony”1119.  
Stefan Kisielewski’s creed when writing his felietony had much to do with this 
belief as well. His aim was to share his view of the world with his readers and express 
his worries about the country’s bad situation in spite of being despised for it and being 
labelled a pessimist for not supporting officialdom’s discourse of “normality”: 
 
I am precisely a pessimist in today’s Polish affairs, I do not see an advantageous way out from this 
disadvantageous system of small and big historical vectors. What is there left for me to do, then? 
In my writing craft there is only one thing left ─to bear witness, to provide fairly well-prepared 
documentation. (…) Independently from everything, I will inscribe this appraisal, introduce it in a 
bottle and throw it to the sea, so that it is kept there. I will do so, it will be my “spiritual desertion” 
from collectivity, from EVERY collectivity…1120  
  
In his defense of individuality, Kisiel consequently conceived a lonely fight 
against Communist power, apparently without trying to convince anybody ─though, for 
his words and thought to have an impact, he had to count necessarily with others. But 
maybe he was not thinking so much about his contemporaries as about those who came 
after them. At some point, some of his bottles might float to a safer shore and its corked 
messages be profited to call once again the Communist system into question. Only that 
finally happened much sooner than he and many other oppositionists expected.  
Interestingly, even some of the inteligenci who did not contribute with their work 
to opposition’s history of the present in Communist times assumed that they should 
have done so at some point. For instance, Bronisław Geremek considered himself a 
“sinner” for not having followed this testimony pattern before; he felt that, in a certain 
sense, he had betrayed the historian-oppositionist’s moral code and fled from his 
responsibility: “Je trouve que cette dérobade est inadmissible et je la pratique. Je sais 
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Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977 (transl. by John and Bogdana Carpenter). 
1120
 Kisielewski: “Czy pesymizm…?”, 702-703, my transl. This is obviously linked to his pessimistic 
stance during Warsaw Uprising too. Kisielewski: “Czy pesymizm…?”, 699; “O mojej religijności”, 665-
668;  “Ja jestem figurynka...”, 584.   
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que je suis pécheur à l’égard de mon métier d’historien.”1121. He never wrote a notebook 
or diary out of fear of being caught by the police and, worst of all, of causing the arrest 
of his colleagues, as he had witnessed more than once after a house search. Since his 
initiation in public life, he became extremely cautious with what was written or could be 
heard, even when he was assured they were not being recorded, like during the meetings 
prior to the Round Table agreements ─his lack of trust in authorities simply weighed 
too much and was too well-founded to believe otherwise. As a consequence, Geremek 
understood that his interviews with Jacek Żakowski were a late fulfilment of this long-
deferred mission, a way to compensate for the previous documentary and memory gap: 
“... c’était ma façon de faire ce que je devais faire. J’avais le sentiment que je devais le 
faire, et j’ai essayé de le faire par cette voie-là”1122.  
Far from being regarded as antagonistic approaches to reality, history and 
journalism were closely linked in critical intellectuals’ minds for two reasons: firstly 
because, according to them, both fields were founded on the same professional and 
ethical principle ─that of providing truthful information and an impartial in-depth 
analysis; and secondly because, thanks to the immediacy inherent in Polish 
oppositionists’ present time narratives and collected sources, the classic differences in 
time span between journalism and history writing were overcome. Sometimes it was 
difficult to tell where one gender ended and the other began. For example, the 
interviews with former Communist leaders and writers in the Stalinist period, like the 
ones that the journalist Teresa Torańska or Jacek Trznadel (n. 1930) made, were 
considered a very valuable document by other inteligenci, including historians such as 
Krystyna Kersten (Chapter 3). But it also happened the other way round: some works 
adopted a journalistic form as a way to popularize history, eg. through “interviews” with 
past historical figures. The past was thus taken to a present scenario and became much 
more communicative and understandable for the majority of Polish readers1123.  
Bronisław Geremek had a very positive opinion of journalists, whom he 
considered not just the narrators of ongoing history, but actually the historians of 
contemporary times. He admired their ability to draw conclusions from recent events 
and rapidly suggest valid and bold hypotheses, contrary to what professional historians 
were taught:  
 
Aux journalistes, j’attribue non seulement le rôle de narrateurs de l’histoire en devenir, mais 
encore celui, plus sérieux, d’historiens de la ‘contemporanéité’1124. Avec ma formation d’historien 
médiéviste, mon habitude de me créer de vastes fichiers aux seules fins d’émettre de timides 
hypothèses, je n’ai rien d’un journaliste, ou plus exactement rien du talent journalistique.1125 
 
 Jan Józef Lipski also valued journalism and chronicles as the purest form of 
freedom of speech in the PRL period and as one of the most effective means to spread 
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their opposition message and achievements. To start with, he didn’t consider that his 
essay about KOR was a scholarly work, not only because he resorted to his own 
memory in some details or because it contained subjective appreciations, but 
specifically because, in his opinion, it was “… too much of a chronicle and does not 
sufficiently attempt a synthesis that would order the sequences of facts within a 
theoretical framework that ─as I firmly believe─ no work with scholarly ambitions can 
do without” 1126. Due to the lack of other sources besides KOR’s, which prevented the 
elaboration of more polyphonic narratives, and the risk of destruction of their own by 
PRL authorities, the members of the Committee had to limit themselves to tell their own 
story and leave comparisons and interpretations for better times:   
 
Given a situation in which information about the Workers’ Defense Committee will have to be 
one-sided for a long time to come, so long as the political and police archives concerning the 
issues addressed here remain inaccessible, and so long as participants in the movement have to 
exercise discretion concerning not only such information as the addresses of print shops (the 
owners of flats where they were set up would not like to be named even now, in the days of 
“Solidarity”) but also such historically more important information as the sources of specific news 
items published in the KOR press or the identities of persons using pen names ─it seems that in 
such a situation, to attempt a more ambitious approach to the subject would be deceptive and 
naive.1127 
 
After all, a basic, moral task such as that which KOR aimed to perform with the 
repressed workers required a basic, simple narrative; the same kind of “simplicity” that 
Kisielewski mentioned when explaining who might have the key to today’s world, 
quoting Adam Mickiewicz’s verses. Thus, it was Lipski’s  “…conviction that a 
knowledge of the facts is necessary for the understanding of any historical or social 
phenomenon but also that any other sort of history, if perhaps more valuable 
intellectually, would misrepresent what KOR really was”1128.  
Closely related to Kersten’s idea of providing “raw material” to readers and 
recounting things “as they really were” 1129 (Chapter 1), Lipski acknowledged “the need 
for a historical journalism” that provided “information and knowledge”, unlike official 
media did (Żołnierz Wolności, Trybuna Ludu…)1130. Honest journalistic material as, in 
his opinion, KOR’s newspaper Robotnik provided, could be the basis of future history 
works, an important contribution to the preservation of truth and a way of giving 
significance to people’s actions during and after the peaks of repression experienced in 
the PRL: “Such articles might also prove useful for scholarship. In the humanities, 
intelligent, incisive, and intellectually inventive journalism has frequently achieved 
results necessary for the formulation of scholarly problems, and sometimes its cognitive 
value can be compared favorably with more strictly scholarly attempts devoid of 
intellectual pathos”1131. It was no waste of time, then, to begin with the basics: carry out 
an initial selection of sources, sort them out, make them accessible to people, try to give 
them a global sense and a narrative structure… In sum, oppositionists were setting the 
ABC of their own history in the making: 
 
Today, topics of contemporary history need to be treated in works that, without being overly 
ambitious, attempt nevertheless to introduce some order into specific problems. Anyone who has 
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ever been concerned with scholarly research, even superficially and with a minimum of 
methodological awareness, knows that information rarely has an absolute and unassailable 
cognitive value. Important facts and trivial facts constitute elements of wider contexts, and these 
are always cognitive constructs. Despite all this, work on the foundations of future syntheses, work 
that organizes the available information, has generally not been proven useless, but rather the 
opposite, even when this work is still theoretically naive.1132 
 
The fleeting, perishable character of the news and information provided by mass 
media didn’t discourage opposition inteligenci nor dissuade them from publishing. 
Quite on the contrary: as we remarked before, many felt it was the best way to spread 
their thoughts and keep them safe in a kind of “virtual archive” made of all critical 
readers’ libraries and minds. In an article significantly entitled “History will be told” 
(“Historia będzie opowiedziana”), Stefan Kisielewski, knowing he was being spied on, 
assured that he didn’t keep at home his notes and registers for his “research” on human 
behavior just in case they might get wet, be “snowed upon” or blown away by the 
wind…, alluding to censorship, house searches and confiscations. He was actually 
transferring these “results” to a Public Library (i.e. Tygodnik Powszechny) where they 
were accessible to other interested “researchers”: “Extraordinarily, (…) their opinions 
allow me to believe that my work will not be in vain, that the Chronicle of the History 
of Human Behavior will be a valuable material for a future, more modernly developed 
history of our country”1133. 
 The idea of conceiving books and periodical publications as potential travelling 
archives transcended the individual sphere soon after the implementation of the Martial 
Law, when several associations and underground publishing houses decided to launch 
collections devoted to opposition documents and oppositionists’ accounts of the past 
few years. The most outstanding and prolific enterprise of this kind was that of 
Archiwum “Solidarności” [Solidarity’s Archive]1134.  
After December 13th, 1981, several groups of oppositionists closely connected to 
Solidarity (including some who were in jail), independently from each other, developed 
the idea of creating an archive containing documentary evidence of the most important 
past and present avatars of Solidarność: meetings, relations with Communist authorities, 
organization in the Martial Law period, strikes, trials and repression, reports about 
underground press, etc. Such initiatives joined together by the end of 1982. During the 
next two years, the participants in the new-born project gathered all the saved written 
information and tape recordings about the banned trade union and devoted themselves 
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to selecting and transcribing materials1135 and to hiding them in safe places until they 
could be issued. In an interview for the official underground weekly periodical of 
Solidarność, Tygodnik Mazowsze, an unidentified member of Archiwum “Solidarności” 
explained in 1987 that Solidarity’s advisers had considered it was too soon to publish all 
the available documents, especially the last meetings of the National Commission, when 
the disagreements, radicalization and clashes between Solidarity members became more 
evident, because they feared this could be used as a proof to justify the subsequent 
implementation of the Martial Law. However, the wish that every Solidarność trade 
unionist should know about his/her organization’s past and be counted prevailed over 
the advisers’ cautiousness, and the project received Lech Wałęsa’s support and 
economic aid from the new Solidarity central underground structure, the Provisional 
Coordinating Commission (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna, TKK)1136.   
The majority of works published by Archiwum “Solidarności” (out of a total of 
twenty-four) were issued by the publishing house Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza. 
Each volume was preceded by the same brief “Note from the publishers”, where its 
members explained the reasons for this initiative: 
 
The existence of NSZZ “Solidarność” and other independent movements formed in 1980-1981 
is one of the most important events of Polish recent history. Its massiveness and spontaneity, its 
popular character, its roots, based upon the fundamental values of European civilization and 
Christianity, the non-violence principle, make all the experiences they’ve introduced surpass the 
boundaries of national history.  
Never in the history of “real socialist” states, beginning with the Kronstadt Rebellion [1921], 
through Berlin Uprising, Polish October, Budapest Uprising, Prague Spring ─until Solidarność 
times, had a revolt against the Communist system lasted so long, acquired such a size or adopted 
such institutionalized forms. As a result, none of the preceding social movements had left behind 
such an amount of documents and materials, which are worth preserving and safeguarding not just 
as an extraordinarily important fragment of national history, but also as sources for studies about 
Communism and about the needs and aspirations of societies under Communist rule, that didn’t 
enjoy the chance of expressing their needs and aspirations in normal circumstances. The 
knowledge and study of the history of Solidarność is indispensable as well for all the present and 
future opposition groups in Communist states, and for Western countries’ politicians and political 
scientists involved in relations with the Eastern Bloc states.  
One of the strategic goals of the December 13th coup was the seizure of Solidarity’s archives, 
that Communist powers wanted to erase not only from social reality, but also from social memory 
─but both these goals were just attained in a very limited scale. Realizing that Communists always 
try to manipulate history in an Orwellian way, a large number of people acting independently from 
each other immediately took up the task of saving Solidarity’s documents, achieving a great 
success.  
The target of the Documentation Team of Archiwum Solidarności, that works in collaboration 
with Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza “Nowa”, is to save and preserve at least part of the legacy 
of independent social movements and the first governing structures of NSZZ Solidarność. Our job 
is to collect, arrange and make accessible documents, accounts and analyses. (…)  
Our enterprise covers dozens of volumes. We wish that our work enables to keep safe for 
history the biggest possible part of Solidarity’s truth, not just of its highlights, but also of its 
nadirs. We want to protect from oblivion and destruction all our preserved documents and we ask 
for help in their gathering. 
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Remember ─by contributing with Archiwum “Solidarności” to the extent of your possibilities 
you save a portion of truth, you open a breach in a system that coerces us with lies.1137 
 
These introductory paragraphs condense many of Polish opposition intellectuals’ 
perceptions about past and present we have analyzed in this research. Firstly, the 
authors of the “Note” carve out a niche for Solidarity in history by linking it both with 
older and newer traditions (Catholicism, European ethos, non-violence principles1138), 
as well as with previous revolts (Polish 1956, Budapest, Prague…), but also by insisting 
on its pioneering character in size, organization, duration and degree of success. Thus, 
they inserted the Union in a historical discourse through a combination of continuity 
and change features.  
Secondly, one may also spot in these words the result of another combination of 
complementary elements: that of hope and fear. Through their opposition activities, 
inteligenci eventually recovered their agency and became aware of their historicity. This 
intertwined with the acute sense of danger and the fear of destruction that pervaded their 
spirits, making them not only aware of the fact that everything was yet possible 
(Jetztzeit), but also of the mortal peril that lay ahead if the “winners” got the chance to 
strike back again. That was the great difference, according to Archiwum “Solidarności” 
members, between the 1980 experience and previous Polish revolts, in which the 
lessons of the past had not been taken on account (eg. December 1970 during June 1976 
protests).  
As a consequence, on this occasion oppositionists thought ahead of their times 
and elaborated historical discourses and/or databases about their own movements and 
present-day affairs, like Archiwum “Solidarności”, in order to frustrate Communist 
authorities’ attempts to crush their movements and master their history and memory 
1984-like, that is, with a view to distorting or erasing them from the country’s annals. 
This way, Polish oppositionists rendered a superior hermeneutical meaning to their 
actions, and Solidarność’s experience was set as an example and an inspiration for 
others in the conviction that it had contributed (and still did) to alter the course of 
history in Poland and beyond. But this was not just something that a large Trade Union 
or opposition movement could do. Actually, it all depended on the sum of efforts of 
individuals. Each anonymous person had to retrieve his/her podmiotowość and be 
conscious that they could also help to change things, for example by contributing to the 
documentary project and funding of Archiwum “Solidarności”1139.  
The editors tried to involve their readers in this task alluding to another 
fundamental pillar of intellectual opposition’s self-perception: truth. Closely linked to 
authenticity and trust, the truth was seen by intellectuals as a crucial identity element to 
differ from Communist power (characterized in opposition narratives by deception and 
manipulation) and therefore to keep holding an alternative moral leadership among 
Polish society. Hence their intention of recounting everything about Solidarność, 
including its darkest hours. It was preferable to share and build together the truth than to 
hush it up and provide a powerful weapon to political enemies. Solidarity opened a 
novel socio-political field of action in Communist Poland and, due to this, had to face 
new problems, situations and crises, so it was important for oppositionists to 
acknowledge and learn from their mistakes in order not to commit them again.   
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Lastly, in connection to the historicization process, the accounts and sources 
provided by Archiwum “Solidarności” dealt mainly with socio-political aspects, 
decision-making processes and fundamental texts issued by or related to Solidarity. It 
was not an easy task to gather or write up that kind of material, one of its members 
argued, because “the Poles only write poetry willingly”. He/she added that their Team 
was looking for volunteer authors who wanted to write monographs about Solidarność 
in different regions and about other independent movements, like the peasants’, with a 
view to preparing regional chronologies of events of Solidarity’s sixteen months of 
legal existence, as well as a few biographical dictionaries of the Union’s local leaders. 
However, this person complained, the accounts they received basically contained 
“unimportant” details and much emotional and personal information instead of focusing 
on the crucial events that had taken place in the country. In general, underground 
publishing houses preferred other kinds of genres or more controversial and 
sensationalist topics. Perhaps collecting and cataloguing papers and tapes of opposition 
movements in an orderly and rational way was a duller and less profitable job than 
writing memories or publicystyka, the participants in Archiwum “Solidarności” 
admitted, but it was certainly fundamental to give a sense to their history and to prevent 
it from falling into oblivion. Rather than to average readers, their volumes of collected 
documents and accounts were addressed primarily to historians, social scientists and 
politicians, both from the West and, hopefully, from Poland and other Eastern Bloc 
countries in the near future, and were only sent abroad as tamizdat once they had been 
previously analyzed and arranged by their Team1140.  
In the light of all this, we may conclude that the members Archiwum 
“Solidarności”, basing themselves in clear and restrictive selection criteria, plus 
convinced about their rigor and impartiality, produced documents-truths (actually 
documents-monuments) about Solidarity’s (immediate) past destined to an international 
intellectual minority. Its arranged volumes were conceived as the groundwork that 
would enable the eventual study of the phenomenon of Solidarity and its comparison 
with similar opposition organizations around the world. It was, in sum, an erudite 
expression of the change in the mastery of national historical narratives that was taking 
place in Poland since the emergence of KOR. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
In search of the best past for a better future 
 
 
Throughout this research we have analyzed some of the perceptions and concerns 
that Polish opposition intellectuals, spurred on by a pressing need in the present, had 
about their country’s past and the course of time in general. 
Resorting to a theoretical background on myths, Eastern European intelligentsia, 
opposition to Communism and Walter Benjamin’s Theses “On the Concept of History”, 
we have proven that critical inteligencja’s discourses contain a very particular 
symbiosis of history and politics due to their authors’ double attempt to 
explain/reformulate the past and to understand the present situation with a view to 
changing it. 
In Chapter 1, we analyzed how opposition intellectuals’ self-perception took 
shape through the reassessment of past political stances and the definition of their duties 
in the present. In Chapter 2, we went over inteligencja’s views about the Polish nation 
“beyond” and “throughout” time ─that is, understood as a century-old tradition of 
ethical behaviors or cluster of values, on one hand (what the nation is, should aspire to, 
isn’t and shouldn’t be), and in terms of society’s awareness and agency in the last two 
hundred years, on the other (development, misuse, loss, recovery…). In Chapter 3, we 
studied how intellectuals further defined Poland’s ethos and tried to reorient some of the 
Poles’ most usual opinions and attitudes by revisiting and reflecting on Polish historical 
relations with Russia and the West, with a special emphasis on the question of 
(co)responsibility. Lastly, in Chapter 4 we approached the ways in which inteligenci 
perceived history and time, such as the conjunction of cyclic and lineal or the pioneer 
issue, and we demonstrated that the topics of hope and helplessness, power and 
responsibility, posterity and search for truth, plus the gathering, writing and publication 
of documents related to opposition activities, can be regarded as different outcomes or 
materializations of historical consciousness and historicization of present time, whether 
deliberate or unconscious. 
In the light of this, we have come up with the following transversal conclusions 
about Polish opposition inteligencja’s self-perceptions and discourses on the past: 
 
I. Historical discourses enabled Polish critical intellectuals to define themselves 
and their nation in opposition to the communist regime. This was achieved fol-
lowing various interconnected paths1141: 
 
1) Assumption of mythical role 
 
Feeling endangered due to their double commitment (professional and 
oppositional), critical intellectuals assumed in their narratives the mythical role 
traditionally attributed to inteligencja in Poland, characterized above all by its trans-
ideological nature and sense of national duty. A social role that, additionally, they also 
believed was being challenged by PRL authorities. 
This self-assigned mission entailed an engagement with the nation’s problems and 
needs plus the encouragement of collective awareness through different fields of 
                                                 
1141
 Besides already mentioned theoretical works, this division was partially inspired as well in Ricoeur: 
“Myth and History”, 275-277. 
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education and art, including history. In other words, inteligenci were to guide and 
advise the rest of the Poles, or even decide what should be done.   
As self-appointed spiritual leaders and representatives of the Polish nation, the 
majority of their ruminations dealt at bottom with ethics, authenticity or the search for 
truth ─which is not strange if we consider that myths are an expression of transhistorical 
values, a behavior pattern and a moral guide in times of misfortune. One way or 
another, morality was a top priority in their world view, not only because it helped them 
give a consistent meaning to their past and present decisions, but also because it secured 
them social support and contributed to preserve their authority in face of a discredited 
political system. 
The fact that opposition inteligencja tried to locate itself within historical 
continuity through its discourses rendered further meaning and purposefulness to its 
stances. Moreover, by appropriating the custody and evaluation of national (and 
especially immaterial) heritage, it consciously performed a “tiger’s leap into the past” to 
become the tacitly authorized (re)interpreter of former knowledge and, at the same time, 
its transmission belt.  
 
 
2) A combat against oblivion, or history writing as a hermeneutical weapon 
against the “winners”. 
 
Defying official historical policies and repression, Polish intellectuals engaged in 
a fight against oblivion in their historical narratives. It was carried out in two ways: by 
retrieving past failures and by reminding about society’s greatest feats, understood 
materially and/or morally. This had to do, in the first place, with the vindication of 
forgotten or defeated traditions despised by authorities (like Abramowski’s, the “Golden 
Age” and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, May 3rd Constitution…) and, in the 
second place, with what inteligenci regarded as the ups and downs of consciousness, 
empowerment and agency due to oppression (nineteenth-and early twentieth-century 
flare-ups and spreading of national awareness, Warsaw Ghetto and Warsaw Uprisings’ 
“pointlessness”, the establishment of the Communist regime and following protests…) 
─a process that, in their opinion, reached an unprecedented triumph quantitatively and 
qualitatively speaking with the Gdańsk Agreements and the formation of Solidarity, 
despite further setbacks.  
 
 
3) History revisited as a “useful past”.  
 
In their effort to know how to confront communist power and work in favor of the 
Polish nation and their own interests, intellectual oppositionists turned to history for 
inspiration, guidance and justifications as well, either for themselves as members of 
inteligencja or for society in general ─though both are closely connected due to 
previously-stated reasons.  
Through the reconsideration of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century clash 
between idealism and realism, for instance, many of them developed various balanced 
or conciliatory formulae with a view to preserving the best of both traditions. 
Nevertheless, such operation was restricted to general attitudes, stances and modi 
operandi: it was not destined to copy specific political ideologies or procedures, such as 
those present in the Second Republic.    
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On the other hand, it was crucial to determine what Poland was and was not, what 
it should aspire to and what it shouldn’t be. Usually, the ethos of the Polish nation was 
defined in terms of values and ideals associated to Western European, Catholic or 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth cultures, of which inteligencja felt particularly fond 
(freedom, human dignity and rights, equality, fraternity, justice, truth, humanism, 
democracy…). In their view, these imponderables had been amplified and kept safe 
owing to experiences of danger and suffering alien to Western Europe, which had 
provided Poles with an insightful vision of reality as well.  
However, there were also social tendencies that raised concerns among some 
inteligenci, like nationalism, xenophobia and violence. On this occasion, to fight against 
oblivion didn’t mean to face communist “winners”, but the Poles’ own “obliviousness” 
and reticence to admit their share of responsibility in history. It was essential too to do 
away with harmful ideas, myths or prejudices that acted as burdens and prevented 
society from moving forward, such as hatred towards Russia, Yalta or the repeated 
treason of the West for not aiding Poland when in need (“myth of the West”). To 
remind about and acknowledge Polish misconceptions, misdeeds and mistakes was the 
first step towards leaving them behind and not repeating them. This was taken further 
by intellectuals through the promotion of tolerance and pluralism (supplying historical 
examples), education and comprehension (supplying historical explanations), plus 
empowerment (supplying advice). Far from vindicating anything, as in the previous 
point, it was about expiating guilt and acquiring a better knowledge of things to enable 
redemption.   
Conversely, one of the most noteworthy theses within inteligenci’s counter-
hegemonic discourses was the Manichaean antagonism between the Polish nation and 
the State apparatus, which is explained and justified using historical and linguistic 
arguments in order to transmit a strong and clear message of nonconformity and 
resistance. Sometimes, this opposition overlapped or blended with others, such as Polish 
nation-Communism, or Polishness-Russianness, the latter not being completely denied 
even by the most open-minded intellectuals, who regarded the national ethos of their 
neighbors as half-European, half-Asian at best. 
 Focused on which aspects of the past must be “brought back” to the present and 
which should be discarded, this reassessment of Polish history in inteligencja’s 
discourses contained mystification and demystification in varying degrees.  
On the one hand, inteligencja was not just a myth in itself, but also a producer of 
mythical narratives. Accordingly, its historical works are dotted with other nineteenth-
century myths coming from broader Messianic and Insurrection frames, like “the Christ 
of Nations” (Polish leadership of the peoples submitted to the USSR), “the Bulwark of 
Christendom” (reconverted into “the Bulwark of Western European values”, conveying 
endurance) or the “black myth of the West” (loss of values and spirituality).  
On the other hand, intellectuals also fulfilled an enlightenment or educational task 
that involved demystifying. We appreciate it in their endeavors to get rid of the “myth 
of the West” by readjusting the object of Polish pride, hopes and strength. Similarly, the 
“Pole-conspirator” myth and the idea of mission (entailing suffering, death and 
sacrifice, plus resurrection) were nuanced at some points and adapted to the needs of 
present-day context: first, there were to be no more victims if oppositionists could avoid 
it (one could sacrifice oneself, but never others); second, violence should be completely 
ruled out in opposition movements and critical society; thirdly, underground conspiracy 
should not be idealized by oppositionists, in order to prevent a new estrangement from 
the rest of the Poles. The notions of death and resurrection were sublimated into less 
drastic or physical actions, like other forms of repression (eg. jail, censorship, fear), loss 
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of agency, moral debasement… and subsequent retrieval of freedom, courage, 
podmiotowość and morality.  
In Chapter 2 we pointed out that, according to Ewa Domańska, the absence of 
violence during Poland’s transformation involved that the mythical death and rebirth 
cycle (which included sacrifice and spilling of blood) was not totally fulfilled on that 
occasion, remaining strangely incomplete1142. We wondered then whether Polish 
national myths would manage to survive transformacja. Our provisional answer to this 
question (which we will hopefully be able to undertake in future researches) is yes 
─only that some of them will have transformed and probably new ones will take shape 
(perhaps short-lasting, owing to the fact they were generated in times of relative success 
rather than catastrophe?).  
We agree with the idea that “history, as a permanent process of reconsidering the 
past, means that demystification is remystification”1143. Therefore, instead of focusing 
on violent components, Polish intellectuals might as well have tried to start up at some 
point (perhaps already in the 1970s?) a kind of mythical tradition about non-violence, 
“self-limiting revolution” (ideal goals, realistic means) or about the notion that, if united 
and aware, a nation becomes powerful enough to vanquish a foreign, dictatorial state 
(i.e. ultimate success instead of cyclic defeats). As to inteligencja’s own myth, we have 
been able to see along the work that, as long as it’s linked to imponderables, it can 
survive in democratic times. In sum, we venture that what probably took place along the 
transformacja years was merely a transition from some of the “classic” nineteenth-
century myths to more modern and less radical political ones1144, though also 
incarnating a new “beginning” (end of twentieth-century democracy). 
 
 
4) In search of the whys and wherefores. 
 
The quest for causality gives an ethical tone to the course of events and confirms 
the link between history and tragedy1145. Polish opposition intellectuals tried to make 
recent history more intelligible in their narratives and were not afraid of wondering if 
things could have turned out otherwise ─that is, if other pasts would have been possible. 
This was especially so in the case of what were regarded as defeats or setbacks, like the 
establishment of communist regime in Poland (1944-1948) or the implementation of 
Martial Law (December 13th, 1981).  
In the examples we have analyzed, there was a clear need to demand moral 
accountability for Poland’s or Polish opposition’s ordeals, and inteligenci came to the 
conclusion that, in certain adverse historical contexts, the Poles hadn’t actually been 
capable of changing anything despite their efforts and mistakes, and that, quite on the 
contrary, the ball had been in communist authorities’ court, whether Soviet or Polish. 
We can appreciate in opposition’s works, hence, a recurrent ethical discourse 
reproaching the USSR and the communist party for their complete and constant 
unwillingness to change or negotiate, which is also linked to the Manichaean opposition 
of “State vs. nation” or “us vs. them”.  
Polish society couldn’t change anything, except for one thing: how it underwent 
defeat. Either surrendering, or fighting until defeated. That made a crucial moral 
difference for inteligenci.  
                                                 
1142
 Domańska: “(Re)creative Myths…”, 256-257. 
1143
 Strǻth: “Introduction...”, 19, footnote 1. 
1144
 In the line of those described by Ifversen: “Myth in the Writing…”, 456. 
1145
 Also inspired in Ricoeur’s comments on Herodotus: Ricoeur: “Myth and History”, 276. 
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II. Narratives on the past influenced oppositionists’ perception of the present and 
the future, engendering specific forms of reasoning and action.  
 
These forms could be summarized in the conjunction of cyclic and lineal 
perceptions of time (the former with positive and negative connotations, depending if 
considered an endless curse or a new opportunity to succeed), the pioneer issue, the 
feelings of hope and helplessness when standing at the crossroads of history, the notions 
of power and responsibility, the question of posterity and the search for truth, plus the 
gathering, writing and publication of documents related to opposition activities. The 
latter aspect was also directly connected to the aforementioned combat against oblivion, 
spurred on especially since the Martial Law period, when danger was seen as imminent. 
Past injustices were given a meaning from the present (partitions, bad 
governments, foreign interferences, deprivation of agency…) but, conversely, their 
remembrance also gave a meaning to oppositionists’ present and became one more 
reason to protest, as if throughout modern national history there had been, in essence, 
just a single struggle pursuing a single goal: independence and freedom. Past frustrated 
attempts justified a new try, whereas the unparalleled achievements of such try attained 
by opposition movements like KOR or, later, Solidarity, made the past gain a different 
sense due to the feeling of culmination. That is why cyclic and lineal images combined 
in inteligencja’s discourses. 
The key in Polish intellectuals’ mission was to conceive history not as something 
dead and buried, but as something actual, alive, and, most importantly, as an inherent 
quality or right of each individual, therefore shared within society (historicity). By 
erasing the fictitious and misleading barriers separating past, present and future, 
oppositionists tried to demonstrate that history was being written and rewritten 
ceaselessly, and that the Polish nation should have the leading voice (or voices) in its 
modification and plotting from then on. It was fundamental to restore in people the 
senses of hope, empowerment and responsibility to change things. 
Polish opposition’s elaboration of a history of the present, plus the ensuing 
production and collection of sources, was a sociopolitical and hermeneutical 
counteraction based on or inspired in positivistic premises which, in the dissidents’ 
case, stemmed from a shared experience of discovery of truth ─that is to say, of the 
repressive and deceitful character of the PRL regime they had previously supported. 
Such intellectual realization transcended inteligencja’s professional or academic spheres 
and led to (or justified) a firmer political stance and oppositional activity, in order to 
prevent a similar distortion of present time ─and thus of the development of opposition 
movements and their own biographies─ by communist authorities in the future. 
The “anticipation of history” caused by the process of historical awareness and its 
offspring, historicization of present time, turned oppositionists into the masters of the 
historical narratives of the future: their version of the history of 1945-1990 period, and 
especially of 1976-1989, would prevail over communists’.  
 
 
III. The purposes of inteligencja’s discourses on the past were to unite, liberate 
and embolden. 
 
In connection to the traditional, mythical duties attributed to intelligentsia, Polish 
oppositionists aimed, in the first place, to unite Polish society in pursuit of a common 
goal: that of putting an end to PRL regime and democratizing a free and independent 
country. Despite their differences of opinion in politics, historical interpretations or 
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socio-economic organization, plus their diverse backgrounds, they spoke the same 
language and transmitted shared images of Poland’s past and present situation through 
their writings and interventions, contributing to a feeling of cohesion. In other words, 
they preferred to concentrate on general, inclusive aspects and transhistorical values in 
order to favor an atmosphere of consensus and cooperation among people and convey 
an image of strength and purposefulness. 
In the second place, intellectuals sought to “liberate” the Poles, which involved, 
among other things, the acknowledgment and expiation of past guilt, the overcoming of 
harmful historical perceptions and the emancipation from previous spiritual 
dependences.  
In the third and last place, Polish inteligencja wanted to remind its fellow 
countrymen about their own strength as a nation and instill in them the courage they 
needed to take an active stand in the struggle for a better future. 
 
As modern, platonic demiurges, inteligenci breathed historical awareness, agency 
and self-confidence into Poles to convince them that, all together, they were capable not 
only of overturning PRL regime, but of doing so in a peaceful way.  
In sum, with their reflections on history and time, Polish opposition intellectuals 
back in 1976-1991 offered a personal and critical approach as to who Poles had been and 
could become as a nation, and resumed inteligencja’s mythical, Promethean mission of 
guiding their country towards better days in moments of hardship.  
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